Opinion
20210026-CA
12-16-2021
Zola Mae Price, Petitioner, v. Labor Commission, Douglas Knell Enterprises Inc., and WCF Insurance, Respondents.
Virginius Dabney and Stony Olsen, Attorneys for Petitioner Eugene C. Miller Jr., Attorney for Respondents Douglas Knell Enterprises Inc. and WCF Insurance
Original Proceeding in this Court
Virginius Dabney and Stony Olsen, Attorneys for Petitioner
Eugene C. Miller Jr., Attorney for Respondents Douglas Knell Enterprises Inc. and WCF Insurance
Judge Ryan M. Harris authored this Opinion, in which Judges Gregory K. Orme and David N. Mortensen concurred.
OPINION
HARRIS, JUDGE
¶1 In this case, we are asked to determine whether an injured worker who settled her contested claim for permanent total disability benefits can later seek additional compensation that was not contemplated in the settlement agreement. The Labor Commission rejected Zola Mae Price's efforts to do so, determining that she should be held to the benefits of her bargain. We decline to disturb the Commission's determination.
When reviewing the propriety of an administrative order granting a motion to dismiss, "we accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and consider those facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to" the petitioner. See Hobbs v. Labor Comm'n, 1999 UT App 308, ¶ 6, 991 P.2d 590 (quotation simplified).
¶2 In 1995, Price worked for Douglas Knell Enterprises Inc. (DKE), a company that owned a motel. One day, while carrying heavy motel linens to launder, Price's "spine gave out." The resultant injuries necessitated surgery, and DKE paid temporary total disability benefits. Later, however, Price filed a claim for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. While DKE did not contest Price's claim that she had been injured on the job, and did not contest its obligation to pay temporary total disability benefits, it did contest Price's claim that she was permanently and totally disabled, and denied any obligation to pay PTD benefits.
¶3 Rather than proceed to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of Price's PTD claim, the parties entered into a stipulated settlement agreement resolving that claim. The agreement was titled "Agreement for Permanent Total Disability and Order of Approval Based upon Claim of Disputed Validity," and it purported to represent a "full and final settlement of any and all claims for workers' compensation benefits which [Price] has against [DKE] arising out of [Price's] industrial accident."
¶4 In the agreement, the parties acknowledged that Price had "sustained personal injuries as a result of an industrial accident arising out of and in the course of her employment," but the agreement specifically recited that "the parties disagree as to whether or not [Price] is permanently and totally disabled." The agreement also recited that Price had undergone a vocational assessment in which the evaluator had noted Price's "lack of interest in a number of jobs" and that "motivation and attitude are both important factors to success" in employment. Indeed, Price "expressly acknowledge[d]" in the agreement that DKE was "not admitting any liability whatsoever," and the agreement further recited that DKE was agreeing to make certain payments only "to avoid further litigation between the parties."
¶5 Finally, in the concluding paragraph, the agreement recited that Price had "carefully read and [understood]" the agreement and that she had "been advised by her own legal counsel" in the matter. Price acknowledged that, by entering into the agreement, she was "giving up the right to a hearing" in which "an administrative law judge could give her more money, the same amount, or less money than" she was to receive pursuant to the agreement. And Price also acknowledged that she could "never contest" or "re-open the terms" of the settlement, and that it was "a final and binding agreement." Simply put, "except for . . . amounts to be paid pursuant" to the settlement, the agreement provided that DKE would "have no additional liability to [Price] as a result of the accident." Price and her attorney both executed the agreement in December 1997.
¶6 Under the settlement, Price was to receive weekly monetary payments "for so long as [she should] live." After acknowledging that-if the matter proceeded to a hearing and she were found to be permanently and totally disabled-Price "could be" entitled to $167 per week in benefits, the parties outlined the agreed-upon terms. Beginning in November 1997, Price was to receive $95 per week for 312 weeks, then $80 per week thereafter, subject to one condition: once Price began receiving Social Security retirement benefits, the amount of her weekly settlement payments would be "off-set in the amount of 50% of her Social Security retirement benefits."
