Summary
affirming award of sanctions "for the filing of this cause of action when it had already been tried once"
Summary of this case from Jones v. Vills. of Town Ctr. Owners Ass'n, Inc.Opinion
No. 04-05-00763-CV
Delivered and Filed: July 5, 2006.
Appeal from the 216th Judicial District Court, Bandera County, Texas, Trial Court No. Cvdv-05-184, Honorable Stephen B. Ables, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Catherine STONE, Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice, Rebecca SIMMONS, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ryan Webster Pope appeals the trial court's order dismissing the underlying cause and ordering him to pay sanctions. Because the issues in this appeal involve the application of well-settled principles of law, we affirm the trial court's order in this memorandum opinion.
Background
On or about March 10, 2000, Pope and Gaffney were involved in a motor vehicle collision. On March 6, 2001, Pope filed a lawsuit (cause number 7940-01) against Gaffney for personal injuries he allegedly sustained as a result of the collision. After a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of Pope for $1,677.76 in damages. Pope's motion for new trial claiming the damages were inadequate was denied, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. See Pope v. Gaffney, No. 04-03-00456-CV, 2004 WL 1732325 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Oct. 5, 2004, no pet.). The trial judge later entered an order allowing Gaffney to deposit the funds in satisfaction of the judgment into the registry of the court because Pope refused to accept payment, and this court dismissed Pope's appeal of that order for lack of jurisdiction. See Pope v. Gaffney, No. 04-05-00413-CV, 2006 WL 1684661 (Tex.App.-San Antonio June 21, 2006, no pet. h.).
On May 9, 2005, Pope filed a second lawsuit for additional damages arising from the same motor vehicle collision alleging that the collision aggravated his development of Crohn's disease with which he was diagnosed in July of 2004, some three and a half years after the accident. Gaffney filed a motion to dismiss asserting limitations and res judicata barred Pope's lawsuit. Gaffney also sought sanctions asserting that the lawsuit was "patently frivolous" because Pope had been continuously advised by both defense counsel and the trial court that he no longer had a cause of action arising from the accident. The trial court granted Gaffney's motion and imposed sanctions in the amount of $2,500.00.
Dismissal
In general, a plaintiff must bring one indivisible cause of action for all damages arising from a defendant's single breach of a legal duty. Pustejovsky v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643, 646-47 (Tex. 2000); Zacharie v. U.S. Nat. Resources, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 748, 755 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.). This rule, known as the single action rule, is a species of res judicata that "prohibits splitting a single cause of action and subsequently asserting claims that could have been litigated in the first instance." Pustejovsky, 35 S.W.3d at 647; see also Zacharie, 94 S.W.3d at 755. "Keeping this single action rule in mind, a cause of action accrues when a wrongful act causes an injury, regardless of when the plaintiff learns of that injury or if all resulting damages have yet to occur." Zacharie, 94 S.W.3d at 755 (rejecting extension of multiple causes of action under Pustejovsky to a case that did not involve asbestos-related diseases resulting from workplace exposure).
Although the discovery rule exception will apply where the nature of the injury is inherently indiscoverable and the injury is objectively verifiable, accrual of a cause of action is not dependent on a confirmed medical diagnosis; a plaintiff whose condition has not yet been affirmatively diagnosed by a physician can have or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence could have, access to information that requires or would require a reasonable person to conclude he likely suffers from an illness. Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 42 (Tex. 1998); Zacharie, 94 S.W.3d at 755. Pope primarily relies on latent disease cases like Childs and Pustejovsky to support his contention that the discovery rule applies to his case. This court, however, has previously explained the reason the discovery rule does not apply in cases involving a traumatic or injurious event, stating:
In a personal injury case, a cause of action accrues when the wrongful act causes the injury. When appropriate, application of the discovery rule would delay accrual of the personal-injury cause of action. However, the discovery rule does not apply to situations in which the traumatic or injurious event causing personal injury is sudden and distinguishable, and the plaintiff knew that injury occurred at the time the event occurred, even if the plaintiff did not know the full extent of injury until much later. In such case, the cause of action accrues at the time of the injurious event, regardless of when the injured party learns of the full extent of injury. When an injury, though slight, is sustained as a consequence of the wrongful act of another, and the law affords a remedy therefor, the cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run. The issue whether all of the damages or the full extent or seriousness of the injury resulting from the act is yet known is immaterial to the accrual of the cause of action.
Howard v. Fiesta Tex. Show Park, Inc., 980 S.W.2d 716, 720-21 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (citations omitted). In this case, because Pope "was injured during a distinct, discernable event, his cause of action accrued at the time of the injurious event regardless [of] whether he knew the full extent of his injury at the time." Id. at 721. "The fact that [Pope's] injury might have been slight at the time, or different from the ultimate injury for which he now sues, is immaterial." Id. at 722. "The circumstances surrounding [Pope's] injury do not place his cause of action within the latent-disease cases in which the discovery rule applies because in those cases the disease inherently lay dormant for many years, could not be detected for an extended time, the plaintiff experienced no immediate injury, or there was no single event upon which the cause of action could accrue." Id. "Because [Pope's] injury arose from a single, discernable event and some injury arose therefrom, [Pope's] injury was not inherently undiscoverable." Id.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in rejecting Pope's discovery rule assertion and dismissing Pope's cause of action under the single action rule.
Sanctions
We review a trial court's award of sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard. Herring v. Welborn, 27 S.W.3d 132, 143 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied). In order for a party seeking sanctions to prevail, there must be little or no basis for claims, no grounds for legal arguments, misrepresentation of law or facts, or legal action that is sought in bad faith. Id. Groundless means without basis in law or fact and not warranted by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Id. (quoting Laub v. Pesikoff, 979 S.W.2d 686, 693 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st] 1998, pet. denied)). Both the single action rule and the inapplicability of the discovery rule to cases involving a traumatic or injurious event were well-settled in the law at the time Pope filed his second cause of action. At the hearing before the trial court, Gaffney's attorney stated to the court:
You may remember that we were trying to pay the judgment and we actually had a hearing on how I could satisfy the judgment that I knew we needed to pay, and at that time Mr. Pope said he was filing the new cause of action. We discussed the fact in open court that it would be difficult to file a new cause of action using the same parties on the same accident for virtually the same injuries and, nevertheless, Mr. Pope filed that cause of action and served my client, the person who was adjudged to have paid $1,700.
I filed a Motion to Dismiss wherein Mr. Pope filed a Motion to Recuse you.
The Texas Supreme Court then became involved, assigning a visiting judge who came down to hear the motion, denied the Motion to Recuse, and now, months after this new suit and years after the accident and over two years and probably $30,000 in defense costs, here we are again over the same accident.
Your Honor, res judicata, collateral or collateral issues have been determined by Bandera — a Bandera jury. It's been tried, a judgment and appeal and attempt to pay the judgment, and now a new suit. This can't go on.
We filed our Motion to Dismiss and we filed Motion for Sanctions of $2,500, which is the basic cost for us to file the answers, to come to the hearings and to present this to the Court.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court awarded $2,500 in sanctions "for the filing of this cause of action when it had already been tried once." Given the circumstances, the trial court did not act arbitrarily or unreasonably or without reference to any guiding rules and principles. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanctions.
Conclusion
The trial court's order is affirmed.