Opinion
No. 06-20-00033-CV
12-21-2020
TERESA COWAN POLK, Appellant v. SEVEN THIRDS HOLDINGS, LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from the 71st District Court Harrison County, Texas
Trial Court No. 19-0383 Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In the judgment below, the trial court awarded Seven Thirds Holdings, LLC (STH, LLC), a roadway easement across Teresa Cowan Polk's property to a private road in Harrison County. On appeal, Polk asserts that (1) the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because STH, LLC, did not have standing when the suit was filed, (2) the trial court exceeded its authority under the Declaratory Judgments Act when it entered judgment without the joinder of all persons who would be affected by the judgment, and (3) legally insufficient evidence supported the trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. Because we find that STH, LLC, did not have standing to assert its claims and that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, we reverse the trial court's judgment and dismiss STH, LLC's, claims against Polk, without prejudice.
I. The Trial Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction to Enter Its Judgment
A. Background
Although our decision turns on standing, it is important to recite the history of the property in question and to identify the access issues presented to give context to our holding. Nevertheless, as we will explain below, our holding turns on the legal status of the parties rather than the property rights at issue. We will begin by discussing the history of the property.
1. The 1933 Partition Judgment and the History of the Property In Dispute
As relevant to the standing issue, the evidence at trial showed that by a partition judgment entered on September 25, 1933, the 71st Judicial District Court of Harrison County partitioned a 200-acre tract of land bordering Caddo Lake into fourteen tracts. Seven smaller tracts, numbered Blocks 8 through 14, abutted Caddo Lake, with Block 8 being the easternmost tract, and Block 14 being the westernmost tract. Seven larger tracts, numbered Blocks 1 through 7, lay to the south of the southern borders of Blocks 8 through 14, with Block 7 being the northernmost tract, and Block 1 being the southernmost tract. A plat of the tracts follows:
Image materials not available for display. Each person or family group that was granted one of the smaller tracts was also granted one of the larger tracts.
The partition judgment also set aside a right-of-way for the use and benefit of each owner of the fourteen tracts. The right-of-way began in the southeast corner of Block 8 and then ran west through Blocks 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 and into Block 14. At a certain point in Block 14, the right-of-way turned south through Block 14 and proceeded south through Blocks, 14, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, and 2 and to the southern boundary of Block 1. As a result, the 1933 partition judgment created a right-of-way easement that travelled west, parallel to the northern boundary line of Block 7, and then turned ninety degrees south to travel parallel to the western boundary line of Block 7. The existence and location of the right-of-way easement created by the 1993 partition judgment are undisputed.
The turn occurred at a stake located twenty varas east of the western boundary line of Block 14.
At some point after the partition judgment was entered, the Polk family acquired a part of Block 7 and a narrow strip on the eastern side of Block 14. Also, around 1997, a dwelling, or cabin, was built on Polk's portion of Block 14, and it is undisputed that the dwelling is situated directly across the right-of-way granted in the partition deed. The following survey shows the tracts owned by Polk to the west of Private Road 2626, the location of the right-of-way granted in the partition judgment, the location of Polk's cabin, and the location of Blocks, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14. The dispute in this case involves access to and across Blocks 7 and 13.
Image materials not available for display.
Although the location and existence of the 1933 right-of-way easement is important to understanding the dispute in this case, there was no evidence that it was ever used. And since 1997, the easement has been encumbered by the dwelling built across it. Nevertheless, ingress and egress to Blocks 12 and 13 did not become a problem until those lots were sold at two sheriff's sales in 2016.
2. The Sheriff's Sales of Blocks 12 and 13 by Robert and Edythe Allen, d/b/a STH, and the Subsequent Creation of STH, LLC
The situation changed in 2016, when Seven Thirds Holdings (STH) purchased Blocks 12 and 13 at two sheriff's sales. STH was not a legal entity, but was merely an assumed name of Robert Clayton Allen, also known as Clay Allen (Clay), and his wife, Edythe Allen. However, in June 2017, Clay and Charles Robert Clayton Allen (Charles)—but not Edythe—formed a limited liability company—STH, LLC—which is very similar to the assumed name of Clay and Edythe—STH. Then, in March 2018, Clay filed an Abandonment of Use of Assumed Business Name, which represented that the assumed name of STH was abandoned on March 19, 2018.
Thus, Clay and Edythe purchased Blocks 12 and 13 at the sheriff's sales under the assumed name STH; but after the purchases, Clay and Charles created STH, LLC, and Clay abandoned the assumed name, STH. Accordingly, as we will discuss in more detail below, Clay and Edythe purchased Blocks 12 and 13 at the sheriff's sales, but did not file this suit, whereas, STH, LLC, filed this lawsuit, but did not purchase Blocks 12 and 13 at the sheriff's sales. This series of events is key to understanding the standing issues in this case.
B. The Litigation
On April 24, 2019, STH, LLC, filed its original petition in which it alleged that it was the owner of Block 13 and complained that Polk's cabin blocked its use of the right-of-way granted in the partition judgment. STH, LLC, also alleged that Polk's late husband had ratified a relocation of the right-of-way to the location of Private Road 2626 and asked the court to declare that the location of the right-of-way had changed, that Polk was estopped from denying its right to access its property, and that STH, LLC, be granted an easement across Polk's property to Private Road 2626. Essentially, STH, LLC, asked the trial court to impose an easement across Block 7 from the Private Road 2636 to the southeast corner of Block 13. The following map shows the location of the requested easement:
Image materials not available for display.
In August 2019, STH, LLC, filed a motion for summary judgment on its claims. In support of its claim that it owned Block 13, STH, LLC, attached a certified copy of the sheriff's deed conveying Block 13 to STH. Polk filed a response to the motion in which she asserted, inter alia, that STH, LLC, lacked standing to assert its claims since it had no ownership interest in Blocks 12 or 13. In its reply, STH, LLC, asserted that STH had conveyed its interest in Block 13 to STH, LLC, by a warranty deed that had an effective date of August 1, 2017, and attached a certified copy of that warranty deed. That warranty deed purported to have an effective date of August 1, 2017; was executed by "Robert Clayton Allen and Charles Allen, individually and DBA Seven Thirds Holding," on August 19, 2019; and was filed of record that same day.
In December 2019, STH, LLC, filed its first amended petition in which it asserted ownership in Block 13 through the warranty deed from STH. Polk answered and again asserted, inter alia, that STH, LLC, lacked standing since it did not own an interest in Block 13 when the suit was filed. At the trial on the merits, Clay, the managing member of STH, LLC, testified that he did not know if STH, LLC, owned Block 13 at the time the lawsuit was filed. He acknowledged filing an assumed name certificate for STH and that he and his wife did business under that name. He also testified that the warranty deed from STH to STH, LLC, was actually executed in August 2019, and that he thought the effective date indicated when the warranty deed was first drafted.
After the trial, the trial court entered its judgment in favor of STH, LLC, awarding it a twenty-foot easement across Polk's property to Private Road 2626 and attorney fees. The trial court also entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it found, regarding STH, LLC's, standing, that:
1. [STH, LLC] is the owner of that certain called 3.900 acres, more or less, out of the B. S. Brooks Survey, A-133, Harrison County, Texas, being the same tract described as Block No. 13 in that certain in Cause No. 8522 of the District Court of Harrison County, Texas, (the "Plaintiffs Property").The trial court also entered conclusions of law that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and that "[STH, LLC,] is the owner of Plaintiff's Property as described herein and had standing to bring this cause of action."
2. Plaintiffs Property was purchased by Robert Clayton Allen dba [STH] in that certain Sheriffs Deed dated March 1, 2016[,] from the Unknown Heirs of Willie Pearl Cook, et al[.] recorded at Document No. 2016-000002675, Official Public Records of Harrison County, Texas.
3. Plaintiff's Property was then conveyed in that certain Warranty Deed from Robert Clayton Allen and Charles Allen, Individually and DBA [STH] to Plaintiff, [STH, LLC], dated August 19, 2019[,] and having an effective date of August 1, 2017, recorded at Document No. 2019-000009442, Official Public Records of Harrison County[,] Texas.
4. Robert Clayton Allen dba [STH] held the property until its transfer to [STH, LLC,] as nominee for Plaintiff, [STH, LLC], as Robert Clayton Allen is a member of Plaintiff.
5. After the conveyance by Robert Clayton Allen dba [STH] to [STH, LLC], [STH, LLC,] Amended its Petition. Plaintiffs Amended Petition did not change the cause of action nor alter the right and obligations of the parties and Defendant filed numerous pleadings after Plaintiffs Amended Petition.