¶7 After entering into the settlement agreement, the parties asked a Labor Commission administrative law judge to approve it, as they were required to do under then-applicable Labor Commission regulations. See Utah Admin. Code R568-1-16 (1995) ("Settlement agreements involving claims of doubtful compensability shall be subject to approval by the Commission."). The judge approved the settlement in a two-page order in January 1998. The record before us does not reveal whether the judge held a hearing to consider the matter, and does not reveal what materials the judge considered before signing the order. At the outset of his order, the judge "recogniz[ed] the disputed nature of [Price's] claim," and "ordered and acknowledged that this is a settlement of a disputed claim." The judge approved all the specific terms agreed upon by the parties, including the weekly payment amount and the condition reducing Price's weekly payments upon receiving Social Security retirement benefits.
¶8 The parties operated under the terms of the settlement agreement, without apparent complaint or complication, for the next twenty-two years: Price received settlement payments of $95 per week for the first 312 weeks, then $80 per week until 2012, when Price became eligible to receive Social Security retirement benefits; after that point, the payments were reduced to $8 per week due to the agreed-upon offset.
¶9 In July 2020, however, Price filed a new claim with the Commission requesting increased payments related to the 1995 accident. Price argued that her payments under the settlement agreement were too low and should be adjusted accordingly. Among other things, she asserted that the payments failed to account for the statutory minimum weekly compensation rates afforded for permanent total disability awards, and thus claimed that her monthly payments should be "adjusted in accordance with the" statutory guidelines. In addition, she asserted that the Social Security offset was improper, in light of the Utah Supreme Court's 2009 decisions declaring such offsets unconstitutional. See Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm'n (Merrill I), 2009 UT 26, 223 P.3d 1089; Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm'n (Merrill II), 2009 UT 74, 223 P.3d 1099. Price claimed she was entitled to recoup the portion reduced from past payments due to the offset, and receive increased future payments by eliminating the offset.
¶10 DKE filed a motion to dismiss Price's claim for increased payments, asserting that Price agreed to settle her disputed PTD claim for a specific amount and that she should be held to the benefit of her bargain. An administrative law judge (the ALJ) agreed with DKE and dismissed the claim with prejudice. Price then asked the Commission to review the ALJ's decision, asserting that re-opening the terms of the settlement agreement was proper because there had not been any bona fide dispute about whether she was permanently and totally disabled. The Commission rejected this argument and affirmed the ALJ's determination. Relying on a statutory subsection enacted in 2014, the Commission concluded that the parties' settlement agreement "extinguish[ed] . . . Price's present claim for additional benefits." See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(5) (LexisNexis 2019) ("A full and final settlement approved under [the Workers' Compensation Act] shall extinguish the employer's liability to the employee . . . except for an issue that is expressly preserved."). The Commission concluded that "disregard[ing] the terms of the agreement and revisit[ing] Price's entitlement would be contrary to the parties' intentions at the time of the settlement and the purposes behind allowing settlement agreements in the workers' compensation context."
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11 Price now seeks judicial review of the Commission's dismissal of her 2020 claim. An agency's decision to grant a motion to dismiss presents a question of law, which we review for correctness, affording no deference to the agency. Hobbs v. Labor Comm'n, 1999 UT App 308, ¶ 6, 991 P.2d 590; see also Baker v. Labor Comm'n, 2015 UT App 127, ¶ 6, 351 P.3d 111.
ANALYSIS
¶12 We begin our analysis with an overview of the legal principles governing settlement of claims in the workers' compensation context, including a discussion of how those principles operated in 1997 and 1998 when the settlement agreement at issue here was entered into and approved. We then turn to the three specific arguments Price raises in support of her challenge to the Commission's ruling.
