Opinion
C/A No. 3:19-2825-MGL-PJG
12-30-2019
Parrish Rayquan Pollard, Plaintiff, v. Detective John Milton, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The plaintiff, Parrish Rayquan Pollard, a self-represented state pretrial detainee, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915; § 1915A. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.). By order dated October 18, 2019, the court provided Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint to correct deficiencies identified by the court that would warrant summary dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to § 1915 and § 1915A. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on October 25, 2019. (ECF No. 10.) Having reviewed the Amended Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes the Amended Complaint still fails to state a viable claim and should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and issuance of service of process.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In the original complaint, Plaintiff purported to bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a City of Sumter police detective, alleging the detective violated several of Plaintiff's constitutional rights in February 2019. Plaintiff claimed his federal and state rights were violated "through means of entrapment, unusual punishment, unconstitutional seizures, and violations of various rights." (Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) Plaintiff sought to be "vindicated from all criminal charges and unlawful detentions of my persons" and compensatory damages from his prosecution. (Id. at 3.)
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff clarifies that on February 6, 2019, Detective John Milton of the Sumter Police Department searched Plaintiff without reason and questioned him without providing a Miranda warning. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 10 at 2, 5.) He also claims Milton charged him without probable cause and in punishment for his "non-compliance." (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff further claims that Milton manipulated the booking process to restrict his access to a phone, which deprived Plaintiff of legal counsel. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks to have his arrest warrants quashed, to be released from incarceration, and damages.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Amended Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Amended Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009). Section 1915A requires, and § 1915 allows, a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "all civil actions").
B. Analysis
The court finds that despite having availed himself of the opportunity to cure the deficiencies previously identified by the court, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should nonetheless be summarily dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 247-48 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding the plaintiff's "repeated, ineffective attempts an amendment" suggest further amendment would be futile).
A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). While Plaintiff claims he brings this suit pursuant to § 1983 for numerous constitutional violations, in accordance with the court's duty to liberally construe pro se complaints, see Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, the court construes Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as alleging that Defendant Milton arrested Plaintiff without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment and failed to issue Miranda warnings in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
1. Injunctive Relief
Initially, the court notes that to the extent Plaintiff seeks to be released from confinement on state charges, such relief is not available in a § 1983 action. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (stating § 1983 is not the proper vehicle to challenge the validity or duration of confinement). Nor should the court construe this matter as seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Dickerson v. State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 1987) (providing that federal habeas corpus cannot be used to dismiss an indictment or prevent a prosecution).
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff asks this court to equitably interfere in his state criminal prosecution, the court must abstain. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. See Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44 (citation omitted). From Younger and its progeny, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
The first part of the test is satisfied in this case because Plaintiff indicated he is currently detained on state criminal charges. The second part of the test is met because the Supreme Court has noted that "the States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also addressed the third criterion in noting "that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights." Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975). Because Plaintiff can pursue his claims in his pending state criminal matter in state court, he is precluded from seeking federal habeas relief at this time. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to dismiss his state court indictments, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. Damages
As to Plaintiff's claims for damages for Milton's alleged violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Plaintiff also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. First, the failure to provide a Miranda warning cannot form the basis of a § 1983 because it does not violate a substantive Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 513-14 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining that pursuant to the Supreme Court's fractured opinion in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), a violation of the right against self-incrimination can only form the basis of a § 1983 claim for damages where the plaintiff was unlawfully compelled to testify at trial, or possibly where the violation so shocked the conscience that it violated the plaintiff's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases from other circuit courts of appeal holding that no damages action can lie against officers who fail to advise a suspect of his Miranda rights).
As to Plaintiff's claim of false arrest, Plaintiff fails to provide facts that would plausibly show that he was arrested without probable cause. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government and requires warrants be issued only upon a finding of probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. To establish a § 1983 claim for false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must show the seizure of his person was unreasonable, i.e., he must show he was arrested without probable cause. See Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992) (" 'Probable cause,' for Fourth Amendment purposes, means 'facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.' ") (quoting Michigan v. De Fillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)).
Here, Plaintiff provides a conclusory allegation that he was arrested "without reason" and as "punishment for non-compliance." (Am. Compl., ECF No. 10 at 6.) Plaintiff fails to provide any facts that would explain the facts and circumstances surrounding his arrest that would show that the arrest was unlawful. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it requires more than a plain accusation that the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff, devoid of factual support). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment upon which relief can be granted.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that the Amended Complaint be summarily dismissed without prejudice and issuance and service of process.
/s/_________
Paige J. Gossett
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE December 30, 2019
Columbia, South Carolina
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
"Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation."
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).