Opinion

NORCOTT, J.

In this appeal, we consider the circumstances under which the accidental failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592 (a), may save an otherwise time barred medical malpractice action commenced after the dismissal of a prior action pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 52-190a, as amended by Public Acts 2005, No. 05-275, § 2 ( P.A. 05-275), for failure to attach to the complaint a written opinion by a similar health care provider stating that there is evidence of medical negligence (opinion letter). The plaintiffs, William Plante, Sr., individually and as administrator of the estate of the decedent, Joanne Plante, and Adam Plante and William Plante, Jr. (plaintiffs), all relatives of the decedent, appeal from the judgments of the trial court: (1) rendered after a court trial in favor of the defendants Charlotte Hungerford Hospital (hospital), Karen Nash and Eleanor Stutz (hospital defendants); and (2) dismissing the complaint against emergency room physicians Peter Bull and Brian Malone (individual defendants) pursuant to § 52-190a (c). In this consolidated appeal, the plaintiffs contend that: (1) with respect to the hospital defendants, the trial court improperly concluded that the plaintiffs could not bring this action under § 52-592 (a) following the dismissal of the original action pursuant to § 52-190a (c); and (2) because the appeal has been consolidated, reversal of the judgment with respect to the hospital defendants similarly requires reversal of the judgment as to the individual defendants. Given the trial court's unchallenged factual finding that the plaintiffs' initial failure to select an appropriately qualified health care provider to review the case for possible malpractice amounted to "blatant and egregious conduct," we conclude that § 52-592 (a) does not save this time barred action. We also conclude that the plaintiffs have abandoned their appellate claims with respect to the individual defendants. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. On April 26, 2006, the plaintiffs commenced the initial action, alleging in the complaint that the decedent had committed suicide as a result of the professional malpractice of the hospital defendants, specifically Stutz, a psychiatrist, and Nash, a clinical social worker employed by the hospital, and the individual defendants, both emergency room physicians practicing at the hospital. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the various defendants had committed malpractice by prematurely discharging the decedent from the hospital's emergency room, where she had presented on April 30, 2004, experiencing a severe mental health crisis. Shortly thereafter, the hospital defendants moved to dismiss the initial action pursuant to § 52-190a (c) on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to attach to the complaint the opinion letter required by § 52-190a (a). On July 28, 2006, the plaintiffs filed an objection to the motion to dismiss, along with a certificate of good faith and an opinion letter purportedly from an "experienced and qualified health care professional in a similar field which supports the cause of action." The plaintiffs represented that, "by simple mistake the report, obtained prior to initiating the action, from a qualified health care professional in a similar field was inadvertently not attached to the complaint at the time of service." The opinion letter was, however, dated May 12, 2006, which is a date subsequent to the commencement of the initial action. The trial court, Alexander, J., granted the hospital defendants' motion to dismiss the initial action on September 1, 2006, but did not issue an oral or written memorandum of decision.

On September 29, 2006, the plaintiffs filed, with leave of the court pursuant to Practice Book § 10-60, an amended complaint in the initial action against the individual defendants that included the requisite good faith certificate and an opinion letter purportedly from a similar health care provider dated April 10, 2006, with the provider's name and qualifications redacted, opining that all of the defendants had been negligent in their treatment of the decedent. Shortly thereafter, the individual defendants moved to dismiss the initial action on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to attach an opinion letter from a similar health care provider. The trial court, Brunetti, J., denied that motion to dismiss on January 8, 2007.

Thereafter, on December 29, 2006, the plaintiffs commenced this medical malpractice action against the hospital defendants, invoking § 52-592 and claiming in the complaint that the first action against them had been "dismissed without opinion, as a matter of form, on September 1, 2006." Pursuant to § 52-190a (a), the plaintiffs attached to this complaint a certificate of good faith and an opinion letter, dated November 3, 2006, from a physician identified as a board certified psychiatrist licensed to practice in Connecticut and New York.

Subsequently, the trial court, Pickard, J., denied the hospital defendants' motions to dismiss, and subsequently for summary judgment, in which they had claimed that the action was time barred under the applicable statutes of limitations, General Statutes §§ 52-555 and 52-584, as well as the doctrine of res judicata, because the case did not meet the criteria necessary to constitute an "accidental failure of suit" saved by § 52-592 (a). Following discovery and numerous revisions to the operative complaint, the trial court, Marano, J., granted the hospital defendants' motion pursuant to General Statutes § 52-206 and Practice Book § 15-1 to bifurcate the proceedings, and to try the claim that the action was saved by § 52-592 (a) separately from the malpractice claims. Judge Marano further granted the hospital defendants' motion to depose and compel the testimony of Kevin Creed, the plaintiffs' attorney.

Thereafter, a court trial was held on the § 52-592 (a) issue before Judge Pickard, who heard testimony from Grace Williamson, the registered nurse who had authored the opinion letter used in the initial action, and Creed. The trial court found that the plaintiffs had proven that Williamson had "provided . . . Creed with her written memorandum prior to the institution of the first action. Unfortunately for the plaintiff[s], this finding does not result in a favorable outcome for [them] because . . . Williamson is not a `similar health care provider' to any of the defendants," despite the fact that she "is a pleasant person who had a long nursing career." Discussing the definition of "`similar health care provider'" under General Statutes § 52-184c, which is cross-referenced in § 52-190a (a), the trial court concluded that Williamson was not a board certified physician and, therefore, not a similar health care provider under § 52-184c (c) with respect to Stutz, a board certified psychiatrist. With respect to Nash, the trial court concluded that Williamson was not a similar health care provider under the applicable statutory definition of § 52-184c (b) because she "is not licensed as a social worker, nor was she trained in the same discipline, nor was she active in the practice or teaching of crisis work within the five year period before the incident." The trial court similarly concluded that, with respect to the hospital itself, Williamson was not qualified to render an opinion as to its vicarious liability with respect to Stutz or Nash, and also was "not qualified in any way to render an opinion about the alleged independent negligence of the hospital for facility or staffing inadequacies." The trial court summarized by calling "the memorandum of . . . Williamson received by . . . Creed prior to the institution of the first action . . . worthless as the opinion of a similar health care provider. There are, undoubtedly, cases in which it is a close call as to whether an author of a presuit opinion is a similar health care provider. This is not such a case." Citing Rios v. CCMC Corp., 106 Conn. App. 810, 943 A.2d 544 (2008), the trial court concluded, therefore, that Judge Alexander had properly dismissed the initial action against the hospital defendants, notwithstanding the fact that she "did not have the benefit of knowing the identity and lack of qualifications of the author of the memorandum."

Turning to the statutory issue that is the principal subject of this appeal, the trial court next concluded that the deficiency under § 52-190a (a) was not a "matter of form" entitling the plaintiffs to invoke § 52-592 and bring a new action following the dismissal of the first action after the expiration of the relevant statutes of limitations. The trial court found that the plaintiffs "had not made a reasonable precomplaint inquiry at the time the first action was commenced . . . because [they] had not received an opinion from a similar health care provider." The trial court concluded that, "[a]lthough § 52-592 is remedial in nature and must be read broadly, the dismissal of the first action in this case cannot be found to be a matter of form. The decision to engage . . . Williamson to review the file and to provide a written opinion of negligence is inexplicable. Even a cursory reading of § 52-190a would have revealed that . . . Williamson did not qualify as a similar health care provider. Section 52-592 is designed to aid the diligent suitor. See Isaac v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 210 Conn. 721, 733, 557 A.2d 116 (1989). The plaintiffs' lack of diligence in selecting an appropriate person or persons to review the case for malpractice can only be characterized as blatant and egregious conduct which was never intended to be condoned and sanctioned by the `matter of form' provision of § 52-592." (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment for the hospital defendants.

After the trial court rendered judgment for the hospital defendants, the individual defendants filed a second motion to dismiss the initial action pursuant to § 52-190a (c), claiming that Williamson was not a similar health care provider authorized to provide an opinion letter against them under § 52-190a (a). In a memorandum of decision issued on May 20, 2009, the trial court granted that motion to dismiss because Williamson "is not even a physician," and there is "no way that anyone could argue that [she] is a `similar health care provider.'" This consolidated appeal followed. See footnote 4 of this opinion.

On appeal, the plaintiffs rely on Cataldo v. Zuccala, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 08-5004961-S (August 11, 2009), as well as the legislative history of § 52-190a, and claim that dismissal of the original action on the basis of the inadequate opinion letter pursuant to § 52-190a (c) was jurisdictional in nature and, therefore, the trial court should have permitted them to commence this action pursuant to the accidental failure of suit statute, § 52-592 (a). The plaintiffs further contend that the trial court improperly analyzed this case using case law applying § 52-592 (a) in the context of disciplinary dismissals, such as Ruddock v. Burrowes, 243 Conn. 569, 706 A.2d 967 (1998), because those decisions apply only to a lack of due diligence in prosecuting the action itself, rather than to deficiencies in a prelitigation investigation. The plaintiffs rely further on Isaac v. Mount Sinai Hospital, supra, 210 Conn. 721, and contend that their failure to append a letter from a similar health care provider was a curable defect that is a matter of form under § 52-592 (a), because they otherwise had met the "basic elements of commencing the prior action."

In response, the hospital defendants contend first that the "want of jurisdiction" provision of § 52-592 (a) is inapplicable because, under Votre v. County Obstetrics Gynecology Group, P.C., 113 Conn. App. 569, 966 A.2d 813, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 911, 973 A.2d 661 (2009), compliance with § 52-190a is not subject matter jurisdictional in nature. Relying further on Votre, the hospital defendants contend that the matter of form provision of § 52-592 (a) should not be used to circumvent the automatic ninety day extension to the statute of limitations provided by § 52-190a (b), by providing an automatic one year extension to plaintiffs who have unreasonably commenced an action without benefit of an opinion of malpractice from a similar health care provider. The hospital defendants then cite, inter alia, Ruddock v. Burrowes, supra, 243 Conn. 569, and Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 572 A.2d 357 (1990), and note the trial court's unchallenged findings with respect to the egregious nature of the plaintiffs' lapse in relying on the opinion letter authored by Williamson. The hospital defendants contend further that the matter of form provision of § 52-592 (a) is intended to aid the "diligent suitor" and excuses only "mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect." We agree with the hospital defendants and conclude that, when a medical malpractice action has been dismissed pursuant to § 52-192a (c) for failure to supply an opinion letter by a similar health care provider required by § 52-190a (a), a plaintiff may commence an otherwise time barred new action pursuant to the matter of form provision of § 52-592 (a) only if that failure was caused by a simple mistake or omission, rather than egregious conduct or gross negligence attributable to the plaintiff or his attorney.

Given the plaintiffs' failure to challenge the trial court's factual findings, the principal issue in this appeal, namely, the applicability of § 52-592 (a) to dismissals pursuant to § 52-190a (c), is a question of statutory construction, over which our review is plenary. Tayco Corp. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 294 Conn. 673, 679, 986 A.2d 290 (2010). Thus, "[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

We begin with the plaintiffs' claim that they are entitled to relief under § 52-592 (a) because the original action was dismissed for jurisdictional reasons. We disagree. As discussed in greater detail in our decision in the companion case, Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., 300 Conn. 1, A.3d (2011), also issued today, we agree with the Appellate Court's decision in Votre v. County Obstetrics Gynecology Group, P. C., supra, 113 Conn. App. 583, that a "plaintiffs failure to comply with the requirements of § 52-190a (a) does not destroy the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it does not affect the power of the court to hear her medical malpractice action." See also Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., supra, 26-27 (no indication in legislative history that amendment of § 52-190a was intended to alter conclusion in LeConche v. Elligers, 215 Conn. 701, 710-11, 579 A.2d 1, that prelitigation requirements are not subject matter jurisdictional in nature); Votre v. County Obstetrics Gynecology Group, P.C., supra, 583-84 ("dismissal pursuant to [§ 52-190a (c)] is a statutory remedy for any defendant who is subject to a legal action in which the statutorily required written opinion is not annexed to the complaint or initial pleading"); Rios v. CCMC Corp., supra, 106 Conn. App. 821 n. 8 ("motions to dismiss are [not] limited to jurisdictional challenges"). Accordingly, any relief for the plaintiffs in this case must lie under the matter of form provision of § 52-592 (a).

Thus, we next turn to whether dismissal for the failure to supply an opinion letter authored by a similar health care provider is a matter of form subject to being saved by the accidental failure of suit statute, § 52-592 (a), which presents an issue of first impression for this court. We begin with the threshold determination that § 52-592 (a) is ambiguous about what constitutes a matter of form, thus permitting resort to the full panoply of extratextual sources as we seek to reconcile its relationship with § 52-190a. Thus, we note that the accidental failure of suit statute, now codified as § 52-592, originally was enacted in 1862; Public Acts 1862, c. 14; see Baker v. Baningoso, 134 Conn. 382, 386, 58 A.2d 5 (1948); "to avoid the hardships arising from an unbending enforcement of limitation statutes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hughes v. Bemer, 206 Conn. 491, 495, 538 A.2d 703 (1988). Although there is no relevant printed legislative history about § 52-592 due to its age; see, e.g., Peabody N.E., Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 250 Conn. 105, 121-22, 735 A.2d 782 (1999); it is well established in our long line of case law interpreting the statute in other contexts that § 52-592 (a) "is remedial and is to be liberally interpreted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Isaac v. Mount Sinai Hospital, supra, 210 Conn. 728.

In previous cases considering the application of the accidental failure of suit statute, we have declined to adopt an extremely broad construction of the statute to the effect that, "[t]he phrase, `any matter of form,' was used in [contradistinction] to matter of substance, as embracing the real merits of the controversy between the parties." Johnston v. Sikes, 56 Conn. 589, 592 (Superior Court 1888) ( Loomis, J.); see Lacasse v. Burns, supra, 214 Conn. 472-73. Rather, we have emphasized that § 52-592 (a) "does not authorize the reinitiation of all actions not tried on . . . [their] merits," and that, "[i]n cases where we have either stated or intimated that the any matter of form portion of § 52-592 would not be applicable to a subsequent action brought by a plaintiff, we have concluded that the failure of the case to be tried on its merits had not resulted from accident or even simple negligence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lacasse v. Burns, supra, 473.

In concluding that even "disciplinary dismissals are not excluded categorically from the relief afforded by § 52-592 (a)," we have noted the fact-sensitive nature of the inquiry and held that, "[t]o enable a plaintiff to meet the burden of establishing the right to avail himself or herself of the statute, a plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity to make a factual showing that the prior dismissal was a `matter of form' in the sense that the plaintiffs noncompliance with a court order occurred in circumstances such as mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect." (Emphasis added.) Ruddock v. Burrowes, supra, 243 Conn. 576-77. Indeed, even in the disciplinary context, only "egregious" conduct will "bar recourse to § 52-592." Id., 576; see also id., 576 n.ll ("[t]he fact that courts have allowed plaintiffs access to § 52-592 [a] in some cases involving [Practice Book § 251, now § 14-3] dismissals does not mean that we must allow recourse to the statute if the attorney's misconduct is egregious"). Thus, in Ruddock, we ordered the trial court on remand to make findings of fact with respect to "the circumstances of the plaintiffs' claimed justification for nonappearance at the pretrial conference." Id., 578; see also, e.g., Vestuti v. Miller, 124 Conn. App. 138, 146-47, 3 A.3d 1046 (2010) (trial court improperly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because "[w]ithout . . . appropriately weighing the evidence and determining credibility, there is an insufficient evidentiary basis for this case [arising from the failure of the plaintiffs attorney to attend a pretrial conference] to be accurately placed on the § 52-592 continuum").

