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finding that Rooker–Feldman deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint where the “Plaintiff request[ed] that th[e] Court restore his lost Thursday night visitations because he [wa]s unsatisfied with the outcome of the custody proceeding that left Plaintiff with ‘four nights out of every ten’ with his son”
Summary of this case from Graham v. City of New YorkOpinion
05 CV 2293 (SJ).
July 14, 2006
PETER C. LOMTEVAS, P.C. Ozone Park, New York, By: Peter C. Lomtevas, Esq., Attorney for Plaintiff.
ELIOT SPITZER Attorney General of the State of New York New York, New York, By: Anthony Tomari, Esq. Attorney for Defendants Hemalee J. Patel, Esq., The Honorable Rachel A. Adams, New York State Unified Court System, Office of Court Administration.
KAUFMAN BORGEEST RYAN, LLP New York, New York By: A. Michael Furman, Esq. Attorney for Defendant Cynthia Ann Lee, Esq.
OHRENSTEIN BROWN, LLP New York, New York By: Christopher Hitchcock, Esq. Attorney for Defendant Michael Anthony Barone, Esq.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Eric Puletti ("Plaintiff") brings this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Honorable Rachel A. Adams ("Judge Adams"), court attorney Hemalee J. Patel, Esq. ("Patel"), the New York State Unified Court System, Office of Court Administration ("OCA") (collectively, the "State Defendants"), as well as law guardian Cynthia Ann Lee, Esq. ("Lee") and Michael Anthony Barone, Esq. ("Barone") (all defendants hereinafter "Defendants"). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, in reducing Plaintiff's custody time with his son during a state court proceeding, conspired to violate and did violate Plaintiff's rights under the First, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (the "Federal Claims"), as well as under Section 12 of Article 1 of the New York state constitution (the "State Claim").
Though Plaintiff also makes references to his wife, Maria Puletti ("Mrs. Puletti"), as "Defendant." (Compl. ¶¶ 12-14, 18, 23; Pl.'s Aff. Supp. Compl. ¶ "Fourth"), because Mrs. Puletti is not named as a defendant in Plaintiff's Complaint, Mrs. Puletti is not considered to be a defendant in this case.
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Rule 12(b)(1) Motion"), and a Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Rule 12(b)(6) Motion"), by the State Defendants and Lee. Barone also moves for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Rule 12(c) Motion") (collectively, the "Motions"). Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter under both the "Domestic Relations" exception and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Additionally, Defendants argue that, even if the Court has jurisdiction, the claims must fail on the grounds of immunity and lack of state action.
See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
Lee and Barone also state that, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting a malpractice claim against them, dismissal is appropriate because Defendants owe no duty of care to Plaintiff. (Barone's Answer ¶ 49; Lee's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss ("Lee's Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Dismiss") 8-11.) Barone also argues for dismissal under theories of estoppel, waiver, unclean hands, laches, the "Colorado River" doctrine,Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), and the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. (Barone's Answer ¶¶ 50, 53; Barone's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Barone's Mem. Law Supp. Mot. J. Pleadings") 10-12.) The Court need not address the merits of these additional arguments as the Court finds dismissal of the Complaint is appropriate on alternative grounds. Alvarado v. Kerrigan, 152 F.Supp. 2d 350, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
For the reasons stated below, the Court finds Plaintiff's Complaint is, in essence, an attempt to have this Court improperly review the state court decision regarding the custody arrangement for Plaintiff's son. As such, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, even if jurisdiction did exist, the doctrines of immunity and state action would warrant dismissal. Accordingly, the Rule 12(b)(1) Motion, the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, and the Rule 12(c) Motion are GRANTED in their entirety.