I
¶13 Utah's Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) provides "the exclusive remedy" for employees to gain redress from their employers for "any accident, injury, or death" sustained or incurred during employment. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1) (LexisNexis 2019); see also Stamper v. Johnson, 2010 UT 26, ¶ 12, 232 P.3d 514. Our workers' compensation system "is a mutual arrangement of reciprocal rights between an employer and an employee whereby both parties give up and gain certain advantages." Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d 678, 679 (Utah 1985). "The Act's remedial scheme [is] a 'quid pro quo' in which employees are able to recover for job-related injuries without showing fault and employers are protected from tort suits by virtue of the Act's exclusive remedy provision." Helf v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2009 UT 11, ¶ 16, 203 P.3d 962 (quotation simplified). The "primary objective" of workers' compensation statutes is to remove industrial accidents "from the concept of the law of tort," Bryan v. Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d 892, 893 (Utah 1975), and thereby provide employees "a measure of economic security for themselves and their families . . . without the risks and uncertainties involved in attempting to prove that it was negligence on the part of the employer . . . which caused the injury or disability," Buhler v. Gossner, 530 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1975). "In place of common law remedies, the Act creates an administrative scheme that seeks to provide a simple, adequate, and speedy remedy for workers injured on the job, while also protecting employers from disruptive or vexatious lawsuits for alleged negligence." Helf, 2009 UT 11, ¶ 16 (quotation simplified).
¶14 The Act mandates that individuals injured in workplace accidents "shall be paid . . . compensation for loss sustained." See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2019). In order to facilitate such payments, an employer is required "to secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits for its employees," usually through insurance. See id. § 34A-2-201. Employers who fail to secure payment for injured workers are subject to criminal penalties, see id. § 34A-2-209(1), and in that event "the employee has the option of seeking damages from the employer in a civil action brought in the courts," see Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 770 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1989); see also Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-207(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2019). Our supreme court has emphasized that Utah's workers' compensation statutes should be construed "liberally in favor of finding employee coverage." See Olsen v. Samuel McIntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1998).
¶15 Outside the workers' compensation context, litigants may generally settle individual personal injury claims on any mutually acceptable terms and conditions. But in the workers' compensation context, Utah law has historically placed some restrictions on parties' ability to settle claims. Our supreme court has long held that, at least in cases where the worker's "right to recover is quite doubtful," settlement of workers' compensation claims "is not detrimental to the interest of the state or of the public," and that in such cases parties have the right to "settle their own controversy and avoid litigation." See Brigham Young Univ. v. Industrial Comm'n, 279 P. 889, 893 (Utah 1929); see also Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 135 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah 1943) (stating that, "[w]here the facts to establish liability are in dispute and there is reasonable doubt about the existence of any liability," settlement of workers' compensation claims is appropriate). But where the employer admits that "the injury arose out of or in the course of the employment" and that the employee is entitled to recover something on the claim, then "a release or settlement agreement as for a partial disability does not constitute a bar to a claim for compensation which . . . would be payable on account of a subsequent change of condition or a new development not contemplated at the time of the release or settlement agreement." See Barber Asphalt, 135 P.2d at 272; see also Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Utah 1984) (allowing the amount of benefits to be later revisited, even though the worker's impairment rating had been arrived at by settlement, where there was no dispute that the worker had sustained a "permanent back impairment" and where the worker alleged that his medical condition had worsened since the settlement).
¶16 More recently, we analyzed this case law and applicable provisions of the Act and concluded that settlements in workers' compensation cases "are appropriate only when the compensable nature of the worker's injury is disputed and the worker's right to recover is doubtful." See Wilburn v. Interstate Elec., 748 P.2d 582, 586 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). We stated that a worker's right to recover must be considered disputed if the parties, at the time of the settlement, "in good faith, viewed [the] claim as one of doubtful compensability." Id. at 587 (quotation simplified). And we stated that we will defer to an administrative law judge's determination that a claim is of doubtful compensability. Id. We noted that allowing workers to settle disputed workers' compensation claims could have "harsh consequences" in the event that a worker's condition later worsens, but stated that "compassion for [workers] does not justify the erosion of a principle and policy pertaining to compensation agreements generally." Id. And at the end of our opinion, we acknowledged the parties' representation that the Commission had a policy of "encourag[ing] the settlement of claims," as well as a "practice . . . to approve settlement agreements before their execution," and urged the Commission to "implement a process" to "formalize its long-standing practice of getting involved in the settlement of claims" in order "to safeguard against abuses that might otherwise occur." Id.
