Opinion
Index No. EF2020518
01-20-2023
Edward J. Przydatek, Plaintiff, v. The County of Saratoga and Saratoga Public Works Department, Defendants.
For Plaintiff: Peter A. McDaniel, Esq. For Defendant: Michael J. Murphy, Esq.
Unpublished Opinion
For Plaintiff: Peter A. McDaniel, Esq.
For Defendant: Michael J. Murphy, Esq.
Thomas D. Buchanan, J.
Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident at the intersection of Saratoga County Route 70 and County Route 71. As he traveled along Route 70, he observed a "Stop Ahead" sign and noticed a "Stop" sign on the left side of the road. According to Plaintiff, he believed the "Stop" sign he observed was to control traffic on County Route 70, rather than on County Route 71. He continued to look to the right side of the road for a stop sign but did not see it because it was covered by the overgrowth from a tree. Ultimately, Plaintiff did not stop at the intersection and was involved in a collision with a vehicle traveling on County Route 70. Defendants move for summary judgment contending that Plaintiff is the sole proximate cause of the accident.
The basic standard to be applied by a court addressing a summary judgment motion is well established. The proponent of a summary judgment motion carries the initial burden to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact (Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851 [1985]). If the requisite showing is made, the burden of proof then shifts to the responding party or parties to show the presence of questions of fact requiring trial (Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320 [1986]). The facts must be construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (see e.g. Hanna v. St. Lawrence County, 34 A.D.3d 1146 [3d Dept 2006]).
In New York, a county is liable for negligence in the maintenance of its highways where it has assumed the duty of maintenance (McDougall v. Livingston County, 89 A.D.2d 815 [4th Dept 1982]). Municipalities owe a nondelegable duty to the public to construct and maintain their roads in a reasonably safe condition (Lindquist v. County of Schoharie, 126 A.D.3d 1096 [3d Dept 2015]). That duty extends to maintaining the right of way beyond the road's surface and trimming growth within the highway's right of way to ensure visibility of stop signs and other traffic (Perkins v. County of Tompkins, 179 A.D.3d 1334 [3d Dept 2020]).
However, the existence of a duty and a breach of duty are not the operative questions here. The ground for the defense motion is the lack of proximate cause, which would be fatal to Plaintiff's case even if it were shown that Defendants were negligent (see e.g. Graff v. State, 126 A.D.3d 1081 [3d Dept 2015]; Hill v. Carpenter, 77 A.D.3d 1130 [3d Dept 2010]; Sherman v. County of Cortland, 18 A.D.3d 908 [3d Dept 2005]).
In support of their motion, Defendants submit the Affidavit of Defendants' sign division foreman, James Bovee. Bovee details the installation of signage at the intersection and how the signage complies with applicable standards. Defendants also submit an affidavit from their expert, Dr. Timothy McClure, who inspected the intersection. Dr. McClure opines that the signage at issue was in accordance with relevant regulations. Dr. McClure's inspection of the intersection revealed "some sight limitations" with respect to the stop sign on the right side of the road at that time. Dr. McClure opined:
Due to the posting of the W3-1 stop ahead advanced warning sign and the supplemental stop sign on the left side of the roadway at the intersection, the reported visibility obstruction to the stop sign on the right side of the roadway does not constitute a contributing factor to the collision event.
Dr. McClure further opined that:
Saratoga County considered and implemented both mitigating signs. Therefore, a potential sight limitation to the stop sign posted on the right side does not constitute an infraction contributing to this collision.
Defendants also point to Plaintiff's own deposition testimony that he observed the "Stop Ahead" sign and the "Stop" sign on the left side of the road, and that he saw the intersection before arriving there. He simply failed to stop or even to apply his brakes. Defendant have thus supplied sufficient evidence to carry their initial burden of proof that Plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the collision.
In response, Plaintiff does not dispute any of the evidence offered by Defendants, but instead focuses on Defendants' nondelegable duty and Plaintiff's allegations of negligence in maintaining the intersection. As discussed above, however, Defendants' negligence, even if established, does not obviate the need to show that their actions-or lack thereof-were the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries. Defendants have made their prima facie showing that Plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the collision at issue and Plaintiff has offered no evidence to counter that showing (see D'Alfonso v. County of Osewgo, 198 A.D.2d 802 [4th Dept 1993]).
Therefore, in consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the motion by Defendants seeking summary judgment dismissing the Complaint in this action is granted and the Complaint is hereby dismissed.
Papers considered:
Notice of Motion; Attorney Declaration of Michael J. Murphy, Esq., with annexed exhibits; Affidavit of Dr. Timothy McClure, with annexed exhibits; Statement of Material Facts; Memorandum of Law; EBT Photographs; Counterstatement of Material Facts; Affirmation in Opposition of Peter A. McDaniel, Esq.; Memorandum of Law in Opposition; Reply Memorandum of Law; Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts; Attorney Declaration in reply; Color Photographs.