BACKGROUND
While considering the Motions to Dismiss, the Court must accept the facts set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint as true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff.See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch Co., Inc., 396 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2005); National Group for Commc'n and Computers Ltd. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 253, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
On December 23, 2004, Plaintiff initiated a divorce action against Mrs. Puletti in New York State Supreme Court, Richmond County ("State Supreme Court"). (Compl. ¶ 10.) A preliminary conference was scheduled for January 21, 2005. (Compl. ¶ 11.) While the preliminary conference was pending, however, Mrs. Puletti filed a motion pendente lite in January 2005 in the State Supreme Court. (Compl. ¶ 12.) Although the Complaint is unclear, Mrs. Puletti apparently charged Plaintiff with some form of abuse in her motion. (Compl. ¶ 13.) On February 24, 2005, Plaintiff, represented by his former attorney, and Mrs. Puletti, represented by Barone, appeared before Judge Adams for a hearing. (Compl. ¶ 14.) At the hearing, Judge Adams directed the parties to join her court attorney, Patel, in a conference room to discuss the matter. Id.
During this conference, there was a discussion involving the custody of the parties' son, Eric Puletti, Jr. ("Puletti, Jr."). (Compl. ¶ 17.) Mrs. Puletti "demanded more time with the child," and "harped on the notion" that the current arrangement is too unstable for their son. (Compl. ¶¶ 17-18.) In protest, Plaintiff responded that the parties' allocation of time with Puletti, Jr. was completely equal, with Plaintiff having visitation every Tuesday night and Thursday night and alternating weekends. (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 20.) Shortly after, Patel intervened, looked at Plaintiff and told him to "be quiet" and that he had better come to some compromise. (Compl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff, in turn, questioned Patel as to why Plaintiff had to compromise since the parties had equal time with their son. (Compl. ¶ 20.) At this point, Patel pointed at Plaintiff and said "[i]f you don't compromise, I'll bring in a [l]aw [g]uardian." (Compl. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff, intimidated by the possibility of losing more time with his son and having another party become involved in the proceeding, agreed to Mrs. Puletti's terms and "reluctantly gave up his Thursday night visitation[s] with his son." (Compl. ¶¶ 23-24, 29.) Notwithstanding Plaintiff's concession, Patel subsequently selected Lee to serve as law guardian for Puletti, Jr. (Compl. ¶ 29.) Lee's appointment was placed in an order signed by Judge Adams and Plaintiff was further ordered to pay the retainer fee for Lee's services. (Compl. ¶¶ 29-30).
On May 11, 2005, Plaintiff commenced the present action seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff maintains that he was the subject of several acts of intimidation, coercion and compulsion during the course of the above-described custody proceeding. With few particulars, Plaintiff's Complaint seems to assert three claims for relief. First, Plaintiff claims a conspiracy to violate, along with the substantive violations, of his due process rights. The due process claim rests on the argument that Defendants caused and allowed for Plaintiff's loss of Thursday night visitations even though Defendants could have prevented it. (Compl. ¶ 34).
Second, Plaintiff claims a conspiracy to violate, as well as the substantive violations, of his right to associate with his child, in violation of the First Amendment. (Compl. ¶ 38.) Lastly, Plaintiff alleges a deprivation of "rights, remedies, privileges and immunities" under Section 12 of Article 1 of the New York state constitution. (Compl. ¶ 44.) Defendants' alleged practice of "implementing, promulgating, and continuing to enforce and/or effectuate a policy, practice and custom pursuant to which equal parenting time is quashed, replaced by `sole' custodial arrangements, and the appoint[ment] of [l]aw [g]uardians to effectuate said plan" form the basis for Plaintiff's State Claim. (Compl. ¶ 43).
Alternatively, Plaintiff's Complaint states that his right to associate is embodied in the concept of "liberty," as that term is used in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. (Compl. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff seems to also be attempting to articulate an Equal Protection claim in alleging that Defendants abridged his "rights to enjoy equal parenting time with his son," and a Ninth Amendment claim. (Compl. ¶¶ 38, 39.) To the extent that these are independent claims, they lack sufficient supporting facts and therefore are without merit.
