Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:98-CV-2669-P
February 17, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is Defendant ADP's Motion for Summary Judgment filed January 3, 2000. Plaintiff Julia Poucher filed her responsive papers on January 24, and ADP submitted its reply on February 8, 2000. For the reasons set forth below, ADP's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
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Julia Poucher brought this action for gender discrimination against ADP, her former employer, under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. More specifically, Poucher alleges that, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), ADP terminated her employment after her supervisors learned that she intended to become pregnant. Poucher claims that ADP fired her in order to avoid the fringe-benefit and productivity costs associated with her anticipated pregnancy.
In response, ADP argues that (i) Poucher has not articulated a prima fade case under Title VII, (ii) that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing Poucher, and (iii) that there is no evidence of intentional discrimination or pretext. After setting out the undisputed facts, each argument will be addressed in turn.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed. Julia Poucher was hired by Defendant ADP in June 1994, and performed sales functions within a certain geographical territory. Poucher's direct supervisor was Canton Dossman, with his supervisor being Wayne Hart.
At a party during the summer of 1997, Poucher mentioned to Hart that she and her husband intended to have children. At a Christmas party that same year, Poucher's husband told Dossman that he and Poucher were trying to have a child.
In February 1998, Poucher met with Hart to discuss ways for her to derive more satisfaction from her work. As a result of that meeting, Poucher was offered — and, beginning in March 1998, took advantage of — the opportunity to work from home. While on such a work plan, Poucher was required to have regular evaluation meetings with her supervisors.
On Thursday, April 30, 1998, soon after beginning to suspect that she was pregnant, Poucher met with Dossman and Hart for an evaluation. Apparently, Dossman was concerned with Poucher's performance, and wanted to verify her sales activity. (Whether this concern was based upon Poucher's performance or upon her pregnancy is disputed.) As Poucher's dedication to her work came up during the meeting, she was instructed to advise ADP within a short period of time — "a few days," according to Poucher, "the next day," according to Dossman — of her employment commitment.
While the parties dispute what happened next, it is clear that Poucher did not reach Dossman by phone on Friday, May I or on Monday, May 4. However, on May 4, Poucher overnight-mailed a letter stating her intention to continue working at ADP. The letter was delivered to Hart's office by 9:00 a.m. on Tuesday, May 5. At some point before the letter was delivered, Dossman left a message on Poucher's answering machine stating that she was terminated due to abandonment of her job. This lawsuit was filed on November 12, 1998.
DISCUSSION
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
In general, summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Carp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party must identify the evidence on file in the case which establishes the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing, the party opposing the motion must offer evidence sufficient to demonstrate the existence of the required elements of the party's case. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Mere assertions of a factual dispute unsupported by probative evidence will not prevent summary judgment; the party defending against a motion for summary judgment cannot defeat the motion unless it provides specific facts that show the case presents a genuine issue of material fact, such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. Conclusory assertions, unsupported by specific facts, presented in affidavits opposing the motion for summary judgment are likewise insufficient to defeat a proper motion for summary judgment. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
All evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom "must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Marshall v. Victoria Transp. Co., 603 F.2d 1122, 1123 (5th Cir. 1979). However, if the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
II. LEGAL STANDARD UNDER TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her) compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1). In 1978, Congress amended Title VII by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (the "PDA"). which provides that:
[t]he terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work. . . .42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
The framework for analyzing employment discrimination claims under Title VII and, by extension, the PDA, was originally set out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) and was elaborated upon in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Under the McDonnell Douglas/St. Mary's scheme, Poucher must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 506. Such a prima facie case is established if Poucher provides evidence that she: (i) was a member of a protected group; (ii) was qualified for the position; (iii) was dismissed or suffered an adverse employment action; and (iv) was replaced by someone outside of the protected class. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Edel, 918 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1990).
If Poucher successfully establishes a prima facie case, she has raised a rebuttable presumption of discrimination and shifted the burden to ADP to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 506. If ADP satisfies this burden of production, Poucher must then present evidence that ADP's proffered reason is actually a pretext for discrimination and that her termination was in fact informed by discriminatory motives. Id. at 507; Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-5 5 (1981). Thus, ADP's successful rebuttal of the presumption created by the prima facie case requires Poucher to present more specific evidence supporting her allegation of discriminatory intent. See Williams v. Time Warner Operation, Inc., 98 F.3d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1996). Poucher can avoid summary judgment if the evidence, taken as a whole, (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of ADP's stated reasons was what actually motivated the termination, and (2) creates a reasonable inference that her gender and pregnancy were determinative factors in the firing. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, of course, rests squarely upon Poucher. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 508; Marcantel v. Louisiana Dep't of Transp. Dev., 37 F.3d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1994).
III. APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO TILE FACTS
A. POUCHER'S PRIMA FACIE CASE UNDER TITLE VII
As set out above, for Poucher's Title VII pregnancy discrimination claims to survive, she must articulate a prima facie case by showing that she: (i) belongs to a protected class; (ii) was qualified for the job; (iii) was fired; and (iv) was replaced by someone outside of the protected class. ADP now focuses on the fourth element, arguing that because part of Poucher's sales territory was delegated to Teresa Williams, a woman, Poucher cannot show that she was replaced by "someone outside of the protected class." This argument fails for numerous reasons.
First and foremost, the Court disagrees with ADP's claim that gender is the relevant protected class in this case, which essentially involves pregnancy discrimination. As there is no evidence that Williams was pregnant, ADP cannot prevail simply based upon Williams' gender.
But even if gender was the relevant class, the argument still is not dispositive for ADP. As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Poucher's former sales territory was divided between Ms. Williams and Bryan Lynch, a male employee. ( See Def Motion at ¶ 9). So even if gender, as opposed to pregnancy, was relevant, ADP's argument is significantly undermined. Furthermore, while ADP downplays the amount of Poucher's territory delegated to Ms. Williams ( see Def. Brief at 4), Poucher submits that not only did Mr. Lynch assume fully one-half of her territory (see Pl. Response at 9), but also that ADP quickly replaced Ms. Williams with two male employees. ( Id.) Under these circumstances, summary judgment would not be proper.
ADP posits a second argument with respect to Poucher's failure to establish her prima facie case for her intent-to-become-pregnant claim. While the Fifth Circuit has yet to consider whether Title VII covers the intent to become pregnant, other courts have found such a protection. See, e.g., Cleese v. Hewlett Packard Co., 911 F. Supp. 1312, 1317-18 (D. Or. 1995) (extending Title VII protection to intent to become pregnant); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (finding that "[a] classification based on potential pregnancy or intended pregnancy is covered"). Based upon a reading of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) and the Cleese court's thoughtful analysis, this Court is satisfied that the intent to become pregnant falls within the scope of protections afforded by Title VII. See Cleese, 911 F. Supp. at 1317-18.
Finally, ADP contends that Poucher's pregnancy-intent claim fails because no "decision-maker concerning Poucher's separation from ADP was aware of her pregnancy" when her employment was terminated. (Def. Br. at 5). ADP distinguishes Cleese and Pacourek on the basis of Poucher's alleged failure to "unequivocally communicate [to ADP] her intentions to become pregnant." More specifically, ADP contends that because Poucher only informed her immediate supervisors of her intent to become pregnant at two separate office parties, she somehow is removed from eligibility for Title VII protection.
Again, the Court disagrees. As an initial matter, ADP offers no support for its argument that Poucher was required to provide some heightened level of notice regarding her desire or intent to become pregnant. As Poucher points out, Title VII protects persons who are members of a protected class — not persons who "formally and unequivocally communicate" to their employers that they are members of a protected class. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. . . ." (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, and perhaps more to the point, ADP admits that it was aware that Poucher was intending and attempting to become pregnant. ( See Def. Motion at ¶ 3). In fact, the two individuals that Poucher told about her pregnancy, Messrs. Hart and Dossman, are not only Poucher's immediate supervisors but the very ADP personnel who decided to terminate her employment. (Def. Motion at ¶ 8).
After considering each of ADP's arguments, the Court cannot agree that Poucher has failed to make her prima facie case with respect to any of her Title VII discrimination claims. At the very least, issues of fact exist so as to preclude summary judgment on this basis.
B. NON-DISCRIMINATORY REASON
Now that Poucher has survived summary judgment on her prima facie case, ADP argues that it has rebutted any presumption of discrimination by offering a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for firing Poucher. At least for present purposes, the Court cannot agree.
As evidence of its non-discriminatory intent, ADP contends that Poucher was terminated only because she abandoned her employment. (Def. Br. at 8-9). ADP claims that, pursuant to the April 30, 1998 meeting with Hart and Dossman whereby Poucher expressed ambivalence about continued employment at ADP, Poucher was required to contact Dossman "the next day" to confirm her intentions. ( Id.) After she failed to contact Dossman, ADP considered Poucher to have abandoned her position. According to ADP, it was for this reason alone that Hart left word on Poucher's home answering machine, informing Poucher that she was fired. ( Id. at 9).
Poucher tells a far different story. According to her, she never abandoned her sales job at ADP. (Poucher Aff. at ¶ 11). In fact, Poucher testifies that at the April 30 meeting, she "reaffirmed to [Hart] several times that I was committed to my job." ( Id. at ¶ 5). Furthermore, Poucher claims that she was never told to call Dossman the next day to inform ADP whether she was committed. ( Id. at ¶ 6). Finally, there is evidence that Poucher not only telephoned Dossman, but also sent a letter via Federal Express which arrived at Hart's office on the day he terminated Poucher. ( Id. at 8, 9).
In short, when ADP's version of events is contrasted with Poucher's, it is obvious that major factual issues remain in dispute. Why the April 30 meeting was called, what was said during the meeting, whether Poucher abandoned her job and whether ADP reasonably believed that she did, are all contested questions of fact more properly left for a jury to consider. Given such circumstances, ADP cannot be said to have demonstrated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Poucher's termination. Summary judgment on this basis is denied.
The Court finds no merit in ADP's remaining arguments. Furthermore, because ADP has failed to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination, the Court need not reach its arguments concerning pretext. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 506-07.
For the foregoing reasons, ADP's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
So Ordered.