Opinion
04-22-00653-CV
08-23-2023
David POWELL and Double 09 Ranch LLC, Appellants v. Randy BAKER; Heart of The Heart Ranch LLC; and Ray Geistweidt, in his capacity as receiver for Heart of the Heart Whitetails LLC, Appellees
From the 452nd District Court, Mason County, Texas Trial Court No. 215965 Honorable Robert Rey Hofmann, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice, Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice, Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Ret.)
Sitting by assignment pursuant to section 74.003(b) of the Texas Government Code.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
In this interlocutory appeal, David Powell and Double 09 Ranch LLC challenge the trial court's temporary injunction order restraining them from barricading, blocking, or restricting access through gates on land that is part of a deer hunting business. In three issues, Powell and Double 09 argue the trial court abused its discretion in granting the temporary injunction. We affirm.
Background
The deer hunting business at the center of this controversy is Heart of the Heart Whitetails LLC ("HHW"), which was formed on February 8, 2013, when Powell and Double 09 and Randy Baker and Heart of the Heart Ranch LLC entered into a company agreement. Double 09 Ranch contributed certain real property, "the Powell Property," and Heart of the Heart Ranch contributed certain real property, "the Baker Property," to form HHW. The Powell Property and the Baker Property, which are contiguous, are surrounded by an exterior high game fence. The interior boundary between the Powell Property and the Baker Property is separated by a low fence with four interior gates that enable access from one property to the other. Together, the properties comprise about 1650 acres.
According to the company agreement, HHW has the right to "use and enjoy" both the Powell Property and the Baker Property for HHW's stated purposes, namely, "to conduct operations upon and fully utilize the Property for development of an abundant population of high-quality deer through proper nutrition, shelter, and application of generally accepted game management and breeding practices, and to accept qualified individuals to enter upon designated portions of the Property under specific guidelines for hunting, killing, removing and/or viewing of deer for a fee, as established, from time to time, by the Managers, all in accordance with and subject to applicable state and federal laws, rules, and regulations." Powell and Baker signed the agreement individually, as "Managers," and as the representatives of their respective ranches, Double 09 and Heart of the Heart.
In 2021, Baker and Heart of the Heart sued Powell and Double 09 for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. In their declaratory judgment claims, Baker and Heart of the Heart asked the trial court to interpret various provisions in the company agreement. Because Powell and Baker were "deadlocked in the management of the company," the trial court appointed Ray Geistweidt ("the Receiver") to manage HHW. Among other things, the trial court ordered the Receiver to "take any actions necessary to manage, control, and dispose of the property of [HHW], including" to "operate the business and buy and pay for feed, labor, supplies, license, fees[,] permits and other items necessary to continue the business"; to "buy and sell deer and to conduct paid hunts on land available to HHW"; to "sue or be sued in the Receiver's name in any court"; and to "take any legal action to determine the interests [HHW] has in the land owned by its members and described in" HHW's company agreement.
In April 2022, Powell barricaded each of the four interior access gates between the Powell Property and the Baker Property. Each barricade consisted of pipes cemented into the ground with a horizontal pipe placed across the gate. The barricades completely blocked the four interior gates rendering them useless.
In July 2022, the Receiver sued Powell and Double 09 Ranch for breach of contract, tortious interference with a contract, and declaratory judgment. In his petition, the Receiver applied for a temporary injunction seeking removal of the barricades while the suit is pending.
The trial court held a hearing on the temporary injunction application. The evidence presented at the hearing showed that the Receiver's management duties included overseeing the care of the deer and the hunting operations. The Receiver hired Caden Baker ("Caden") to assist him in feeding and caring for the deer. Caden, who was also an animal inspector, was responsible for the health of the deer. Deer feeding was a daily event. Before Powell erected the barricades, Caden fed the deer on both properties himself. However, since the barricades were installed, Caden did not go onto the Powell Property to feed the deer. Instead, HHW paid a third party to feed the deer on the Powell Property. The barricades made it more time-consuming for Caden to perform his other caretaking duties, which included conducting deer counts and setting coyote snares.
As to the hunting operations, the Receiver was responsible for coordinating and controlling all hunting on HHW's properties. The undisputed evidence showed that the Receiver controlled both the number of hunting groups on HHW property as well as their locations on the property. The Receiver relied on Caden to assist in his management duties by setting up and receiving payments for hunts. Caden met with the Receiver on a weekly basis, bringing him HHW's bills and hunting deposits.
