Opinion
A166362
12-06-2023
Conservatorship of the person T.D. v. T.D., Petitioner and Appellant. PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF DEL NORTE COUNTY, Objector and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Del Norte County Super. Ct. No. CVSM174001)
CHOU, J.
Defendant T.D. appeals the trial court's order granting the petition of plaintiff and respondent the Public Guardian of Del Norte County (Public Guardian) for reappointment as the conservator of his person and estate under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act). (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.) Following a bench trial, the trial court found that T.D. was still gravely disabled and imposed certain special disabilities on him. T.D. does not contest the grave disability finding but argues that the imposition of disabilities was not supported by requisite findings or substantial evidence. We find that meaningful review is not possible because the record does not reflect that the trial court was aware of the findings it was required to make before imposing the disabilities. We therefore reverse.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
I. BACKGROUND
T.D. has been conserved since November 2017. In April 2022, the Public Guardian petitioned for reappointment of his conservator for another one-year term. (§ 5361.) The petition requested the imposition of certain disabilities on T.D. pursuant to section 5357. These included the curtailment of T.D.'s rights to possess a driver's license, to possess a firearm, to enter into a contract, and to refuse medical treatment both related and unrelated to his grave disability. The petition included the form declarations of two doctors recommending the continued conservatorship.
The declarations were not admitted as evidence at trial. We observe however, that the declarations only addressed some of the special disabilities sought by the petition. For example, they recommended that T.D. not be allowed to drive a motor vehicle because of his poor judgment and medications and addressed T.D.'s "willingness or inability to accept treatment voluntarily." But they did not address whether T.D. should be allowed to possess a firearm or enter into a contract, calling into question the sufficiency of the petition as to the imposition of those disabilities. Moving forward, the Public Guardian should consider addressing all of the special disabilities it seeks to impose on a conservatee in its declarations in support of a conservatorship petition.
T.D. objected to the petition and waived his right to a jury trial. A bench trial was held on October 12, 2022. Dr. Sayuli Wong, a clinical psychologist who has treated T.D. since 2021, testified that T.D. currently suffers from schizophrenia. Dr. Wong further testified that T.D. was currently taking his medications and that his symptoms were in partial remission. However, Dr. Wong noted that T.D.'s outpatient records show that in late 2021, he was not in compliance with his treatment and had "relapse[d] on methamphetamine and marijuana." Dr. Wong explained that if T.D. stopped taking his medications, he would decompensate, engage in internal stimuli or delusional thoughts, and be unable to provide food, clothing, or shelter for himself. Accordingly, Dr. Wong opined that T.D. remained gravely disabled.
Deputy Public Guardian Jennifer Beeson testified that T.D. was placed in a board and care facility in late 2018 or early 2019. T.D. was kicked out of that facility after various issues arose, including his substance use. T.D. was then placed in a mental health shared housing facility. Beeson testified that while there, T.D.'s medication compliance was "spotty" but that he would take his medications without a problem when staff was with him. T.D. also smoked marijuana while he was there, which a doctor cautioned would increase T.D.'s delusions and psychosis. Finally, Beeson testified that in November 2021, T.D. was detained pursuant to section 5150 after he jumped out of a car and ran while shopping with a staff member. As a result, T.D. was placed at Restpadd, an acute psychiatric facility, before being moved to his current facility.
T.D. testified that before receiving assistance from Del Norte County, he worked for his father in Oregon pouring "stamped concrete." He claimed that he "poured 170,000 yard slab" with his brother and father. After that, he testified that he worked as a cashier at the Dollar Tree but had to resign after his roommate prevented him from going to work by taking all of his left shoes. T.D. testified that if he was not conserved, he would live in a cheap motel room or try to find an apartment. T.D. acknowledged that he had a mental illness and that he needed medications. He testified that if released, he would continue taking his medications and would not go back to using substances like marijuana and methamphetamine. T.D. further testified that if he could not find housing in Del Norte County, he would go back to Carson City, his hometown, and get a job as a stone mason or a smith mason.
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court initially stated that it found "by clear and convincing evidence that [T.D.] continues to be gravely disabled." After both counsel informed the court that the correct standard was beyond a reasonable doubt, the court stated that it "thought the standard was clear and convincing evidence" but that it was nonetheless "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt" that T.D. was still gravely disabled. The court then asked whether anything else needed to be "read into the record," and T.D.'s counsel responded, "the letters and orders should be there and should be signed, based upon the findings." Without mentioning any special disabilities or any findings in support of those disabilities, the court signed an order reappointing the Public Guardian as T.D.'s conservator and imposing all of the special disabilities that were requested in the petition. Consistent with the petition, the order also specified that T.D. retained the right to vote. T.D. timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
T.D. contends reversal is warranted here because the record does not reflect: (1) that the trial court was aware of the findings it was required to make in order to impose special disabilities on T.D.; (2) what proffered evidence it considered with respect to the imposition of disabilities; and (3) that it made the requisite findings. We agree.
