Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-3016, SECTION "K" (5)
August 27, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Before this court is a Motion for Summary Judgment brought by defendant Housing Authority of New Orleans, ("HANO"). (Rec. Doc. 62). HANO contends that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to plaintiff Stanley Price's allegations and therefore, plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice, at plaintiffs cost. For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS HANO's motion.
BACKGROUND
This action involves a pro se plaintiff, Stanley Price, against the Housing Authority of New Orleans, Benjamin Bell, in his capacity as Director of HANO, Chequita McGowan, in her capacity as Interim Director of Human Resources for HANO, Selarstein Mitchell, in her capacity as the Director of Human Resources for the HANO, Nicole Barnes, in her capacity as the Director of Housing Resident Loan Corporation for HANO, and Thaddeus Billy, in his capacity as the Public Housing Manager for HANO.
In his initial complaint, Price asserts that the defendants have violated certain federal laws. He cites the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968.
Although not entirely clear from the initial complaint, Price's grievance arose some time in June 2001 when defendants allegedly failed to hire him for the position of Accounting Specialist. Additionally, Price complains that defendants allegedly failed to extend economic opportunities to him, presumably in the form of a loan to his construction business or enter into any contracts with his construction business. Lastly, Price asserts that in 1997 the defendants removed Plaintiff from his residence in the Desire Development.
On October 11, 2002 this Court granted defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings dismissing Price's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The Court also granted plaintiff leave to amend and re-file his complaint reasserting his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and/or Title VI with more specificity. Price complied and clarified his allegations. He now claims that HANO discriminated against him when: (1) females were hired for the position of Accountant Specialist n, in violation of his rights as a member of a protected class (male gender); (2) HANO contracted with construction companies which are owned by Caucasian individuals and refused to contract with plaintiff, a member of a protected class (African-American); (3) HANO removed plaintiff from his mother's lease despite the fact that he was employed by HANO in 1996 and 1997 and his mother objected to his removal; and (4) HANO officials discriminated against him by refusing loans under the Housing Resident Loan Program, despite the fact that he submitted two business plans.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Stults v. Conoco, 76 F.3d 651, 656, (5th Cir. Feb. 29, 1996), (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). Finally, the Court notes that the substantive law determines materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court now turns to the merits of the arguments with these standards in mind.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs Title VI claims against the individual defendants
Plaintiff has sued HAND as well as HANO employees pursuant to Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. HANO argues that the individual defendants should be dismissed because individuals may not be sued under Title VI. The Court agrees. As previously set forth in its October 11, 2002 minute entry, "the plaintiff may bring this action under Title VI against HANO, but not the individual defendants." Title VI sets forth a remedy against an entity not an individual. Jackson v. Katy Independent School Dist., 951 F. Supp. 1293, 1298 (S.D. Tex. 1999). To state a claim for damages under Title VI, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the entity involved is engaging in racial discrimination; and (2) the entity involved is receiving federal financial assistance. Jackson, 951 F. Supp. at 1298. Because the proper defendant in a Title VI case is an entity rather than an individual, the individual defendants cannot be sued in their individual capacity under Title VI; therefore, Price's Title VI claim is dismissed as to the individual defendants.
Title VI states that
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
Plaintiffs Title VI claims against HANO
HANO contends that the Title VI claims brought by Price are barred by prescription and that Price has not created a material issue of fact that his action falls with in the applicable limitations period.
The statute of limitations for a Title VI action is governed by the forum state's prescriptive period for personal injury actions. See Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1515, 1521 (5th Cir. 1993). Under Louisiana law, a claim for personal injury is a delictual action and must be brought within one year.
La.C.C. art 3492 states in pertinent part: "Delictual actions are subject to a liberative prescription of one year. This prescription commences to run from the day injury or damage is sustained."
Price alleges that HANO awarded contracts to white-owned companies in 1995, 2000, and 2001. Price argues, however, that he was denied a contract with HANO in 1995. His supporting documentation and his deposition suggest that Price's injury occurred in 1995. In his deposition Price states:
Q: Did you submit a bid to a state, public or private entity from 1991 up until the present where the contract award was $3,000,000?
A: Nope.
Q: And did you submit a bid between 1991 to the present to a public body where the contract award was $10,000?
A: Not to a public body, no.
Q: To whom did you prepare such a bid or proposal and when?
A: It was in 94 or 95 for Dweller's Incorporation.
Q: That's the only one you can refer to; is that correct?
A: That's the only one I can recall right now.
Deposition of Stanley Price, p. 103. Price has not submitted any evidence to dispute the fact that the alleged violation occurred in 1994 or 1995. He merely brings forth unsubstantiated allegations that HANO has undergone "intense efforts to conceal information propounded in discovery" and that he will submit "contracts issued to developers in connection with the Hope VI Revitalization Project at Desire Development." Neither of Price's arguments have merit, nor do they contest HANO's the deposition testimony that establishes that the alleged incident occurred in 1995. The Court acknowledge's Price's pro se status, however, even a pro se plaintiff must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" and may not defeat a motion for summary judgment on allegations alone. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). Price has not met his burden and, therefore, his cause of action against HANO under Title VI is hereby dismissed as prescribed.
