Opinion
No. 3-272 / 01-2018
Filed September 24, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court forPolk County, Artis Reis, Judge.
Plaintiff, injured in a fall through an unguarded stairwell while working for a subcontractor at a residential construction site, appeals from the summary judgment ruling entered in favor of the owner/developer, and from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the subcontractor. AFFIRMED.
Stephen D. Hardy of Grefe Sidney, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Mark L. Tripp, Jason T. Madden and Jason C. Palmer of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee Jerry's Homes.
Thomas M. Braddy of Locher, Cellilli, Pavelka Dostal, L.L.C., Omaha, Nebraska, for appellee Johnson.
Heard by Zimmer, P.J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.
James Piper, injured in a fall through an unguarded stairwell while working for a subcontractor at a residential construction site, appeals from the summary judgment ruling entered in favor of the owner and developer of the site, and from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the subcontractor. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings . In 1999 Jerry's Homes, Inc. (Jerry's Homes) was the owner and developer of a residential construction site. It had entered into subcontracts with a number of individuals and entities for the completion of all aspects of the building process. One of these individuals was Michael Johnson d/b/a Johnson Erections (Johnson). Johnson had worked as a framing subcontractor for Jerry's Homes off and on since the early 1980s.
Johnson subcontracted with Jerry's Homes to conduct framing activities at the site where Piper was injured. Jerry's Homes provided Johnson with blue prints and lumber, but Johnson and his crew were solely responsible for the framing process. The on-site interaction of Jerry's Homes was limited to checking on Johnson's progress and consulting with Johnson on design modifications. On one occasion Jerry's Homes's superintendent did instruct Johnson's crew to change a wall location in order to comply with an alteration requested by the future homeowners.
This individual site was part of a larger residential development being completed by Jerry's Homes.
James Piper worked for Johnson hauling lumber for the carpenters, cleaning up the job site, and doing other tasks as requested. Although Piper was not a carpenter, on occasion he was instructed to perform some basic carpentry work, such as nailing supports onto overhead beams. There was no written agreement between Piper and Johnson, nor were specific terms of employment discussed. Piper had obtained the position by showing up at the construction site after a friend told him that Johnson was "looking for bodies." It was Piper's understanding, after talking to his friend, that the workers would be paid when Johnson was paid.
During the framing process, Piper assisted with the installation of steps connected to an unguarded stairwell opening. The stairwell opening was not hidden from view, and Piper clearly knew the opening existed. Two to three days after the stairwell was completed, but before the entire structure had been fully framed, Piper stepped off a ladder, and backed into the opening. He fell and broke several bones in his foot.
Piper filed a workers' compensation claim against Johnson. Johnson defaulted, but answered interrogatories stating that he had no workers' compensation insurance. Piper voluntarily dismissed the workers' compensation proceedings before entry of a final judgment, and brought suit against Jerry's Homes in district court. He later added Johnson as a defendant. As to both defendants Piper alleged several grounds of negligence, including violation of occupational safety and health (OSHA) standards and requirements. He further alleged that Jerry's Homes had not exercised reasonable care in selecting Johnson as the framing subcontractor.
Jerry's Homes sought and obtained a summary judgment dismissing all of Piper's claims against it. The case against Johnson went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in Johnson's favor. It found that Piper was not Johnson's employee, and that Johnson was not at fault for Piper's injuries. Piper appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of Jerry's Homes, and from the jury verdict in favor of Johnson.
II. Scope of Review . All the issues presented in this matter are reviewed for the correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4.
III. Jerry's Homes . Piper alleges four errors in the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Jerry's Homes. His first three assignments of error are based on assertions that Jerry's Homes failed to provide and maintain a safe work environment. Piper claims the court erred in (1) finding Jerry's Homes did not exercise sufficient control over the job site or Johnson to give rise to a duty of care, (2) failing to find Jerry's Homes had a non-delegable duty to provide a safe place to work, and (3) failing to find OSHA regulations imposed a duty on Jerry's Homes to provide fall protection. Piper's fourth claim on appeal is based on the district court's dismissal of a negligent hiring claim against Jerry's Homes, for its selection of Johnson as the framing subcontractor. Piper argues such claim was authorized under Restatement (Second) Torts section 411 (1965).
