Opinion
14-P-879
05-28-2015
JOSEPH POPE v. SUPERINTENDENT, MASSACHUSETTS CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, NORFOLK.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
This is an appeal from the dismissal of a complaint filed pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, and G. L. c. 231A, by the plaintiff, an inmate at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk (department). The plaintiff's complaint asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the property at issue was stolen and requests that the court make two declarations concerning the department's responsibility for following mail room regulations and the department's ability to discipline or sanction prisoners for possessing "their own property."
The plaintiff alleges that there was insufficient evidence that he stole the videotape from the chapel because he presented evidence that he holds the copyright for the contents of the videotape, which he alleges was his property that he kept in the Muslim chapel. "Where inmates challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to justify a disciplinary board's decision, we apply the substantial evidence test. . . . Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, . . . taking into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the evidence." Jordan v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Cedar Junction, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 584, 587 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The plaintiff admitted in his complaint that he packaged the videotape and placed it in the institutional mail. The plaintiff does not allege that evidence was ignored that the videotape was included in his personal property inventory or that a videotape is an item he is permitted to possess. The hearing officer considered the evidence the plaintiff now highlights but relied upon the evidence that the videotape was not included on the plaintiff's property inventory to determine it was not his property regardless of whether he held the copyright for the contents of the tape. The disciplinary report also states that the plaintiff admitted that he removed the property from the Muslim chapel. The conclusion that the plaintiff stole the videotape from the Muslim chapel was supported by substantial evidence. The plaintiff's claim for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, was properly dismissed.
The fact that the videotape was not included in any property inventory, including the Muslim chapel's VHS inventory and the master VHS inventory, did not require the hearing officer to conclude the videotape, which the reporting officer noted is contraband, was the plaintiff's property.
Although the plaintiff does not appear to contest this, it is also clear from the disciplinary record that the plaintiff did not have permission to mail the videotape to his sister. He sent the superintendent a letter concerning mailing the videotape but did not wait for a response.
The plaintiff's requests for declaratory relief were also properly dismissed. "Inmates challenging alleged improprieties in prison disciplinary proceedings under State law must proceed by way of an action in the nature of certiorari." Pidge v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Cedar Junction, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 14, 17 (1992). See Grady v. Commissioner of Correction, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 126, 135-136 (2013). Here, the plaintiff requests declaratory relief, however, his requests and allegations are grounded in the prison officials' actions in this one disciplinary case. As a result, the plaintiff did not allege facts that entitled him to declaratory relief. See G. L. c. 231A, § 2, as amended by St. 1974, c. 630, § 1 ("Said procedure under section one may be used in the [S]uperior [C]ourt to enjoin and to obtain a determination of the legality of the administrative practices and procedures of any municipal, county or state agency or official which practices or procedures . . . are in violation of rules or regulations promulgated under the authority of such laws, which violation has been consistently repeated. . . . For the purpose of this section practices or procedures mean the customary and usual method of conducting municipal, county, state agency or official business" [emphasis supplied]).
In Grady, supra, we concluded that a complaint for declaratory relief "failed to set forth facts sufficient to warrant declaratory relief" when "at its core, this claim is a fact-specific challenge to the defendants' decisions denying his grievances in his particular case . . . [and it] failed to raise or plead sufficient facts to establish that the regulation at issue has resulted in an ongoing, repeated violation of his constitutional rights."
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Trainor, Brown & Vuono, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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Clerk Entered: May 28, 2015.