Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3505-10T3
04-04-2013
ANDREW PINTO, personally and as Partner of PINTO MANAGEMENT COMPANY, WAYNE DISPOSAL and STATEWIDE RECYCLING, New Jersey Partnerships, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. MICHAEL PINTO, Defendant-Appellant.
Philip B. Vinick argued the cause for appellant. Angelo Cifelli, Jr., argued the cause for respondents (Piro, Zinna, Cifelli, Paris & Genitempo, P.C., attorneys; Paul J. Jackson, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fuentes, Graves, and Koblitz.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-5918-03.
Philip B. Vinick argued the cause for appellant.
Angelo Cifelli, Jr., argued the cause for respondents (Piro, Zinna, Cifelli, Paris & Genitempo, P.C., attorneys; Paul J. Jackson, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Michael Pinto appeals from the order of the Law Division entered on February 4, 2011, granting plaintiffs' motion, made pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(f), to clarify a judgment obtained against defendant on January 30, 2006. We affirm. We will review the legal issues raised here in the factual context presented by the parties to the motion judge.
Andrew Pinto and Michael Pinto are brothers. When their father died in 1996, they inherited the family business, then known as Wayne Disposal and Statewide Recycling. According to Andrew Pinto, defendant managed the business' finances from 1996 to 2002, when they decided to sell the company. The brothers disagreed as to how to divide the net proceeds of the sale, resulting in plaintiffs filing suit against defendant and ultimately obtaining a default judgment against him in 2006.
In support of their motion for the entry of default, plaintiffs submitted to the court an affidavit from Andrew Pinto, a certification from a certified public accountant, and a certification from the attorney who was representing plaintiffs at the time. The following excerpts from plaintiffs' counsel's certification explained to the court how plaintiffs calculated the measure of damages against defendant:
Andrew Pinto has incurred legal and accounting fees in the amount of $20,000.00. Since the professional fees were on behalf of the companies as well as himself, Andrew is seeking reimbursement for one-half of the legal and accounting fees in the amount of $10,000.00. Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully requests that legal and accounting fees in the amount of $10,000.00 be added to the judgment amount against
[d]efendant, Michael Pinto, bringing the outstanding judgment to $106,512.50.
The balance of the proceeds of the sale of the businesses, after business loans were paid, are being held in the [purchaser's attorney's] Trust Account . . . . [Purchaser's attorney] is holding $68,670.69 in his account._Of those funds, Andrew Pinto is entitled to $34,335.35 and Michael Pinto is entitled to $34,335.34.
In light of the within request for Judgment against Michael Pinto, the undersigned respectfully requests that this [c]ourt enter an order directing that all the funds in [the trust account] be turned over to Andrew Pinto. Of which, $34,335.35 is to be credited against the judgment against Michael Pinto, leaving a balance of $72,177.15 still owed to Andrew Pinto.
[(Emphasis added).]
Andrew Pinto's affidavit likewise petitioned the court for the entry of default judgment against defendant, adding the following information as to the amount of monetary damages sought:
Some of the proceeds of the sale of the businesses are being held in the [purchaser's attorney's] Trust Account . . . . [Purchaser's attorney] is holding $68,670.69 in his account. Of those funds, $34,335.35 is this Affiants and $34,335.34 belong to Michael Pinto.
In light of the within request for Judgment against Michael Pinto, the undersigned respectfully requests that this [c]ourt enter an order directing that all the funds in [the purchaser's attorney's] Trust Account be turned over to my attorney for
distribution to me. Of those funds, $34,335.35 are to be credited against the judgment I am seeking against Michael Pinto. This would leave a balance of $72,177.15 that would continue to be owed to me.
[(Emphasis added).]
On January 30, 2006, the motion judge entered an order of reinstatement, for entry of default and judgment by default. The language of the order reads as follows:
FURTHER ORDERD, that Judgment in the amount of $106,512.50 be entered on behalf of [p]laintiff, Andrew Pinto and against [d]efendant, Michael Pinto; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the funds being held in the [purchaser's attorney's] Trust Account . . . in the amount of $68,670.69 be turned over directly to [p]laintiff, Andrew Pinto; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the balance of the aforesaid judgment be allowed to be docketed as a judgment in this court against [d]efendant, Michael Pinto . . . .
[(Emphasis added).]
The parties' mother died in March 2002, leaving real property as part on her estate. This property was eventually sold in November 2010. At that time, Andrew Pinto sought to have "the balance" of the judgment entered against defendant in 2006 paid from defendant's share of the proceeds of the sale. In Andrew Pinto's view, defendant owed him $72,177.15. Defendant argued that "the balance" referred to in the order entered by the motion judge meant that Andrew Pinto was due only $37,841.81. The matter returned to court when the parties were unable to reach an amicable resolution.
