Opinion
HHDCV175046639S
04-24-2018
Prostar, Inc., DIP v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
File Date: April 26, 2018
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh):Cobb, Susan Quinn, J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Cobb, J.
This is an unemployment compensation appeal initiated by the plaintiff-employer, Prostar, Inc., DIP. The plaintiff appeals from the decision of the Employment Security Board of Review (board) affirming the appeals referee’s (referee) determination that the employee-claimant was fired for reasons other than willful misconduct and thus was not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and record, the court dismisses the appeal.
FACTS
The following facts found by the appeals referee and adopted by the board are relevant to this appeal. The employee-claimant, Kingsley Nyarko, worked for the plaintiff from August 19, 2013 to February 27, 2017. In 2016, the claimant was promoted from a production worker to a supervisory position. In mid-February 2017, the claimant told the plaintiff’s production manager that he no longer wished to work as a supervisor and wanted to return to his prior position as a production worker. The production manager told the claimant that he could return to this position and instructed him to put his request in writing. The claimant wrote a letter, dated February 23, 2017, to the production manager stating he wished to begin working as a production worker in lieu of his supervisory position. The production manager signed the letter on February 24, 2017 and instructed the claimant to report to work as a production worker on February 27, 2017.
When the claimant reported to work on February 27, 2017, the human resource officer instructed him to meet with her to discuss his letter. The human resource officer attempted to call the production manager at that time to gather further information but the production manager did not pick up his phone. The human resource manager advised the claimant that if he stepped down from his supervisor position there would be a reduction in pay. The human resource manager claimed that the claimant laughed and said he would not accept a reduction in pay. Because the human resource manager was upset and felt disrespected by the claimant’s alleged conduct, she did not ask the claimant to clarify if he wanted to continue as a supervisor or take a pay cut and return as a production worker. She then told the claimant his letter constituted a letter of resignation and that he needed to leave the building. The claimant was shocked and as a result did not say anything. He was then escorted out of the building.
The plaintiff did not have any concerns or issues with the claimant’s work performance or attendance in the year prior to the termination of his employment. The claimant did not intend to resign when he sent his letter seeking a demotion on February 27, 2017, and was aware that a demotion would result in a pay reduction.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Following his termination the claimant filed an application for unemployment compensation benefits. On March 31, 2017, the defendant, the Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act, determined that that the claimant had voluntarily quit his employment for reasons which did not constitute good cause attributable to his employer. Consequently, the claimant was found to be ineligible for unemployment benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31-236(a)(2)(A).
The Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act is hereinafter referred to as the defendant.
General Statutes § 31-236(a)(2)(A) provides in relevant part: " An individual shall be ineligible for benefits: ... if, in the opinion of the administrator, the individual has left suitable work voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer ..."
The claimant subsequently appealed the administrator’s decision to the referee, who conducted a de novo hearing on May 15, 2017. The referee made findings of fact, summarized above, and reversed the administrator’s decision, concluding that the claimant was fired for reasons other than willful misconduct and was not ineligible from receiving unemployment benefits. The plaintiff then timely appealed the referee’s decision to the board, challenging (1) the referee’s admittance of a letter written by the production manager into the record, and (2) the referee’s conclusion that the claimant did not voluntarily resign his position. After considering the record and hearing before the referee, the board adopted the entirety of the referee’s findings of fact and affirmed the referee’s decision on July 24, 2017.
On September 27, 2017, the plaintiff filed a timely appeal and the board certified the record of its proceedings to this court. On October 19, 2017, the defendant filed a motion for judgment to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal, accompanied by a supporting memorandum. In its memorandum, the defendant argues the board properly affirmed the referee’s decision to admit the letter into the record and the referee’s conclusion that the claimant did not voluntarily leave suitable work.
The defendant also argued that the appeal was subject to dismissal because the plaintiff, a corporation, could not appear without an attorney. However, the defendant later noted in its reply memorandum that plaintiff’s counsel had resolved the issue by filing an appearance on October 30, 2017.
The plaintiff opposed the defendant’s motion on November 8, 2017, arguing that the referee’s legal conclusions were unreasonable based on the facts in the record and that its due process rights were violated when the letter was considered and admitted into the record. The defendant filed a reply memorandum on December 4, 2017. Oral argument was heard by the court on February 26, 2018.
DISCUSSION
Appeals from the board to the Superior Court are regulated by General Statutes § 31-249b. Under § 31-249b, the court " acts as an appellate court to review the record certified and filed by the board of review." Finkenstein v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 192 Conn. 104, 112, 470 A.2d 1196 (1984). " To the extent that an administrative appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249b, concerns findings of fact, a court is limited to a review of the record ... The court must not retry the facts nor hear evidence ... If, however, the issue is one of law, the court has the broader responsibility of determining whether the administrative action resulted from an incorrect application of the law to the facts found or could not reasonably or logically have followed from such facts. Although the court may not substitute its own conclusions for those of the administrative board, it retains the ultimate obligation to determine whether the administrative action was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Resso v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 147 Conn.App. 661, 664-65, 83 A.3d 723 (2014); Martinez v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 170 Conn.App. 333, 339-40, 154 A.3d 1048 (2017).
" Conclusions of law reached by the referee must stand if they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts." Robinson v. Unemployment Security Board of Review, 181 Conn. 1, 5, 434 A.2d 293 (1980). If a claimant wishes to challenge the factual findings of the board, he or she must file a motion to correct the findings within two weeks of the record being filed with the Superior Court. See Belica v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 126 Conn.App. 779, 786, 12 A.3d 1067 (2011); see also Practice Book § 22-4. " Our case law is clear that the failure to file such a motion acts as bar to any further review of the facts found in an unemployment compensation benefits hearing." Addona v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 121 Conn.App. 355, 365, 996 A.2d 280 (2010).
In the present case, the plaintiff did not file a motion for correction. Consequently, this court may not, under the standards which guide this appeal, disturb the findings of fact of the referee which were adopted by the board. However, the court may review its legal conclusions. See Resso v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, 147 Conn.App. 664.
A. Improper Admittance of Letter
The court first considers whether the referee improperly admitted the production manager’s letter into the record as improper hearsay evidence. " [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that a hearing officer’s evidentiary ruling is arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion." Recycling, Inc. v. Commissioner of Energy & Environmental Protection, 179 Conn.App. 127, 153-54, 178 A.3d 1043 (2018).
The plaintiff contends its rights were violated when the referee admitted a typed, unsigned and undated letter written by the production manager into the record. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the referee, and later the board, erred by not considering the four part reliability test discussed by the board in Jarvis v. Bodine Corporation, Board Case No. 290-BR-87 (May 8, 1987) which incorporates factors originally set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) and adopted by our courts in Cassella v. Civil Service Commission, 4 Conn.App. 359, 364, 494 A.2d 909 (1985), aff’d, 202 Conn. 28, 519 A.2d 67 (1987).
In Cassella, our Appellate Court thoroughly reviewed state and federal precedents establishing the trustworthiness of hearsay evidence in administrative proceedings. Citing the factors set forth in Richardson : 1) the availability of the witness declarant; 2) the lack of bias or interest on the part of the witness declarant; 3) the quality and probative value of the out of court statements; and 4) the nature and atmosphere of the proceeding, the court found that the due process rights of the plaintiff had not been violated by the use of hearsay evidence Cassella v. Civil Service Commission, 4 Conn.App. 359, 364, 494 A.2d 909 (1985), aff’d, 202 Conn. 28, 519 A.2d 67 (1987).
We note that pursuant to General Statutes § 31-244, the referee is not strictly bound by the formal rules of evidence and, therefore, must accept evidence that would otherwise be excluded under these formal rules. In the board’s decision, it states that during a hearing in front of the referee, the plaintiff objected to the letter on the basis that it constituted hearsay, but did not dispute the letter’s authenticity or probative value. The board then concluded that the letter’s status as hearsay alone did not disqualify it from being admitted into the record.
General Statutes § 31-244 states in relevant part: " neither the administrator nor the examiners shall be bound by the ordinary common law or statutory rules of evidence or procedure, but may make inquiry in such manner, through oral testimony or written, printed or electronic records, as is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties ..."
The plaintiff now argues that beyond citing to Jarvis, there is nothing to indicate that the board or the referee actually considered the factors set out in Jarvis’ reliably test. However, " [w]hen a trial court indicates that it has reviewed statutory factors, an appellate court accepts the statement as true, at least in the absence of information to the contrary ... We accord at least as great deference to agencies as to courts ..." (Citation omitted.) Ray v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 133 Conn.App. 527, 535, 36 A.3d 269, 274 (2012). The board here clearly cited Jarvis in its decision and the plaintiff does not present information to the contrary. Consequently, the court finds that the referee’s decision to admit the letter, and the board’s decision to uphold that action, were not unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion.
B. Nature of Employer/Employee Separation
The plaintiff also appeals the board’s conclusion that the claimant was not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that it was unreasonable for the board to conclude the claimant was discharged for reasons other than willful misconduct because the facts clearly show he voluntarily quit his employment. The court disagrees.
A claimant is ineligible for unemployment benefits if he voluntarily left suitable work. See General Statutes § 31-236(a)(2)(A). Section 31-236-18 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies further provides that " in order to establish that an individual left suitable work voluntarily, the Administrator must find that the individual committed the specific intentional act of terminating his own employment." (Emphasis added.)
" [W]hen interpreting provisions of the act, we take as our starting point the fact that the act is remedial and, consequently, should be liberally construed in favor of its beneficiaries ... Indeed, the legislature underscored its intent by expressly mandating that the act shall be construed, interpreted and administered in such manner as to presume coverage, eligibility and nondisqualification in doubtful cases." Standard Oil of Connecticut, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 320 Conn. 611, 616, 134 A.3d 581 (2016).
" Where there is a controversy over whether a claimant quit or was discharged, the ultimate decision with respect to the categorization of the separation is made based on the facts of the case. It is within the exclusive authority of the adjudicator to make this determination which does not depend on either party’s characterization of the separation." Burgos v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-15-5016655 (April 11, 2016, Tanzer, J.T.R.); see Hutchinson v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-13501404-S (August 28, 2013, Karazin, J.T.R.).
In the present action, the court is bound by the referee’s findings of fact and may not retry the facts or hear evidence. See Resso v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, 147 Conn.App. 664-65. In the present action, the referee and board found as fact that " the claimant had no intention of resigning his position ... [and] knew that if he stepped down from the supervisor job ... he would no longer be paid $15 per hour and that he would earn $11 per hour as a production worker." Moreover, the board also found that " the human resource manager ... did not ask the claimant if he wanted to continue working as a supervisor or wanted to take the reduction in pay to be a regular production worker" before escorting the claimant out of the building. The court concludes that the board could reasonably have found, based on those findings of fact, that the claimant did not intentionally leave his employment as required by Section 31-236-18 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, but was discharged for reasons other than willful misconduct. Consequently, the administrative action of the board was not unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s appeal is dismissed.