Opinion
No. 3193.
Decided March 4, 1941.
Regulations of the hours of service as affecting motor trucks engaged in interstate commerce as established by sections 8 and 12 of Laws 1933, c. 106; Ib., c. 169 and the regulations of the Public Service Commission in pursuance thereof have been superseded by the regulations of the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935 and the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission prescribed thereunder.
BILL IN EQUITY, for an injunction to restrain the defendant from violating the provisions of Laws 1933, c. 106, s. 8 and the orders of the Public Service Commission promulgated in accordance therewith. The bill alleges that the defendant violated the statute and orders of the Commission in 1937. The defendant in its answer sets forth that it is a common carrier engaged in the transportation of property by motor truck in interstate commerce; that the provisions of Laws 1933, c. 106, s. 8 and the regulations of the Commission issued in furtherance thereof have been superseded by the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 and the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission in pursuance thereof. The parties agree that the present bill is based upon the same violations of the statute as those considered in Welch Company v. State, 89 N.H. 428. The only difference in the situation now presented is that, on March 1, 1939, the hours of service regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission adopted pursuant to the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 became effective. The court (Connor, J.) transferred, without ruling, the following questions:
"1. As applied to this defendant, are the provisions of sections eight and twelve of chapter 106 of Laws of 1933 as amended by Chapter 169 of Laws of 1933, and the regulations of the Public Service Commission promulgated in pursuance thereof, superseded by the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 and the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgated in pursuance thereof?
"2. If not, is rule 4n promulgated by said order No. 3101 of the Public Service Commission null, void, and of no effect and promulgated without lawful authority as alleged by the defendant?
"3. Has the Court power to enjoin and restrain the defendant from violating the provisions of section eight of chapter 106 of the Laws of 1933 while engaged in the transportation of property for hire in either interstate or intrastate commerce?
"4. Has the Court power to enjoin and restrain the defendant from violation of orders No. 2560 or No. 3101 of the Public Service Commission?"
Dudley W. Orr (by brief and orally), for the plaintiff.
Robert W. Upton and Richard F. Upton (Mr. Richard F. Upton orally), for the defendant.
Our prior decision in this controversy, Welch Company v. State, 89 N.H. 428, proceeded squarely upon the assumption that when the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission became effective, they would supersede the state regulations here involved. Ib. 437. The same is true of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the same case, where it is said: "Without so deciding, we assume, so far as concerns the periods of continuous service condemned by the state commission, that when the federal regulations take effect they will operate to supersede the challenged provisions of the state statute." Welch Company v. State, 306 U.S. 79, 84. We are now asked to hold that the underlying assumption of the previous opinion was unsound and that the local regulations are still effective although, since March 1, 1939, regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission regulating hours of service have been in force. Due regard for the reasonable reliance of parties upon decisions of this court to determine the extent of their legal obligations, as well as obvious considerations of judicial consistency, unite to impose upon the plaintiff a heavy burden of persuasion.
The contention of the plaintiff that "the two laws do not deal with the same subject matter" and that the New Hampshire statute, together with the regulations of the Public Service Commission thereunder are merely highway regulations, whereas the Federal regulations are designed to protect interstate commerce and workers engaged in it, can hardly be adopted in view of the fact that the section of the statute herein involved, Like the applicable rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission, deals specifically with "hours of service." Laws 1933, c. 106, s. 8; Motor Carrier Safety Regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, part 5.
Equally unavailing is the contention of the plaintiff that the two regulations may stand together. "Supplementary as well as conflicting regulations of the same subject by the states are, therefore, precluded by the Federal Constitution as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court." University Overland Express, Inc. v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 395, 399.
These two arguments, particularly the first one, together with their corollaries, are the chief reliance of the plaintiff. They cannot be adopted. We therefore conclude that the New Hampshire regulations here in question have been superseded by those of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 and the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission prescribed thereunder. This conclusion renders it unnecessary to decide the other three questions reserved by the Superior Court.
Bill dismissed.
All concurred.