Opinion
No. SUCV2005-03940, 05-3940-E.
October 18, 2007.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This action arises from an incident where the plaintiff, Susan Pinto ("Pinto"), was allegedly injured while riding a horse owned by the defendants, Revere-Saugus Riding Academy ("Riding Academy") and Wallace Ward ("Ward"). Pinto seeks to recover for her physical injuries that resulted from the defendants' alleged negligence. This matter is before the court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 56. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED .
BACKGROUND
The undisputed facts and the disputed facts viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, as revealed by the summary judgment record, are as follows.
On September 25, 2002, Pinto arrived at Riding Academy intending to purchase a "western pleasure" horse for her children. Having some horse riding experience, Pinto asked Riding Academy's staff to show her a "dead broke horse," one suitable for inexperienced riders. Pinto was first shown a horse named "Blaze," however she rejected him as being too small; Pinto did not want a horse her children would outgrow. Pinto required a horse of at least "15 hands" in size. Thereafter, Pinto was shown a horse named "Twilight." Twilight was a thoroughbred, purchased by Riding Academy a few years previously from a trainer at Suffolk Downs Race Track. Despite his racing background, Twilight was used by Riding Academy to teach beginners and children how to ride. Twilight was known for being slow and having a calm demeanor. After voicing her approval, Pinto asked Riding Academy's staff to place "western tack," Pinto's preferred saddle style, on Twilight so he could be ridden.
The size of a horse can be measured in "hands."
The term "tack" refers the style of saddle used for riding. "Western tack" is distinguished from "English tack" in that the former has a horn on the saddle that the rider can grasp.
Pinto and Twilight were brought to an enclosed riding area. There, a Riding Academy employee rode Twilight around to warm him up. Pinto contends that Twilight seemed agitated during this warm up, but when asked if she would like to ride Twilight, Pinto responded affirmatively and mounted him. Once atop Twilight, Pinto commanded him forward by squeezing his sides with her heels. Twilight proceeded to walk in a circle around the enclosed area. After circling around few times, Pinto asked a Riding Academy employee if she could put Twilight in a trot. The Riding Academy employee said that it would be fine to do so.
Pinto then squeezed Twilight harder with her heels. However, rather than increasing his speed slightly to a trot, Twilight broke into a run. Pinto began to feel the saddle slip to the left. Fearing that she would slide under Twilight, Pinto threw herself from the horse landing on a patch of concrete adjacent to the riding area. As a result of her fall, Pinto sustained injuries to her ankle, hip, chest, and arm.
Following the incident, Pinto contends that an observer remarked "I can't believe that [a Riding Academy employee] would put you on a horse that just got off the track." This statement is hearsay and which the court will not consider.
Thereafter, Riding Academy's staff collected Twilight. At that time, Twilight appeared agitated. Then, a Riding Academy employee changed Twilight's bridle and rode him around the riding area without any problems. No adjustments were made to the saddle following Pinto's fall.
At her deposition, Pinto, now the owner of a horse farm, testified that she believes that Twilight's saddle may have slipped because he exhaled loosening its fit.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate if there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mass. R. Civ. P 56(c); Cassesso v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 419, 422 (1983); Community Nat'l Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 553 (1976). It is the moving party's burden to affirmatively demonstrate the absence of a triable issue, and that the summary judgment record entitles him to judgment as a matter of law.Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 16-17 (1989). The moving party may satisfy this burden either by submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the opposing party's case or by demonstrating that the opposing party has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of his case at trial. Flesner v. Technical Commc'ns Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809 (1991); Kourouvacilis v. Gen. Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991).
Recognizing the unpredictable nature of equines, the legislature adopted G.L. c. 128, § 2D. See, Fraumeni v. Aleppo Temple Shriners Activities, Inc., Civil No. 95-0204 (Middlesex Super. Ct. April 22, 1997) (Borenstein, J.). General Laws c. 128, § 2D(b) dictates that an equine sponsor or professional will not be held "liable for an injury or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities . . ." Id. However, this limit on liability is restricted by subsection (c), which states that an equine sponsor or professional can be held liable if he
An "equine sponsor" is defined as: "[A]n individual, group, club, partnership, or corporation . . . which sponsors, organizes, or provides the facilities for, an equine activity, including but not limited to . . . riding clubs . . . stable and farm owners and operators, instructors, and promoters of equine facilities. . . ." G.L. c. 128, § 2D(a).
An "equine professional" is defined as: "[A] person engaged for compensation: (1) in instructing a participant or renting to a participant an equine for the purpose of riding, driving or being a passenger upon the equine; (2) in renting equipment or tack to a participant; (3) to provide daily care of horses boarded at an equine facility; or (4) to train an equine." G.L. c. 128, § 2D(a).