¶17 Following our suggestion in Wilburn, the Commission enacted an administrative rule intended to govern the settlement of claims in the workers' compensation context. Those rules-as they existed in 1995, at the time of Price's industrial accident- stated that "[s]ettlement agreements are appropriate . . . when the parties, in good faith, view the claim as one of doubtful compensability." See Utah Admin. Code R568-1-16 (1995). Any such settlement was "subject to approval by the Commission," which was tasked with "determining if [the] claim is of doubtful compensability." Id. In doing so, the Commission was to "look to the facts of the matter" and was not to consider itself "bound by mere recitations in the settlement agreement." Id. Any settlement agreement approved by the Commission was to "be final and not subject to further review upon the same facts merely because of subsequent dissatisfaction." Id.
When adjudicating workers' compensation claims, "we apply the law as it exist[ed] at the time of the event regulated by the law in question." O'Connor v. Labor Comm'n, 2020 UT App 49, ¶ 11, 463 P.3d 85 (quotation simplified). Thus, because the industrial accident in this case occurred in 1995, we apply the law as it existed in 1995; we note that the Commission improperly relied on Utah Code section 34A-2-420(5)-enacted in 2014-to dismiss Price's present claim for benefits. See Workers' Compensation Amendments, ch. 82, § 1, 2014 Utah Laws 383, 383-84 (providing that "a full and final settlement" of a workers' compensation claim "shall extinguish the employer's liability to the employee"). However, as we explain herein, Price's arguments fail even under the law as it existed at the time of the accident.
¶18 The settlement agreement that the parties reached in this case appears to have been drafted with this administrative rule in mind. The agreement's very title proclaims that it is "based upon [a] claim of disputed validity," and it recites that "[t]he parties disagree as to whether or not [Price] is permanently and totally disabled" and were settling only "to avoid further litigation." Indeed, Price "expressly acknowledge[d]" that DKE was "not admitting any liability whatsoever." And the agreement even contained a reference to some of the evidence that DKE would have introduced, at a hearing, to rebut Price's claims of permanent total disability: it mentioned "an assessment evaluation" of Price that questioned her "motivation and attitude" and indicated that she had a "lack of interest in a number of jobs."
¶19 The agreement also delineated the compromises made by both parties in settling, thereby indicating that the parties genuinely disputed liability. DKE recognized that it "could be responsible" to Price for $167 per week for the remainder of her life but instead was paying only $95 per week, with reductions over time. Price recognized that, if the matter went to a hearing, a judge "could give her more money, the same amount, or less money than she is receiving for the settlement." Moreover, she acknowledged that, by entering into the agreement, she was giving up the right to contest the amount of compensation she would receive in the future, and that the sums to be paid pursuant to the agreement would resolve "any and all claims, past, present or future for temporary total disability, temporary partial disability, permanent partial disability, permanent total disability or death benefits in connection with" the workplace accident. And she confirmed that she understood she could never "re-open the terms of [the] settlement."
¶20 In addition, the parties saw to it that the agreement was approved by an administrative law judge. They filed the agreement with the Commission, and therein "requested" that the Commission "review and approve" it. Soon thereafter, an administrative law judge did in fact review and approve the agreement, memorializing that approval in a two-page order. In the order, the judge "ordered and acknowledged that this is a settlement of a disputed claim," and "recogniz[ed] the disputed nature of [Price's] claim." At the time, and for more than two decades thereafter, Price raised no challenge to that approval.
II
¶21 Now, some twenty-two years after administrative approval of the settlement, Price seeks additional compensation not contemplated in the agreement, and advances three grounds for her position. First, she contends that the agreement should not have been approved, and should not be binding now, because there was never a "bona fide dispute" about whether she was entitled to PTD benefits. Second, Price asserts that the agreement did not constitute a valid waiver of her right to receive at least the statutory minimum amount of PTD benefits. And finally, Price asserts that-in light of our supreme court's determination in 2009 that any offset for Social Security retirement benefits was unconstitutional-she is entitled to $80 per week rather than $8 per week. We discuss each of these arguments in turn.
A
¶22 Price's first argument is that the agreement should never have been approved in the first place, because there was not a bona fide dispute about her entitlement to PTD benefits. In support of this argument, Price asserts that, prior to the settlement agreement, the Social Security Administration had already found her to be disabled, and contends that the Commission could have relied upon that finding to determine that she was permanently and totally disabled. Without making any determination regarding the merits of this argument, we reject it here on procedural grounds: Price's challenge to the administrative law judge's 1998 determination comes far too late.
