Opinion
Civ. NO. 99-3195 SECTION "N"
April 4, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendants Darrell Holt and Jerry J. Larpenter's Joint Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss and, Alternatively, Rule 56(c) Motion for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the 12(b)(6) Motion is GRANTED.
A. BACKGROUND
On October 20, 1999, Tina Pitre and Debbie Chaission filed the instant suit in their individual capacities and on behalf of their minor children, respectively, Zachary Phillips and Brittany Chaission. Ms. Pitre and Ms. Chaission made Darrel Holt, the Parish of Terrebonne, the Terrebonne Parish Sheriffs Office, and Terrebonne Sheriff Jeny J. Larpenter defendants. Terrebonne Parish and the Terrebonne Parish Sheriffs Office earlier were dismissed as defendants, and the instant motion relates solely to the claims against the two remaining defendants, Mr. Holt and Sheriff Larpenter.
On December 12, 1999, Ms. Chaission added Jeremy Chaission as an additional plaintiff. For convenience and consistency, the Court shall refer to the claims as belonging to Ms. Pitro and Ms. Chaission.
On November 30, 1999, the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss all claims against Terrebonne Parish without prejudice. On January 25, 2000, the Court approved of and adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation that the Terrebonne Parish Sheriffs Department be dismissed as a defendant.
Ms. Pitre and Ms. Chaission allege that "[d]uring the time Darrell Holt was employed by the Terrebonne Parish Sheriffs Office, . . . Darrell Holt sexually molested Zachary Phillips and Brittany Chaission. The molestation occurred for Brittany Chaission during September, October, November and December 1998 and for Zachary Phillips in December of 1998." Complaint ¶ 5. Ms. Pitre and Ms. Chaission do not set forth any of the "particulars of the molestation", including the alleged acts or the times and locations of those acts, but do allege that "[a]t relevant times, the defendant, Darrell Holt, acted under the color of law at times while in uniform as a Terrebonne Parish Sheriff Officer." Id. ¶¶ 6-7. The Plaintiffs assert claims against the Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In paragraph 6, Plaintiffs state: "The particulars of the sexual molestation of these two minor children as to the methods and types of molestation will be itemized at the time of trial."
B. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Defendants Holt and Larpenter now move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims on two grounds. First, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because the complaint fails to allege what action Defendant Holt was performing "under color of law" at the time of the alleged acts of sexual molestation. Second, and in the alternative, the Defendants move for summary judgment in their favor on the grounds that Plaintiffs will be unable to prove that any actions on the part of Defendant Holt were performed "under color of law" at the time of the alleged acts of sexual molestation.
Two allegations are required in order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived her of a federal right. Second, she must allege that the person who has deprived her of that right acted under color of state or territorial law. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980).
In determining whether the Court should grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must "accept all well-pleaded facts as true, and . . . view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Capital Parks. Inc. v. Southeastern Adver. Sales Svs. Inc., 30 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1994). Dismissal ordinarily is justified "only if it appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations." Id. (citation omitted). However, in the context of a § 1983 claim against a public official in his individual capacity, the Fifth Circuit requires a heightened standard of pleading. See Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999);Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1996); Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). In particular, a § 1983 complaint must state specific facts, not simply legal and constitutional conclusions. See Shipp v. McMahon, 199 F.2d 256, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1999); Anderson, 184 F.3d at 443 ("plaintiffs suing governmental officials in their individual capacities must allege specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional violation"); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990).
The Court finds that Ms. Pitre and Ms. Chaission have failed to meet the heightened pleading standard required for a § 1983 complaint. From the face of the complaint, it is simply impossible to discern any basis for a finding that Mr. Holt acted "under color of law" at the time of the alleged conduct: Plaintiffs have stated no specific facts that could establish that Mr. Holt misused or abused his official power or that there was a nexus between the victim, the allegedly improper conduct and Mr. Holt's performance of his official duties. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2255, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); U.S. v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 452 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Instead, Plaintiffs merely state in a conclusory fashion that Mr. Holt was acting under color of law "at relevant times" and expressly omit the "particulars of the [alleged] molestation". The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against either Mr. Holt or Sheriff Larpenter and grants Defendants' 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.
The Court notes that Ms. Pitre and Ms. Chaission failed to address the Defendants' 12(b)(6) motion, instead focusing solely on the summary judgment argument.
Cf Morin, 77 F.3d at 121 (reversing district court's denial of 12(b)(6) dismissal where plaintiff alleged that defendant police officer knew, or should have known, that the evidence against the plaintiff was false without pleading factual allegations indicating the evidence was false or that no reasonable police officer would have believed the evidence).
Because the Court grants Defendants' 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, it does not reach Defendants' Alternative Rule 56(c) Motion for Summary Judgment.
C. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the heightened standard of pleading required in a § 1983 complaint by Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Darrell Holt and Jerry J. Larpenter's Joint Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 3 day of April, 2000.