Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-796 (NHP).
May 28, 1999
Steven Siegler, Esq., KENNY, SCHAER MARTIN, The Galleria, Red Bank, N.J., Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Marvin M. Goldstein, Esq., PROSKAUER, ROSE, LLP, Newark, N.J., Attorneys for Defendants, Freehold Sportservice, Inc., Leo Ross, Wallace Sokolewicz.
LETTER ORDER ORIGINAL ON FILE WITH CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Counsel:
This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Ronald J. Hedges to remand the above captioned civil action, Portine v. Sportservice, Inc., 99-0796, to state court. For the reasons stated herein, Magistrate Judge Ronald J. Hedges' Report and Recommendation is AFFIRMED and this case is REMANDED to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division in Monmouth County, docket number MON-L-6206-98.
DISCUSSION
This Court shall now make a de novo determination whether to accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings made by the Magistrate Judge. Local Rule 40D. The United States Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a Magistrate makes a finding or ruling on a motion or an issue, his determination should become that of the district court unless specific objection is filed within a reasonable time." Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-51 (1985).
In determining whether it is appropriate to remand this civil matter, this Court finds ample support in the record to sustain Judge Hedges' findings made pursuant to the analysis set forth in the Report and Recommendation and the discussion herein.
Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, if a plaintiff's complaint presents only state causes of action, the fact that issues of federal law may be involved will not be sufficient to create federal jurisdiction.See, e.g., Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983). Where Congress has acted to completely preempt a particular area, however, any civil complaint "raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character. For 20 years, this Court has singled out claims pre-empted by § 301 of LMRA [Labor Management Relations Act] for such special treatment." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987).
Section 301 is sufficiently authoritative to displace "entirely any state cause of action `for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.' Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law . . . ." Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 23.
Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), provides for federal jurisdiction for "claims founded directly on rights created by collective bargaining agreements, and also claims `substantially dependent on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement.'" Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (citing Electrical Workers v. Hechter, 481 U.S. 851, 859, n. 3 (1987)). Where the resolution of a state law claim depends upon or is "inextricably intertwined" with the analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, then the state law claim will be preempted by section 301. See Lingle v. Norge, Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988).
This section does not, however, preempt all labor-related state claims. Where a state law claim can be resolved without interpreting the collective bargaining agreement itself, the claim is independent of the agreement for preemption purposes. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 400;Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 218-219 (1985).
It is axiomatic that "not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective bargaining agreement, is preempted by Section 301 or other provisions of federal labor law."Allis-Chalmers at 211. The Third Circuit has stated that a "plaintiff may bring a state law tort action against an employer, even where he could have brought a similar claim based on a provision in his collective bargaining agreement, so long as the state claim does not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement." Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 229 (3d Cir. 1995).
In this matter, Count One of plaintiff's First Amended Complaint alleges discrimination based upon disability in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1, et seq. Count Two alleges failure to accommodate in violation of the NJLAD. Count Three alleges discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation in violation of the NJLAD. Defendants contend that plaintiff's allegation of discrimination on the basis of disability is inextricably intertwined with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and, therefore, federal jurisdiction is appropriate. More specifically, defendants assert that the provisions addressing the job assignment rotation system set forth in the collective bargaining agreement are the actual source of plaintiff's disability discrimination claim. However, this Court concludes that the inquiry into whether defendants' conduct was, in fact, in conformity with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement is not "inextricably intertwined" with plaintiff's allegations of discrimination pursuant to the NJLAD. See Carrington v. RCA Global Communications, 762 F. Supp. 632, 641-42 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding that, based on facts of case, "state law discrimination claims under the NJLAD are derived independently from state law, and not from the obligations assumed by the parties under the labor agreement."). See also Mitchell v. Village Super Market, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 476 (D.N.J. 1996). It is certainly possible that defendants' conduct was in conformity with the collective bargaining agreement yet still in violation of the NJLAD. Thus, such claims are not preempted by the LMRA.
Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Ronald J. Hedges' Report and Recommendation is AFFIRMED and this case is REMANDED to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division in Monmouth County, docket number MON-L-6206-98. This case is CLOSED.