Opinion
Civil Action No: 99-0199 Section: "R"(3)
August 1, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Milliken Michaels, Inc.'S motion to sever the claims of plaintiff Eldridge Thompson from the claims of plaintiffs Terry Porter and Karen Robinson pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 21 and 42(b). For the following reasons, defendant's motions are denied.
I. Background
Plaintiffs filed suit on January 20, 1999 alleging that defendant violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by paying them less than similarly situated white employees. They also assert that they were subjected to a racially hostile work environment. Thompson further alleges that defendant demoted him in retaliation for a previous charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
On June 26, 2000, defendant filed a motion to sever Thompson's claims from Porter and Robinson's claims because their respective claims do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. Specifically, Thompson reported to a different management team and worked on a different floor. Alternatively, defendant moves to sever because of concerns about jury confusion and the consequent prejudice.
II. Discussion
Although defendant moves to sever under Rules 21 and 42(b), motions for severance under Rule 21 and motions for separate trial under Rule 42(b) "are distinct and preferably should be treated as such." McDaniel v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 987 F.2d 298, 304 n. 19 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Separate trials will usually result in one judgment, but severed claims become entirely independent actions to be tried, and judgment entered thereon, independently."). See also United States v. O'Neil, 709 F.2d 361, 368-69 (5th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, the Court addresses defendant's Rule 21 and Rule 42(b) motions separately.
A. Rule 21
Under Rule 21 a district court has "broad discretion" to sever improperly joined parties. Brunet v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 15 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1994). To determine whether panes were properly joined under Rule 20(a), a district court must consider (1) whether the right to relief arose "out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences," and (2) whether there is a question of law or fact common to all of the plaintiffs that will arise in the action. FED.R.Civ.P. 21(a). Critically, both requirements must be met. See Lott v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1999 WL 242688, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 1999) (noting both requirements must be satisfied) ; Music Merchants, Inc. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 462, 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) (noting Rule 20(a) uses the conjunctive "and" instead of the disjunctive "or")
Although no hard-and-fast rules have been established to guide a court's analysis under Rule 20(a), the Court is not bereft of analytical guideposts when assessing the two prongs. See Applewhite v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 67 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting the need for case-by-case analysis); Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974) (same) In determining what constitutes a single transaction or occurrence under the first prong, a number of courts have looked to the interpretation of "transaction" under Rule 13(a) — compulsory counterclaims. See, e.g., Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000); Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333; Lott, 1999 WL 242688, at *3. Transaction, for the purposes of Rule 13(a); "is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship." Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610, 46 S.Ct. 367, 371 (1926) (interpreting the compulsory counterclaim provision of former Equity Rule 30)). Adopting this flexible definition in their Rule 20(a) analysis, the courts then conclude that allegations of a "pattern or practice" of discrimination may describe such logically related events and satisfy the same-transaction requirement. See id. at 1324 (noting "plaintiffs' claims stem from the same core allegation that they were subject to a systemic pattern or practice of race-based discrimination") See also Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333-34 (finding that "a company-wide policy purportedly designed to discriminate against blacks in employment . . . arises out of the same series of transactions and occurrences" (quoting United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 142, 85 S.Ct. 808, 815-16 (1965))); Lott, 1999 WL 242688, at *3 (finding a pattern or practice of discriminatory conduct "can constitute the `series of transactions or occurrences' required by Rule 20(a)"); Blesedell v. Mobil Oil Co., 708 F. Supp. 1408, 1422 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("A company-wide policy purportedly designed to discriminate against females in employment arises out of the same series of transactions or occurrences."); King v. Pepsi Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 86 F.R.D. 4, 6 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("[A]llegations of a pervasive policy of discrimination by [the employer] would bring the complaints of the individual plaintiffs under the rubric of the `same series of transactions.'"); Vulcan Soc'y of Westchester County v. City of White Plains Fire Dept., 82 F.R.D. 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding transaction requirement met where plaintiffs and would-be plaintiffs claimed discriminatory policies and practices, which included a series of exams allegedly used to discriminate against blacks). The Court finds this analysis to be persuasive.
The second prong does not require all questions of law and fact raised by the dispute to be common. Rather, only "some question of law or fact must be common to all parties." Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1324 (citing Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1334) See also Guedry v. Marino, 164 F.R.D. 181, 184 (E.D. La. 1995). Indeed, several courts have found that the question of the discriminatory character of a defendant's conduct "can satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 20." Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1324. See Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1334 (finding that whether the threat of a racially discriminatory policy hangs over a racial class is a question of fact common to all the members of the class); Blesedell, 708 F. Supp. at 1422 (noting that "[i]n employment discrimination cases under Title VII, courts have found that the discriminatory character of a defendant's conduct is common to each plaintiff's recovery") ; Vulcan Soc'y of Westchester County, 82 F.R.D. at 387 ("The second requirement, the common question of law or fact, is derived from the alleged discriminatory policy and impact with respect to these exams.") cf. Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1095-96 (11th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that "a unified policy, plan, or scheme of discrimination" can satisfy Rule 20's commonality requirement) Moreover, as an overarching consideration when applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court has emphasized that "the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged." United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138 (1966)
Here, the Court finds that the Thompson's claims were properly joined with Porter and Robinson's claims. First, all three plaintiffs assert they were subject to a pattern or practice of discrimination against black employees. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-12.) Although Thompson worked for a different supervisor and on a different floor, his claim arises from the same pattern or practice of discrimination, which this Court finds to be dispositive. Second, defendant's alleged discriminatory conduct is common to each plaintiff's recovery. Therefore, because the Court finds that Thompson's claims were properly joined with Porter and Robinson's claims, the Court denies defendant's Rule 21 motion to sever Thompson's claims.
B. Rule 42(b)
Alternatively, defendant argues the Court should exercise its discretion and order a separate trial of Thompson's claim. See Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285, 1293 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting a district court's discretion to grant separate trials). Under Rule 42(b), a separate trial may be ordered "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy. . . ." FED.R.Civ.P. 42 (b). Separate trials, however, are the exception, not the rule. See McDaniel, 987 F.2d at 304 ("Separation of issues, however, is not the usual course that should be followed."); Laitrarn Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 791 F. Supp. 113, 114-15 (E.D. La. 1992) ("[C]ourts should not order separate trials `unless such a disposition is clearly necessary.'") (citation omitted). Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has cautioned district courts that the "issue to be tried [separately] must be so distinct and separable from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice." Swofford v. B W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 1964) (citing Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 499-500, 51 S.Ct. 513, 515 (1931)).
Here, defendant fears prejudice will rise if the jury is presented different facts and claims. The Court disagrees. In any case a jury must weigh each plaintiff's claims individually, and that duty in this case presents no undue burden on a jury. See, e.g., Lott, 1999 WL 242688, at *4 (rebuffing alleged jury confusion); Guedry, 164 F.R.D. at 186 (same). Furthermore, as already explained, while Thompson's claims may arise out of separate factual circumstances, all of the plaintiffs' claims arise from an alleged common discriminatory policy. Therefore, because the Court is neither convinced that this case raises concerns about undue jury confusion, nor convinced that Thompson's claims are "so distinct" as to require a separate trial, the Court denies defendant's motion for separate trials. Should defendant harbor any lingering concerns, those concerns can be addressed in instructions to the jury.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to sever and its motion for separate trials are denied.