Opinion
No. 2:10-CV-02951-KJM-JFM
04-14-2014
LISA POLONSKY-BRITT, Plaintiffs, v. YUBA CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
Yuba City Unified School District ("defendant") moves to enforce a settlement agreement with Lisa Polonsky-Britt ("plaintiff"), requesting in the alternative an evidentiary hearing on any disputes of material fact. Defs.' Mot. for Enforcement of the Settlement ("Mot.") at 1-2, ECF No. 90. Finding the matter suitable for disposition without argument, the court took the matter under submission.
For the reasons below, the court GRANTS the request for an evidentiary hearing and defers judgment on the motion to enforce settlement.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed suit on November 1, 2010, alleging two claims: (1) deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) retaliation under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Compl. ¶¶ 27-46, ECF No. 1. Following stipulation by the parties, Stipulation and Proposed Order at 1-2, ECF No. 17, the court dismissed the first claim with prejudice on May 5, 2011, Order at 1-2, ECF No. 19. Defendant then moved for summary judgment on the second claim, Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 1, ECF No. 42, which the court denied on November 15, 2012, Order at 1, ECF No. 71.
Before the case was to go to trial, the parties stipulated to a stay. Stipulation and Proposed Order at 1-2, ECF No. 82. The stipulation, signed by counsel for both parties, included the following language: "[T]he parties have entered into a conditional settlement the terms of which are as follows: a $ 150,000.00 [sic] payment from the Defendant contingent upon Plaintiff receiving disability retirement from CalSTRS . . . , in exchange for a full and final release of any and all claims arising out of her employment with [defendant], . . . and Plaintiff to voluntarily separate from her employment [with defendant] but remain eligible for retirement health benefits provided she pays her premiums." Id. at 2. The court granted the stay on May 3, 2013. Minute Order, ECF No. 83.
CalSTRS approved plaintiff for disability retirement on September 23, 2013, Jay Decl., Ex. C, ECF No. 91, and plaintiff's counsel communicated the approval to defense counsel on October 11, 2013, id. On November 18, 2013, defense counsel emailed plaintiff's counsel a proposed settlement and release agreement. Jay Decl., Ex. D, ECF No. 91. That document provided for a $150,000 payment to plaintiff in exchange for release of defendant from all potential claims and plaintiff's resignation. Id. The proposed agreement also specified that plaintiff was "eligible to enroll in [defendant]'s retiree health plan" and that plaintiff "shall pay any and all costs associated with her enrollment" therein. Id. Defendant approved and executed the proposed settlement and release agreement on November 20, 2013. Mot. at 4. To date, plaintiff has refused to execute the agreement.
II. STANDARD
"[A] district court has the equitable power to enforce summarily an agreement to settle a case pending before it." Callie v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). "[A] motion to enforce [a] settlement agreement essentially is an action to specifically enforce a contract," Adams v. Johns-Manville Corp., 876 F.2d 702, 709 (9th Cir. 1989), and the "court's enforcement power include[s] authority to award damages" or "specific performance," T.N.T. Marketing, Inc. v. Agresti, 796 F.2d 276, 278 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
"[T]he district court may enforce only complete settlement agreements." Callie, 829 F.2d at 890 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). A complete agreement requires: (1) accord on all "material terms"; and (2) "the intent of the parties to bind themselves." Id. at 891 (emphasis in original). Intent is established "[i]f the record . . . show[s] that the [parties] had agreed to the settlement, or that the attorneys had authority to settle the suit and dismiss the action . . . ." Harrop v. W. Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1143, 1144 (9th Cir. 1977).
"Where material facts concerning the existence or terms of an agreement to settle are in dispute, the parties must be allowed an evidentiary hearing." Callie, 829 F.2d at 890 (emphasis in original) (citing Russell v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co., 737 F.2d 1510, 1511 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also In re City Equities Anaheim, Ltd., 22 F.3d 954, 958-59 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding summary enforcement improper where material facts disputed). Such factual disputes include "[w]hether the parties intended only to be bound upon the execution of a written, signed agreement . . . ." Callie, 829 F.3d at 890-91 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). "In the absence of a signed writing, . . . the moving party must demonstrate that the parties intended to be bound in the absence of a fully executed agreement." Schaffer v. Litton Loan Servicing, L.P., No. CV 05-07673 MMM (JCx), 2012 WL 10274678, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2012) (citing Callie, 829 F.3d at 890-91).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant moves to compel enforcement, arguing "the parties reached an enforceable settlement agreement" that is "complete and . . . unambiguous." Mot. at 2. It further insists that "Plaintiff's counsel was authorized to settle this matter," id., and the "settlement was placed on the record via a stipulation of the parties," id. (citing Stipulation of the Parties to Stay the Case and Proposed Order ¶ 2). As such, "Defendant requests that this Court enter judgment in its favor" or "conduct an evidentiary hearing if it finds any dispute of material fact as to whether the parties entered into an enforceable settlement agreement." Id.
Plaintiff responds that "plaintiff never saw the [proposed] release and settlement agreement prior to approval by defendant and its counsel," and "Plaintiff's counsel, while advising defense counsel that the release and settlement agreement appeared consistent with the parties' prior stipulation, did not make any [such] representations in open Court . . . ." Opp'n at 5. Further, plaintiff asserts, there was "[n]o [m]eeting of the [m]inds." Id. "At all times during settlement negotiations it was plaintiff's understanding that [the] part of the settlement involving future healthcare benefits would be administered similarly [to when she was employed]. That plaintiff's share of the cost of premiums or dollar amount might fluctuate depending on the type of coverage she preferred was never an issue or discussed." Id. "Defendant never advised plaintiff she would be responsible for all costs to enroll and all premiums." Id. at 6.
In essence, the parties dispute both elements necessary to form a "complete settlement agreement[]": agreement as to material terms and intent to be bound. Callie, 829 F.2d at 890 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). In contesting whether "[plaintiff's healthcare] premiums," Stipulation and Proposed Order at 2, is equivalent to "any and all costs associated with [plaintiff's enrollment] in [defendant]'s health plan," Jay Decl., Ex. D, the parties disagree as to the interpretation of a material term. Additionally, the parties dispute intent in several respects: whether plaintiff authorized counsel to settle on her behalf, whether plaintiff intended to be bound without an executed instrument and whether plaintiff's counsel, assuming authorization, intended to be bound without an executed instrument. Under such circumstances, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual disputes before properly deciding the motion to enforce settlement. Callie, 829 F.2d at 890.
IV. CONCLUSION
As set forth above, the court GRANTS the request for an evidentiary hearing. Within fourteen days of the date of this order, the parties are to file a joint statement detailing the anticipated: (1) scope of the hearing, enumerating (A) the factual disputes to be decided and (B) the parties' respective positions as to each; (2) witnesses; (3) exhibits; (3) duration; and (4) schedule, including total time and available dates. In light of the hearing, the court postpones disposition of the motion to enforce settlement.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE