Opinion
Civ. No. JFM-98-2535.
July 20, 1999.
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff, Aaron Pulley, has brought this action against defendants, The May Department Stores Company t/a Hecht's and Hecht's Department Stores (collectively "Hecht's"), alleging false imprisonment, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Hecht's has filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion will be granted.
I.
On July 24, 1997, Pulley was working for the Hecht's store in Owings Mills Mall in the Men's Polo Department. He was eighteen years old at the time. A customer asked him for a shopping bag for his hat, and placed his hat and some socks in the bag. There is a dispute as to whether the socks came from a Hecht's counter or were being carried by the customer in his pants pockets. According to Pulley, he recognized the socks as coming from an athletic store in the mall. After the customer left Pulley's department, Pulley called the security office to advise them that the customer had acted suspiciously and would be returning with a credit card number. The security office told him that they would keep an eye on the situation and thanked him for reporting the matter. They did not give Pulley further instructions.
Where facts are in dispute, they are stated most favorably to Pulley, the non-moving party.
The customer returned later that day with a credit card number written on a piece of paper. Pulley was required to call the credit department in order to complete the purchase transaction. When the credit department asked for the customer's mother's maiden name, the customer could not provide the information and left the store.
One week later, on July 31, 1997, Kathryn Johnson, the human resources manager at Hecht's, told Pulley that security wanted to talk to him. Pulley entered the security office room with two security officers, William Atwell and Scott Krause. Both of the officers were physically large men, and one sat in front of Pulley and one sat behind him. They told Pulley that he could leave the room at any time, but told him that it was not advisable for him to do so. They questioned Pulley for more than two hours about whether he had allowed or assisted friends in stealing merchandise from Hecht's. At one point, Atwell raised his voice. During the interview, after being pressured by Atwell, Pulley said that the socks that the customer had placed in the shopping bag were Hecht's socks rather than socks form the athletic store.
Atwell told Pulley that if he would sign a written statement admitting to certain points, he could keep his job and the statement would just be placed in a file. Pulley did so, even though he felt that some of the information included in the statement was not true. The statement included: (1) that he had observed the customer take socks from the register and place them in a bag; (2) that at least once or twice a week his friends would tell him that they were coming into the store to steal merchandise, and he would not notify security; and (3) that he had been treated fairly by the security officers. Pulley also signed a promissory note agreeing to repay $325.00 for stolen merchandise.
After the security meeting, Johnson told Pulley to go home for the day. Later that day, she called him and informed him that he had been terminated. Pulley alleges that Johnson told his former co-workers that he was fired for stealing. He has since lost touch with his former co-workers. Pulley found another job approximately two weeks after being dismissed from Hecht's.
II. A.
False imprisonment is the deprivation of plaintiff's liberty without his consent and without legal justification. See Great Atl. Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 261 A.2d 731, 737 (Md. 1970). Pulley admitted that while he was working in the Men's Polo Department on July 31, 1997, Johnson asked him to walk with her, and he responded "Sure." She led him to the security office, where he was told that he could leave, and that he was not required to participate in the interview. Pulley testified that Atwell told him "that he wanted to ask me a series of questions — and that this is voluntary, I guess, and that I am not obligated to — I guess I am not obligated to stay." Pulley suggests that because the security officers were large in stature, he felt that he could not leave the room. He did not, however, allege that the security officers acted in any way to prevent him from exiting the room. He also testified that he remained in the room because he wanted to keep his job. Pulley stated that Atwell raised his voice at one point, demanding to know what happened when merchandise was stolen.
Pulley argues that although he initially consented to speaking with the security officers, the two-hour interview exceed the scope of his consent. However, Pulley never indicated to Atwell or Krause that he wished to withdraw his consent. He did not ask to leave the room or to take a break, and he did not ask to make any phone calls.
Under these facts, it is impossible for Pulley to succeed on a claim of false imprisonment. Pulley consented to be questioned by the security officers. He may have subjectively felt that he could not leave the room due to his fear that he would lose his job. However, that is insufficient as a matter of law to support a claim for false imprisonment. See, e.g., Johnson v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1282, 1284 (D. Md. 1989) ("The restraint that resulted simply from plaintiff's fear of losing his job is insufficient as a matter of law to make out a claim of false imprisonment."), aff'd 927 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1991); Faniel v. Chesapeake Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 404 A.2d 147, 152 (D.C.Ct.App. 1979) ("[F]ear of losing one's job, although a powerful incentive, does not render involuntary the behavior induced.").
B.
Pulley's claim for slander is based on his testimony that his aunt told him that his former co-workers told her that Johnson told them Pulley was fired for stealing. This testimony involves two layers of hearsay and is thus not admissible for the purposes of this motion. See Fed.R.Evid. 801, 802. Plaintiff has presented no direct testimony from his aunt or his former co-workers. The only admissible evidence on Johnson's allegedly slanderous comment is her own affidavit stating that she never told anyone Pulley was fired for stealing. Therefore, the slander claim must fail as well.
C.
The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are as follows: (1) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be severe. See Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977). A plaintiff must prove each of the four elements in order to succeed. Pulley is unable, as a matter of law, to prove that he suffered severe emotional distress. He claims that his friendships with his former co-workers suffered as a result of his firing. Pulley also testified that he suffered the stress of finding another job at a time when he was about to start college and had to make car payments. Additionally, he felt that Atwell's raising his voice scared him and caused him emotional damage.
Pulley admits that he has not sought any sort of medical, psychiatric, or psychological assistance as a result of this incident. He has not claimed that he was unable to function or attend to necessary matters; in fact, he found a job within two weeks of his questioning and discharge by Hecht's and has had no problem finding other jobs since then. Maryland law requires a more severe response to defendants' conduct. See, e.g., Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 625 A.2d 959, 964-65 (Md. 1993) (feeling sad, ashamed, and unable to socialize as much as before not sufficiently severe when plaintiff continued his normal activities); Harris, 380 A.2d at 617 (feeling humiliated, "shaken up," and "like going into a hole [to] hide" not sufficiently severe emotional distress); Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 502 A.2d 1057, 1064-65 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1986) ("[Plaintiff's] ego was bruised and her dignity was bent, but neither was destroyed.").
D.
Pulley's final claim is for conspiracy to violate his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. In order to succeed on such a claim, Pulley must show "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). Pulley has not alleged such animus, much less presented evidence of it. Even assuming that he could prove such intent on the part of defendants, Pulley has failed to show that he was deprived of a civil right. He claims to have been deprived of his liberty, but his own evidence indicated that he consented to the questioning.
For these reasons, defendants' motion will be granted. A separate order to that effect is being entered.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the memorandum entered herewith, it is, this 20th day of July, 1999
ORDERED that
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted; and
2. Judgment is entered in favor of defendants against plaintiff.