Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 01-475, SECTION: "J" (2)
February 6, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Northlake Christian School's Motion Under Rule 59 (Rec. Doc. 38) which was set for hearing on the briefs on December 18, 2002. Plaintiff Pamela Prescott has filed a memoranda in opposition. Rec. Doc. 39. Northlake Christian School has also filed two reply memoranda. Rec. Docs. 44 47. Upon consideration of the memoranda submitted by counsel, the record, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that Defendant's motion should be denied.
Background
See Rec. Doc. 34 for a thorough description of the factual background of this case.
Subsequently, the Court entered a final judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $157,856.52 as awarded by the arbitrator in his June 14, 2002 judgment. See Rec. Doc. 35. The final judgment also awarded Defendant $786.46, representing the amount awarded by the arbitrator in his June 14, 2002 judgment. Id.
Defendant has now filed the instant motion to alter or amend the final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Defendant argues that the Court committed clear legal error in holding that the handwritten clause in the arbitration agreement does not expand the scope of the Court's judicial review. Defendant also contends that clear legal error was committed by the Court because it confused Louisiana substantive law with biblical-based procedures for dispute resolution. Defendant also argues that the judgment should be altered or amended because the Court failed to allow the transfer of the arbitration record prior to confirming the arbitration award, resulting in manifest injustice to Defendant.
Discussion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) provides that a party may file a motion to alter or amend a final judgment within ten days after entry of the judgment. However, the power of a court to reconsider a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy which should only be used sparingly. 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995). Thus, a court enjoys considerable discretion in ruling on such a motion. Id. The Fifth Circuit has advised that the standards applicable to Rule 59(e) "favor the denial of motions to alter or amend a judgment." Southern Contractors Group, Inc. v. Dynaelectric Co., 2 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1993). A court is to "strike the proper balance between the need for finality and the need to render a just decision on the basis of all the facts." Doss v. Morris, 2002 WL 31640487 (E.D. La. 2002) (quoting Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. The Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993).
There are four general grounds upon which a court may alter or amend a final judgment under Rule 59(e): (1) new evidence has become available; (2) it is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; (3) it is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) the existence of an intervening change in the controlling law. Peterson v. Cigna Group Ins., 2002 WL 1268404, at *2 (E.D. La. 2002). A party may not use a Rule 59(e) motion to relitigate issues that "should have been urged earlier or that simply have been resolved to the movant's dissatisfaction." Id.
Defendant does not allege the existence of an intervening change in the controlling law.
Defendant's arguments in support of its motion merely attempt to relitigate issues already resolved by the Court. The Court continues to conclude that the handwritten clause in the arbitration agreement does not expand the scope of the Court's judicial review. Contrary to Defendant's interpretation of the current law in this area, to expand the scope of judicial review beyond that allowed by the law governing the arbitration process, the arbitration agreement must expressly and unambiguously evidence the parties' intent to do so. UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Comp. Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 998 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that to expand the scope of judicial review of an arbitration award, "the parties intent to do so must be expressly and unmistakably expressed"); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a contract that "expressly and unambiguously" provides for the appeal of "errors of law" expanded the scope of judicial review); Ergobilt, Inc. v. Neutral Posture Ergonomics, Inc., 2002 WL 1489521, at *4 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (stating that courts "generally require the contract to clearly demonstrate an intent by the parties to expand the standard of review" and then holding that an agreement wherein the parties "reserved their rights" was insufficiently clear). The phrase "[n]o party waives appeal rights, if any, by signing this agreement" clearly does not expressly and unambiguously evidence the parties' intent to expand the scope of the Court's review. See Rec. Doc. 22, exhibit B (emphasis added).