The district court correctly granted Jerry's Homes's summary judgment motion if no genuine issue of material fact existed, and Jerry's Homes was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R.Civ.P. 1.981(3); City of West Branch v. Miller, 546 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 1996). In reviewing the district court's actions, facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Piper. Bearshield v. John Morrell Co., 570 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Iowa 1997). However, Piper bore the responsibility of setting forth any specific facts that showed there was a genuine issue for trial. Iowa R.Civ.P. 1.981(5). For Piper's claims to survive summary judgment there must exist afact upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in his favor. Hall v. Barrett, 412 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Iowa Ct.App. 1987).
A. Possession and Control Issues. The claims based on Jerry's Homes's alleged failure to provide and maintain a safe working environment primarily attempt to hold Jerry's Homes liable for Johnson's alleged negligence in failing to provide adequate safety measures around the stairwell opening. As a general matter, however, an owner and general contractor is not liable for injuries to a subcontractor's employee that arise out of the subcontractor's negligence. See Downs v. A H Constr., Ltd., 481 N.W.2d 520, 523-24 (Iowa 1992). An exception to this rule is made when the general contractor retains possession or control. Id. at 524-25. A review of relevant statutory and case law reveals that retained control is a necessary element for all claims derived from Johnson's alleged negligence, whether based on the retained control doctrine, Jerry's Homes's role as the owner of the land on which the injury occurred, or a violation of OSHA standards.
An owner and general contractor can be held liable for injury to a subcontractor's employee if it negligently exercised retained control over part of the subcontractor's work, such that the subcontractor was "not entirely free to do the work in his own way." Restatement (Second) Torts § 414 cmt. c. See also Downs, 481 N.W.2d at 524-25. Similarly, safe-premise liability can be imposed on the general contractor if it was substantially involved in overseeing construction. Robinson v. Poured Walls of Iowa, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 873, 875-76 (Iowa 1996). Once again, the key is the amount of control retained over the subcontractor's work. Id. at 876. Because the violation of OSHA standards cannot enlarge, diminish or otherwise affect common law or statutory rights, duties, and liabilities, seeLunde v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 299 N.W.2d 473, 478 (Iowa 1980), Jerry's Homes would be liable for Johnson's violation of OSHA standards only if it otherwise owed Piper a legal duty.
Here, while Jerry's Homes provided blueprints and lumber, it is undisputed that Johnson alone was responsible for framing the home where Piper was injured. Although Jerry's Homes had a superintendent on site every other day, his role was limited to checking on Johnson's progress and consulting on design modifications. Instructing Johnson's crew to change the location of a wall to come in line with a design alteration is not tantamount to controlling the manner in which the framing subcontractor went about his job. Cf. Downs, 481 N.W.2d at 522 (concluding, upon appeal of a summary judgment ruling, that a general contractor had not retained the necessary control even though a representative was on site every day inspecting progress and making recommendations, and empowered to direct that work be stopped or alterations be made).
We decline to conclude that control sufficient to create a legal duty exists merely because the general contractor coordinated the building permits and work performed by the various subcontractors. Nor do we conclude it exists simply because Jerry's Homes set certain standards for its subcontractors. See Hoffnagle v. McDonald's Corp., 522 N.W.2d 808, 814-15 (Iowa 1994) (applying concept of retained control to relationship of franchiser and franchisee, and determining that franchiser had not retained necessary control by attempting to insure "the uniformity and standardization of products and services" offered in its franchises). Based upon the record before the court at summary judgment, there is simply no material factual dispute as to whether Jerry's Homes retained the necessary control to create a duty of care to Piper.
Piper alternatively argues that Jerry's Homes had a direct and non-delegable duty to ensure the safety of its subcontractors' employees. However, in the cases relied on by Piper, the general contractor not only retained control over a portion of the subcontractor's work, but also assumed, under its contract with the property owner, a duty for the safety of on-site workers. See, e.g., Farris v. General Growth Dev. Corp., 354 N.W.2d 251, 254-55 (Iowa 1984); Giarratano v. Weitz Co., 259 Iowa 1292, 1300-04, 147 N.W.2d 824, 830-31 (1967). As already noted, Jerry's Homes did not retain operative control over Johnson's work, and Piper does not point us to, nor are we aware of, any evidence in the summary judgment record that indicates Jerry's Homes assumed a duty under contract.
