Opinion
C084486
01-30-2018
In re J.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. PLACER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.O., Defendant and Respondent, PATRICIA S., Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 53-003394)
De facto parent Patricia S., paternal grandmother of J.S. (the minor), appeals following the juvenile court's order granting the minor's mother, S.O., six months of reunification services. De facto parent raises three contentions on appeal: (1) the juvenile court violated her right to due process by denying her counsel's access to the juvenile case file; (2) the court violated her right to due process by denying her counsel's request to object to testimony, cross-examine certain witnesses, and to call the minor's court-appointed special advocate (CASA) to testify; and (3) the court abused its discretion in ordering reunification services for the minor's mother. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother has six children, and at the time of the hearing, two were in her care. She petitioned under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to receive reunification services with the six-year-old minor, Julia S. Before the section 388 petition, the Placer County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) had recommended terminating parental rights, but by the time of the hearing, it recommended granting mother services. The minor had been living in foster care for 20 months and before the hearing, her paternal grandparents were granted de facto parent status.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Only the grandmother was represented at the hearing, though her husband was present. And only the grandmother de facto parent is party to this appeal.
Counsel of de facto parent requests a copy of the minor's dependency file
At the hearing, counsel for the de facto parent petitioned under section 827 to review the minor's dependency file. Counsel argued the documents may contain information vital to his client's assessment of the petition, including the history of the parents and the minor. Counsel noted mother had previously been bypassed for services and the reasons for that would be necessary to his presentation of evidence. He added, "If those reports don't have anything regarding mother, then I don't need them."
The court responded, "None of that affects your client's due process rights. They are limited, in my view, looking at the case." Counsel was given a copy of the section 388 petition and the bonding study, but the court otherwise declined to rule on the request to review the case file.
The juvenile court declines to allow counsel to object to witness testimony
Witnesses thereafter testified at the hearing, including mother. When mother was asked about the de facto parent and if she had concerns about the de facto parent's care of the minor, the de facto parent's counsel objected as to relevance. The court overruled the objection explaining, "you're a de facto participant here, and so I'm not going to permit you to object."
Counsel argued that de facto parents are parties to the case and, as parties, have a right to object. The court replied that the hearing is limited to whether mother should receive reunification services and the court questioned the relevance of the de facto parents on that issue. But the court noted de facto parents would have an opportunity to present evidence.
Counsel declines to present witnesses after the court precludes him from calling certain witnesses
Later in the proceedings, the court asked de facto parent's counsel if he intended to present evidence. Counsel listed four witnesses to call: a social worker who had just testified, mother, the minor's CASA, and the grandmother de facto parent. The court continued the hearing.
When it reconvened, the juvenile court explained it had left open the possibility of permitting the de facto parent to present evidence. The court asked for an offer of proof.
Counsel explained he intended to recall the social worker to explore her conclusions regarding the mother's sincerity and commitment, and to determine what information the Department had when it recommended terminating parental rights. As to the mother, he sought to ask her about her participation in a rehabilitation program and her history of rehabilitation efforts. As to the CASA, he sought to ask her about a family meeting in which the social worker had painted the de facto parent as uncooperative. Finally, as to the de facto parent, he sought to ask her about her relationship with mother and her observation of mother's prior conduct and behavior.
The court reiterated that the focus of the hearing is mother and whether she has demonstrated a credible change in circumstances, and whether it is in the minor's best interest to offer services to mother. The court explained de facto parents would have the right to make a statement and offer their views, adding they would be in the best position to tell the court whether it is in the minor's best interest for mother to receive services.
But, the court continued, "I would not permit the de facto parents to cross-examine or question the Department about why they wrote a report, why they made some recommendation. That's not relevant in my view under [Evidence Code section] 352. Even if it were, it would be an undue consumption of time and has, in my view, not much to do with the issues I've just stated on the record."
As to cross-examining mother, the court explained, "I would permit the de facto parents to question mother only in a limited regard though . . . if there's something that was not elicited that you feel is relevant [to] whether she made a genuine change in circumstance, I would permit that." "But . . . I'm not going to allow you to go backward in her history of drug abuse and addiction, that's all laid out very thoroughly in the report, and even in her own testimony, no one is contesting she has a history."
The court denied the request to call the minor's CASA, finding the proffered testimony under Evidence Code section 352 was "relatively not that significant" as to the issues of whether the mother made a credible and genuine change of circumstances and whether it would be detrimental to the minor to postpone a permanent plan for up to six months.
After the court's ruling, de facto parent's counsel told the court, "I had the opportunity to talk to my client. Based on the Court's orders, I think—I believe you've . . . handcuffed my clients to the point where they really can't provide the information that they feel is necessary for the Court and that they feel case law provides that they provide the information, so I will not be calling any witnesses."
The juvenile court's findings and order
The court found mother's circumstances had changed and found allowing mother services was in the minor's best interest. It explained, despite mother's long history of drug abuse and relapse, mother had impressed the court by putting herself into treatment. The court found mother's appearance healthy and her testimony credible regarding her conviction to remain sober. And there was a strong bond between mother and the minor, as evidenced by recent visits and the bonding study.
The juvenile court ordered six months of reunification services to mother.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, de facto parent raises three contentions: (1) the juvenile court violated her right to due process by denying her counsel's access to the juvenile case file; (2) the court violated her right to due process by denying her counsel's request to object to testimony, cross-examine certain witnesses, and to call the minor's CASA to testify; and (3) the court abused its discretion in ordering reunification services for the minor's mother.
Preliminarily, respondents mother and the Department argue de facto parent lacks standing to appeal from the order granting reunification services and thus the appeal should be dismissed. Respondents are partially incorrect with respect to de facto parent's due process challenges; de facto parent has standing to raise those challenges. (In re Hirenia C. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 504, 510, fn. 2 ["An order denying a person the right to participate in a juvenile proceeding as a 'de facto' parent is appealable by that person under section 395."]; see In re J.T. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 707, 718 (J.T.) [de facto parent status confers standing to challenge orders pertaining to those things to which the de facto parent is entitled].) But, as discussed below, respondents are correct that de facto parent lacks standing to challenge the order granting reunification services.
1.0 The Juvenile Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Declining to Allow De Facto Parent's Counsel to Review the Minor's Case File
De facto parent first contends the juvenile court violated her right to due process and meaningful access to the courts when it denied her counsel's request to review the juvenile case file. She avers that because she is considered a party as a de facto parent, her counsel was entitled to inspect the juvenile file because section 827, subdivision (a)(1)(E) and California Rules of Court, former rule 5.552(b)(1)(F) authorize " 'attorneys for the parties' " to inspect juvenile case files. We disagree.
Further rule references are to the former California Rules of Court in effect at the time of the continued section 388 hearing in March of 2017; former rule 5.552 was significantly amended and relettered effective January 1, 2018.
"De facto parents do not have an automatic right to receive the Agency's reports and other documents filed with the court." (In re B.F. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 811, 817 (B.F.).) They may, however, petition the juvenile court to review the case file. (Id. at p. 818.) A petition must show good cause, and the petitioner bears the burden of showing " 'that the records requested are necessary and have substantial relevance to the legitimate need of the petitioner.' " (Ibid.; former rule 5.552(e)(1), (6), now rule 5.552(d)(1), (6).) We review a juvenile court's decision to release confidential juvenile court records for abuse of discretion. (In re R. G. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1413.)
Here, the juvenile court acted within its discretion in declining counsel's request to review the case file. Counsel's proffered reasons for accessing the file were not germane to de facto parent's role at the hearing. De facto parents can aid the court by providing "the views of such persons who have experienced close day-to-day contact with the child . . . ." (In re B. G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 693.) But counsel did not seek the records for those purposes. Counsel sought to learn the circumstances of bypassing services to mother. He added, "If those reports don't have anything regarding mother, then I don't need them." Because the requested records were neither necessary nor substantially relevant to de facto parent's legitimate needs, the juvenile court acted well within its discretion in declining to grant the request. (Cf. B.F., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 821 [de facto parents had no legitimate interest in seeing the mother's psychological evaluation contained in the case file].)
Respondent Department argues de facto parent has appealed from an order that was never made, averring the juvenile court never actually ruled on the request to view the files. We find the record sufficient to conclude the juvenile court at the very least implicitly denied de facto parent's request. --------
2.0 The Juvenile Court Properly Denied Counsel's Request to Object to Testimony to Cross-examine Certain Witnesses and to Present the Minor's CASA as a Witness
De facto parent next contends the juvenile court violated her right to due process by denying her counsel's requests to object to unfavorable testimony, to cross-examine a social worker, and to present the minor's CASA as a witness. We find no error.