The phrase contained in the instant agreement is distinguishable from those contained in the cases cited by Defendant where the parties expressly contracted to expand the scope of review. See, e.g., Parker Coll. of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790, 793 (5th Cir. 2002) ("the Award of the Arbitrator shall be binding on the parties hereto, although each party shall retain his right to appeal any questions of law"); Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996 ("[t]he arbitration decision shall be final and binding on both parties, except that errors of law shall be subject to appeal"). If anything, including the phrase "if any" clearly and explicitly leads to the conclusion that through the handwritten clause the parties agreed to preserve whatever review and appeal rights were provided to them by the law governing the arbitration process. In this case, the MUAA governed the arbitration process pursuant to the choice-of-law provision contained in the arbitration agreement. Under the MUAA, Defendant had the right to move to vacate the arbitration award, MONT. CODE § 27-5-312, or to modify or correct the award. MONT. CODE § 27-5-313. Defendant also has the right to appeal the order confirming the award and the final judgment entered. MONT. CODE § 27-5-324(1)(c) (f).
The choice-of-law provision states that "THIS AGREEMENT IS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO THE MONTANA ARBITRATION ACT, TITLE 27, MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED." See Rec. Doc. 22. exhibit B.
Defendant also seeks to relitigate the issue of whether the arbitrator exceeded his powers in ruling that Defendant breached the employment contract "legally as well as Biblically." See Rec. Doc. 22, exhibit C, at 14. In confirming the arbitration award, the Court held that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers and that the award was rationally related to the parties' unique employment agreement and arbitration method. Defendant merely asks the Court to reconsider its ruling on this issue. However, Defendant has not convinced the Court that it has made any manifest errors of law which merit reconsideration.
Defendant additionally argues that the Court erred in denying the transfer of the entire arbitration record. Defendant contends that the record constitutes new evidence under Rule 59(e) which requires the Court to amend or alter the final judgment. Defendant also argues that the denial of its request to transfer the arbitration record resulted in a denial of due process and manifest injustice. However, Defendant's arguments are further evidence of its attempts to relitigate issues already resolved by the Court. Under the MUAA, a reviewing court is not permitted to review the merits of the controversy. Stockade Enterprises v. Ahl, 905 P.2d 156, 157 (Mt. 1995). Furthermore, a court may vacate an arbitration award under only the very narrow provisions spelled out in MONT. CODE § 27-5-312(1).
Defendant seeks to introduce the arbitration record in order for the Court to review the merits of the controversy and to conduct a review much more thorough than allowed by the MUAA or the parties' agreement. Since the record was unnecessary for purposes of review under the MUAA, the Court denied the request for transfer. Defendant is merely relitigating these issues in its Rule 59(e) motion. Thus, the Court sees no manifest injustice or denial of due process resulting from the denial of Defendant's request.
The Court notes that despite the Court's denial of Defendant's motion to transfer the arbitration record, Defendant attempts to make a portion of the arbitration record a part of this Court's record by attaching volumes 1-6 of the arbitration hearing transcript as an exhibit to its Rule 59(e) motion. See Rec. Doc. 38, exhibit 3. This is as an end-run around the Court's prior order, see Rec. Doc. 33, and thus the exhibit must be stricken from the Court's record.
The Court also concludes that Defendant was not denied due process as a result of the denial of its motion to modify or vacate the arbitration award prior to the November 20, 2002 hearing date. Plaintiff applied to the Court to confirm the arbitration award. See Rec. Doc. 22. Defendant sought to vacate the award and also opposed Plaintiff's motion to confirm. See Rec. Docs. 21 25. Under the MUAA, the Court was required to first dispose of the motion to vacate prior to confirming the award. MONT. CODE § 27-5-311 (stating that "[u]pon the application of a party, the district court shall confirm an award unless within the time limits imposed in this chapter grounds are urged for vacating, modifying, or correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed as provided in 27-5-312 and 27-5-313"). All of the relevant issues had been fully briefed at the time the Court disposed of the two motions. Both parties submitted two extensive memoranda on the issues involving these motions.
Conclusion
Defendant has failed to establish any of the four grounds for altering or amending a final judgment under Rule 59(e).
Accordingly;
It is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion Under Rule 59 (Rec. Doc. 38) is DENIED.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that Exhibit 3 to Rec. Doc. 38 be physically removed from this Court's record and returned to Defendant's counsel.