Piper also appears to argue that, without regard to Jerry's Homes's control over the work site, OSHA standards imposed a direct duty on Jerry's Homes to comply with those standards. However, a violation of an OSHA standard is negligence per se only if the violator was the employer of the injured worker. Wiersgalla v. Garrett, 486 N.W.2d 290, 292-93 (Iowa 1992). For all others, it is only evidence of negligence. Id. Thus, while a proven violation of an OSHA standard could serve as evidence Jerry's Homes breached a duty to provide a safe work environment, it does not give rise to the duty itself. SeeLunde, 299 N.W.2d at 478 (concluding OSHA cannot expand rights or liabilities).
B. Negligent Hiring . While the district court dismissed Piper's negligent hiring claim for several reasons, on appeal Piper focuses solely on the court's refusal to recognize a cause of action under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 411. That section, which has yet to be adopted in Iowa, subjects an employer to liability for physical harm to a third person that results from the employer's "failure to exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and careful contractor to do work which will involve a risk of physical harm unless it is skillfully and carefully done . . . ." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 411. Piper urges us to adopt section 411. However, under the facts of this case, we find it unnecessary to decide whether that provision of the Restatement should be adopted. Even if we would find that section 411 should be applied in this case, the facts in the summary judgment record are inadequate to render Jerry's Homes liable for its selection of Johnson as the framing subcontractor.
The section also imposes liability if the contractor was employed "to perform any duty which the employer owes to third persons." Such liability is not at issue in this case.
Under section 411 a general contractor can be liable for damage resulting from the incompetence or carelessness of a subcontractor only if the general contractor had reason to know, at the time the subcontractor was selected, that the subcontractor was incompetent or careless in the particular way that injured the plaintiff. See id. at cmt. b. Here, Piper argues that Johnson was incompetent or careless because he failed to provide adequate safety precautions on the stairwell opening prior to the completion of framing. See id. at cmt. a. (defining "competent and careful" as the knowledge, skill, experience and personal characteristics that a reasonable person would realize were necessary to perform the assigned task without creating an unreasonable risk to others). However, no facts presented at summary judgment indicated that Jerry's Homes had reason to doubt Johnson's safety procedures.
Although Piper also points to Johnson's failure to carry workers' compensation insurance, financial responsibility, or lack thereof, is irrelevant to a negligence determination under section 411. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 411 cmt. g.
There was no indication that, in the nearly two decades leading up to Piper's accident, Johnson had a deficient safety record as a subcontractor. To the contrary, Jerry's Homes had worked with Johnson numerous times, and Ronald Grubb, the president of Jerry's Homes, had been generally satisfied with Johnson's framing work. While Grubb did qualify his assessment by stating that Johnson performed up to standards "most of the time," there was no indication any of these unnamed standards implicated the safety issues underpinning Piper's section 411 claim. Although Johnson did not have a safety officer, that alone would not cause a reasonable person to doubt Johnson's ability or willingness to comply with safety procedures. See id. at cmt. c. (indicating that, when work to be performed by subcontractor is not peculiarly dangerous, general contractor should be able to rely on subcontractor's reputation).
Although in 1994 Jerry's Homes had dismissed Johnson from a position as one of its site superintendents, nothing in the record indicated that Johnson's dismissal related to his competence as a framing subcontractor, much less his attention to safety issues. Rather, it appears his dismissal was due to inadequate training and experience in site supervision issues.
Contrary to Piper's assertion, the summary judgment record did not indicate Jerry's Homes had actual knowledge that Johnson left stairwell openings unguarded. At best, the record indicated Jerry's Homes knew that carpentry or framing subcontractors often left stairwell openings unguarded while the framing was still in process. We see nothing in the summary judgment record that would require Jerry's Homes to conduct a further inquiry into Johnson's safety procedures before selecting him as the carpentry subcontractor for the site upon which Piper was injured. The district court did not err in dismissing Piper's negligent hiring claim. IV. Johnson . Piper argues the court made numerous errors during the trial of his claims against Johnson. Most of these were specified within Piper's new trial motion, which was denied by the district court. We will therefore separately address each alleged error, as a new trial motion based upon alleged errors by the district court stands or falls on the correctness of the underlying legal rulings. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Thermogas Co., 620 N.W.2d 819, 823 (Iowa 2000). We will address all issues, even though Piper's arguments suffer from several procedural deficiencies that could impact review of his claims. See generallyIowa R.App.P. 6.14.