The issue before us in this appeal is whether STH, LLC, had standing to file this suit. For the reasons stated below, we find that it did not.
II. Standard of Review
"Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to suit." Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012) (citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Mktg. on Hold Inc., 308 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Tex. 2010). Standing "requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court." Id. at 154 (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304, 307 (Tex. 2008)). "If a plaintiff lacks standing to assert a claim, then a court has no jurisdiction to hear it." Bray v. Fenves, No. 06-15-00075-CV, 2016 WL 3083539, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 24, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150; Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 304). "A court must dismiss a claim if the plaintiff lacks standing to assert it, and it must dismiss the entire action for want of jurisdiction if the plaintiff lacks standing to assert any of its claims." Id. (citing Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150-51).
Further,
[s]tanding must exist at the time a plaintiff files suit and must continue to exist between the parties at every stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal; if the plaintiff lacks standing at the time suit is filed, the case must be dismissed, even if the plaintiff later acquires an interest sufficient to support standing.La Tierra de Simmons Familia, Ltd. v. Main Event Entm't, LP, No. 03-10-00503-CV, 2012 WL 753184, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 9, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Martin v. Clinical Pathology Labs., Inc., 343 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied); Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 205 S.W.3d 690, 703 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied), overruled on other grounds by Revell v. Morrison Supply Co., LLC, 501 S.W.3d 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.); Bell v. Moores, 832 S.W.2d 749, 754 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) ("A trial court determines its jurisdiction at the time a suit is filed. At that time, the court either has jurisdiction or it does not. Jurisdiction cannot subsequently be acquired while the suit is pending.")); see also Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 n.9 (Tex. 1993) ("Our concern is with a party's right to initiate a lawsuit and the trial court's corresponding power to hear the case ab initio. Standing is determined at the time suit is filed in the trial court . . . . "); McMillan v. Aycock, No. 03-18-00278-CV, 2019 WL 1461427, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 3, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). "Whether a plaintiff has standing is a question of law that we review de novo." Bray, 2016 WL 3083539, at *4 (citing Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 149-50).
A trial court's findings of fact may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794-95 (Tex. 2002); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991). "[A]n appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence offered in a nonjury trial must challenge specific findings of fact." Boucher v. Thacker, 609 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (alteration in original) (quoting Green v. Alford, 274 S.W.3d 5, 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied)). We give a trial court's findings of fact the same weight, and review them by the same appellate standards, as a jury verdict. Tex. Outfitters Ltd., LLC v. Nicholson, 572 S.W.3d 647, 653 (Tex. 2019). In determining legal sufficiency, the appellate court determines "whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review." City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005); Basley v. Adoni Holdings, LLC, 373 S.W.3d 577, 582 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.). "In looking at the evidence, we credit favorable evidence if a reasonable jury could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable jury could not." Petrohawk Props., L.P. v. Jones, 455 S.W.3d 753, 770 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. dism'd) (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827).
As we have stated previously,
The evidence is legally insufficient if (1) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the rules of law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) there is no more than a mere scintilla of evidence offered to prove a vital fact; or (4) the opposite of the vital fact is conclusively established by the evidence.Id. (citing Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 532 (Tex. 2010)). "More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence reaches a level enabling reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions." Id. (citing Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)). "Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is 'so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion' of a fact." King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003) (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)).
A reviewing court applies a de novo standard to review a trial court's conclusions of law in a bench trial. See BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794. We "review the trial court's legal conclusions drawn from the facts to determine their correctness." Id. (citing Templeton v. Dreiss, 961 S.W.2d 645, 656 n.8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied)). If we determine that a conclusion of law is erroneous, but that the trial court's judgment was proper, the error does not require reversal. Id.
III. Analysis
In her first issue, Polk challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings that the warranty deed from STH to STH, LLC, had an effective date of August 1, 2017, and its finding that Clay Allen d/b/a STH held the property until its transfer as the nominee of STH, LLC. She also challenges the trial court's conclusions of law that STH, LLC, had standing to bring its cause of action and that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.
