Opinion
For Opinion on Hearing, see 32 Cal.Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158.
Bodle & Fogle, George E. Bodle, Daniel Fogel and Lawrence Drasin, Los Angeles, for appellants.
Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke Jones, Asst. City Atty., and Marcus E. Crahan, Jr., Deputy City Atty., for respondent.
FOURT, Justice.
This is an appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment declaring the rights and duties of the parties herein with respect to Labor Code, sections 1960-1963.
The Labor Code sections mentioned provide as follows:
The substance of the trial court's determination is that (a) the aforesaid sections of the Labor Code are repugnant to the provisions of article I, section 21, of the California Constitution, and (b) that the aforesaid sections are not lawfully applicable to defendant as a freeholders' chartered city in view of the provisions of article XI, sections 6, 8, 8 1/2, 12 and 13, and article XX, section 16, of the California Constitution.
A resume of the essential facts is as follows:
Defendant City of Los Angeles is a municipal corporation, organized and existing under the Constitution and laws of the State of California, and holding a freeholders' charter (California stats. 1925, p. 1024 et seq., as amended to date).
In the Los Angeles City Charter there are created several departments of city government, which departments are under the control and management of boards of five commissioners. The fire department is one of these departments (charter secs. 70 and 71). The charter provides that the board of each such department, including the fire The chief administrative officer of the fire department is designated as the chief engineer of the fire department. He is subject to appointment under the civil service system and removable by the board of fire commissioners under the procedure set forth in section 135 of the charter and is subject to the provisions of the charter, the rules of the department and the instructions of said commission. He has the power and duty to administer the affairs of the department as it chief administrative officer, to appoint, discharge, suspend or transfer the employees of the department, and to issue instructions to said employees in the line of their duties; to expend the funds of the department in accordance with the provisions of the budget, to recommend to the commission matters with respect to the budget, to certify all expenditures of the department to the chief accounting employee and to exercise such further powers in the administration of the department as may be conferred upon him by the commission (charter secs. 134 and 80).
In addition to the charter sections and certain ordinances (i. e. ordinance No. 77,738 and No. 89,935) the fire commission of the respondent city has adopted certain rules and regulations which are apposite to the within action. The substance of these rules (i. e. sec. 15, subsecs. (h), (k) and (l) of the rules and regulations of the fire department) is that no member of the fire department shall belong to any organization which will in any manner divide his loyalty to the department, City of Los Angeles or the United States, or which seeks to subvert any municipal, state or federal law, rule, policy, or regulation of the department or directive of the board; but that organizations and committees of members existing or created for purposes consistent with the rules and regulations of the fire department may apply to the commission for official recognition as representatives of their membership, and may present grievances and complaints or suggestions for the good of the service through the chief engineer to the commission by delegations of not more than six members. These rules also provide that members of the department may appeal in writing through the chief engineer to the commission with respect to matters in which they believe they have been unjustly or unfairly treated.
Plaintiff union is an organization composed of some of the members of the Los Angeles City Fire Department. It has been officially recognized by the city fire commission under the aforesaid rules, and furthermore has been designated under the provisions of ordinance No. 77,738, as an organization for which a city employee may authorize the payment of payroll deductions of fees, dues, assessment or contributions. Plaintiff Wheatley is an officer of plaintiff union and a member of defendant's fire department.
On February 20, 1962, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint for declaratory relief and injunction. It was alleged in substance that defendant, through its officers and agents employed in the Los Angeles City Fire Department, has denied employees of the department promotions ahd has given employees unfavorable work assignments solely because of their membership and activity on behalf of plaintiff union; has adopted a general policy of discrimination against those employees who On March 2, 1962, defendant filed a demurrer and also its answer to the first amended complaint. The substance of the answer is that defendant denied each of the pertinent allegations and then alleged that neither it, nor the city council, nor the city board of fire commissioners, nor the chief engineer of the city fire department, nor anyone authorized to act for them, has adopted or issued any rule or acted otherwise to prohibit, forbid, obstruct or interfere with the joining of any firefighters in defendant's employ, or by any other employee of the city fire department, or any bona fide labor organization of their choice, or the joining particularly of plaintiff union. It was further alleged that the city council, the board of fire commissioners and the chief engineer of the city fire department have received and considered presentation of grievances and recommendations, on such matters as were within their respective authority, regarding wages, salaries, hours and working conditions from firefighters, and other employees of the city fire department, and from organizations including plaintiff union, in which such firefighters, and other employees, have joined; that they have discussed such grievances and recommendations with such employees and organizations, and that they continue ready to receive and discuss such grievances and recommendations from and with such employees and such organizations, including plaintiff union.
Interpretation of the Constitution, statutes, charters, ordinances and rules of the board of fire commissioners is a proper subject of declaratory relief. (Hoyt v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 21 Cal.2d 399, 401, 132 P.2d 804.)
The hearing of the demurrer was continued several times. A minute order dated March 23, 1962, discloses that the demurrer was submitted subject to being reset for further hearing.
On March 30, 1962, defendant city filed a notice of motion for summary judgment along with points and authorities and several declarations. Defendant sought a judgment '1. Declaring that plaintiffs, and each of them, take nothing by reason of their First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief * * * and dismissing said complaint; or 2. Declaring that Sections 1960-1963 of the Labor Code * * * and each of them, are not lawfully applicable to the City of Los Angeles as a freeholders' Chartered city, and that said City is not required by law to comply with the provisions contained therein.'
On April 23, 1962, plaintiffs filed a notice of motion for summary judgment seeking a judgment 'declaring that Sections 1960-1963 of the Labor Code * * * and each of them, are lawfully applicable to the City of Los Angeles as a freeholders' Chartered city, and that said City is required by law to comply with the provisions contained therein. Said motion will be made upon the ground that the only issues involved in the Second Cause of Action are issues of law, and that Sections 1960 through 1963 of the Labor Code as a matter of law are applicable to chartered cities.'
The minute order dated April 23, 1962, disclosed that defendant city's motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment were submitted.
The applicability of the summary judgment procedure (Code Civ.Proc. § 437c) to an action for declaratory relief is established. (Spencer v. Hibernia Bank, 186 Cal.App.2d 702, 712, 9 Cal.Rptr. 867.)
On May 11, 1962, the trial court filed a fifty page complete and thoroughly comprehensive memorandum of decision upon motions for summary judgment and upon general demurrer. The judgment was filed May 11, 1962, and entered on May 15, 1962.
The precise issue to be resolved on this appeal is whether Labor Code sections 1960
Defendant city is a municipal corporation, organized and existing under the Constitution and laws of the State of California, and holding a freeholders' charter. Defendant's charter was adopted and approved by the Legislature on January 22, 1925, and became effective on July 1, 1925. (Cal. stats. 1925, p. 1024.) Under the provisions of sections 6 and 8, and more particularly subsection 4 of section 8 1/2 of article XI of the California Constitution, the people of this state have conferred upon defendant city plenary and exclusive authority over all matters concerning the management, control and supervision of its departments and employees.
By virtue of this authority the people of defendant city have enacted and the Legislature has ratified specific and detailed charter provisions concerning the particular matters under consideration. These provisions have the same force and effect within the city as statutes enacted by the Legislature upon matters which it is competent to regulate. (Dinan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal.App. 217, 219, 222, 223-224, 91 P. 806; Adams v. Wolff, 84 Cal.App.2d 435, 440, 190 P.2d 665.)
Under and by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by section 78 of the city charter, defendant city's board of fire commissioners has adopted rules and regulations pertaining to the control and management of defendant's fire department and members of that department (i. e. sec. 15, subsecs. (h), (k) and (l) of the rules and regulations of the fire department, supra). As rules relating to the management and control of defendant's fire department and its employees which have been specifically authorized by and are not in conflict with the city's charter, these rules have the same force and effect as the charter provisions themselves. (Viner v. Civil Service Com., 59 Cal.App.2d 458, 465, 139 P.2d 88.)
Under and by virtue of sections 6 and 8 of article XI of the California Constitution and sections 2, 33 and 35 of the charter, defendant city has adopted an ordinance (i. e. No. 89,935) providing for the adoption, application and administration of the civil service classification plan for members of the defendant's fire department. This ordinance, as amended, provides a detailed regulation of all terms and conditions relating to employment of firemen in defendant's fire department. This ordinance has the same force and effect within the defendant city as a statute passed by the state Legislature has within the area in which the Legislature is competent to act. (Monterey Club v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.App.2d 131, 147, 119 P.2d 349; Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal.App.2d 348, 370, 203 P.2d 37.)
In support of their position that the pertinent sections of the Labor Code are applicable to defendant City of Los Angeles, plaintiffs rely upon a recent opinion of the Attorney General--35 Opinions of the Attorney General of California 191, and the cases cited therein in support of the opinion; a memorandum opinion by Judge M. G. Del Mutolo in International Association of Fire Fighters Local 1319 v. City of Palo Alto, Santa Clara County Superior Court No. 128184; and the recent case of International Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. County of Merced, 204 A.C.A. 439, 22 Cal.Rptr. 270.
The Palo Alto case is presently on appeal before the District Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division 1, Cal.App., 29 Cal.Rptr. 219.