In his testimony, the Receiver referred to two instances in which he sent Powell's counsel written correspondence about the coordination of hunting on HHW's properties. One of these writings, an email, was admitted into evidence. The email addresses hunting on the property from January 7 to January 9, 2022, and directs Powell and his guests to hunt on the "lower" part of the ranch, while the paid hunters hunt on the "upper" part of the ranch. Additionally, Powell testified that he had requested from the Receiver lists of the names and dates of the hunters coming onto HHW property and that the Receiver sometimes provided this information to Powell's counsel.
During previous hunting seasons, hunters were able to use the four interior access gates to move between HHW's properties. The four interior access gates allowed guides and hunters to go back and forth between deer blinds and feeders. Additionally, the four interior access gates enabled guides and hunters to avoid "scaring off" deer and interfering with another group's hunting. Now, with the barricades, there was only one access point between the Baker Property and the Powell Property, and it required the use of an easement through a third-party's land. In addition to affecting the way Caden fed and cared for the deer, the barricades were going to affect the way the hunters accessed the properties during the upcoming hunting season.
The Receiver testified that the barricades "create[] a detriment to the hunting experience, which is what these hunters pay for, and that extra time [needed to move between the Baker property and the Powell property], driving by each other's blinds, creates a problem." The Receiver further testified that the barricades were "contrary to [his] operational decision" and that the best way for him to conserve HHW was to remove the barricades and restore access between the properties through the four interior gates.
In addition to the witnesses' testimony, the evidence included photographs and maps of the Baker Property and the Powell Property and the land surrounding them. The maps showed where the barricaded interior access gates and the deer blinds were located on HHW's properties.
After the hearing, the trial court granted the temporary injunction and ordered Powell and Double 09 to restrain from: (1) "[b]arricading, blocking or unreasonably restricting access by the Receiver or his agents" "through entrance gates on the interior low fence between" the properties, and (2) "[r]estricting in any manner the Receiver or his agents from removal of said barricades." The trial court's injunction order contained specific findings, including:
7. The[] barricades interfere with and impede with the performance and management of company business and require [HHW] management to spend a significant additional amount of time to perform company business for its stated purpose.
8. The[] barricades require significant additional amounts of time for the placement and retrieval of hunters in isolated deer blind locations on the property. It is now impossible to place and retrieve some hunters without disrupting others.
9. The[] barricades significantly impair [HHW] management in performing normal company business for its stated purpose such as filling deer feeders, hunting varmints, setting and checking traps as well as transporting hunters.
…
11. Such actions by Powell and Double 09 Ranch [in erecting the barriers] has altered the status quo at the time of the appointment of the [R]eceiver and significantly impaired [HHW's] management in performing normal company business for its stated purpose.
12. The Receiver was appointed to manage and preserve the property and business of [HHW] which includes the right to manage the Baker Property and the Powell Property and specifically the right to fully use and enjoy the Powell Property.
13. The single access point currently allowed by Powell and Double 09 Ranch is not reasonable access for the Receiver to manage and preserve the property and the business of Heart of the Heart Whitetails, LLC and is more than a mere inconvenience.
14. The management rights granted by this Court to the Receiver, through whom this Court acts, are unique and irreplaceable.
15. The Receiver is without adequate remedy at law and the management rights of the Receiver are damaged and cannot be measured with any pecuniary standard.
16. Monetary damages cannot provide adequate compensation, constituting irreparable injury to the Receiver in his management and preservation of the property and business of [HHW].
17. The fall[] 2022 Whitetail hunting season for Mason County, Texas is at hand with guided hunts scheduled and to be scheduled.
18. [HHW] management is currently significantly unable to provide the same hunting experience to outfitters, hunting guides and hunters as in prior years. The hunting experiences to be provided are significantly different from and more inconvenient than those provided in prior years.
19. The multiple, cumulative and significant inconveniences created by the barricades create irreparable harm which is impossible to quantify.
20. Interference with the Receiver's right to the land is an injury to him. His right to use and enjoy the Baker Property and the Powell Property in the Company business and for its stated purposes creates irreparable harm.
According to the temporary injunction order, trial was set for January 24, 2023. Powell and Double 09 appealed.
Trial has been reset or continued multiple times during the pendency of this appeal.
Temporary Injunction Standards
Because our review of a temporary injunction order is limited to the validity of that order, we do not consider or determine the merits of the underlying case. Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 33-34 (Tex. 2017). We review a trial court's temporary injunction order for a clear abuse of discretion, and we will not disturb the order unless it is so arbitrary that it exceeds the bounds of reasonable discretion. Id.
The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the litigation's subject matter pending a trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). "To obtain a temporary injunction, the applicant must plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim." Id. The decision to grant or deny a temporary injunction is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. "The trial court does not abuse its discretion if some evidence reasonably supports the trial court's decision." Id. at 211.
Evidence is legally insufficient when (1) the record discloses a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018). Less than a scintilla of evidence means the evidence offered to prove a vital fact's existence is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion. Id. More than a scintilla of evidence means the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Id.
Irreparable Injury
On appeal, Powell and Double 09's complaints are confined to the third temporary injunction element-a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury. In their first issue, Powell and Double 09 argue the trial court abused its discretion in granting the temporary injunction because the Receiver failed to plead and prove irreparable injury. They argue that interference with management rights was not alleged in the Receiver's petition. They further argue there is legally insufficient evidence of interference with management rights and legally insufficient evidence that the injury cannot be compensated in damages or that damages cannot be measured by any pecuniary standard.
"An injury is irreparable if the injured party cannot be adequately compensated in damages or if the damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard." Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. Because real property is unique, the potential loss of rights in real property is a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury that qualifies an applicant for a temporary injunction. Sonwalkar v. St. Luke's Sugar Land P'ship, L.L.P., 394 S.W.3d 186, 199 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Rus-Ann Dev., Inc. v. ECGC, Inc., 222 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2007, no pet.). Similarly, "[t]he loss of management rights over a company are unique, irreplaceable, and cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard." Cheniere Energy, Inc. v. Parallax Enters. LLC, 585 S.W.3d 70, 83 & n.9 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. dism'd) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a trial court may grant injunctive relief when a dispute involves real property, Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211, or when the enjoined conduct interferes with management rights. Sonwalkar, 394 S.W.3d at 199-200 (noting injunctive relief may be granted "when the enjoined conduct threatens to disrupt an ongoing business").
Sufficiency of the Receiver's Pleadings
Texas follows a "fair notice" standard for pleading, which looks to whether the opposing party can ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy and what testimony will be relevant. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000). "A petition is sufficient if it gives fair and adequate notice of the facts upon which the pleader bases his claim." Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 810 (Tex. 1982). "The purpose of this rule is to give the opposing party information sufficient to enable him to prepare a defense." Id.; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 45, 47.
When reviewing the sufficiency of pleadings to support a temporary injunction, courts consider the applicant's allegations as a whole. See Roark, 633 S.W.2d at 810 (inferring "from the petition as a whole" that it alleged negligence even though it did not use the terms "negligent" or "fail[ure] to use ordinary care" in describing the complained-of conduct); L.D. Brinkman Inv. Corp. v. Brinkman, No. 04-16-00651-CV, 2017 WL 1684836, at *6 (Tex. App.-San Antonio April 26, 2017, no pet.) (holding applicant's pleadings sufficiently alleged irreparable harm when they "alleged an irreparable injury based on the appellants' refusal to recognize the validity of her election" as the sole director and officer of an investment company).
Here, the temporary injunction application was included in the Receiver's petition, which alleged that he was appointed by the trial court to take over as the manager of HHW and thus had a "duty to properly operate the business"; that in his capacity as Receiver he "managed the deer breeding operation and the hunting operation on both" ranches; that when the 2021 hunting season was completed Powell and Double 09 "took actions that changed the status quo and prevented the Receiver and those acting under his direction" from "properly and effectively access[ing] the Double 09 property" by placing barricades on the Double 09 side of existing entrances; that the "barricades were placed by Powell and Double 09 to prevent [the Receiver]" from "effectively operat[ing] the ranch"; that the actions "made it more difficult for those assisting [the Receiver] in managing and operating HHW to feed the deer, to snare varmints, to attempt to eradicate hogs, to take guides and others on the property, and to perform deer counts"; and that "[t]he actions taken by Powell and Double 09 caused persons attempting to manage and operate HHW [for the Receiver] to travel approximately another thirty to forty-five minutes in a much more circuitous, steep and less direct route to take care of the business of HHW."
The temporary injunction section of the Receiver's petition specifically incorporated the above-mentioned factual allegations and alleged that "the acts are prejudicial to Applicant in his capacity as Receiver." The temporary injunction section of the Receiver's pleadings further alleged:
Irreparable injury to [] HHW has occurred and will continue to occur . . . because the ranch will receive bad reviews if hunting is not as accessible on the Double 09 property as it was in prior years. . . . At this time the irreparable injury exists[,] damages are ongoing[,] and are not easily calculated or ascertainable. The injuries are irreparable because [they are] a disruption of the business conducted by HHW. The irreparable injury includes the disruption and interference of the business operation as it has been conducted for years. For those reasons there is no adequate remedy at law.(Emphasis added).
