Opinion
C. A. 9:23-05260-JD-MHC
11-06-2023
James Hildred Proctor, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Rebecca Reifer; PA DOC; Mark Dialesandro; John Stabiel, Jr., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
This is a civil action filed by Plaintiff James Hildred Proctor, Jr., a state prisoner at SCI-Houtzdale in Houtzdale, Pennsylvania. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff appears to bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that prison guards at SCI-Greene attacked him on June 21, 2020. Plaintiff requests monetary damages and that “people [be] fired [and] arrested.”
Some of the claims may be duplicative of those asserted in another case recently filed by Plaintiff in this Court. See Proctor v. Dialesandro, No. 9:23-05070-JD-MHC (D.S.C.).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se complaint is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
A review of Plaintiff's Complaint reveals venue is not appropriate in the District of South Carolina. In general, venue is only proper in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). If a case is filed in the wrong venue, a court may transfer a case to any other district where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses” and “in the interest of justice.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”). A court need not have personal jurisdiction over a defendant to transfer a case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) or 1406(a). See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962); O'Neal v. Hicks Brokerage Co., 537 F.2d 1266, 1268 (4th Cir. 1976). Questions regarding transfer are committed to the sound discretion of the district court. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988); Brock v. Entre Computer Ctrs., Inc., 933 F.2d 1253, 1257 (4th Cir. 1991).
None of named Defendants reside in South Carolina and Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the events or omissions that gave rise to this claim occurred in this district. Therefore, venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 is not appropriate in the District of South Carolina.
On September 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed a case in the Western District of Pennsylvania against Dialesandro, Stabiel, and three other defendants that are not named as defendants in this action. The case was closed on June 13, 2023, because Plaintiff failed to comply with that court's deficiency order and failed to pay the filing fee or file a properly supported motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See Proctor v. Dialesandro, Case number 2:22-01405-PLD (W.D. Pa.). Plaintiff also filed a habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Middle District of Pennsylvania on August 9, 2023. See Proctor v. Warden, No. 3:23-1323-MEM-DB (M.D. Pa.). A federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts. See Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of other courts' records and proceedings).
Defendants all appear to be residents of Pennsylvania for purposes of venue. See ECF No. 1 at 2-3 (listing Pennsylvania addresses for all Defendants). Plaintiff lists addresses for two of the Defendants, Mark Dialesandro and John Stabile, Jr., as Waynesburg, Pennsylvania, which is in Greene County, Pennsylvania. Defendant Rebecca Reifer's address is in Houtzdale, Pennsylvania, which is in Clearfield County. The address for PA DOC is Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, which is in Cumberland County. It appears that the majority of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred at SCI-Greene (see ECF No. 1 at 5, 7), a PA DOC correctional institution located in Greene County. Clearfield and Greene Counties are located within the judicial district of the Western District of Pennsylvania (see 28 U.S.C. § 118(c)). Cumberland County is located within the judicial district of the Middle District of Pennsylvania (see 28 U.S.C. § 118(b)).
Therefore, the appropriate venue in this case appears to be the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The convenience of the parties and interests of justice are better served by a transfer of venue. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that this case be transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).