In December 2010, plaintiffs moved before the Law Division under Rule 1:13-1 to correct a clerical error or, in the alternative, for clarification and/or to correct or modify a judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(f). Specifically, plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration that the phrase "the balance" in the order entered by the motion judge in 2006 indicated that a final judgment was entered against defendant in the amount of $72,177.15. According to plaintiffs, the original judgment against defendant was $106,512.50. However, defendant received a credit of $34,335.35, representing his fifty percent share of the $68,670.69 held by the purchaser's attorney in escrow. Thus, plaintiffs were entitled to receive from defendant $72,177.15, constituting "the balance" due after applying this credit.
Defendant argued that Rule 1:13-1 did not apply in this case because the order entered by the court in 2006 did not have a clerical error. Alternatively, defendant also argued that plaintiffs were time-barred from any relief afforded under Rule 4:50-1 because they waited more than five years before seeking judicial intervention. According to defendant, plaintiffs did not come forward with evidence that shows extraordinary circumstances to justify waiting so long to act.
After hearing from both sides, the court granted plaintiffs' motion pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(f), finding that the order entered in 2006 "lacked clarity and specificity. It was too general." The court also found that the record of the events in 2006 showed that plaintiffs' counsel "applied to the [c]ourt for the turnover of the [purchaser's attorney's] funds expressly indicating that $34,335.35 is to be credited against the judgment against Michael Pinto leaving a balance of $72,177.00." Addressing defendant's argument concerning the timing of plaintiffs' motion, the court found, under the "totality of the circumstances," that "the issue really did not become in controversy until the inheritance became an issue" in November 2010.
On February 22, 2011, the motion court entered an order clarifying the 2006 judgment as follows: "That the amount due on said Judgment from defendant, Michael Pinto, after the receipt of the credit from the funds in the Trust Account of [the purchaser's attorney], previously designated, be and the same hereby is $72,177.15 as of February 23, 2006."
Defendant now appeals, raising the same arguments rejected by the motion judge.
We agree with the reasons expressed by the motion judge and reject defendant's arguments accordingly. It cannot be reasonably disputed that the original 2006 judgment's inclusion of the phrase "the balance" was an unfortunate oversight, leaving the court's intent needlessly ambiguous. Although all litigation is adversarial, disputes between close family members are often clouded with great passion, anger, and extraneous unresolved familial disputes. The legal process is a poor surrogate for addressing these emotionally latent injuries. In this context, it is particularly important for the trial court to be as clear as possible when drafting orders containing inchoate clauses that, as in this case, may take years before they are ripe for execution.
As to the merits of plaintiffs' application, we are satisfied that the result here is consistent with our holding in Heim v. Wolpaw, 271 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 316 (1994). In Heim, the trial court awarded a judgment "in the amount of $475,000.00 together with interest and costs to be taxed" in a personal injury negligence action. Id. at 540. After the defendant moved for a clarification, the plaintiffs cross-moved to amend the judgment to include a sum for the prejudgment interest, which was omitted due to a "clerical mistake." Id. at 541. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion and granted the plaintiffs' motion. Ibid.
Writing for the panel, Judge Brody framed the issue in Heim thusly: "The main issue on appeal is whether the trial court mistakenly exercised its discretion when it granted plaintiffs' motion. Preliminarily, plaintiffs question whether the trial court exceeded its authority by entertaining appellant's motion eighteen months after entry of the judgment." Ibid. As occurred here, the trial court in Heim rejected the plaintiffs' application under Rule 1:13-1 because there were no clerical errors to correct. Ibid. Instead, we held that both the parties and the trial judge implicitly relied on the relief available under Rule 4:50-1. Ibid.
Specifically, Judge Brody noted that "[t]he court acknowledged that it, not the clerk, had made the mistake by not making clear its intent to award prejudgment interest." Ibid. In this context, the Appellate Division found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in viewing the motion under Rule 4:50. Id. at 541-42. Judge Brody explained the reasons that made the one-year time limit for correcting a mistake inapplicable:
Resolving an ambiguity in a judgment, however, goes beyond correcting a mistake. Unless the ambiguity is resolved, the judgment in that respect has no meaning.
Resolving an ambiguity is a "reason justifying relief" from the judgment other than correcting a mistake and is therefore cognizable under [Rule] 4:50-1(f), the catch-all for extraordinary relief not otherwise specified in the rule.
[Id. at 542.]
The same reasoning applies here.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION