Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-1053.
July 30, 2004
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by David DiGuglielmo ("Petitioner"), an individual currently incarcerated in the State Correctional Institution in Graterford, Pennsylvania. For the reasons that follow, I recommend that the petition be denied.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 5, 1994, officers of the Philadelphia Narcotics Strike Force arrested Petitioner after watching him act as the middleman in a narcotics transaction. Prior to Petitioner's arraignment on March 1, 1996, the Commonwealth offered him a negotiated plea agreement, whereby Petitioner would plead guilty in exchange for the Commonwealth recommending to the court a prison term of eighteen (18) to thirty-six (36) months of imprisonment. Petitioner rejected the negotiated plea agreement and demanded a jury trial, after which the case was assigned to the Honorable Ricardo C. Jackson, Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
On June 11, 1997, Petitioner entered an open guilty plea before Judge Jackson, thereby pleading guilty to charges of intent to deliver a controlled substance and criminal conspiracy. On October 9, 1997, Judge Jackson sentenced Petitioner to two (2) consecutive terms of five (5) to ten (10) years of imprisonment.
Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the Pennsylvania Superior Court, presenting a claim that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing. On February 3, 1999, the Superior Court issued a Judgment Order affirming the judgment of sentence without reviewing the merits of Petitioner's claim. Petitioner did not seek review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The Superior Court did not review the merits of Petitioner's claim because Petitioner failed to comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(f), which requires "a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal" where an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of a criminal sentence. See Pa. R. App. Proc. 2119(f).
On October 7, 1999, Petitioner filed a petition for collateral relief pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq. Counsel was appointed, but on July 3, 2000, counsel filed a letter requesting withdrawal pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988). On September 21, 2000, the PCRA court granted counsel's request to withdraw and denied PCRA relief, without conducting a hearing.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Pennsylvania Superior Court. By memorandum opinion dated August 21, 2001, the Superior Court found that Petitioner had stated an arguable claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, and remanded the case to the PCRA court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to whether Petitioner had accepted the Commonwealth's plea offer.Commonwealth v. Pleasant, No. 2946 EDA 2000 (Pa.Super. Aug. 21, 2001). The PCRA court held the required evidentiary hearings on February 28, 2002, and March 1, 2002. By Order dated April 22, 2002, the PCRA denied Petitioner's PCRA petition on the merits.
Petitioner again appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, presenting one issue: Whether trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance "for inducing [Petitioner] to plead guilty pursuant to [the] prosecutor's plea bargain which [Petitioner] relied on." See Ptr.'s Br. to Superior Court, attached to Answer at Exhibit "I," at 4. On October 10, 2003, the Superior Court found the claim to be meritless based upon the evidence adduced at the two (2) evidentiary hearings held on remandCommonwealth v. Pleasant, No. 1581 EDA 2002 (Pa.Super. Oct. 10, 2003). Petitioner did not seek review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
On March 9, 2004, Petitioner filed the instant pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, raising the identical claim that he raised before the Pennsylvania Superior Court on collateral appeal. On July 19, 2004, Respondents filed an answer asserting that Petitioner's claim is without merit.
Generally, a pro se petitioner's habeas petition is deemed filed at the moment he delivers it to prison authorities for mailing to the district court. Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988)). Petitioner signed his habeas petition on March 9, 2004; therefore, we will assume that he presented his petition to prison authorities on that date.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), which became effective on April 24, 1996, increased the deference federal courts must give to the factual findings and legal determinations of the state courts. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002); Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 196 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 1996)). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the AEDPA, a petition for habeas corpus may only be granted if (1) the state court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of United States;" or if (2) the adjudication resulted in a decision that was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Factual issues determined by a state court are presumed to be correct and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Werts, 228 F.3d at 196.
The Supreme Court expounded upon this language in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). In Williams, the Court explained that "[u]nder the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Hameen v. State of Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 235 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 389-390). The Court in Williams further stated that "[u]nder the `unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. III. DISCUSSION
The "unreasonable application" inquiry requires the habeas court to "ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Hameen, 212 F.3d at 235 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 388-389). "In further delineating the `unreasonable application of' component, the Supreme Court stressed that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of such law and a federal habeas court may not grant relief unless that court determines that a state court's incorrect or erroneous application of clearly established federal law was also unreasonable." Werts, 228 F.3d at 196 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 389).
