Opinion
A164267
05-10-2023
Conservatorship of the Person of Steven P. v. STEVEN P., Objector and Appellant. PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Petitioner and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. P2000147)
BURNS, J.
Steven P. appeals from an order reappointing a conservator of his person, pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (the Act; Welf. &Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.). Because the order has already expired and the appeal is moot, we address only one of Steven's arguments on the merits and dismiss the appeal.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Background
A.
In 2020, the trial court appointed the director of the Contra Costa County Health Services Department (Public Guardian) as conservator of Steven's person, found him gravely disabled, and empowered the Public Guardian to place him in a locked facility and make medical decisions on his behalf. Approximately three weeks before the conservatorship period expired, the Public Guardian petitioned to be reappointed as conservator. Steven objected to the petition and asked for a bench trial, which the court held on November 2, 2021.
Psychiatrist Michael Levin, M.D., testified as an expert in psychiatry and grave disability. Dr. Levin had met Steven three times, once in person in May of 2020, once in September of 2021 via videoconference, and then another time in November 2021 via videoconference. Dr. Levin also reviewed medical records from Steven's most recent hospitalization at Contra Costa Regional Medical Center and from his current placement, Crestwood Vallejo. The trial court admitted the medical records.
Dr. Levin diagnosed Steven with schizophrenia (paranoid type) and polysubstance abuse, which are recognized as major mental illnesses in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Schizophrenia is a thought disorder that has several symptoms, including delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia.
Dr. Levin testified that the primary treatment for schizophrenia is medication. At the time of trial, Steven was on two antipsychotic medications, Haldol and Zyprexa. Steven also was prescribed Depakote-a mood stabilizer. Dr. Levin identified insight-or awareness of having a mental illness-as another factor that can help people comply with treatment and avoid the problems caused by schizophrenia. However, Steven appeared to lack such awareness. In his interviews with Dr. Levin, he denied experiencing hallucinations, despite the fact that hallucinations are documented in Steven's medical records. Steven also denied having a mental illness and stated that he did not need to take (and would not take were he not in a facility) any psychiatric medication.
Based on his interviews with Steven and his review of Steven's medical records, Dr. Levin concluded that Steven remained gravely disabled. Dr. Levin stated that Steven's lack of insight into his mental disorder, as well as his resistance to taking medication, made it highly doubtful that he would take his medication if released from the conservatorship. Furthermore, Steven's mental illness undermines his ability to maintain relationships, which means that he is unable to obtain or maintain shelter with other people. In Dr. Levin's opinion, Steven had no viable plan for maintaining shelter if he were released from conservatorship.
B.
The trial court found (1) that Steven remained gravely disabled in that, because of his schizophrenia, he is unable to provide for his personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter; (2) that several legal disabilities should be imposed, including the right to refuse or consent to psychiatric and routine medical treatment; the right to enter into contracts; the right to drive; and the right to possess a firearm or other deadly weapon; and (3) that Steven's current placement was the least restrictive and most appropriate level of care.
The court later issued written orders reappointing the Public Guardian as conservator for a one-year period commencing on August 20, 2021.
Steven filed a notice of appeal after the court's oral ruling but before the court filed its written orders. It is unclear which order constitutes the final order for purposes of appeal. (See Prob. Code, § 1301, subd. (a) [order granting letter of conservatorship is appealable order]; Conservatorship of D.C. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 487, 493.) To the extent Steven's notice of appeal was premature, we treat it as having been filed after entry of the written orders. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2).)
Discussion
A.
Because the one-year period of Steven's conservatorship expired before appellate briefing was complete (§ 5361, subd. (a); Conservatorship of K.P. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 695, 709-710), we asked the parties to submit supplemental letter briefs addressing whether the appeal is moot.
The Public Guardian maintains that Steven's appeal is moot-not only because the challenged order has expired but also because the conservatorship has not been renewed. In fact, the petition for reappointment (filed in August 2022) was dismissed after Steven left his placement, in November 2022, and could not be located.
Pursuant to the Public Guardian's unopposed request, we take judicial notice of the trial court's order dismissing the petition for reappointment. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
Steven concedes his appeal is moot. (See MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214 ["[a] case is moot when the decision of the reviewing court 'can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief' "].) However, as he points out, we have discretion to address issues in an otherwise moot appeal if the controversy between the parties is likely to reoccur (Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School Dist. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 139, 144), or if the issue concerns a matter of public importance that is capable of repetition yet evades review. (Brown, Winfield &Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1233, 1240, fn. 1; Conservatorship of Manton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 645, 647, fn. 1; Conservatorship of J.Y. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 220, 225, rev. granted Aug. 19, 2020, S263044, rev. dismissed July 20, 2022.)
In exercising our discretion, we consider Steven's arguments on appeal. Steven's first argument is that the trial court erred by admitting certain portions of his psychiatric records, which he insists were inadmissible hearsay. Steven does not dispute that the trial court had an obligation to consider "the historical course of [Steven's] mental disorder," which explicitly includes his psychiatric records. (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 5008.2, subd. (a).) He also concedes that Conservatorship of S.A. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 438, 447-448 (S.A.) held that a conservatee's redacted psychiatric records were properly admitted under the business records exception (Evid. Code, § 1271) when accompanied by a foundational declaration, and does not argue that S.A. was incorrectly decided.
Instead, Steven argues that the trial court, despite excluding all psychiatric diagnoses within those records, exceeded the bounds of S.A., supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at pages 447-448, People v. Reyes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 486, 502-504, and People v. Terrell (1955) 138 Cal.App.2d 35, 57-58-by admitting certain select statements in the psychiatric records, which purportedly were not observations of "an act, condition, or event" (Evid. Code, § 1271). Steven contends these particular statements were instead inadmissible opinions or conclusions. We decline to address such fact-intensive questions in the context of this moot appeal. Steven fails to persuade us that this is an issue of public importance or that our review of the specific instances he complains of now will be of any utility to a reoccurring dispute between these parties.
Steven also argues that there was no substantial evidence to support the order imposing legal disabilities (§ 5357), which deprived him of the right to make routine medical decisions, to drive, to possess a firearm, and to contract. Because Steven is no longer subject to the challenged order and the issue is solely factual and not of general interest, we decline to address it.
However, we will exercise our discretion to address Steven's second argument on appeal-the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony on the ultimate issue-because it appears likely to arise again in future conservatorship proceedings.
B.
Steven argues that the trial court erred by admitting Dr. Levin's expert opinion on the ultimate issue-grave disability. We assume (for the sake of argument) that the issue was not forfeited by Steven's failure to raise this specific objection below but conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. (See People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 266 [standard of review].)
In this bench trial, the trial court was tasked with deciding the ultimate factual issue-whether Steven P. was "gravely disabled" as defined by the Welfare and Institutions Code. (Conservatorship of Murphy (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 15, 19.) A person is gravely disabled if, as a result of a mental disorder, they are unable to provide for their basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter. (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) Under this standard, the petitioner must prove that the proposed conservatee has a mental disorder and must demonstrate a causal link between that diagnosed mental disorder and the conservatee's inability to meet basic personal needs. (Conservatorship of Torres (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1159, 11621163.)
Expert opinion testimony "that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." (Evid. Code, § 805; People v. Doss (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1585, 1596.) The decisive consideration in admitting expert opinion testimony is whether the expert will opine on "a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact[.]" (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a); People v. Cole (1956) 47 Cal.2d 99, 103.) In the conservatorship context, expert opinion is allowed on the ultimate issue because "[a]lthough a juror might know whether a person was able to take care of his basic needs[, they] cannot determine from common experience whether that inability results from a mental disorder or from some other reason." (Conservatorship of Torres, supra, 180 Cal.App.3d at p. 1163.)
This case is not like Summers v. A.L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1155, which involved a lawyer giving opinions regarding the application of the law to particular facts. (Id. at p. 1179.) Nor is it like People v. Torres (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37, in which a police officer testified that a defendant's conduct constituted robbery. (Id. at pp. 44-45.) Here, Dr. Levin opined on a psychiatric subject beyond common experience-the causal connection between Steven P.'s mental disorder and his inability to provide for his basic needs. Dr. Levin testified that Steven's paranoia impedes his ability to maintain the relationships necessary to obtain and maintain shelter, and that his mental disorder impedes his cognitive functioning such that he is unable to make a viable plan for his basic needs. Although Dr. Levin also testified explicitly that Steven was "gravely disabled", this was essentially a shorthand version of his medical opinion, and the trial court was not compelled to draw the same inference.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged testimony.
Disposition
The appeal is dismissed.
We concur: SIMONS, ACTING P.J. LANGHORNE, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Napa County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.