"While de facto parents have 'standing to participate as parties' ([former] rule 5.534(e)), their role is limited and they do not enjoy the same due process rights as parents." (B.F., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 817.) "De facto parents are not part of any adversarial aspect of a dependency case." (Ibid.) They are only " 'entitled to procedural due process to the extent necessary and appropriate for them to assert [their] recognizable interest in the child [citations].' " (In re Damion B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 880, 888 (Damion B.), citing Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice & Procedure (2011 ed.) § 2.60A[3], p. 2-130.) "The extent of a de facto parent's right to present evidence depends on the relevant circumstances." (In re A.F. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 692, 700.)
Here, de facto parent was afforded an opportunity to exercise her procedural rights as a de facto parent, including testifying to her views of whether reunification services were in the minor's best interest. But her rights did not include her counsel's participating in an adversarial role on matters beyond the scope of the de facto parent's role. (Cf. B.F., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 821 [noting it was not the de facto parent's function to rebut information the mother had given a psychologist].) As such the juvenile court's ruling neither deprived the de facto parent of her due process rights nor was it an abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352.
De facto parent, nevertheless, points to In re Matthew P. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 841 (Matthew P.) as analogous. There, the de facto parents moved under section 388 to secure the return of two minors from respite care. (Matthew P., at p. 847.) At the hearing, the de facto parents objected to the admission of several social workers' reports unless they were allowed to cross-examine the preparer. (Ibid.) The reports recommended not returning the minors to the de facto parents and noted that the de facto parents had not wanted one of the minors returned to their care. (Ibid.) The court refused to allow cross-examination but admitted a letter written by the de facto mother contesting one of the reports. (Ibid.) The section 388 motion was ultimately denied. (Matthew P., at p. 848.)
On appeal, the order was reversed. (Matthew P., supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 852.) The appellate court explained, " 'Although . . . de facto parents do not have all the substantive rights and preferences of legal parents or guardians, they have been afforded procedural rights in order to "assert and protect their own interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of the child" [citation], and to "ensure that all legitimate views, evidence, and interests are considered" by the juvenile court in dependency proceedings.' " (Id. at p. 850.) The court noted the denial of the de facto parents' motion had rested entirely on the reports and therefore the juvenile court should have afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the preparers. (Id. at p. 851.)
Here, however, the circumstances that warranted a greater exercise of procedural rights in Matthew P., supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 841 did not exist. Unlike in Matthew P., where the de facto parents and the report pertaining to them were central to the inquiry, here the de facto parent was decidedly peripheral. Under those circumstances, the de facto parent's procedural rights were limited to weighing in on the minor's best interests—and she was afforded an opportunity to do so. (See Damion B., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 889-890 [distinguishing Matthew P. on the grounds that the de facto parents were not completely precluded from submitting their opinion].)
3.0 De Facto Parent Lacks Standing to Challenge the Order of Reunification Services
Finally, de facto parent contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering six months of reunification services for mother. She argues mother's circumstances were only changing, and it was not in the minor's best interest to wait any longer for mother to become a stable parent. De facto parent, however, lacks standing to challenge the court's order.
"The acquisition of de facto parent status does not confer standing to appeal from any juvenile court order; rather, it confers standing to challenge only orders pertaining to those things to which the de facto parent is entitled." (J.T., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 718.) Merely taking a position on an issue affecting the minor does not establish standing. (Id. at p. 717.) A party must show her personal rights are affected by a ruling. (Ibid.)
Here, the order of reunification services to mother was not an order pertaining to the legal rights of the de facto parent. As such, de facto parent lacked standing to challenge that order on appeal. (See J.T., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th 707 [sister lacked standing to challenge termination of parental rights where order does not impact her legal rights]; In re P.L. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1361-1362 [de facto parent has no standing to challenge decision to place a child with a new prospective couple, as a de facto parent has no right to custody or continued placement of child]; Clifford S. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 747, 752 [stepparent/de facto parent lacked standing to challenge the failure to order reunification services because a stepparent has no right to reunification services].)
And even if the de facto parent had standing to challenge the order, we would be hard pressed on the record to conclude the trial court's order exceeded the bounds of reason. (See In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319 [" ' "[T]he appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason." ' "].)
DISPOSITION
The order granting mother reunification services is affirmed.
BUTZ, Acting P. J. We concur: MURRAY, J. RENNER, J.