The pivotal question is whether the internal affairs of the defendant city's fire department constitute a 'municipal affair' or whether they are a matter of statewide concern. What was stated by the learned trial judge in his memorandum is dispositive of this issue and we hereby adopt it in pertinent part as follows:
'The Civil Service generally, and maintenance of the Fire Department, is a municipal affair; and the Charter, and rules adopted pursuant thereto, govern the rights of the Civil Service Commission, the appointing power, and the City employees of all classes. (Cunningham v. Hart, supra, 80 Cal.App.2d 902 [183 P.2d 75]; Higgins v. Lynch, 72 Cal.App.2d 526, 529 [164 P.2d 943]; cf. Pearson v. Los Angeles County, 49 Cal.2d 523, 535 [319 P.2d 624].) The internal affairs of the organization and maintenance of a police or fire department are municipal affairs, solely governed by the Charter. (Lossman v. City of Stockton, 6 Cal.App.2d 324, 332 [44 P.2d 397]; Armas v. City of Oakland, 135 Cal.App. 411, 420 [27 P.2d 666, 28 P.2d 422]; cf. Popper v. Broderick, 123 Cal. 456 [56 P. 53].) The granting of firemen's pensions is a municipal affair, not subject to State legislative control. (Murphy v. City of Piedmont, 17 Cal.App.2d 569 [62 P.2d 614, 64 P.2d 399]; Richards v. Wheeler, 10 Cal.App.2d 108, 111 [51 P.2d 436].) Also, terms and conditions of employment are strictly a municipal affair and charter and ordinances relating thereto prevail. (Klench v. Board of Pension Comrs., 79 Cal.App. 171 [249 P. 46]; Jackson v. Wilde, 52 Cal.App. 259 [198 P. 822].)
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'As early as San Francisco v. [Liverpool & L. & G.] Insurance Co., 74 Cal. 113 [15 P. 380], it was held (p. 124): 'The management and control of the fire departments have always been left to local authorities. The fact that the state at large has an interest in the efficiency of the departments does not render the end any less a municipal one. The people of the state have such an interest in all the police powers granted to these municipalities. And even if the state may exercise a concurrent supervision over a subject, still, so far as actually controlled by the local board, it is a matter of municipal concern.'
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'Concededly, the employment of local fire departments in extraterritorial aid of those of other cities during major catastrophies is a well-recognized subject of general concern, amenable to general law. But that the citizens of any given city, maintaining their own fire department, have any direct or state interest in the control of the number of men, organization, employment, or grievances in other cities in the State is far-fetched. In respect to the Los Angeles Fire Department, it cannot be an interest in raising general standards, for it is a matter of common knowledge that Los Angeles and other chartered cities of California already lead the nation. Los Angeles has the third largest department in the United States, serving the second-largest incorporated area [457.9 square miles].
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'It is the fact that they are its officers and employees, rather than the nature of their function, which gives effect to the exclusive municipal charter power over their relationships. Thus, city policemen predominantly enforce state law; but this does not take their personal relationships out of the category of a constitutionally exclusive municipal affair under Article XI, section 8 1/2 (Elder v. McDougald, 145 Cal. 740 [79 P. 429]; Graham v. Mayor etc. of Fresno, supra, 51 Cal. 465, 472 [91 P. 147]); irrespective whether the duties are exacted by the charter or imposed by general law (Matter of Dodge, supra, 135 Cal. 512 [67 P.2d 973]); nor did it, in respect to a reporter for a police court, holding preliminary examinations under general law (Trefts v. McDougald, supra, 15 Cal.App. 584, 588 [115 P. 655]); or a city sealer of weights and measures enforcing state law (Milliken v. Meyers, supra, 25 Cal.App. 510, 514-515 [144 P. 321]); or a school director (Stern v. City of Berkeley, 25 Cal.App. 685, 690 [145 P. 167]). 'Such statutes as Labor Code sections 1960-1963, and Government Code sections 3500-3509, not only involve the individual firemen, but also cast correlative duties upon the municipal officers in respect to personnel management, an internal business concern; which in this case is asserted to conflict with and invalidate charter procedures and rules which are made under its authority.
'We hold that the Labor Code sections 1960-1963 and Government Code sections 3500-3509 are inapplicable to the defendant * * * which itself is empowered in the subject matter (Charter, secs. 17, 76, 78, 79, 80; 2(11) p). It has power to adopt or make applicable state law (Charter 2(4)) and Rule 15 pro tanto, seems to have done so. We are bound to follow the well-established rule in determining that the matters concerned are municipal affairs, in which the Charter and Rule 15 are paramount * * *.'
The judgment is affirmed.
WOOD, P.J., and LILLIE, J., concur.
Sec. 1960: 'Neither the State nor any county, political subdivision, incorporated city, town, nor any other municipal corporation shall prohibit, deny or obstruct the right of firefighters to join any bona fide labor organization of their own choice.'
Sec. 1961: 'As used in this chapter, the term 'employees' means the employees of the fire departments and fire services of the State, counties, cities, cities and counties, districts, and other political subdivisions of the State.'
Sec. 1962: 'Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to present grievances and recommendations regarding wages, salaries, hours, and working conditions to the governing body, and to discuss the same with such governing body, through such an organization, but shall not have the right to strike, or to recognize a picket line of a labor organization while in the course of the performance of their official duties.'
Sec. 1963: 'The enactment of this chapter shall not be construed as making the provisions of Section 923 of this code applicable to public employees.'