Opinion
3:19-cv-00239-LPR
11-09-2021
EDDIE LAREECE PITTMAN PLAINTIFF v. NICE-PAK PRODUCTS, INC. DEFENDANT
ORDER
LEE P. RUDOFSKY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending is Defendant's Motion for Costs. Defendant seeks $1,044.75. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.
Defendant's Motion for Costs, Doc. 69.
Bill of Costs, Doc. 69-1. Although Defendant paid $1,754.50 for transcription services and $200.00 for pro hac vice admission fees, it only seeks reimbursement for the original transcript ($844.75) and the pro hac vice admission fees ($200).
A party that prevails in a summary judgment can seek reimbursement for the costs associated with the litigation. The relevant federal rule and statute provide the Court with a significant amount of discretion in determining whether to award costs. This discretion, however, is not boundless. And, the losing party, Mr. Pittman, carries the burden of showing that awarding costs would be inequitable. Mr. Pittman has not done so. Rather, he reasons simply that it is “not right to punish [him].” The award of costs, however, are not a punishment; they are an assumed risk of litigation.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1) (stating that “costs should be allowed” to the prevailing party “unless . . . a court order provides otherwise.”); Hibbs v. K-Mart Corp., 870 F.2d 435, 443 (8th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that both Rule 54(d) and § 1920 are “phrased in permissive terms.”); see also Garrison v. ConAgra Foods Packaged Foods, LLC, 833 F.3d 881, 886 (8th Cir. 2016) (cost decisions reviewed for abuse of discretion).
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 309 F.3d 494, 498 (8th Cir. 2002).
Mr. Pittman's Response, Doc. 75.
Mr. Pittman brought his discrimination case in forma pauperis; however, indigency alone does not protect a pro se litigant from bearing responsibility for costs. In reviewing Defendant's motion, I am reminded that Mr. Pittman's underlying discrimination claim was just barely better than frivolous. I recognize that allowing costs against an indigent plaintiff may, at times, have “a chilling effect on persons who seek their rights under antidiscrimination laws;” however, the circumstances of this case--primarily the essentially speculative and completely unproven allegation of discrimination--merit the award of costs to Defendant. Moreover, the costs sought by Defendant are not exorbitant--particularly in light of the fact that Defendant reduced its requests from those it actually expended.
See 28 U.S.C. §1915(f)(1) (providing for the assessment of costs against pro se litigants).
Stricklin v. Dolgencorp, LLC., 2013 WL 2096211, *2 (E.D. AR May 14, 2013) (internal citation omitted); see also Draper v. Rosario, 836 F.3d 1072, 1087-1089 (9th Cir. 2016) (enumerating factors to be considered in awarding costs).
IT IS ORDERED.