Opinion
June 15, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Williams, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The record fails to support the defendant's contention that the plaintiffs' expert willfully destroyed or altered the subject vehicle so as to warrant the granting of an order of preclusion as a sanction pursuant to CPLR 3126. During his inspection o the vehicle prior to the commencement of this action, the plaintiffs' expert removed some of the automobile components and stored them in boxes beside the vehicle. However, there is no objective indication that the expert's actions in this regard were designed to frustrate any legitimate disclosure rights of the defendant, and it appears that all of the components are still available for examination (cf., Miller v. County of Orange, 120 A.D.2d 713; Ricco v. Deepdale Gardens Apts. Corp., 113 A.D.2d 822; Ferraro v Koncal Assocs., 97 A.D.2d 429). Moreover, the defendant already has obtained a redacted copy of the expert's report, as well as numerous photographs depicting the relevant portions of the vehicle in their original post-accident condition (see generally, Town of N. Hempstead v. Wiedersum, 131 A.D.2d 661; Perfido v. Messina, 125 A.D.2d 654; Stevens v. Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 117 A.D.2d 733). Given the foregoing circumstances, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its broad discretion in granting the defendant's alternative request for a limited deposition of the plaintiffs' expert rather than the unwarranted and drastic remedy of precluding the plaintiffs from offering expert evidence at trial (see, RPM, Inc. v. Pentagon Chem. Paint Works, 114 A.D.2d 1025; Cepin v. Cepin, 66 A.D.2d 764; see generally, Miracolo v Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 91 A.D.2d 679; Coley v. Michelin Tire Corp., 75 A.D.2d 610). Sullivan, J.P., Harwood, Balletta and Eiber, JJ., concur.