In its brief, STH, LLC, candidly admits that it was not the owner of the property at the time the suit was filed and that it was only after this defect was brought to its attention that STH transferred the property to STH, LLC. It does not argue that the purported effective date of August 1, 2017, has any legal significance to the issues in this case, and it does not contend that STH held the title to Block 13 as the nominee of STH, LLC. Rather, STH, LLC, argues that the trial court's judgment may be upheld because the trial court acquired jurisdiction under the misnomer doctrine.
A. The Evidence is Insufficient to Support the Trial Court's Finding of Fact that the Transfer of Title from Clay and Edythe Via Warranty Deed Dated August 19, 2019, Was Effective as of August 1, 2017
We agree that the recital in the warranty deed providing an effective date of August 1, 2017, has no significance in this case. Standing "requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court." Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150. For there to be a concrete injury to STH, LLC, in this case, it must own an interest in Block 13 that would entitle it to enforce the original easement. It is well "settled that title to transferred property will vest upon execution and delivery of the deed." Stephens Cty. Museum, Inc. v. Swenson, 517 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Tex. 1974).
The warranty deed recites that it was executed by Robert C. Allen and Charles Allen on August 19, 2019, and the notarial acknowledgment of their signatures also recites a date of August 19, 2019. Therefore, the earliest date that STH, LLC, acquired any interest in Block 13 would have been August 19, 2019, almost four months after this suit was filed. Consequently, to the extent that the trial court's finding of fact can be construed as a finding that the transfer of title into STH, LLC, was effective as of August 1, 2017, we find that there is legally insufficient evidence to support that finding.
B. The Evidence Is Insufficient to Support the Trial Court's Finding of Fact that Robert Clayton Allen, d/b/a STH Was STH, LLC's, Nominee
We also agree that there is no evidence that Robert Clayton Allen d/b/a STH held title to Block 13 as the nominee of STH, LLC. As applicable to this case, a nominee is "[a] party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others." Nominee, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The evidence in this case showed that Robert Clayton Allen and Edythe Allen d/b/a STH acquired title to Block 13 in March 2016 and that STH, LLC, was not formed until July 2017. Although Allen testified that, after STH, LLC, was formed, he moved different properties out of STH to STH, LLC, over a period of time, he never testified that Block 13 or any other properties that were not transferred to STH, LLC, were held by STH for the benefit of STH, LLC. Therefore, we find that there was no evidence to support the trial court's finding that Robert Clayton Allen d/b/a STH held Block 13 as the nominee of STH, LLC.
Consequently, the trial court's conclusions of law that STH, LLC, had standing to bring this suit and that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction may not be supported by the trial court's findings that STH, LLC, held title to Block 13 as of August 1, 2017, or that STH held title for the benefit of STH, LLC.
C. The Evidence Is Insufficient to Support the Trial Court's Conclusion of Law that the Misnomer Doctrine Applies
STH, LLC, argues that the evidence supports the trial court's legal conclusion under the misnomer doctrine as applied to standing. "Misnomer arises 'when a party misnames itself or another party, but the correct parties are involved.'" Reddy P'ship/5900 N. Freeway LP v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 370 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Tex. 2012) (quoting In re Greater Houston Orthopaedic Specialists, Inc., 295 S.W.3d 323, 325 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam)). "When the correct party sues or is sued under the incorrect name, 'the court acquires jurisdiction after service with the misnomer if it is clear that no one was misled or placed at a disadvantage by the error.'" Id. (quoting Sheldon v. Emergency Med. Consultants, I, P.A., 43 S.W.3d 701, 702 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.)). In such cases, the plaintiff may amend its petition to correct the name, and the amendment will relate back to the original petition. Id. at 377.
The distinctive quality of the misnomer cases is that the plaintiff who intended to sue owned the cause of action when the suit was filed, i.e., it had standing to bring the suit, but misnamed itself. See id. at 374-75; Diaz v. Multi Serv. Tech. Sols. Corp., No. 05-17-00462-CV, 2018 WL 6521916, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 12, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (determining misnomer occurred when actual plaintiff, MSTSI, instead named MSTSC in its original petition); Myers v. HCB Real Holdings, LLC, No. 05-13-00113-CV, 2015 WL 2265152, at *1-2, *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 14, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (amendment naming actual owner of debt allowed); Pierson v. SMS Fin. II, L.L.C., 959 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (determining that misnomer occurred when actual plaintiff, SMS II, instead named another entity, SMS I, in its original petition). In such cases, an amendment that corrects the name of the plaintiff relates back to the original petition when determining standing. Reddy P'ship/5900, 370 S.W.3d at 377.