In arguing that the Receiver's pleadings are insufficient to support a finding of irreparable harm based on interference with management rights, Powell and Double 09 assert that the only irreparable harm identified in the Receiver's pleadings is harm to HHW's reputation. Powell and Double 09 direct our attention to the allegation that "[i]rreparable injury" has occurred and will continue to occur because HHW "will receive bad reviews if hunting is not as accessible on the Double 09 property as it was in prior years." But by focusing on a single sentence in the Receiver's pleadings, Powell and Double 09 ignore all the other irreparable harm allegations in the petition, including the allegation that the "irreparable injury includes the disruption and interference with the business operation."
Having reviewed the Receiver's petition and considered its allegations as a whole, we conclude it sufficiently alleges irreparable injury based on interference with the Receiver's management rights. See Roark, 633 S.W.2d at 810; Brinkman, 2017 WL 1684836, at *6.
Interference with Management Rights
The trial court identified the irreparable injury in this case as interference with the Receiver's "management rights," his "right to the land," and his right to "use and enjoy" "the Baker Property" and "the Powell Property" in HHW's business and for its stated purposes. Powell and Double 09 argue that there is legally insufficient evidence to support a finding of irreparable harm based on interference with the Receiver's management rights.
In reviewing a temporary injunction order, we "must draw all legitimate inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's [order]." David v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ). "In resolving evidentiary matters, a trial court does not abuse its discretion if some evidence reasonably supports the court's ruling." Abbott v. Anti-Defamation League Austin, Sw., and Texoma Regions, 610 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Tex. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Powell and Double 09 argue that to satisfy the irreparable harm standard, the Receiver was required to establish that the barriers completely prevented him from performing his management duties. We disagree. Powell and Double 09 cite no authority to support their contention that the interference with management rights must render a manager completely incapable of performing his duties and we have found no such authority. Cf. Positive Feed, Inc. v. Wendt, No. 01-96-01250-CV, 1998 WL 43321, at *9-10 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 5, 1998, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (concluding the trial court could have reasonably found irreparable harm based on "constructive eviction" or interference with the reasonable use and enjoyment of a home).
1. More than a Matter of Convenience
Powell and Double 09 further argue that the finding of irreparable injury based on interference with the Receiver's management rights is not supported by legally sufficient evidence because the denial of access was a matter of convenience. We have held that irreparable injury was not established when the circumstances showed that the purported denial of access was a matter of mere convenience. See Camp Mystic, Inc. v. Eastland, 399 S.W.3d 266, 275-76 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (dissolving temporary injunction because "while it is inconvenient for appellees to access or hunt on the property, we conclude they are not denied use of the property"); Arledge v. Ricks, No. 04-08-00020-CV, 2008 WL 1882806, at *2 (Tex. App.- San Antonio Apr. 30, 2008, no pet.) (holding that while inconvenient, the applicants had at least limited access to their property while the suit was pending and their infrequent use of the property would not be entirely prohibited in the interim); Trada Partners VI, LP v. Vogt, No. 04-06-00723-CV, 2007 WL 163181, at *2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Jan. 24, 2007, no pet.) (dissolving temporary injunction involving access to applicant's land by easement when applicant had an alternative way to access his land through another contiguous tract he owned); Long v. Long, 814 S.W.2d 227, 228-29 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no pet.) (dissolving a temporary injunction involving a right-of-way easement when the applicant had alternative access to his land by using a nearby gate and another gate situated on the same road). In each of these cases, we evaluated the nature and quality of the injury by analyzing the degree and frequency of the denial of access as well as the availability of any alternative means of access.
In Finding 19, the trial court specifically found: "The multiple, cumulative and significant inconveniences created by the barricades create irreparable harm which is impossible to quantify."
To support their argument, Powell and Double 09 direct us to the parts of Caden's cross-examination testimony in which he stated that the use of a single access point at the front of the Powell Property would be an "inconvenience" when transporting, placing, and retrieving hunters on the property. However, this was not the only evidence concerning the nature and quality of the denial of access. The trial court had other evidence before it. This evidence showed that, with the barricades, the only way to access the Powell Property from the Baker Property was to leave the Baker Property through its front gate, drive a few miles, and then enter the Powell Property through its front gate. On direct examination, Caden testified that this route required the use of an easement on land owned by a third-party, Tracy Omby. Caden further testified that this route required passage through five gates, some of which were controlled by Omby.
Of course, to the extent there were conflicts or inconsistencies in the testimony of any one witness or in the testimony of different witnesses, the trial court was responsible for resolving those conflicts. See Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978) ("An abuse of discretion does not exist where the trial court bases its decisions on conflicting evidence."); Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 24 S.W.3d 570, 576 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (noting an appellate court "cannot reverse a trial court's [temporary injunction] order if the trial court was presented with conflicting evidence and the record includes evidence that reasonably supports the trial court's decision."); see also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 & n.90 (Tex. 2005).
Powell testified that the route required passage through three gates.
As he demonstrated the route on a map, Caden testified:
Caden: [] So you come to the lane, you come to right here, there is a gate right here, and then the easement runs on the - on the Omby property right down the fence line, and then [Omby's] got a set of pens right here that has a gate on either side of the set of pens. And, I don't know, sometimes one side or the other is open. And then there is a gate that [Powell] has put in now at the top of the hill.
Shortly thereafter, Caden testified:
Counsel: So to make sure that I understand, right now there is one way in and one way out of the Powell property, correct?
Caden: Yes, sir. Yeah. Everything else has been blocked.
Counsel: After it was blocked, there is only one way in and one way out?
Caden: Yes, sir, and that's through that easement.
Thus, the evidence showed that, with the barricades, the only route to the Powell Property from the Baker Property required the use of an easement on land owned by a third-party. Because this route required use of an easement on land owned by a third party, the trial court could have determined that, for purposes of evaluating irreparable injury, it was not a bona fide alternative route. See Medina v. Bowers, No. 04-17-00035-CV, 2018 WL 6793851, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Dec. 27, 2018, no pet.) ("Because the Medinas had no legal right to access the Nunneley easement to the northern entrance, we conclude the temporary route suggested by Timothy was not an alternative route."); Garcia v. Gonzalez, No. 04-95-00971-CV, 1996 WL 425995, at *4 (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 31, 1996, no pet.) (concluding route was not an alternative route when it was not across appellee's own land).
The present case is distinguishable from Camp Mystic, Arledge, Trada Partners, and Long based on the degree and frequency of the denial of access as well as the lack of a bona fide alternative route. Here, unlike the situations in Camp Mystic and Arledge, the denial of access through the interior gates was definite and frequent. See Camp Mystic, 399 S.W.3d at 276 (concluding the record did "not support a finding that access has been or will definitely be denied."); Arledge, 2008 WL 1882806, at * 2 (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying temporary injunction when applicants were "absentee landowners" and traveled the road at issue "maybe once every couple of years."). And, unlike the situations in Trada Partners and Long, there was not a bona fide alternative route. See Trada Partners, 2007 WL 163181, at *2 (holding irreparable injury was not established when the applicant testified that notwithstanding the defendants' conduct he had access to his land through another tract of land that he owned); Long, 814 S.W.2d at 227-28 (vacating temporary injunction when the evidence showed that the applicant had access to his property by use of an old gate that required him to "traverse approximately twenty-five feet" "before gaining access to the roadway" and by use of a second gate situated on the same road). Furthermore, none of the above-cited cases involved the disruption of an ongoing business operation. Here, the barricades were already affecting Caden's access to the Powell Property to feed and care for the deer and would soon affect the hunters' ability to move throughout HHW's properties. For these reasons, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the denial of access was not a matter of mere convenience.
2. Significant Impairment of Transportation of Hunters
Powell and Double 09 further argue there is no evidence that the "barricades significantly impair" the "transporting [of] hunters" [Finding 9] and no evidence that it is "impossible to place and retrieve some hunters without disrupting others." [Finding 8]. Caden testified that with the barricades it takes an extra fifteen or twenty minutes for the hunters to get from the lodge where they stay to the Powell Property to hunt. He further testified that the hunters must use the sole access point at the front of the Powell Property. Again, he testified that this route requires the hunters to cross Omby's property and open and close as many as five gates. Caden also demonstrated on a map how the hunters had to be dropped off at the deer blinds and how having a single access point to the Powell Property made it more difficult to drop off some hunters without disturbing other hunters or "scaring off" the deer. He further testified that a typical hunting group will include a guide and hunters and they use more than one vehicle to get to the deer blinds. Drawing all legitimate inferences from the evidence and viewing it in the light most favorable to the trial court's order, we conclude that the challenged findings are supported by the evidence.