Plaintiff seeks the following relief: (1) a judgment declaring that "Defendants' actions taking away Plaintiff's parenting time were in violation of Plaintiffs federal constitutional rights and contrary to New York state law"; (2) an order enjoining "Defendants' policies, practices and customs of gerrymandering custodial arrangements of matrimonial litigants by intimidation or by coercion"; (3) an order enjoining Defendants from "manipulating custodial arrangements of matrimonial litigants"; (4) a judgment "directing that [Plaintiff's] lost time [with Puletti, Jr.] be returned;" (5) a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from continuing to violate the Plaintiffs constitutional rights; (6) compensatory damages against each Defendant in the amount of two million dollars ($2,000,000); (7) exemplary and punitive damages against each Defendant in the amount of two million dollars ($2,000,000); and (8) reasonable costs and attorney's fees. (Compl. ¶¶ 49-58).
The Court has renumbered the "Relief Requested" section in Plaintiff's Complaint for the purposes of uniformity and consistency.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I. Motion to Dismiss, Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must "accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint," but may not draw any "argumentative inferences favorable to the party asserting jurisdiction." Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Balfour Maclaine Int'l Ltd., 968 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The Court, however, may "refer to evidence outside the pleadings." Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Kamen v. American Tel. Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that "evidentiary matter may be presented by affidavit or otherwise" under a Rule 12(b)(1) motion)). The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Id. (citation omitted).
II. Motion to Dismiss, Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
With a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court should not dismiss a case "`unless it appears beyond all doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Dangler v. New York City Off Track Betting Corp., 193 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "is to look only to the allegations of the complaint and any documents attached to or incorporated by reference in the complaint, to assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and to view all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such allegations and documents" in the plaintiff's favor.Id. at 138 (citations omitted).
III. Motion to Dismiss, Pursuant to Rule 12(c)
On a motion to dismiss on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), the Court should apply the "same standard as that applicable to a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)." Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). In addition, the standard is "`applied with particular strictness when the plaintiff complains of a civil rights violation.'" Id. at 150 (quoting Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991)).
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction Over the Federal Claims
As previously stated, Defendants challenge subject matter jurisdiction in this Court. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction cannot lie "where the Constitution and Congress have not" conferred it. Wynn v. AC Rochester, 273 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113 ("A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it."). Thus, before considering the merits of the Motions, the Court must first examine whether it, in fact, has subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claims.
A. The "Domestic Relations" Exception to Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Each Defendant seeks dismissal on the ground that the "Domestic Relations" exception bars this Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the present case. The United States Supreme Court (the "Supreme Court") has long recognized that "the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States." In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890). "So strong is [the Supreme Court's] deference to state law in this area that [the Supreme Court has] recognized a `domestic relations exception' that `divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.'"Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12-13 (2004) (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992)).
Moreover, even if subject matter jurisdiction exists over a particular matrimonial action, federal courts should abstain from entertaining such actions in light of sound policy considerations. See Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704 (noting that "state courts are more eminently suited to work of this type than are federal courts which lack the close association with state and local government organizations dedicated to handling issues that arise out of conflicts over divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees"); American Airlines v. Block, 905 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[A] federal court presented with matrimonial issues or issues `on the verge' of being matrimonial in nature should abstain from exercising jurisdiction" if state courts are available for a full and fair adjudication). Thus, district courts will "dismiss civil rights actions aimed at changing the results of domestic proceedings, including orders of child custody." Elmasri v. England, 111 F. Supp. 2d 212, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff here is asking this Court to review the result of a portion of his custody proceeding before Judge Adams. Attempting to argue to the contrary, Plaintiff states that he "is not moving his divorce to the doors of this Court" but is merely "recovering for parenting time lost via an unconstitutional deprivation of parenting time. . . ." (Plaintiff's Affidavit in Opposition to State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Aff. Opp'n State Defs.' Mot. Dismiss") ¶ "Ninth.") However characterized, Plaintiff's constitutional claims are "directly related" to the custody proceeding, and resolution of Plaintiff's claims would force this Court to "re-examine and re-interpret all the evidence brought before the state court in the domestic relations proceedings. [This] is not the role of this Court."McArthur v. Bell, 788 F. Supp. 706, 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (citations omitted). Moreover, Plaintiff has made no showing as to why the New York state appellate courts are not available fora for Plaintiff for a full and fair adjudication of his claims. Thus, the "Domestic Relations" exception requires dismissal of the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Defendants assert that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine also independently deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the federal district courts generally lack any authority to review the final judgments of state courts. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476; Elmasri, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 218. To assert jurisdiction under this circumstance "would be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction," with which district courts are not vested, as appellate review is vested solely in the Supreme Court. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1, 24 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring). Constitutional claims presented in district court that are "inextricably intertwined" with state court judgments are also prohibited. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, n. 16; Elmasri, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 218. A federal claim "is inextricably intertwined" with the state-court judgment if "the federal claims succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it." Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 25 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they are nothing more than an attempt to have this Court overturn the state court stipulation concerning the custody arrangement for Puletti, Jr. Plaintiff argues that theRooker-Feldman doctrine is inapposite because he does not seek a comment or reversal of the state court ruling, but rather only "seeks redress concerning an alleged Constitutional violation of his right to be a parent to his child according to an arrangement reached between him and his divorcing spouse." (Pl.'s Aff. Opp'n State Defs.' Mot. Dismiss ¶ "Eighth.") This argument is unpersuasive. Although Plaintiff characterizes his claims in this Court as constitutional claims, it is clear these claims are, at a minimum, "inextricably intertwined" with the state court judgment. Among other requested remedies, Plaintiff requests that this Court restore his lost Thursday night visitations because he is unsatisfied with the outcome of the custody proceeding that left Plaintiff with "four nights out of every ten" with his son.Id. To do so, this Court would have to conclude that the state court ruling was wrong; thus, "it is difficult to conceive the federal proceedings as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment." Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 25 (Marshall, J., concurring). For this reason, theRooker-Feldman doctrine also requires that this Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. The Complaint Would Be Dismissed for Failure to State a Cognizable Claim
Even if the Court had subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff's Complaint is devoid of any cognizable causes of action and therefore could not survive Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c) Motions.
A. Lack of State Action
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides, in part, that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." To state a claim under § 1983. a plaintiff must (1) establish that he or she was deprived of a federally protected right by the defendants and (2) establish that the defendants' action were taken under color of state law. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). The "under-color-of-state-law" requirement in a § 1983 action "excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful." Id. at 50 (citations and internal quotations omitted). To determine whether a person is a state actor, a court will look at "the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits; whether the actor is performing a traditionally government function; and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority." Storck v. Suffolk County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 927, 939 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (citations omitted). Additionally, "when considering the state action requirement of a court appointed representative, courts focus on whether the duty of the person appointed runs to the state or the individual client." Id. at 941.
Plaintiff's § 1983 claim with respect to Lee and Barone would not survive a motion to dismiss because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Lee and Barone are state actors. It has been held that law guardians, "although appointed by the court, exercise independent professional judgment in the interests of the clients they represent and are therefore not state actors for purposes of Section 1983." Id. (citations omitted). Thus, Lee's status as a court appointed law guardian to Puletti, Jr., alone, is insufficient to render her a state actor. Likewise, Barone, who was acting as Mrs. Puletti's attorney, is also not a state actor. At all times, Barone acted as a private attorney exercising judgments in his clients intcrests in connection with the state court custody proceeding. See Elmasri, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 221. Accordingly, the Court finds that neither Lee nor Barone are state actors; therefore, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them would fail.
B. Failure to Plead a § 1983 Conspiracy Claim
Although state action is necessary for a § 1983 claim, "[p]rivate individuals who are not state actors may nonetheless be liable under § 1983 if they have conspired with or engaged in joint activity with state actors." Storck, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 940; see also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980) ("[T]o act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes does not require that the defendant be an officer of the State.");Annuziato v. The Gan. Inc., 744 F.2d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Private parties may incur liability for their conduct when the individual actor is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Moreover, a private individual may still be liable for a § 1983 conspiracy "even if the state actor is immune from liability."Storck, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 940 (citing Sparks, 449 U.S. at 27-28). "Thus, a private individual claiming immunity who is charged with conspiring with a state actor must establish his own basis for invoking an immunity defense." Id.