Under the LPS Act, a conservator "may be appointed for a person who is gravely disabled as a result of a mental health disorder ...." (§ 5350.) "Gravely disabled" means, among other things, "[a] condition in which a person, as a result of a mental health disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter." (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).)
It is well established, however, that conservatees do not forfeit legal rights or suffer legal disabilities merely because they were found to be gravely disabled. (§ 5005; Conservatorship of Walker (1989) 206 Cal.App.3d 1572, 1578 (Walker).) As a result, a trial court "must separately determine the duties and powers of the conservator, the disabilities imposed on the conservatee, and the level of placement appropriate for the conservatee. The party seeking conservatorship has the burden of producing evidence to support the disabilities sought, the placement, and the powers of the conservator, and the conservatee may produce evidence in rebuttal." (Conservatorship of Christopher A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 604, 612.) To meet this burden, "[t]he better practice is for the conservator to disclose, by the questions asked or the argument made, the evidence relied upon to support special disabilities under section 5357." (Walker, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 1578.)
Although the conservator may meet this burden by presenting evidence or argument at the grave disability trial, the better practice would be to conduct a short evidentiary hearing on the special disabilities immediately following a jury or court finding of grave disability. This way, the findings necessary to support the imposition of those disabilities as well as the trial court's awareness of its obligation to make these findings will be clear from the record.
In K.G. v. Meredith (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 164, 179 (K.G.), we acknowledged that "there is no clear statutory requirement that the [trial] court make an express finding of decisional incapacity before imposing" any special disabilities. Nonetheless, we held that "the record must disclose that the [] court was aware of the finding it was required to make before imposing the disabilities, that it considered the evidence proffered on the issue, and that it in fact made the finding." (Ibid., italics added.) Because "meaningful review" is not possible without such disclosures in the record, remand so the trial court can make the requisite findings may be necessary in certain instances. (See id. at p. 180 ["we recognize that the decisional incapacity finding is the superior court's responsibility regardless of the forms submitted by the Public Guardian"].)
In K.G., we only addressed the medical treatment disabilities (§ 5357, subd. (d)) because this was one of the two issues the petitioner had adequately presented and briefed for appellate review. (K.G., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 178.) But our citation to Walker makes clear that our holding applies to all disabilities imposed under section 5357. (See K.G., at p. 179.)
Here, there is nothing in the record suggesting that the trial court was aware of the legal standards for imposing any of the special disabilities, that it considered evidence relevant to these standards, or that it made any findings utilizing those standards. Although the witnesses at trial testified about T.D.'s employment history, treatment history, and medication compliance, they did not testify about any of the special disabilities sought by the Public Guardian. Indeed, there were no questions at trial directed to those disabilities, and neither counsel for the Public Guardian nor counsel for T.D. even mentioned the special disabilities during the trial, much less in their closing arguments. Instead, the only statement at trial by the court or counsel that could even be remotely construed as a reference to the special disabilities imposed by the court's order came from T.D.'s counsel when he told the court that "I think the letters and orders should be there and should be signed, based upon the findings." (Italics added.) Finally, the court's order imposing the special disabilities on T.D. makes no reference to any legal standards or findings by the court. From this record, we cannot conclude that the court was aware of the special disabilities, much less that it applied the correct legal standards or made the findings it needed to make before imposing them.
This conclusion is reinforced by the trial court's apparent confusion over the standards that apply in a conservatorship proceeding. At the conclusion of trial, the court initially applied the wrong standard-clear and convincing evidence-in finding that T.D. was gravely disabled. The court only corrected its mistake after both counsel reminded the court that the correct standard was "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Because this record does not "permit meaningful review," we reverse and remand this matter to ensure that any special disabilities are imposed only after the correct legal standards are applied and the requisite findings are made. (K.G., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 180.) In doing so, we express no opinion as to whether there is substantial evidence to support the imposition of any special disabilities on T.D.
The Public Guardian does not dispute that reversal is required here if the record does not "disclose that the trial court was aware of the finding it was required to make before imposing the disabilities, that it considered the evidence proffered on the issue, and that it in fact made the finding." (K.G., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 179.)
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court's reappointment of conservator order is reversed with respect to the imposition of special disabilities. On remand, the court shall conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We concur. JACKSON, P. J., BURNS, J.