In the portions of the pretrial depositions appended to the summary judgment filings, Grubb stated only that, while the decision to guard a stairwell opening was left to the individual carpenter, he would not expect an opening to be guarded while a structure was still being framed. While the superintendent of the site where Piper was injured testified to general safety practices, his only testimony regarding Johnson's specific work history concerned, not the use of safety barriers on stairwell openings, but the location where such openings were regularly built.
It would appear Piper's section 411 claim is further impeded by the fact that Jerry's Homes relinquished control of the site to Johnson during the framing process. SeeRestatement (Second) Torts § 411cmt. f. (limiting liability of possessor of land, who entrusts erection of building to independent contractor, to those persons to whom the possessor owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to prepare and maintain a safe building, such as an invitee injured by a dangerous condition).
A. Evidentiary Rulings. Trial courts are granted broad discretion concerning the admissibility of evidence. Horak v. Argosy Gaming Co., 648 N.W.2d 137, 149 (Iowa 2002). Reversal on the basis of an evidentiary ruling by the district court is warranted only if the court clearly abused its discretion, to Piper's prejudice. Id. Discretion is abused when it is exercised to a clearly unreasonable extent, or for reasons or on grounds that are clearly untenable. Graber v. City of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Iowa 2000). A ground or reason is untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous application of the law. Id.
1. Construction documents. Piper argues the district court erred in excluding from evidence Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 4, which were agreements between Johnson and Jerry's Homes. The contracts were excluded, prior to trial, upon Johnson's motion in limine. Johnson sought exclusion on the grounds that the documents both referenced liability insurance, and demonstrated a contractual relationship between the two parties, which relationship necessarily raised questions of liability and indemnification. Piper argued the documents demonstrated Jerry's Homes's expectation that Johnson was responsible for any individuals he brought to the work site, which was a "key fact on the issue of whether there was an employment relationship and whether Johnson was responsible for the people he brought onto the site."
The district court did not find any such expectation by Jerry's Homes to be relevant, and excluded the exhibits. During trial Piper attempted to reintroduce Exhibits 3 and 4 with the specific references to liability insurance redacted. When the court reaffirmed its prior ruling excluding the exhibits, Piper made no further offer of proof.
Significantly, Piper had obtained a pretrial ruling that no reference was to be made to the fact Jerry's Homes had been dismissed as a party or otherwise determined to be free from liability or fault for Piper's injuries. However, the redacted exhibits, which clearly telegraphed that the deleted portions related to Johnson's duties and responsibilities under the contract, continued to reference Johnson's assumption of liability for injury to his workers, as well as his agreement to hold Jerry's Homes harmless from liability. Other portions of the exhibits, such as Johnson's agreement to furnish tools and materials, were at best minimally probative of the existence of an employer/employee relationship between Johnson and Piper. Under the record, we cannot conclude that exclusion of Exhibits 3 and 4 was an abuse of discretion that worked to Piper's prejudice.
Piper also claims the court erred in excluding from evidence Exhibit 6, Jerry's Homes's construction manual. Piper argues the manual is relevant on the issue of Johnson's negligence, as it is evidence that temporary guardrails were required at the time Piper fell. Even if portions of the construction manual applied during the course of the construction, nothing on the face of the document indicates the temporary guardrail requirement applied prior to the completion of framing. If anything, the presence of the temporary rail requirement on the final framing inspection checklist supported Grubb's testimony that temporary guardrails were not required until framing was complete. Given the record before the court, we cannot find it abused its discretion in excluding Jerry's Homes's construction manual.
To the extent Piper argues the manual demonstrates relevant facts above and beyond the existence of temporary guardrails, he failed to make an offer of proof to show what those relevant specifics were, thereby waiving error. See Strong v. Rothamel, 523 N.W.2d 597, 599 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994).