Notwithstanding the fact that Lee and Barone are not state actors, of course, they could still be liable under a conspiracy theory. However, conspiracy claims that "are nothing more than broad, simple, and conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983." Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Storck, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 940 (stating that a § 1983 conspiracy claim cannot make vague or conclusory allegations, but rather, "must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in which were reasonably related to the promotion of the alleged conspiracy") (citations and internal quotations omitted). Here, Plaintiff's conspiracy allegations are conclusory and tenuous, at best. Throughout his Complaint, Plaintiff states that "Defendants have conspired among themselves" to deprive him of his parenting time and "failed to prevent one another from doing so." (Compl. ¶¶ 35, 40, 44.) Other than these vague references, the Complaint fails to allege any facts to support Plaintiff's assertions. For this reason, Plaintiff's Complaint lacks the specificity required to state a § 1983 conspiracy claim, McArthur, 788 F. Supp. at 711. Therefore, this claim could not survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c).
C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity for State Agencies
Plaintiff's Complaint also would not survive a motion to dismiss as to OCA because the immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment would preclude Plaintiff's claims against OCA for compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees, and injunctive relief.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const., Amend. XI. It is well established that the Eleventh Amendment has been construed to bar private suits against an unconsenting State in "federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2001). This sovereign immunity "represents a real limitation on the federal courts' federal-question jurisdiction." Idaho v. Coeur d'Arlene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997). Additionally, Eleventh Amendment immunity is an available defense regardless of whether a plaintiff is seeking monetary damages or injunctive relief. McGuinty, 251 F.3d at 91.
Of course, immunity can be waived if a State provides unequivocal consent to being sued. Halderman, 465 U.S. at 99-100 (citations omitted).
Congress does have the limited authority to abrogate sovereign immunity. To do so, "a statute enacted by Congress must (1) unequivocally express Congress' intent to abrogate state immunity and (2) act under a valid exercise of power." Bland v. New York, 263 F. Supp. 2d 526, 534 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Halderman, 465 U.S. at 99; see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449, n. 2, 452 (1976) (finding Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 contains explicit language authorizing private actions against state and local governments); cf. Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Welfare Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973) (noting that, because there is no clear language that Congress intended the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1983, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201- 219, to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, courts therefore cannot "infer that Congress . . . desired silently to deprive the States of an immunity they have long enjoyed").
In certain instances, "there may be a question . . . whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State." Halderman, 465 U.S. at 100. When this question arises, "[i]t is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment." Id. (citations omitted). But even when the State is not explicitly named as a party to the action, a suit may still be barred by the Eleventh Amendment if a suit seeks to impose liability that must be paid by public funds drawn from the State's treasury. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663 (citations omitted). When this is the case, "the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke sovereign immunity even though individual officials are nominal defendants." Id.
Although the State of New York has not been named as a defendant here, it is clear that OCA, as an official arm of the state, enjoys the same Eleventh Amendment immunity as the State.Posr v. Court Officers Shield No. 207, 180 F.3d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1999). As such, OCA is "immune from suit here under § 1983 or under state law because the State of New York has not consented to suit in federal court, and because no express override of State statutory authority has been enacted by Congress in association with § 1983." Bland, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 534 (citations omitted); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979) (stating that the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not support the view that "Congress intended by the general language of § 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity of the States"). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims as to OCA would also be subject to dismissal.