As previously mentioned, Petitioner's sole claim is that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by allegedly inducing Petitioner to plead guilty. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court set forth the standard for a petitioner seeking habeas relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.Id. at 687. Because "it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable," a court must be "highly deferential" to counsel's performance and "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689.
The court notes that the AEDPA's deferential standard of review, as previously set forth, does not apply "unless it is clear from the face of the state court decision that the merits of the petitioner's constitutional claims were examined in light of federal law as established by the Supreme Court of the United States." Everett v. Beard, 290 F.3d 500, 508 (3d Cir. 2002),cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1107 (2003). In Everett, the Third Circuit held that the AEDPA standard of review did not apply in the review of petitioner's ineffectiveness claim because "the Pennsylvania courts . . . analyzed his ineffectiveness claim not under a Strickland analysis, but under standards set by its own precedent, different from those enunciated in Strickland."Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 69 n. 18 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Everett, 290 F.3d at 506-507)). Specifically, whereasStrickland requires federal courts to inquire whether counsel's performance was objectively reasonable, the Third Circuit inEverett found that the state court "inquired whether the underlying claim was meritorious, then whether `the course of action chosen by his counsel had no reasonable basis designed to effectuate the client's interests,' and, finally, whether the defendant was prejudiced." Id. Here, as in other recent cases applying Pennsylvania law, the Superior Court set forth the following standard for ineffectiveness claims: "(1) [whether] there is arguable merit to the underlying claim, (2) the course chosen by counsel does not have a reasonable basis designed to effectuate the defendant's interest, and (3) the defendant demonstrates prejudice." Commonwealth v. Pleasant, No. 1581 EDA 2002, at 4-5 (Pa.Super. Oct. 10, 2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326 (Pa. 1999)). As a result, the ineffectiveness standard utilized by the Superior Court in this case is indistinguishable from the state law standard which the Third Circuit in Everett determined to be different from the standard set forth in Strickland. Nevertheless, and despiteEverett, courts in this jurisdiction continue to apply the deferential AEDPA standard of review to ineffectiveness claims in cases on appeal from the Pennsylvania courts. See, e.g., Bronshtein v. Beard, 2004 WL 515922 (E.D. Pa. March 5, 2004) (J. Shapiro). In any event, for the reasons discussed infra, the court finds that Petitioner would not be entitled to relief under either the pre-AEDPA standard of review, or the more deferential AEDPA standard.
Moreover, to comport with the Fifth Amendment, a defendant's plea of guilty must be voluntary and intelligent. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) ("[The] long standing test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is `whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant") (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). A guilty plea may be constitutionally infirm if a defendant failed to understand the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty or had an incomplete understanding of the charges lodged against him.Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n. 13 (1976). In addition, the quantum of proof necessary to rebut the presumption of correctness traditionally given to factual determinations by a state court has increased to the "clear and convincing" standard found in the AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Banks v. Horn, 63 F. Supp.2d 525, 537 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (citations omitted). The presumption applies to findings of fact by both the trial and appellate courts of the state. Id. Therefore, a habeas petitioner challenging the voluntary nature of his or her guilty plea faces a heavy burden. Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 1994). "[T]he representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at [a plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations made in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." Id. (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74-74 (1977)).
In addressing the merits of Petitioner's claim on collateral appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court set forth the law regarding ineffectiveness of counsel, as well as for the validity of a guilty plea, and then summarized the relevant evidentiary hearing testimony as follows:
At the February 28, 2002 hearing, on direct examination, Attorney Ibrahim [Petitioner's trial counsel] testified that the Commonwealth made a negotiated offer, but that the offer was rejected by [Petitioner]. Attorney Ibrahim testified that, when [Petitioner] pled guilty on June 11, 1997, the offer was no longer available to [Petitioner], and Attorney Ibrahim told [Petitioner] that he was entering an open plea agreement. Attorney Ibrahim testified that he advised [Petitioner] that an open plea agreement meant that there was no agreed upon sentence and that [Petitioner] would be sentenced in accordance with the [sentencing] guidelines.
On cross-examination, Attorney Ibrahim testified that the Commonwealth offered [Petitioner] a negotiated plea of eighteen [18] to thirty-six [36] months in prison, but that the offer was made prior to the case being transferred to Judge Jackson and [Petitioner] adamantly rejected the offer prior to pleading guilty. Attorney Ibrahim testified that in January of 1997, he sent a letter to [Petitioner] advising him that the case was transferred to Judge Jackson and [that Petitioner] should reconsider accepting the Commonwealth's offer.
* * * *
As to the circumstances surrounding the rejection of the plea offer, Attorney Ibrahim indicated that, aside from the one offer, he had no further negotiations with the district attorney concerning [Petitioner's] case; [Petitioner] told him that he was rejecting the one offer made by the Commonwealth; and Attorney Ibrahim verbally told the district attorney that [Petitioner] was not accepting the offer. Attorney Ibrahim admitted that, on March 13, 1997, he sent the trial court a letter indicating that, when the case was reassigned to Judge Jackson, [Petitioner] advised Attorney Ibrahim that he had changed his mind and wanted to accept the Commonwealth's offer because [Petitioner] believed that Judge Jackson was a "stern sentencer."
However, Attorney Ibrahim testified that the offer was "off the table" when [Petitioner] changed his mind. In explaining why he sent the trial court the letter of March 13, 1996, Attorney Ibrahim testified: "My letters were an attempt to affect the judge in the event that my client decided to pursue with an open plea so that he would gain whatever benefit he could of a prior recommendation in terms of a negotiation being made by the Commonwealth." Attorney Ibrahim specifically testified that [Petitioner's] rejection "took the offer off the table," that a new offer was not "on the table" when [Petitioner] appeared before Judge Jackson, and that Attorney Ibrahim's letter indicating that [Petitioner[changed his mind about accepting the offer were done in order to influence Judge Jackson. . . . Attorney Ibrahim indicated that he absolutely told [Petitioner], before pleading guilty before Judge Jackson, that he was entering an open guilty plea. . . .
[Petitioner] also testified at the February 28, 2002 hearing. Specifically, on direct examination, [Petitioner] testified that originally he wanted to proceed to a jury trial; however, when he received a letter dated January 7, 1997 from Attorney Ibrahim indicating that Judge Jackson was assigned to [Petitioner's] case, [Petitioner] decided he wanted to accept the Commonwealth's offer. [Petitioner] testified that . . . he telephoned Attorney Ibrahim and told him that he wanted to accept the Commonwealth's offer. . . .
On cross-examination, [Petitioner] testified that when he pled guilty he was not aware that he was entering into an open guilty plea. He testified that Attorney Ibrahim told him to tell Judge Jackson during the guilty plea colloquy that no one had promised him anything, and that Attorney Ibrahim would later "take care of the deal." [Petitioner] said that, when Judge Jackson asked him at the guilty plea colloquy whether anything was promised to him, and [Petitioner] answered "no," [Petitioner] had lied. However, [Petitioner] testified that he lied because Attorney Ibrahim told him to do so.
On redirect examination, Attorney Ibrahim testified that he did not receive a telephone call from [Petitioner] after he sent the letter dated January 7, 1997, and he did not tell [Petitioner] to lie during the guilty plea colloquy. Attorney Ibrahim testified that, at some point later, [Petitioner] did indicate that he had changed his mind, but that the Commonwealth had already removed the offer. Attorney Ibrahim reiterated that he made it clear to [Petitioner] that, if he pled guilty, Judge Jackson would decide what the sentence would be and that it could be more than eighteen [18] to thirty-six [36] months in prison. . . .
At the March 1, 2002 hearing, Assistant District Attorney (ADA) Mary Ellen Walter testified that . . . she made an offer in writing of eighteen [18] to thirty-six [36] months in prison in exchange for [Petitioner] pleading guilty. ADA Walter testified that, through Attorney Ibrahim, [Petitioner] rejected the offer prior to June 20, 1996, because at that time [Petitioner] demanded a jury trial. . . . ADA Walter testified that she did not make another offer to [Petitioner] after he rejected the first offer. . . .Commonwealth v. Pleasant, No. 1581 EDA 2002, 6-9 (Pa.Super. Oct. 10, 2003) (citations to Notes of Testimony omitted). The prosecutor further testified that once a negotiated plea offer is rejected, "it's taken off the table forever. And I appeared in court ready for trial, so I wouldn't plea out a case at that point." Id. at 9.
Based upon this testimony, as well as the PCRA court's binding credibility determinations, the Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court's finding that Petitioner had rejected the Commonwealth's only negotiated plea offer, and that he made an open plea before Judge Jackson. Commonwealth v. Pleasant, No. 1581 EDA 2002, 11 (Pa.Super. Oct. 10, 2003). Moreover, because trial counsel specifically told Petitioner that he was entering an open plea, the Superior Court found that trial counsel was not ineffective.
I find that the decision of the state court is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, the standard for ineffectiveness set forth in Strickland, or that of a valid guilty plea set forth in Boykin. As an initial matter, this court is bound by the credibility determinations made by the state courts, see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985), and, as previously explained, the factual determinations of the state courts are presumed to be correct in the absence of "clear and convincing evidence" to the contrary. See Weeks v. Snyder, 219 F.3d 245, 258 (3d Cir. 2000); Banks, 63 F. Supp.2d at 537. No such clear and convincing evidence exists in the instant case. To the contrary, the record belies Petitioner's claim that he thought he was entering a negotiated plea. Petitioner was thoroughly colloquied by the trial court and defense counsel before he pleaded guilty. See Notes of Testimony 6/11/97, attached to Answer as Exhibit "A." Specifically, the court and counsel advised Petitioner that he was entering an "open" guilty plea, and that he could be sentenced to up to ten (10) years on both charges. See id. Petitioner specifically denied that anyone had promised anything to him in exchange for his guilty plea, or had induced him to plead guilty against his will. See id.
Testimony from the evidentiary hearings on remand, as summarized by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, further reinforces this conclusion. The prosecutor testified that she communicated an offer for a negotiated plea to Petitioner on March 1, 1996; that Petitioner rejected the offer when he demanded a jury trial; and that the offer, once rejected, was not renewed. Defense counsel testified that he had explained to Petitioner that the offer for a negotiated plea was no longer available after he had rejected it; that Petitioner's subsequent guilty plea would be an "open" plea; and that, as a result, Petitioner could receive a longer sentence than what had been contained in the negotiated plea offer. See Notes of Testimony, attached to Answer as Exhibits "F" and "G."
Given the aforementioned state court findings and evidence in this case, I find that Petitioner's guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent. See Boykin, supra. Petitioner knew the original negotiated guilty plea offer was no longer "on the table" after he had rejected it, and that the plea he entered before Judge Jackson was an "open," and not a "negotiated," guilty plea. In addition, as the state court found, defense counsel informed Petitioner that the prosecution's negotiated plea offer was no longer available, that Petitioner was therefore entering an open plea, and that he could receive a sentence longer than that contained in the negotiated plea offer. Because counsel's advice was both appropriate and accurate, it cannot be said that he acted deficiently. Therefore, I further find Petitioner's sole claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.
Accordingly, I make the following:
RECOMMENDATION
AND NOW, this day of July, 2004, IT IS RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be DENIED. There has been no substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right requiring the issuance of a certificate of appealability.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of, upon careful and independent consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and Respondents' answer thereto, and after review of the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Peter B. Scuderi, and any objections made thereto, IT IS ORDERED that:1. The Report and Recommendation is APPROVED and ADOPTED.
2. The petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED.
3. There is no basis for the issuance of a certificate of appealability.