2. Limiting Examination of Johnson . Piper called Johnson as a witness and attempted to question him in relation to Iowa Code chapter 91C, and its requirements as they applied to construction contractors. The record referred to by Piper reveals that, after an bench conference, the court sustained objections to the following three questions: whether a construction contactor was required to have a license on file with the Department of Labor; whether Johnson was "in some way exempt" from the licensing requirements because he did not personally bring workers onto the job site; and whether Johnson ever had "any employment arrangement with another man for the business of construction in the state of Iowa." Piper's claim that it was error to preclude this line of questioning faces several obstacles.
Piper failed to make an offer of proof at trial, and on appeal makes no effort to explain why exclusion of this testimony was error . See Brooks v. Holtz, 661 N.W.2d 526, 529 (Iowa 2003) (noting dual purpose of offer of proof, to "give the trial court a more adequate basis for its evidentiary ruling" and "make a meaningful record for appellate review"). Our review on the question is further hampered because the basis of Johnson's objections were not recorded, and Piper did not attempt to supplement or complete the record for review. See Iowa R.App.P. 6.10(3) (allowing for statement of evidence); Wende v. Orv Rocker Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995) (noting burden of providing adequate record is on appellant). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Piper has not shownhow precluding the answers to the above three questions prejudiced his ability to demonstrate an employer/employee relationship between himself and Johnson, or Johnson's negligent failure to maintain a safe working environment. To the extent we are able to review the question, we detect no abuse of discretion in the district court's exclusion of this testimony.
3. Evidence of subsequent, similar accident . Piper argues the court erred when it precluded him from introducing evidence that, after Piper's injury, another of Johnson's workers, Pete Garcia, fell and was injured. The fall occurred at another construction site, during the same year as Piper's injury. In regard to the specifics of the fall, an offer of proof established only that Garcia was not equipped with personal fall protection at the time the fall occurred. Johnson's attorney countered with a professional statement that Garcia fell, not through a hole, but off of a wall.
It is well established that a prior accident can be admissible to show knowledge of a dangerous condition if the prior accident was substantially similar or comparable to the accident in issue, and not too remote in time. Madison v. Colby, 348 N.W.2d 202, 210 (Iowa 1984). The key to admissibility is the fact the evidence demonstrates a defendant's knowledge of a dangerous condition. Id. Based on the offer of proof, Piper could show only a subsequent fall, on a separate site, occurring up to nine months after Piper's injury, which involved, not a fall through a stairwell opening, but a fall from a wall. This evidence has little if any relevance to establishing Johnson's knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition at issue in this case, and we see no abuse of discretion in excluding this evidence. Cf. Rattenborg by Rattenborg v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 438 N.W.2d 602, 606 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989) (acknowledging that, in strict liability cases, evidence of subsequent accidents may be relevant on question of whether product was hazardous).
4. Testimony regarding industry practice . The district court excluded testimony from one of Piper's witness, Randy Bahl, regarding industry practice as to the height of temporary guardrails and the type and size of lumber used in their construction. Piper argues that, notwithstanding the fact that Bahl had only constructed between two and six guardrails, he was qualified to render the opinion because he had observed numerous such guardrails during his twenty-five years of carpentry experience. The record is unclear as to whether the district court sustained an objection to Bahl's testimony on more than one ground. However, even if we assume the sole basis of the district court's ruling was a lack of foundation, we see no abuse of discretion. Bahl's proposed testimony regarding his industry observations was somewhat vague and non-specific. Moreover, exclusion of the testimony did not work to Piper's prejudice, as he was able to introduce the same evidence through another witness. See Associated Grocers of Iowa Co-Op., Inc. v. West, 297 N.W.2d 103, 109 (Iowa 1980).