Those cases are qualitatively different from cases in which the intended plaintiff correctly names itself, does not own the cause of action when the original petition is filed, but acquires an interest in the cause of action during the course of the proceedings. In such cases, courts consistently hold that "a later-acquired interest does not retroactively confer standing." La Tierra de Simmons Familia, 2012 WL 753184, at *5 (citing Martin, 343 S.W.3d at 888; Kilpatrick, 205 S.W.3d at 703); see also McMillan, 2019 WL 1461427, at *3; Doran v. Clubcorp USA, Inc., No. 05-06-01511-CV, 2008 WL 451879, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 21, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); Bell, 832 S.W.2d at 754.
In La Tierra, the owner of an uphill tract in Austin installed a drainage system that diverted water from the uphill tract to a lower tract that was owned by the Ballard Estate. Three years after the drainage system was complete and fully functional, the Ballard Estate sold the lower tract to La Tierra. Because La Tierra was forced to install an extensive drainage system and was delayed in developing the lower tract, it sued the owner of the upper tract, and others, for the injury to its property caused by the uphill tract's drainage system, including damages occurring before La Tierra acquired the lower tract. Id. at *1-2. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and determined, inter alia, that La Tierra lacked standing to assert its claims for injuries to the lower tract occurring before its purchase. Id. at *3. On appeal, the Austin Court of Appeals noted that "[s]tanding must exist at the time a plaintiff files suit and . . . if the plaintiff lacks standing at the time suit is filed, the case must be dismissed, even if the plaintiff later acquires an interest sufficient to support standing." Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
The court of appeals then explained that "a cause of action for injury to land is a personal right belonging to the person owning the property at the time of injury, and a mere subsequent purchaser cannot recover for an injury committed before his or her purchase," and that "[a] subsequent landowner may assert a cause of action for pre-existing injuries only if there is an express assignment of the cause of action." Id. at *5 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 331 S.W.3d 419, 424 (Tex. 2010)). Since La Tierra did not obtain an assignment of the Ballard Estate claims when it purchased the lower tract, La Tierra did not have standing to assert those claims when it filed its original petition. The court went on to hold that, even though La Tierra obtained assignments from the Ballard Estate a year after the lawsuit was filed, its later-acquired interest would not retroactively confer standing to assert those claims in the lawsuit. Id.
The facts in this case are similar to those in La Tierra, rather than the misnomer cases. The owners of Block 13 at the commencement of this lawsuit were Robert Clayton Allen and Edythe Allen, d/b/a STH. As such, they were the only persons who had standing to bring the claims asserted in the lawsuit. Yet, Robert Clayton Allen and Edythe Allen, d/b/a STH, were never joined or named as plaintiffs in an amended petition. Rather, the plaintiff who intended to sue in the lawsuit was STH, LLC, which had no ownership interest in Block 13 at the time the lawsuit was filed and, consequently, had no standing to bring the lawsuit. Although it filed an amended petition alleging its acquisition of Block 13 months after it filed the lawsuit, this later-acquired title did not retroactively confer standing to assert the claims asserted in this lawsuit. See id.; McMillan, 2019 WL 1461427, at *3 ("Pleading additional facts that describe events occurring after suit was filed . . . . would not operate to cure the jurisdictional defect. A trial court's jurisdiction is determined when a suit is filed; at that time the court either has jurisdiction or it does not.").
Because STH, LLC, did not have standing to file the lawsuit, the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction when the suit was filed. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 n.9. And since STH, LLC's, later-acquired title did not retroactively confer standing, the trial court remained without subject-matter jurisdiction. La Tierra de Simmons Familia, 2012 WL 753184, at *5. Consequently, we find that the evidence in this case does not support the trial court's conclusions of law that STH, LLC, had standing to bring this lawsuit and that the trial court had jurisdiction over the claims asserted by STH, LLC. We sustain Polk's first issue.
Because our resolution of Polk's first issue requires reversal of the trial court's judgment, we do not address her other issues.
IV. Disposition
Having determined that STH, LLC, lacked standing to bring this lawsuit and that the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss this case, without prejudice.
Ralph K. Burgess
Justice Date Submitted: October 26, 2020
Date Decided: December 21, 2020