"Equine activities" include: ". . . riding, inspecting, or evaluating by a purchaser or an agent an equine belonging to another. . . ." G.L. c. 128, § 2D(a).
(1)(i) provided the equipment or tack, and knew or should have known that the equipment or tack was faulty, and such equipment or tack was faulty to the extent that it did cause the injury; or (ii) provided the equine and failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity, and determine the ability of the participant to safely manage the particular equine based on the participant's representations of his ability. . . .
Neither party disputes that Riding Academy is an equine sponsor, or that Pinto was a participant engaged in equine activities. The sole points of contention are whether Riding Academy made reasonable inquiry into Pinto's riding capabilities, and whether the tack, which Riding Academy supplied was faulty. Riding Academy contends that Pinto has not presented factual issues on either point. Conversely, Pinto maintains that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Riding Academy made a reasonable inquiry into whether her abilities were sufficient to ride Twilight. In addition, Pinto contends that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the tack, which Riding Academy supplied was, faulty.
To "engage in equine activity" includes: "[R]iding, training, assisting in veterinary treatment of, driving, or being a passenger upon an equine, whether mounted or unmounted, visiting or touring or utilizing an equine facility as part of an organized event or activity, or assisting a participant or show management. . . ." G.L. c. 128, § 2D(a).
Even if it is assumed for the purposes of summary judgment that Pinto's saddle slipped to the left, Pinto has not presented any evidence that Riding Academy knew or should have know that the saddle Pinto used to ride Twilight was faulty. In fact, there is evidence that the tack was not faulty as Pinto's deposition testimony indicates her belief that the horse may have exhaled causing the saddle to become loose and shift. Nor has Pinto presented any evidence that Riding Academy placed the saddle on Twilight improperly causing it to slip. Pinto must do more than make a generalized accusation that the tack or equipment Riding Academy provided was faulty. "Conclusory statements, general denials, and factual allegations not based on personal knowledge are insufficient to avoid summary judgment." Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 721 (1985) (quoting, Olympic Junior, Inc. v. Davide Crystal, Inc., 463 F.2d 1141, 1146 (3d Cir. 1972). Not having identified a defect in the tack, Pinto has failed to demonstrate evidence, in the record, to support her contention that it was defective.
Inherent in G.L. c. 128, § 2D is the recognition that equines are innately unpredictable and dangerous animals. Fraumeni, Civil No. 95-0204 (Middlesex Super. Ct. April 22, 1997) (Borenstein, J.). Riding Academy cannot reasonably be required to account for Twilight's unanticipated breathing patterns.
Pinto's second argument is that Riding Academy failed to make reasonable and prudent inquiry into her riding ability. While Pinto asserts that she was merely a beginner at the time of the incident, her representations to Riding Academy indicate she had considerable knowledge of horseback riding. In this case, it was not necessary for Riding Academy to directly question her about her riding experience because Riding Academy could glean Pinto's riding ability implicitly from her words and actions. Selecting the horse to be ridden, and the tack to be used, Pinto presented herself as a purchaser of some sophistication. Even if it is assumed that Twilight was bred and trained to be a racehorse, Pinto does not dispute that Twilight was used to teach beginners or that his reputation was one of being slow and calm, a horse suitable for novice riders. Therefore, Riding Academy's reliance on Pinto's presentation of herself was sufficient to satisfy the burden of reasonable inquiry under G.L. c. 128, § 2D.
For example, Pinto used several horseback riding terms during her interactions with Riding Academy's staff. She asked to purchase a particular kind of horse, a "western pleasure horse." Pinto was shown horses that met this criterion. However, because she was looking for a horse of a particular size, "15 hands," she rejected a first horse for being too small. After expressing an interest in Twilight, Pinto requested to use "western tack" to ride him. In addition, Pinto's deposition testimony indicates that, once mounted on Twilight, she knew how to direct the horse's movements, squeezing him with her heels to make him proceed forward.
Pinto does not allege that there were any prior or subsequent incidents involving Twilight indicating he had dangerous propensities. Courts will require a plaintiff to show a pattern of dangerous behavior to impose liability on a defendant owner. See Mitchell v. Lonergan, 285 Mass. 266, 270 (1934) (holding that the plaintiff failed to provided sufficient evidence that the defendant knew or should have known of a horse's vicious propensities and that such propensities could not be inferred by the events that gave rise to the claim).
Pinto has not asserted any additional measures Riding Academy should have taken to determine her riding ability.
Pinto has no evidence in the record that Riding Academy either provided faulty tack or that Riding Academy failed to make reasonable inquiry into her riding ability. Thus, Pinto has failed to establish that Riding Academy is not immune from liability under G.L. c. 128, § 2D(c). Consequently, summary judgment for Riding Academy must be ALLOWED .
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED .