Opinion
No. 566178
August 26, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On June 25, 2003, the plaintiff, Plas-Pak Industries, filed a two-count complaint against the defendant, Prime Electric, LLC, for claims sounding in negligence and products liability. On February 6, 2004, the defendant filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff for common-law indemnification and statutory indemnification under General Statutes § 52-572o. On February 25, 2004, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike both counterclaims, along with a supporting memorandum of law.
The plaintiff alleges the following facts. In May 2001, the defendant assembled, sold, and installed an electrical subpanel in the plaintiff's manufacturing plant. On April 4, 2003, Richard Couture, employed by the plaintiff as a maintenance worker, attempted to install a replacement circuit breaker in the subpanel. While he attempted to install the breaker, an electrical discharge from the subpanel created an explosion that burned him. The plaintiff has been paying Couture medical and indemnity benefits pursuant to its obligation under the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act, §§ 31-275 et seq.
Richard Couture is an intervening plaintiff in this case.
DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Intemal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "A motion to strike . . . requires no factual findings by the trial court . . . We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint . . . and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "Moreover . . . [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lombard v. Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 626, 749 A.2d 630 (2000). "A motion to strike . . . may properly be used to challenge the sufficiency of a counterclaim." Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Romano's Auto Service, 4 Conn.App. 495, 496, 495 A.2d 286 (1985).
In its counterclaims, the defendant asserts that it is entitled to both common-law indemnification and/or contribution, and statutory contribution and/or indemnification pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572o. Both of these claims for indemnification and/or contribution rely on the following alleged facts. The defendant alleges "[t]he design and installation of the electrical panel was done to and by the express requirements of the plaintiff . . . in part for it to conform to its OSHA responsibilities." The defendant further alleges the following: (1) Couture's injuries were caused by the direct negligence of the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff "had exclusive control of the access to the electrical panel," and (3) the defendant did not know of the plaintiff's negligence and could reasonably rely upon the plaintiff to not act negligently.
The plaintiff moves to strike both counterclaims for failure to plead that the plaintiff had an independent legal duty toward the defendant, a necessary element for the defendant's indemnification and/or contribution claims to overcome the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. "`When the third party, in a suit by the employee, seeks recovery . . . against a contributorily negligent employer, contribution [or indemnification] is ordinarily denied on the ground that the employer cannot be said to be jointly liable in tort to the employee because of the operation of the exclusive-remedy clause. But if the employer can be said to have breached an independent duty toward the third party, or if there is a basis for finding an implied promise of indemnity, recovery in the form of indemnity may be allowed. The right to indemnity is clear when the obligation springs from a separate contractual relation, such as an employer-tenant's express agreement to hold the third-party landlord harmless, or a bailee's obligation to indemnify a bailor, or a contractor's obligation to perform his work with due care." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferryman v. Groton, 212 Conn. 138, 144-45, 561 A.2d 432 (1989). "Statutory law provides that, for most purposes, workers' compensation payments are the exclusive source of remedy against an injured employee's employer . . . In view of the exclusivity of workers' compensation relief, indemnity claims against employers as joint tortfeasors warrant the special additional limitation of an independent legal relationship." (Citations omitted.) Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694, 699, 694 A.2d 788 (1997).
The defendant fails to allege that any independent legal relationship existed between itself and the plaintiff. The defendant fails to allege that the plaintiff breached an independent duty that it had toward the defendant. Construing the facts alleged in the counterclaim most favorably toward sustaining the legal sufficiency of the claims does not lead this court to conclude that an implied independent legal duty existed between the parties.
The defendant argues that it has sufficiently alleged this duty stating in the counterclaim that the plaintiff "had exclusive control of the access to the electrical panel." An allegation of exclusive control, however, without more, does not imply that the plaintiff owed the defendant a duty. The defendant argues that in Ferryman v. Groton, supra, 212 Conn. 138, the Supreme Court determined that an allegation of control sufficiently established the necessary element of an independent legal relationship. However the defendant's allegation of "exclusive control" is not the same as the allegations made in Ferryman, and does not lead the court to the same conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in that case.
In Ferryman, the plaintiff administrator brought an action against the city of Groton for the wrongful death of the decedent. The city of Groton impleaded the decedent's employer, Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corporation, as a third-party defendant.
The court found that the third-party complaint, which alleged the following, sufficiently plead the existence of an independent legal duty: "[t]he electric substation was owned, operated, maintained and controlled by Electric Boat. The City of Groton owned only the transformers and the metering equipment at the electrical substation . . . Electric Boat controlled access to the electrical substation . . . an employee and agent of Electric Boat unlocked the gate surrounding the electric substation, making it possible for [the decedent] to enter the area of the substation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferryman v. Groton, supra, 212 Conn. 145. The Supreme Court stated that the complaint showed "allegations by an owner whose property, while in the possession of another, is alleged to have caused the death of a third person whose access to the property has been furnished by the agent of the party in possession." Id., 146. The court further stated that "[w]hen viewed in the light most favorable to the pleader, as required in addressing a motion to strike . . . the complaint discloses the essentials of either a co-owner relationship, a bailor-bailee relationship or a lessor-lessee relationship, any one of which could contain the express or implied independent, legal duty that would serve to preclude the operation of the exclusive remedy provisions of § 31-284." (Citation omitted.) Id. "[T]he allegations of the third-party complaint were facially sufficient to establish an independent relationship between Groton and Electric Boat . . . a relationship that goes beyond the active/passive negligence relationship." Id.
For the foregoing reasons the plaintiff's motion to strike the counterclaims for common-law contribution and/or indemnification, and statutory contribution and/or indemnification pursuant to 52-572o is granted.
D. Michael Hurley, JTR