3. Right to Use and Enjoy the Land
Powell and Double 09 also argue there is legally insufficient evidence to support Finding 20, which provides: "Interference with the Receiver's right to the land is an injury to him. His right to use and enjoy the Baker Property and the Powell Property in the Company business and for its stated purposes creates irreparable harm." Again, we disagree. The undisputed evidence showed that the Receiver was authorized "to take any actions necessary to manage, control, and dispose of the property of [HHW]," which included real property, namely, the Baker Property and the Powell Property. During his testimony, Powell acknowledged that the Receiver had the right to access the Powell Property for purposes of engaging in HHW's business. The evidence showed that the Receiver was responsible for making decisions about the hunting operations on the properties, which included control of the number of hunters on the properties at any given time and their placement on the property. As previously discussed, the evidence showed the barricades interfered with the Receiver's right to manage and control HHW's real property. See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211 (finding irreparable injury by virtue of interference with rights to real property); Rus-Ann Dev., 222 S.W.3d at 927 (noting potential loss of rights in real property constitutes a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury).
Inadequacy of Money Damages
Next, Powell and Double 09 argue the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence is legally insufficient to show that HHW cannot be compensated for its injury with money damages. To support this argument, Powell and Double 09 cite N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. Ltd. v. St. Laurent, 296 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). In N. Cypress, a doctor obtained a temporary injunction preventing the sale of his profits-only interest in a medical partnership. Id. at 173. One of the purposes of the medical partnership was to own and maintain a hospital. Id. at 176. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the temporary injunction because the doctor failed to establish that money damages were inadequate to compensate him for any loss of property. Id. The court of appeals reasoned that because the doctor had "no right to control the management or operation of the hospital" and his "only interest in the hospital real estate [was] confined to whatever net income may be generated from the hospital's business" and because his ownership interest gave him "no voice in the management or control of the partnership," he did not establish that damages would be inadequate to compensate him for any monetary losses. Id.
Powell and Double 09 mistakenly frame the issue as whether HHW can be compensated for its injury, but that is not the issue before us. Instead, the issue is whether the Receiver can be compensated for his injury, which is interference with his management rights and his right to use HHW's properties. This case is the reverse of N. Cypress. Unlike the doctor in N. Cypress, the Receiver has no monetary interest in HHW; his sole interest in HHW is the rights and obligations set out in the receivership order, that is, his right to control and manage HHW. See id. In N. Cypress, the applicant had no right to control the management or operation of the hospital and no voice in the management and control of the partnership. Id. His only risk was monetary: the loss of his proportionate share in the partnership's net income and future distributions. Id. Therefore, the court of appeals held that he failed to establish that monetary damages would be inadequate to compensate him. Id.
To the extent Powell and Double 09 argue there is no evidence that the interference with management rights could not be measured by any pecuniary standard, we disagree. "Generally, money damages may be inadequate to compensate an injured party for the loss of property deemed to be legally 'unique' or irreplaceable." Id. at 175. "The loss of management rights over a company are unique, irreplaceable, and cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard." Cheniere Energy, 585 S.W.3d at 83 (internal quotation marks omitted); Sonwalkar, 394 S.W.3d at 201 ("Because the management rights at issue in this case cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard, and are unique and irreplaceable, money damages would not provide adequate compensation.") (citations omitted).
Powell and Double 09 further argue that the loss of management rights is "simply a proxy for lost hunting income, that is, monetary damages." We disagree. In this case, the trial court specifically found that the Receiver's "management rights" were "unique and irreplaceable" and that the barriers significantly impaired the Receiver from performing normal business operations. These findings are supported by the evidence. The Receiver's management rights derived from a court order that expressly authorized him to manage and operate HHW and "use and enjoy" both the Baker Property and the Powell Property for HHW's stated purpose. The Receiver testified the barricades were contrary to his operational decision. Caden, who the Receiver employed to assist him in performing his management duties, testified that the loss of access through the interior gates disrupted the way he fed and cared for the deer and would change how hunters will be transported onto HHW's properties and how they will conduct their hunts. Caden also testified that the lack of access through the interior gates was not a good way to run HHW's business operations. Thus, the evidence established that the Receiver had the right to manage and control HHW and its properties and that the barriers significantly interfered with the Receiver's ability to manage and control HHW's normal business operations. See Cheniere Energy, 585 S.W.3d at 83-84 (holding applicant would be irreparably harmed by the loss of its right to manage and control a subsidiary); Sonwalkar, 394 S.W.3d at 201 (holding the loss of several management rights, including the right to select a governing board representative, were non-pecuniary rights that were unique and irreplaceable).