The argument may well have substantive infirmities too. The administrative rules then in effect stated that the Commission "may use" a disability finding by the Social Security Administration in making its own determination as to disability. See Utah Admin. Code R568-1-17(B) (1995). That is, the Commission was not required to defer to a disability determination made by the Social Security Administration, although it could elect to rely upon one. In this case, there is no indication-at least not in the record before us-that the judge who approved the settlement agreement was ever made aware of the Social Security Administration's disability finding. And in any event, in entering its order approving the settlement agreement, the judge relied on the parties' own representations-made notwithstanding the Social Security Administration's determination-that Price's entitlement to PTD benefits was very much in dispute. That determination is one to which we would have deferred, had the matter been challenged at the time. See Wilburn v. Interstate Elec., 748 P.2d 582, 586-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (deferring to an administrative law judge's determination that a claim was "of doubtful compensability," largely because the parties "in good faith" viewed it that way).
¶23 Generally, a decision made by an administrative law judge becomes final thirty days after its issuance, unless that decision is appealed to the Commission within that time frame. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801(3), (4) (LexisNexis 2019). As noted, Price did not appeal from the administrative law judge's 1998 order approving the settlement agreement, so that order is final.
In 1998, when the settlement was approved, the same thirty-day appeal period applied. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801(2), (3)(a) (1997) (stating that a party "may appeal the decision of an administrative law judge by filing a motion for review within 30 days of the date the decision is issued," and that, unless an appeal is filed, "the decision of an administrative law judge" is "final"). We cite the current statute only for convenience.
¶24 However, the Commission retains continuing jurisdiction over workers' compensation cases, and may "from time to time modify or change a former finding or order," even after the thirty-day appeal window has passed. See id. § 34A-2-420(1)(b); see also Waite v. Labor Comm'n, 2017 UT 86, ¶¶ 9-10, 416 P.3d 635 (explaining that the statutory grant of continuing jurisdiction authorizes the Commission to reexamine a claim, for twelve years, if "the employee's physical condition worsened" (quotation simplified)); Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2009 UT 71, ¶ 24, 222 P.3d 55 (clarifying that the statutory grant of continuing jurisdiction extends beyond the thirty-day appeal window). This "grant of continuing jurisdiction" is broader than, but "encompasses, the authority that district courts have under rule 60" of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and provides the Commission with the "ability to protect the substantive rights of its parties" and "to prevent inadequate or excessive awards." Frito-Lay, 2009 UT 71, ¶¶ 25, 26, 28 (quotation simplified). Should a party request late review due to "clerical or other error[s]" in an administrative decision, see id. ¶ 24, or file a new application for benefits "where a claimant's medical condition deviates from its anticipated course," the Commission may provide relief under this authority, see Waite, 2017 UT 86, ¶ 9 (quotation simplified) (recognizing "two appropriate bases" for invoking the Commission's continuing jurisdiction: "(1) a change in condition or new development or (2) the inadequacy of a previous award" (quotation simplified)); see also Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 770 P.2d 125, 129-30 (Utah 1989).
¶25 But this authority is not as broad as Price imagines. Our supreme court has recognized "a justified need for finality in administrative decisions." Merrill II, 2009 UT 74, ¶ 17, 223 P.3d 1099 (quotation simplified). While the Commission has continuing jurisdiction, "it lacks the authority to reopen workers' compensation proceedings to consider legal arguments not previously made." Id.; see also Spencer v. Industrial Comm'n, 290 P.2d 692, 694-95 (Utah 1955) (explaining that the Commission's continuing jurisdiction gives it the "authority to entertain further proceedings to deal with any substantial changes or unexpected developments that may arise as a result of the injury," but that it is "inconceivable . . . that a party could file a new application and have the Commission redetermine his cause on identical facts" and "[i]f such were the case, the proceedings themselves would be but a sham"). Challenges to previous factual determinations related to a claimant's changed medical condition fit squarely within the Commission's statutory grant of continuing jurisdiction, and may be asserted by bringing a new application for benefits. See Waite, 2017 UT 86, ¶ 9. But challenges to the propriety of final legal determinations made by the Commission (or by an administrative law judge) must be brought through "direct review and not by bringing another action upon the same cause," see Merrill II, 2009 UT 74, ¶ 17 (quotation simplified), or otherwise must be justified for reasons similar to those set forth in rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, see Frito-Lay, 2009 UT 71, ¶ 37 (stating that, although "rule 60 is inapplicable to" Commission cases, "the Commission has authority under the grant of continuing jurisdiction . . . to address claims that state courts would address under rule 60").Simple invocation of "continuing jurisdiction" is not sufficient to justify any late challenge to all rulings rendered by the Commission.