Despite the plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, Connecticut case law limiting the application of § 52-592 (a) to cases of good faith mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect, and precluding it in cases of egregious conduct by an attorney or party, has been applied beyond the context of disciplinary dismissals. See Rosario v. Hasak, 50 Conn. App. 632, 638-39, 718 A.2d 505 (1998) (failure to return complaint in original action for more than two years after service was "egregious and blatant conduct" precluding plaintiff from commencing new action pursuant to § 52-592 [a] following dismissal of original action); Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 08-5009160 (March 17, 2010) ("whether the termination of the earlier action was disciplinary or nondisciplinary in nature, one of the factors a court must consider in applying [§ 52-190a (a)] is the conduct of counsel in the original action"). Thus, we find instructive decisions of our sister states concluding that their savings statutes may be invoked when the original complaints in medical malpractice cases, otherwise filed in good faith, have been dismissed based on technical failures with respect to required notice and merit certificates. See Pringle v. Kramer, 40 So. 3d 516, 519 (Miss. 2010) (state savings statute applicable to dismissals based on matter of form applies to dismissal for failure to give mandated prelitigation notice in medical malpractice case when that failure was not result of "bad faith," defined as, inter alia, "gross negligence" and "indifference" [internal quotation marks omitted]); Davis v. Mound View Health Care, Inc., 220 W. Va. 28, 32, 640 S.E.2d 91 (2006) (medical malpractice case dismissed because of insufficient prelitigation notice or certificate of merit may be refiled pursuant to savings statute when party has "demonstrated a good faith and reasonable effort to further the statutory purposes of preventing the making and filing of frivolous medical malpractice claims and lawsuits" [internal quotation marks omitted]); cf. Brisson v. Santoriello, 351 N.C. 589, 597, 528 S.E.2d 568 (2000) (plaintiff may refile voluntarily dismissed medical malpractice action pursuant to savings rule when initial action, although procedurally defective for failure to append affidavit of merit, was not brought in "bad faith," such as with no intent to pursue action).

Turning to the present case, the determination of whether the plaintiffs' failure to supply an opinion letter authored by a similar health care provider was "egregious" conduct precluding resort to § 52-592 (a) requires consideration of the policies underlying § 52-190a. Responding to "significant and continued increases in malpractice insurance premiums by reforming aspects of tort law, the insurance system and the public health regulatory system," the legislature enacted P.A. 05-275, which expanded on § 52-190a, originally enacted as part of the Tort Reform Act of 1986, Public Acts 1986, No. 86-338, § 12. Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., supra, 300 Conn. 17-18. Intended to protect health care providers from frivolous malpractice actions, P.A. 05-275 amended "§ 52-190a (a) to include a provision requiring the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to obtain the written opinion of a similar health care provider that `there appears to be evidence of medical negligence' and to attach the opinion to the certificate of good faith to be filed with the complaint. . . . In addition, the amendment provided that the failure to file the written opinion would be grounds for dismissal of the complaint." (Citation omitted.) Dias v. Grady, 292 Conn. 350, 357, 972 A.2d 715 (2009). "The legislative history of this amendment indicates that it was intended to address the problem that some attorneys, either intentionally or innocently, were misrepresenting in the certificate of good faith the information that they had obtained from experts." Id., 357-58; see also Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., supra, 20 (discussing testimony of Attorney Michael D. Neubert on behalf of Connecticut Medical Society to effect that opinion from similar health care provider would "`help [e]nsure that there is a reasonable basis for filing a medical malpractice case under the circumstances and . . . eliminate some of the more questionable or meritless cases filed under the present statutory scheme'").

Put differently, the legislature, by requiring a comprehensive prelitigation inquiry, including the provision of an opinion letter by an objectively qualified health care professional in an attempt to reduce the filing of frivolous medical malpractice actions; see, e.g., Dias v. Grady, supra, 292 Conn. 357; has in effect made the prelitigation inquiry pursuant to § 52-190a (a) a significant aspect of the medical malpractice action. This is particularly so given that: (1) § 52-190a (a) requires that the opinion letter be attached to the complaint; and (2) § 52-190a (c) mandates the dismissal of cases commenced without adequate prelitigation investigations. See Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., supra, 300 Conn. 25. Thus, the diligence inquiry under § 52-592 (a) is equally applicable to an attorney's prelitigation investigation of a medical malpractice case pursuant to § 52-190a (a).