Plaintiff's § 1983 action
The Court notes that Price has not set forth any factual allegations in his complaint that specifically relate to a § 1983 claim. However, in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment he states that he "inadvertently omits in the amended pleading that the specified facts are applicable" to a § 1983 action. Because this circuit follows a policy of leniency towards pro se litigants, the Court will construe the facts in Price's complaint as also alleged under a § 1983 action. Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 1998). In order to state a claim for relief under 42U.S.C. § 1983, where a plaintiff alleges employment discrimination as the constitutional violation, a plaintiff must show: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) that the plaintiff was qualified for the position at issue; (3) that the defendant made an adverse employment decision despite the plaintiffs qualifications; and (4) that the person chosen over the plaintiff was not a member of the protected class. Lee v. Conecuh County Bd. of Educ., 634 F.2d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that in section 1983 suits alleging racially motivated employment discrimination, however, the factors set forth in McDonnell-Douglas represent one means by which a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case). Price claims that HANO and the defendants intentionally discriminated against him based on his race by awarding contracts to white contractors in November of 2000 and in 2001. Price also alleges that defendants Selarstein Mitchell and Chequita McGowan discriminated against him by hiring females for the position of Accounting Specialist n, despite the fact that he was more qualified than the women who were chosen for the position.
Gender Discrimination
Price has not met his burden of coming forward with specific facts to show that the defendants violated § 1983 by discriminating against him based on his gender. In case involving gender discrimination in the employment setting brought under § 1983, the court uses the same framework it previously outlined in the context of a racial employment discrimination case. To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) that the plaintiff was qualified for the position at issue; (3) that the defendant made an adverse employment decision despite the plaintiffs qualifications; and (4) that the person chosen over the plaintiff was not a member of the protected class. Lee, 634 F.2d at 962.
Other than conclusory statements such as "females with lower scores to [sic] Stalnely Price were selected for an interview" and "Stanley Price was in the top five candidates selected and interviewed by HANO for the position of Accounting Specialist n," Price has brought forth no set of facts showing that he was qualified for the Accountant Specialist n position. HANO argues that Price's Civil Service scores ranked 27th on a list of candidates eligible for the position of Accountant Specialist n. Price has not brought forth any evidence to rebut this fact. In fact, he also produces the same "Official Certificate of Eligibles" which lists Price as the 27th most qualified on the list. In a gender discrimination case, as in a racial discrimination case, even if Price could make out a prima facie case of gender discrimination, he would have to show that the defendant's hiring was pretextual. Legania v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp. Ctr., No. 02-1085, 2003WL 21277127, *8 (E.D. La. 5/29/03). To do so he would have to establish that he is "clearly better qualified" for the position in question. Id. Price has not done this. Accordingly, his complaint for gender discrimination is dismissed with prejudice.
Race Discrimination concerning construction contracts
As discussed in the context of plaintiff s Title VI claim, this claim has prescribed. Price has not presented any evidence that he pursued and was denied a contract after 1995. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, (1985) (finding that the statute of limitations on section 1983 actions should be characterized as personal injury claims where state law statute of limitation applies).
Other claims
Price also claims that Thaddeus Billy violated the Housing and Urban Development Act by removing him from his lease. This Court has already ruled that "plaintiff has made insufficient allegations for any claim under the Housing and Urban Development Act." See Order and Reasons, 10/11/02. Even if the Court were to construe this claim under the § 1983 rubric, Price's claims would be prescribed because the action he complains of occurred on or about September 15, 1997. See Complaint, ¶ X.
Finally, Price contends that he was wrongly denied a loan from the Resident Loan Corporation's Loan program sometime in 2001. He alleges that HANO denied his loan proposal after he completed the required entrepreneurial training programs and submitted two proposals to HANO. If analyzed under the § 1983 framework, Price's claim must be denied. In order to establish a prima facie case under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege either a constitutional violation or a violation of a federal statutory right. Iriving v. Thigpen, 732 F.2d 1215, 1216 (5th Cir. 1984). The Court construes Price's claim as a claim that he was deprived of liberty or property without due process of law. This type of procedural due process claim is analyzed using a two step inquiry. First the Court analyzes whether the state, or in this case HANO, has deprived a person of a liberty or property interest. Fr aise v. Kelly, No. 98-1863, 1999 WL 397948, *2 (E.D. La. 1999). If there has been such a deprivation, the Court then determines whether the procedures relative to that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient. Id. If the plaintiff alleges a violation of a constitutional right, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the constitutional deprivation.
Price's claim that HANO wrongfully denied his loan application lacks merit. First, Price does not have a constitutional right to receive a HANO loan. The language of section 1701u of the Housing and Urban Development Act mandates that the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development follow certain procedures to require that certain public agencies "make their best efforts . . . to give to low — and very low-income person the training and employment opportunities generated by development assistance provided pursuant to section 1437c of Title 42 . . ." 12 U.S.C. § 1701u(c)(1)(A). This provision by no means establishes that a low income individual has a constitutional right to receive a loan. Further, Price has made no specific factual allegations as to his denial or the reason he was denied a loan. His claim and opposition to the motion for summary judgment are vague and are not supported by affidavits, depositions, or other summary judgment type evidence. Moreover, in his deposition, Price admits that he did not receive sufficient training to qualify for the loan program. See Deposition of Stanley Price, p. 72. Consequently, Price has not created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat HANO's motion for summary judgment on this claim.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, this Court grants the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Rec. Doc. 62, is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs claims are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.