Price does not invoke rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and does not argue that any of the substantive grounds that might motivate a district court to grant relief under that rule would apply here.
¶26 In 1998, an administrative law judge determined that these parties had a genuine dispute as to whether Price was entitled to PTD benefits as a result of the 1995 industrial accident. The judge expressly "[r]ecogniz[ed] the disputed nature" of Price's claim, and twice more referred to her claim as "disputed." Both parties asked the judge to make this determination, and neither party appealed that determination to the Commission; thus, that determination became final in 1998. And the question of whether Price's claim to PTD benefits was- at the time-the subject of a bona fide dispute between the parties is not the sort of thing (unlike a claimant's potentially changing medical condition) that is subject to alteration by future events. Whatever evidence existed regarding the genuineness of the dispute should have been brought to the attention of the judge at the time, and any challenge to the judge's decision should have been brought within the thirty-day period. Any exceptional situations (involving the post-order discovery of additional unknown evidence, for instance) should be handled through invocation of principles similar to those animating rule 60.
¶27 Moreover, the administrative record before us now does not contain any materials from that time period, other than the settlement agreement as submitted to the judge and the judge's order. We do not know, for instance, what universe of materials the judge considered in making this determination, or whether the judge held a hearing on the matter. Due to the passage of time and the scant record before us, we are ill-equipped, twenty-three years later, to assess whether that determination was sound.
¶28 Price had the right to challenge the judge's 1998 determination within thirty days, but she didn't. And the statutory grant of continuing jurisdiction, while broad, is not broad enough to allow Price to challenge that determination now. We therefore accept as settled the judge's determination that, at the time of the settlement agreement, there was in fact a genuine dispute regarding Price's entitlement to PTD benefits.
B
¶29 Next, Price argues that the settlement does not reflect a waiver, on her part, of her right to recover at least the statutory minimum amount of PTD benefits. This argument is unpersuasive; indeed, the plain language of the agreement expresses an intent to waive any right to receive the statutory minimum payment.
¶30 Under the Act, a worker who is determined to be permanently and totally disabled is entitled to receive a minimum weekly amount of benefits. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(2) (LexisNexis 2019). For the first 312 weeks, the amount is (subject to certain exceptions) two-thirds "of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury." Id. Thereafter, the amount is "36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar," id. § 34A-2-413(2)(c), a figure that is recalculated each year, see O'Connor v. Labor Comm'n, 2020 UT App 49, ¶ 4, 463 P.3d 85. This statutory minimum entitlement, available to those who are adjudicated as permanently and totally disabled, furthers the policies behind the Act, which are to "provide[] economic support for injured workers and their families . . . thereby relieving society of the care and support of the unfortunate victims of industrial accidents." See Touchard v. La-Z-Boy Inc., 2006 UT 71, ¶ 14, 148 P.3d 945 (quotation simplified).
¶31 The first problem with Price's argument is that she was never determined to be permanently and totally disabled; indeed, her status as such was the subject of a bona fide dispute between the parties at the time of the settlement. The statutory minimum entitlement, as noted, is available only to workers who have been so adjudicated. Until such an adjudication occurs, a worker has no right to receive the statutory minimum amount; because Price had not been so adjudicated, she possessed no statutory right that was subject to waiver.
¶32 Second, and more to the point, Price did waive any right she might have acquired, at some point in the future, to receive the statutory minimum amount of PTD benefits. We acknowledge Price's assertion that, under Utah law, waiver of a statutory right "must be clear and unmistakable," and that courts "will not infer from a general contractual provision that the parties intended to waive a statutorily protected right unless the undertaking is explicitly stated." See Pioneer Builders Co. of Nevada v. K D A Corp., 2018 UT App 206, ¶ 15, 437 P.3d 539 (quotation simplified). But here, Price's waiver of any right to receive the statutory minimum amount was clearly and unmistakably made.