Drawing all legitimate inferences from the evidence and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's order, we conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that the Receiver established irreparable injury. We overrule Powell and Double 09's first issue.
Probable, Imminent Injury
In their second issue, Powell and Double 09 argue the temporary injunction order fails to comply with Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure because it does not identify a probable, imminent injury. Additionally, they argue the evidence is legally insufficient to support the existence of probable, imminent injury.
Rule 683 provides that an order granting a temporary injunction shall set forth the reasons for its issuance and shall be specific in terms. Tex.R.Civ.P. 683. The purpose of Rule 683 is to adequately inform a party of what he is enjoined from doing and the reason why he is so enjoined. In re Krueger, No. 03-12-00838-CV, 2013 WL 2157765, at *5 (Tex. App.-Austin May 16, 2013, orig. proceeding.). When determining if a temporary injunction order is sufficiently specific to comply with Rule 683, we look no further than the order itself. Autonation, Inc. v. Hatfield, 186 S.W.3d 576, 582 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
Rule 683 provides, in pertinent part:
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.Tex. R. Civ. P. 683.
Here, Powell and Double 09 argue that the temporary injunction order does not identify "any imminent harm that is actually probable." (Emphasis in original). Additionally, they argue there is legally insufficient evidence of probable injury because "[n]o witness spoke with a single hunter or a single outfitter to assess whether the existence of the [barrier], or an additional few minutes of travel time, would cause any hunter to request a return of his deposit or cause any outfitter to choose not to book hunts at the ranch in the future." They also argue there is "no evidence that [HHW] will suffer any injury before trial" because "hunts have already been scheduled, and deposits taken, for the fall of 2022."
These arguments are based on the idea that the injury is lost hunting income, which is not the injury found by the trial court. The injury found by the trial court was interference with the Receiver's management rights over HHW and his right to use and enjoy the Baker Property and the Powell Property in HHW's business and for its stated purposes.
The temporary injunction order contains the following findings regarding probable, imminent injury:
• Powell testified at the hearing that, "barring an injunction," "the barricades will remain in place during the pendency of this case" [Finding 10];
• the barricades erected by Powell and Double 09 "interfere with and impede the performance and management of company business" [Finding 7];
• the barricades "significantly impair[] [HHW's] management in performing normal company business for its stated purpose" [Finding 11];
• the "barricades significantly impair [HHW] management in performing normal company business for its stated purpose such as filling deer feeders, hunting varmints, setting and checking traps as well as transporting hunters" [Finding 9];
• the "barricades require significant additional amounts of time for the placement and retrieval of hunters in isolated deer blind locations on the property" and "[it] is now impossible to place and retrieve some hunters without disrupting others" [Finding 8];
• the "fall[] 2022 Whitetail hunting season for Mason County, Texas is at hand with guided hunts scheduled and to be scheduled" [Finding 17].
The first finding listed above-that the barricades will remain in place barring an injunction-plainly identifies an imminent injury. Imminent injury is established by a showing that the respondent will engage in the activity sought to be enjoined. State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 946 (Tex. 1994) The next three findings-pertaining to the ongoing impairment of management rights in the performance of normal business operations-identify injury that is not only imminent but is already occurring. The last two findings identify an injury that will commence as soon as the hunting season starts, which is in the fall of 2022. Based on these findings, we conclude the trial court's temporary injunction order satisfies Rule 683's requirement that the order set forth the reasons for its issuance in specific terms.
The hearing on the temporary injunction application took place on August 18, 2022, and the trial court signed the order granting the temporary injunction on September 15, 2022.
As to Powell and Double 09's sufficiency arguments, each of the above-listed findings are supported by the evidence. Powell testified that he would not remove the barricades prior to trial. Caden testified that the barricades were already affecting his ability to feed and care for the deer and that the barricades will change the way hunters will be transported to and from the deer blinds and how they will move on HHW's properties while hunting. The Receiver testified that the barricades were contrary to his operational decision, and echoed Caden's concerns about how the barricades will change how hunters and guides access HHW's properties while hunting. Caden testified that he had already received reservations and deposits for the upcoming 2022 hunting season. Both Caden and the Receiver expressed their concerns that the barricades will adversely affect HHW's business operations during the upcoming 2022 hunting season. Accordingly, we conclude the above-listed findings regarding probable, imminent injury are supported by some evidence.
Drawing all legitimate inferences from the evidence and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's order, we conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in finding that the injury was probable and imminent. We overrule Powell and Double 09's second issue.
Remaining Arguments
In their third issue, Powell and Double 09 present multiple arguments. First, they argue the temporary injunction order fails to comply with Rule 683 because the words "probable, immediate, irreparable harm" appear in only one of its findings. Second, they argue that there is no evidence to support Finding 13, which provides that "the single access point currently allowed" "is not reasonable access." Third, they "re-urge" their previous arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's other findings regarding probable, imminent, and irreparable harm.
Reasons for Issuing Temporary Injunction
"Every order granting an injunction shall set forth the reasons for its issuance." Tex.R.Civ.P. 683. The trial court's temporary injunction order "must give the reasons why injury will be suffered" if the temporary injunction is not ordered. IAC, Ltd. v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 160 S.W.3d 191, 200-01 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). The reasons must not be mere conclusory statements. Id. at 200. "Merely stating that a party 'will suffer irreparable harm' or 'has no adequate remedy at law' does not meet the Rule 683 requirement for specificity." Autonation, 186 S.W.3d at 581.
In determining whether a temporary injunction order is sufficiently specific to comply with Rule 683, we consider the substance of the findings contained in the order. See id. at 582. (concluding Rule 683's specificity requirement was met when temporary injunction order identified the probable injury and explained why it was irreparable and why the applicants had no adequate legal remedy if the injunction did not issue); Khaledi v. H.K. Global Trading, Ltd., 126 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (holding injunction order findings satisfied Rule 683 when they stated that former business partner's failure to release and subordinate liens prevented applicants from realizing the significant loan values in unique properties, and significantly impaired their ability to assist in paying amounts owed under a promissory note; and that applicants' business plan and their ability to obtain financing on the properties would be adversely affected in a way that could not be effectively measured in dollars).
Citing Grounds v. First GroundRock Royalties, LLC, 629 S.W.3d 674 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2021, no pet.), Powell and Double 09 argue the temporary injunction order fails to comply with Rule 683 because the words "probable, immediate, irreparable harm" only appear in Finding of Fact 1. In Grounds, the trial court granted the temporary injunction, but the only basis for its issuance explicitly stated in the order was that the parties had "all agreed to the Application and Temporary Injunction." Id. at 678. We held that the order violated Rule 683 because it failed to specifically state the reasons why injury would be suffered and dissolved the temporary injunction. Id.
Finding of Fact 1 states:
Petitioner, Ray Geistweidt, Court appointed Receiver for Heart of the Heart Whitetails, LLC, has alleged a viable cause of action against Defendants as set forth in the Petition showing probable right to relief, and probable, immediate, irreparable harm as alleged if a temporary injunction is not granted.(Emphasis added).
The present case is readily distinguishable from Grounds. Here, the temporary injunction order contains multiple, detailed findings explaining why probable, imminent, irreparable injury exists. These findings operate together to inform Powell and Double 09 why the temporary injunction was issued. See Autonation, 186 S.W.3d at 582; Khaledi, 126 S.W.3d at 280. Accordingly, we conclude that the temporary injunction order complies with Rule 683.
Finding 13: No Reasonable Access
Powell and Double 09 next argue that Finding 13 is not supported by the evidence. Finding 13 states: "The single access point currently allowed by Powell and Double 09 Ranch is not reasonable access for the Receiver to manage and preserve the property and business of [HHW] . . . ." According to Powell and Double 09, the only evidence concerning the reasonableness of access with the barriers was from Powell, who testified that the single access point was reasonable because it was the best road. But the record shows otherwise. Caden testified at length about how the barriers altered access between the properties, changing the way he fed and cared for the deer and the way guides and hunters will have to navigate the properties while hunting. Caden further testified that the multiple access points provided by the interior access gates was a good way to run HHW and "the one way in and one way out" route was not a better way to run the hunting operations on the properties. Additionally, the evidence included maps of the properties. During his testimony, Caden used the maps to demonstrate the single access point, the barricaded interior access gates, and the location of the deer blinds on HHW's properties. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the single access point was unreasonable. We conclude that Finding 13 is supported by the evidence.
"Re-Urged" Arguments
Finally, Powell and Double 09 "re-urge" their earlier arguments concerning the evidence supporting the existence of probable, imminent, irreparable injury. They acknowledge that their third issue "gather[s] objections peppered throughout" their first two issues, "present[ing] them here in a more succinct fashion, with cross-references to the relevant arguments above." Because we have already addressed these arguments, we will not re-address them here.
We overrule Powell and Double 09's third issue.
Conclusion
The temporary injunction order is affirmed.