5. Workers compensation file. Piper sought to introduce into evidence his workers' compensation file. The court denied his request, apparently on the basis of relevance. Piper now argues that Johnson's default in the workers' compensation proceeding constituted an admission of an employer/employee relationship between Piper and Johnson. However, at the time Piper requested admission of the file, the grounds he provided were limited to a general assertion that the file demonstrated Johnson's default in the workers' compensation proceeding, and a specific assertion that it demonstrated Johnson's lack of workers' compensation insurance. Piper did not argue that the file was relevant as establishing an employment relationship between himself and Johnson. It therefore appears that this claim was not preserved for our review. See In re Estate of Crabtree, 550 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa 1996) (holding matters not raised before the district court are deemed waived); Porter v. Iowa Power Light Co., 217 N.W.2d 221, 231 (Iowa 1974) ("where the materiality and relevancy of evidence are not apparent, the party offering the evidence is obliged to state the purpose of the proof").
Moreover, Piper sought to use Johnson's default as preclusive proof of the employment relationship. However, for issue preclusion to apply to any prior admission of an employment relationship, the issue must have been actually litigated. Hoth v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 577 N.W.2d 390, 391-92 (Iowa 1998). A default in an action subsequently dismissed without prejudice does not constitute actual litigation to judgment of an issue claimed in the petition or complaint. See id. There was no abuse of discretion by the district court in excluding the exhibit.
B. Directed Verdict on Claim that Piper was Employee of Johnson . Piper argues the court erred when it failed to direct a verdict in his favor on the issue of whether he was in fact an employee of Johnson. Without addressing the standard of review to be applied to such a ruling, he contends that all relevant considerations point to an establishment of the relationship. We cannot agree.
A question must be sent to the jury if reasonable minds could disagree in light of the evidence presented. McClure v. Walgreen Co., 613 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Iowa 2000). Even in the face of undisputed facts, a jury question exists so long as reasonable minds might draw different inferences from those facts. Id. While the record includes evidence which could be viewed as establishing an employment relationship, testimony from several witnesses regarding issues such as the level of control exercised by Johnson, the manner in which Piper was paid, and facts surrounding Piper's receipt of unemployment benefits and his injury, supported a finding that Piper was an independent contractor. Under the facts a reasonable jury could find that Piper was an independent contractor. We see no error in the court's denial of Piper's directed verdict request.
C. Negligence Instruction. Piper objected to the district court's jury instructions, because they failed to "assert general negligence on the part of [Johnson] for violation of the OSHA regulations . . . ." He argues that the district court erred when it overruled this objection. Although Piper claims he was entitled to an instruction "such as" Iowa Uniform Civil Jury Instruction No. 700.1, the record does not demonstrate he requested the submission of that specific instruction. While Piper seems to assume the district court was well versed in the content of his proposed instruction, he fails to identify any part of the record where specifics of the desired instruction appear.
Without a more specific indication of what instruction Piper sought, we are hard pressed to determine whether he was entitled to have the instruction presented to the jury. See Vasconez v. Mills, 651 N.W.2d 48, 52 (Iowa 2002) ("Parties are entitled to have their legal theories submitted to the jury so long as the instructions embodying those theories correctly state the law, have application to the case and are not otherwise covered in the court's instructions."). Moreover, based on the record, Piper did little more than state his objection to the court's failure to give a general negligence instruction grounded in OSHA violations. He failed to delineate the grounds supporting his claim that such an instruction was appropriate under the record made in this case. See Lynch v. Saddler, 656 N.W.2d 104, 110-11 (Iowa 2003) (citation omitted) (noting that objection must be "`sufficiently specific to alert the trial court to the basis of the complaint so that if error does exist the court may correct it before placing the case in the hands of the jury.'"). Piper did not preserve error on this issue. See id.
D. New Trial. Johnson argues the foregoing actions by the district court constituted cumulative legal error entitling him to a new trial. Because we have already addressed the merits of Piper's individual claims, and found them wanting, they cannot serve as a basis for granting Piper a new trial. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Thermogas Co., 620 N.W.2d 819, 823 (Iowa 2000).
Reviewing Piper's brief in conjunction with his new trial motion, it appears he raises an alternate argument: the evidence did not sufficiently support the jury's findings that Piper was not an employee of Johnson, and that Johnson was not at fault for Piper's injuries. When the question raised by a new trial motion is the adequacy of the jury verdict, we review the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion by the district court . See Johnson v. Knoxville Cmty. School Dist., 570 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Iowa 1997). In reviewing the record, we conclude it adequately supports the verdict. We therefore determine the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Piper's new trial request.