¶33 In the settlement agreement, the parties recited that, in the event that Price was determined to be permanently and totally disabled, DKE "could be responsible for compensation benefits to [Price] for the remainder of [her] life at a rate of $167.00 per week." The agreement itself does not contain any information about where this $167 figure came from, but Price asserts in her briefing that the minimum PTD award at the time of the settlement was "no less than $167 a week" after the "first 312 weeks." Thus, according to Price, this amount was a reference to a statutory minimum amount DKE might have been obligated to pay if Price had been adjudicated permanently and totally disabled.
¶34 Despite her knowledge that she might be entitled to $167 per week if her claim turned out to be successful, Price clearly waived any right she might have later acquired to receive that amount. Immediately after the reference to the possible $167 weekly amount, the agreement states that, "rather than litigate the issue of permanent total disability, the parties have agreed to settle this case on a disputed basis." The agreement later recited that "[t]he above sums"-$95 per week for 312 weeks, then $80 per week, until the Social Security offset-"are being paid and accepted in order to avoid further litigation" and are "in settlement of any and all claims for . . . permanent total disability" benefits. Finally, Price acknowledged that, by entering into the agreement, she was "giving up the right to a hearing before the Labor Commission wherein an administrative law judge could give her more money, the same amount, or less money than she is receiving for the settlement." DKE knew that it could be liable for at least $167 per week if it lost at a hearing; Price knew that she could end up with nothing if she lost at a hearing. By agreeing on a sum in the middle, "both parties undertook a risk that the resolution of the uncertainty might be unfavorable." See Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah 1985).
¶35 Our supreme court has recognized that "parties to a settlement each bear . . . risk[s] that could cut either way." Merrill II, 2009 UT 74, ¶ 18, 223 P.3d 1099. Parties to a settlement "are entitled to contract on their own terms," and courts will not step in "to relieve either party from the effects of a bad bargain." Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982). In view of her litigation risks, Price agreed to accept a monthly settlement payment that was significantly lower than the minimum statutory amount that she would have been entitled to receive had she prevailed at a hearing. Price's waiver of her potential right to receive the statutory minimum amount was "clear and unmistakable," see Pioneer Builders, 2018 UT App 206, ¶ 15 (quotation simplified), and we are bound to enforce the agreed-upon terms, see Monaco Apartment Homes v. Figueroa, 2021 UT App 50, ¶¶ 9-10, 489 P.3d 1132 (explaining that courts are not "empowered to rewrite the settlement agreed upon by the parties" (quotation simplified)).
C
¶36 Finally, Price challenges a provision in the agreement that operates to lower her weekly benefits by half of the amount of Social Security retirement benefits she receives. In the settlement agreement, Price quite clearly agreed to an offset equal to "50% of her Social Security retirement benefits." This agreement reflected the requirements of a then-applicable statutory provision, contained in the Act, which mandated that the minimum weekly amount to which permanently and totally disabled workers were otherwise entitled "'shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period.'" See Merrill I, 2009 UT 26, ¶ 2, 223 P.3d 1089 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(5) (2005)). But at the time, Price did not challenge the constitutionality of this statutory provision; instead, she agreed to a settlement that incorporated its limitations. Now, Price points out that-eleven years after she entered into the agreement-our supreme court declared that statutory provision unconstitutional, and she claims that she is entitled to receive the full agreed-upon $80 per week, both prospectively and dating back to 2012.
¶37 In two related opinions, our supreme court addressed the constitutionality of the Social Security offset provision in the Act. See generally id.; Merrill II, 2009 UT 74. In Merrill I, the court held that this provision violated constitutional equal protection principles because it "singl[ed] out and reduc[ed] workers' compensation benefits of injured individuals over the age of sixty-five who qualify for social security retirement benefits." See 2009 UT 26, ¶ 38.
¶38 In a second opinion issued a few months later, the court discussed whether its decision in Merrill I was to be applied retroactively, or prospectively only. See Merrill II, 2009 UT 74, ¶¶ 12-20. As applied to this case, Merrill II's instructions are not entirely clear. On the one hand, in addressing whether Merrill I applied to "future payments," the court held-without apparent exception-that "[n]o one may take offsets for payments made after the date" of the ruling in Merrill I, and stated that, "[i]f an ongoing stream of future payments exists from and after" the date of Merrill I, "our ruling applies to them." See Merrill II, 2009 UT 74, ¶ 14. But later in the opinion, in addressing the extent to which Merrill I applied to settled cases, the court stated as follows:
[W]e believe that waiver and finality are most applicable to settled cases. Settlements, we believe, should not be upset, even because of a change in the law; the process of compromise they represent is too multifaceted and context-driven to permit unwinding. The parties to a settlement each bear the risk of a subsequent change in or clarification of the law-a risk that could cut either way.
Accordingly, for claimants who actively negotiated and settled their claims, and thus chose not to challenge the offset, our ruling will have no retroactive effect.Id. ¶¶ 18-19. And the court went on to state that, due to principles of "waiver and finality," claimants "who disputed claims but settled without obtaining an express designation of permanent total disability . . . have, for whatever reason, foregone the ability to recoup payments." Id. ¶ 20.
¶39 Price directs our attention to the statement made in paragraph 14 of Merrill II, and asserts that "[n]o one," without exception and including DKE, "may take offsets for payments made after" issuance of Merrill I. DKE, by contrast, directs our attention to the statements made in paragraphs 18-20 of Merrill II, and asserts that, "for claimants who actively negotiated and settled their claims, and thus chose not to challenge the offset, our ruling will have no retroactive effect."
¶40 We acknowledge Price's citation to our supreme court's unquestionably broad language in paragraph 14 of Merrill II. Her argument that "[n]o one may take offsets for payments made after" the issuance of Merrill I is not without force. Read in isolation, this statement could be construed to mean that even payments made pursuant to a settlement agreement come within Merrill I's ambit. But in our view, the best contextual reading of Merrill II gives force to the more specific language-dealing particularly with settlement agreements-that appears later in the opinion, where the court stated that "[s]ettlements . . . should not be upset, even because of a change in the law," and that for "claimants who actively negotiated and settled their claims, and who thus chose not to challenge the offset, our ruling will have no retroactive effect." See id. ¶¶ 18-19. At least in interpreting statutes, courts give specific provisions more weight than general provisions. See, e.g., Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt., 2004 UT 12, ¶ 9, 84 P.3d 1201 ("When two statutory provisions conflict in their operation, the provision more specific in application governs over the more general provision." (quotation simplified)). We see no reason not to apply that same interpretive principle to examination of a judicial opinion. Cf. Iota LLC v. Davco Mgmt. Co., 2016 UT App 231, ¶ 33, 391 P.3d 239 ("Generally, we interpret language in judicial documents in the same way we interpret contract language.").
¶41 Accordingly, we conclude that the series of payments to which these parties agreed, in their settlement of Price's disputed claim to PTD benefits, is not subject to the rule established in Merrill I. Price could have challenged the constitutionality of the Social Security offset provision back in 1997. She decided not to and, instead, voluntarily entered into a settlement agreement that expressly reduced her weekly payments by half of her Social Security retirement benefits. In entering into that agreement, the parties assumed "the risk of a subsequent change in the clarification of the law-a risk that could [have] cut either way." See Merrill II, 2009 UT 74, ¶ 18. Other factors went into that agreement too; as the supreme court noted, "the process of compromise" that happens prior to a settlement "is too multifaceted and context-driven to permit unwinding" the settlement due to a subsequent change in the law. Id. Price agreed to the Social Security offset as part of the settlement, and the Merrill opinions do not operate to relieve her of that bargain.
CONCLUSION
¶42 More than two decades ago, Price settled a disputed claim for PTD benefits with her employer. In doing so, she agreed to accept monthly settlement payments that were less than the established statutory minimum weekly compensation rate for workers adjudicated as permanently and totally disabled, and she agreed to offset the payments by half of her Social Security benefits. For the reasons stated, Price should be held to the benefits of her bargain, and we decline to disturb the Commission's order dismissing Price's later-filed claim for additional benefits.