In Plaintiff's response to the State Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiff states "[t]here is no Eleventh Amendment bar in this case because Plaintiff is suing Defendants in their individual capacities, [even though throughout his Complaint, Plaintiff holds Defendants liable in both the individual and official capacities], and has not specified that the only way he can be monetarily reimbursed for his damages is for New York to pay the judgment." (Pl.'s Aff. Opp'n State Defs.' Mot. Dismiss ¶ "Seventh.") As previously stated, even where individual officials have been named defendants, the State remains the "real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke sovereign immunity. . . ." Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663. Thus, Plaintiff's attempt to circumvent the plain text of, and establish precedent regarding the application of, the Eleventh Amendment is unavailing.
D. Absolute Judicial Immunity for Patel and Judge Adams
Plaintiff's claims against Patel and Judge Adams, in their individual and official capacities, also would not survive a motion to dismiss because of the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. This doctrine dates back to at least 1872, when the Supreme Court recognized that it is a "`general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.'" Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872)) (alteration in original). "It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his [or her] jurisdiction that are brought before him [or her], including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants." Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1988). Thus, judges cannot be held liable "`to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.'" Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 355 (quotingBradley, 13 Wall. at 351).
The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity has also been extended to certain individuals "who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process." Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997). To determine whether an individual is entitled to claim absolute judicial immunity, the Supreme Court has adopted the "functional comparability" test. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978). Under this test, "absolute immunity flows not from rank or title [of the individual] or [the individual's] location within the Government, but from the nature of the responsibilities of the individual official." Heller, 839 F.2d at 39 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Here, it is clear that Patel, as Judge Adams' court attorney, is entitled to claim absolute judicial immunity. In selecting a law guardian for Puletti, Jr., Patel is "performing [a] discretionary act of a judicial nature." Id. Patel's work was "supervised, approved, and adopted by [Judge Adams] who initially authorized it." Id. at 40. As such, Patel "was clearly assisting the judge in carrying out judicial functions, [and thus,] covered by the doctrine of absolute immunity." Id.
Absolute judicial immunity is also "applicable in suits under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the legislative record gave no indication that Congress intended to abolish this long-established principle." Stump, 435 U.S. at 355 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)). Judicial immunity, though, is not applicable under all circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from suit if he or she acts in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." Id. at 356-57 (citation omitted). The scope of the judge's jurisdiction, however, must be construed broadly. Id. at 356. The second circumstance in which a judge can be held liable for his or her actions is when a judge engages in nonjudicial acts, that is, acts that are not in the judge's official capacity. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
Plaintiff does not contest that Patel and Judge Adams had jurisdiction to hear the custody proceeding; rather, Plaintiff seems to assert the second theory of liability against Patel and Judge Adams, as Patel's supervisor, namely, that Patel and Judge Adams engaged in nonjudicial acts. To support his § 1983 claims, Plaintiff states that "a Judge who acts ultra vires may be sued in her individual capacity and may shoulder legal liability for her acts." (Pl.'s Aff. Opp'n State Defs.' Mot. Dismiss ¶ "Seventh.") Plaintiff further alleges that Patel acted outside the judicial function by threatening to appoint a law guardian during the state court proceeding. Id. ¶ "Tenth." These mere assertions, however, are insufficient to overcome Patel and Judge Adams' judicial immunity, as there is no evidence in Plaintiff's submissions that suggest that appointing a law guardian or threatening to appoint a law guardian exceeds Patel and Judge Adams' judicial functions.
Moreover, even if Plaintiff provided facts to show that Patel and Judge Adams acted maliciously or injuriously, these claims would still fail since Patel and Judge Adams were working in a judicial capacity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356, n. 5. In an emotionally charged setting such as a custody proceeding, the non-prevailing party will frequently seek another forum and charge "the participants of the first with unconstitutional animus." Butz, 438 U.S. at 512. This being the case, "[a]bsolute immunity is thus necessary to assure that judges . . . can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation." Id. Accordingly, Patel and Judge Adams are immune from suit, meaning Plaintiff's claims against them could not survive a motion to dismiss.
E. The State Claim
Because the Court has concluded it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Federal Claims, the Court obviously does not have pendant jurisdiction over the State Claim. Thus, the State Claim must also be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motions under Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are hereby GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED in their entirety. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
SO ORDERED.