Opinion
NO. 2013-CA-000363-MR
11-26-2014
LLOYD PRATER; AND HOLLY PRATER, HIS WIFE APPELLANTS v. EQT PRODUCTION COMPANY APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS: Lawrence R. Webster Pikeville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: J. Kevin West Columbus, Ohio
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN D. COMBS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 12-CI-00197
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: JONES, KRAMER, AND MAZE, JUDGES. MAZE, JUDGE: Lloyd and Holly Prater (the Praters) appeal from a summary judgment of the Pike Circuit Court dismissing their claims against EQT Production Company (EQT) arising from reclamation work performed by EQT on their property. We agree with the trial court that the damages claimed by the Praters were clearly covered under the terms of a release which they had previously executed with EQT. Hence, we affirm.
Judge Joy A. Kramer, formerly Judge Joy A. Moore.
The relevant facts of this matter are not in dispute. On December 4, 2005, EQT drilled a natural gas well on property owned by the Praters pursuant to a preexisting lease. Prior to the well being drilled, EQT paid the Praters $4,500 for any damage to the surface property caused by construction of the well. EQT also filed a Well Site Reclamation plan with the Kentucky Department of Mines, Oil and Gas Division, when it submitted its permit application 2005.
On May 13, 2011, the Praters contacted EQT about a soil slip which had occurred on their property near the well location. Shortly thereafter, on May 18, EQT and the Praters entered into a settlement agreement for damage to the property caused by the slip. In exchange a payment of $10,000, the Praters released EQT from liability caused by its actions on the property. The Praters specifically released all claims arising from EQT's work or activities on the property both before and after the date of the agreement. The release included reclamation work and EQT's duties under the Surface Damage Compensation Statute, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 353.595, but not for personal injury or surface damage caused by non-reclamation work performed after the date of the release.
On February 17, 2012, the Praters filed a complaint alleging that EQT had caused additional damage to their property in the course of the reclamation work. In its answer, EQT cited the release which the Praters had previously executed. After both parties conducted discovery, EQT filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Praters had released their claims under the clear terms of the agreement.
The trial court initially granted the motion, but shortly thereafter the court set aside the summary judgment for EQT. EQT then renewed its motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on January 22, 2013. The Praters now appeal to this Court.
The Praters argue that there were genuine issues of material fact whether the damages caused by EQT were within the scope of the claims covered by the release. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03. In making this determination, the trial court must consider all evidence of record, including depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations and admissions on file. "[S]ummary judgment ... is only proper where the movant shows that the adverse party could not prevail under any circumstances." Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991), citing Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985). Furthermore, "[t]he record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor." Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480.
In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, "[t]he standard of review on appeal ... is whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996), citing CR 56.03. There is no requirement that the appellate court defer to the trial court since factual findings are not at issue. Goldsmith v. Allied Bldg. Components, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Ky. 1992).
A release is a private agreement amongst parties which gives up or abandons a claimant's right to prosecute a cause of action. Waddle v. Galen of Kentucky, Inc., 131 S.W.3d 361, 364 (Ky. App. 2004). As a form of settlement agreement, a release is a contract and is governed by contract law. Ford v. Ratliff, 183 S.W.3d 199, 202 (Ky. App. 2006). If the language of a settlement agreement is unambiguous, the meaning of the language is a question of law, and the intent of the parties must be discerned from the words used in the instrument. Id. at 203. The court may only resort to extrinsic evidence if the agreement is ambiguous, or "capable of more than one different, reasonable interpretation." Id. at 202-03.
The Praters note that they signed the release after a small slip near the site of the gas well. They contend that they did not intend to release EQT from liability for its subsequent negligence in conducting reclamation work which caused a much greater slide and more extensive damage to the property. However, the language of the release is not ambiguous. The Praters released EQT from
any and all liabilities, obligations, damages, causes of action, suits, rights, demands, costs, expenses, and losses, whether known or unknown, whenever occurring (past, present, and future), that relate in any way whatsoever to the work or activities performed on the property (a) on or before the date of this Agreement..., and (b) after the date of this Agreement for reclamation work related to the same. This Agreement covers but is not limited to personal and real property damage (including surface and timber damage) on the property. This Agreement does not relate to personal injuries, or to surface damage caused by non-reclamation work performed on the property after the date of this Agreement.(Emphasis in original).
There is no dispute that the additional damage to the property occurred during the course of EQT's reclamation work on the property after the agreement was executed. The Praters only contend that the damage was far more extensive than they anticipated. We agree with the trial court that the Prater's claim was clearly covered by the unambiguous terms of the release. Consequently, the trial court properly granted summary judgment for EQT.
Accordingly, the summary judgment of the Pike Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS: Lawrence R. Webster
Pikeville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: J. Kevin West
Columbus, Ohio