Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 02-1719, SECTION I/1.
May 4, 2003.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the motion of defendant, Nabors Offshore Corporation ("Nabors"), to compel arbitration and to stay or dismiss this action pending arbitration. The plaintiff opposes the motion. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
Rec. Doc. No. 19.
Rec. Doc. No. 28.
Background
In April, 2001, Nabors adopted a dispute resolution program (DRP) which required that all Nabors' employees submit any claims against Nabors arising out of their employment to binding arbitration. Pursuant to the specific terms of the DRP, any employee subject to the DRP would be required to submit any claims for alleged personal injuries incurred at a Nabors' workplace or in the course and scope of his Nabors' employment to binding arbitration. Such employee would waive his right to file a lawsuit and his right to a jury trial.On February 2, 2002, and on March 2, 2002, plaintiff alleges that he was a Jones Act seaman who, while working aboard the defendants' jack-up vessels, the POOL 53 and the POOL 54, was injured in the course and scope of his employment by the defendant. At the time of his accidents, the POOL 53 and the POOL 54 were drilling for oil. He filed the instant action, seeking relief under the Jones Act and general maritime law, in this court on June 6, 2002.
Rec. Doc. No. 1.
Discussion
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.9 U.S.C. § 2. This provision is subject to the exception set forth in § 1 which states that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1.
The plaintiff argues that because he is a Jones Act seaman working on a jack-up rig drilling for oil, he is specifically exempted from the FAA. Citing the differences between the meaning of the term "seaman" in the Jones Act and the meaning of that term in the Fair Labor Standards Act, the defendant suggests that § 1 does not exclude the plaintiff because the meaning of the word "seaman" may be different under the FAA than the Jones Act. The defendant also contends that even if Nabors is a "seaman" within the meaning of the FAA, he was not "engaged in" the transportation of goods in interstate commerce as required by the U.S. Supreme Court in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001).
These arguments have previously been rejected. In Buckley v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 190 F. Supp.2d 958 (S.D. Tex. 2002), aff'd 51 Fed.Appx. 928, ___ F.3d ___, 2002 WL 31415106 (5th Cir. 2002) (TABLE, NO. 02-40477), the district court dismissed the notion that a Jones Act seaman is not a seaman for purposes of the FAA, observing that, "[t]here is absolutely no indication that the FAA envisioned a more restrictive class of seaman than the Jones Act." Id. at 964-65. The Buckley court also held that pursuant to Circuit City, not only "transportation workers", but " all seamen, as well as all railroad employees, [are exempted from the FAA] by virtue of the fact that all seamen and all railroad employees are directly involved in the transport of goods in interstate commerce." Id at 961-62 (italics in original). TheBuckley court concluded that the Nabors DRP, the same arbitration agreement at issue in the present case, was "not a valid and enforceable arbitration provision under the FAA."Id. at 966.
In addition, even if a seaman had to be engaged in the transportation of goods in interstate commerce to qualify for an FAA exemption, there is evidence in the record supporting the finding that plaintiff was so engaged while working as a Nabors' roustabout. Mitch Carrier, an employee of Nabors, stated in his affidavit that:
While Nabors does not participate in extracting the resources from the earth or in post-production activities, Nabors' pre-production drilling and workover services enable its customers to extract oil, gas or other natural resources and then to distribute them to Louisiana, Texas and other locations throughout the United States.
Like other Nabors employees on the rigs, Mr. Pittman was one of many individuals involved in the drilling and workover operations, and, as part of Nabors' projects as a whole, his efforts were directly related to Nabors' customers' ability to extract and produce natural resources and distribute their product.
Rec. Doc. No. 19, Exh. 1, to memorandum in support (emphasis added) (paragraph numbers omitted). Mr. Carrier also stated in his affidavit that the plaintiff's job duties did not include any navigation function and that neither Nabors nor the plaintiff moved, transported, or distributed natural resources.
The court in Brown v. Nabors Offshore Corporation, 2002 WL 31319943 (E.D. La. 2002), also responded to the defendant's argument a seaman, as a roustabout, is not exempted from the FAA because he is not engaged in the transportation of goods in interstate commerce. The district court in Brown noted that Nabors agreed that Brown, also a roustabout who provided support services on a rig, had duties which were "directly related" to the drilling rig's operation and to the oil company's ability to distribute oil and gas throughout the United States. Id. at *2. The Brown court held that under those circumstances, the plaintiff was a seaman exempted from FAA coverage and, therefore, Nabors' motion to compel arbitration and to stay or dismiss the action was without merit.
The district court decisions in Brown and Buckley, the latter of which has been affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, are factually and legally indistinguishable from the present case. Accordingly, for the above and foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion of Nabors Offshore Corporation to compel arbitration and to stay or dismiss this action pending arbitration is hereby DENIED.