Accordingly, in determining as a factual matter whether the failure to supply an opinion letter authored by a similar health care provider pursuant to § 52-190a (a) is not so "egregious" as to be considered a matter of form subject to § 52-592 (a), the trial court cannot ignore the qualifications of the opinion letter's author. Such consideration will have the effect of alleviating some of the "harshness" of the legislature's strict requirement that only "similar health care providers" may author opinion letters, which might well result in the dismissal of otherwise meritorious medical malpractice actions on technical grounds, while still achieving the purpose of § 52-190a, namely, protecting health care providers from frivolous malpractice actions. Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., supra, 300 Conn. 27. Indeed, that the opinion letter author might well be qualified to testify at the trial of the action pursuant to § 52-184c (d), regardless of the fact that he or she is not a similar health care provider as strictly defined by § 52-184c (b) or (c); see footnote 12 of this opinion; is one such factor that a trial court reasonably might consider in making the factual determinations attendant to a plaintiffs invocation of the protections of § 52-592 (a). Cf. Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 and n. 6 (describing general surgeon's extensive experience and training in emergency medicine, and qualifications to testify at trial in case alleging malpractice on part of specialist in emergency medicine, despite holding that surgeon was not statutorily permitted to author opinion letter). Thus, we conclude that a plaintiff may bring a subsequent medical malpractice action pursuant to the matter of form provision of § 52-592 (a) only when the trial court finds as a matter of fact that the failure in the first action to provide an opinion letter that satisfies § 52-190a (a) was the result of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect, rather than egregious conduct or gross negligence on the part of the plaintiff or his attorney.

Under the facts found by the trial court, we agree with the hospital defendants that § 52-592 (a) did not permit the plaintiffs to bring this action against them after dismissal of the original action. The trial court found that the "decision to engage . . . Williamson to review the file and to provide a written opinion of negligence is inexplicable. Even a cursory reading of § 52-190a would have revealed that . . . Williamson did not qualify as a similar health care provider." (Emphasis added.) The trial court's finding is particularly apt given that Williamson is neither a physician nor a social worker, and even her psychiatric nursing experience was scant. See footnote 11 of this opinion. Thus, we agree with the trial court's determination that the "plaintiffs' lack of diligence in selecting an appropriate person or persons to review the case for malpractice can only be characterized as blatant and egregious conduct which was never intended to be condoned and sanctioned by the `matter of form' provision of § 52-592." Cf. Bates v. Gilbert, 479 Mich. 451, 462, 736 N.W.2d 566 (2007) (concluding that affidavit of merit was defective requiring dismissal because, "[g]iven the law at the time [the] plaintiff filed her affidavit of merit, together with the fact that optometry is a distinct health profession from ophthalmology, [the] plaintiffs counsel could not have reasonably believed that [the] plaintiffs expert, an ophthalmologist, was qualified . . . to address the standard of practice or care applicable to [the] defendant, an optometrist"). Accordingly, the trial court properly rendered judgment for the hospital defendants.

Finally, we address briefly the plaintiffs' appeal from the trial court's decision to dismiss the action against the individual defendants for failure to supply the written opinion of a similar health care provider pursuant to § 52-190a (a). The only briefing with respect to the individual defendants is the plaintiffs' novel claim, raised for the first time in their reply brief and then at oral argument before this court, that the consolidation of the appeals pursuant to Practice Book § 61-7 (b); see footnote 4 of this opinion; requires reversal of the judgment with respect to the individual defendants, should we also reverse the judgment as to the hospital defendants. We agree with the individual defendants' contention at oral argument before this court that we should decline to consider the plaintiffs' appellate claims with respect to the individual defendants. Although any relief on the merits nevertheless is foreclosed by our decision in the companion case, Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., supra, 300 Conn. 25, the plaintiffs also have abandoned their claims with respect to the individual defendants by raising them for the first time in their reply brief, which is an impermissible practice. See, e.g., State v. Richardson, 291 Conn. 426, 431, 969 A.2d 166 (2009).

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.