Opinion
CIV-21-849-C
12-01-2021
ANTONIO DION PINKARD, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Antonio Dion Pinkard, an Oklahoma prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1. United States District Judge Robin J. Cauthron referred the matter to the undersigned for proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 3. Plaintiff sues Defendants “DOC, ” “Unit Manager Ms. Hunter C Unit, ” and “Warden Lonny Lawson.” Doc. 1, at 1, 4, 6-7. He brings two claims for relief against Defendants in their official capacities seeking monetary damages. Id. at 4. The undersigned recommends the Court dismiss Plaintiff's complaint in its entirety.
Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless otherwise indicated.
I. Screening.
Federal law requires the Court to screen complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 2010).
This Court construes “[a] pro se litigant's pleadings . . . liberally, ” holding them “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The Court, however, may not serve as Plaintiff's advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
II. Plaintiff's claims.
In his first claim, Plaintiff alleges that, while he was housed at the William S. Key Correctional Center, DOC, “Unit Manager Ms. Hunter, ” and “Warden Lonny Lawson/ William S. Keys” violated his rights on December 1, 2020, “to be treated justly, ” “to be [treated] fairly, ” and “to be treated equally, ” “all because of a bottom bunk at William S Keys.” See Doc. 1, at 4, 6. Plaintiff states that he has “a titanium rod in [his] left femur, ” “four screws in [his] leg, ” and has had “surgery from the hip joint.” Id. at 7. He alleges that since “[t]here [were] no steps to get on [the] top bunk, ” “it hurt every time [he] got up there.” Id. at 7. He wants the Defendants to “[f]inancial[ly]” compensate him for these violations. Id.
The undersigned assumes Plaintiff's reference to “DOC” is to the Oklahoma Department of Corrections.
Plaintiff is no longer an inmate at the William S. Key Correctional Center. At the time Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, the Oklahoma Department of Corrections was housing Plaintiff at the Davis Correctional Facility in Holdenville, Oklahoma. See Doc. 1, at 4.
In his second claim, Plaintiff alleges that on January 12, 2021, “DOC” and “Warden Lonny Lawson/ William. S. Keys” violated his freedom of speech and subjected him to “wrongful inprisonment.” Id. Plaintiff states that he was “shipped up in security, because of a bunk.” Id. at 8. He alleges that he “could not keep trying to jump up on the top bunk, ” which caused him “pain and suffering.” Id. Plaintiff wants these Defendants to financially compensate him for this claim. Id.
Plaintiff specifies no other types of relief. Since he has been transferred from the William S. Key Correctional Center to another facility, any request for injunctive relief against these Defendants would be moot. See, e.g., Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1300 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that “[s]ince [plaintiff] is no longer a prisoner within the control of the ODC, the entry of a declaratory judgment in [his] favor would amount to nothing more than a declaration that he was wronged....” and as such was moot).
III. Plaintiff's claims for monetary relief against Defendants in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities seeking monetary damages. See Doc. 1, at 4, 7-8. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims, and they should be dismissed.
Plaintiff did not specify the capacity in which he sues Defendant Lawson. Because Plaintiff sued the other individual Defendant in her official capacity only and he references Defendant Lawson by his official title of “Warden, ” the undersigned liberally construes Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Lawson to be in his official capacity. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985) (“In many cases, the complaint will not clearly specify whether officials are sued personally, in their official capacity, or both. ‘The course of proceedings' in such cases typically will indicate the nature of the liability sought to be imposed.” (quoting Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 469 (1985))); see also Pride v. Does, 997 F.2d 712, 715 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[W]here the complaint fails to specify the capacity in which the government official is sued, we look to the substance of the pleadings and the course of the proceedings in order to determine whether the suit is for individual or official liability.”); cf. Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that, “in order to sue a public official in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must expressly and unambiguously state so in the pleadings, otherwise, it will be assumed that the defendant is sued only in his or her official capacity”).
A. The Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity bar precludes Plaintiff's claims.
“The Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar that precludes unconsented suits in federal court against a state and arms of the state.” Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that sovereign immunity has been waived.” Impact Energy Res., LLC v. Salazar, 693 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Neither States nor state officials sued in their official capacities are considered “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, claims for damages against a state official in his official capacity are construed as claims against the State and, so, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (holding that a suit against an individual acting in an official capacity is properly treated as a suit against the State itself and “the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal court”); see also White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 366 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity barred § 1983 claims “for money damages” against prison officials in their official capacities).
Exceptions to immunity exist where a State consents to suit in federal court or where Congress has abrogated a State's sovereign immunity. Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012). But Oklahoma has not consented to be sued in federal court, nor did Congress abrogate States' sovereign immunity by creating a private right of action under § 1983. See Berry v. Oklahoma, 495 Fed.Appx. 920, 921-22 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 152.1; Will, 491 U.S. at 66). Thus, “the State of Oklahoma's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits seeking money damages in federal court remains intact.” Christian v. Thompson, No. CIV-18-699-G, 2019 WL 4920885, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 3, 2019).
B. Sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff's claims against Defendant DOC and Defendants Hunter and Lawson in their official capacities.
Plaintiff has named DOC as a Defendant and seeks monetary damages. Doc. 1, at 1, 4, 7-8. But the Oklahoma Department of Corrections is “shielded by sovereign immunity because it is an arm of the state.” Berry, 495 Fed.Appx. at 922. And DOC's immunity extends to its employees who are sued in their official capacities for monetary damages. See Cleveland v. Martin, 590 Fed.Appx. 726, 730 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Because the defendants are employees of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections . . ., the Eleventh Amendment applies to the official-capacity claims for damages.”); Pietrowski v. Town of Dibble, 134 F.3d 1006, 1009 (10th Cir. 1998) (“An action against a person in his official capacity is, in reality, an action against the government entity for whom the person works.”). Plaintiff's claims against Defendant DOC and Defendants Hunter and Lawson in their official capacities seeking monetary damages are barred and should therefore be dismissed without prejudice. See, e.g., Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[W]here the district court dismisses an action for lack of jurisdiction . . . the dismissal must be without prejudice.”).
Having barred Plaintiff's monetary damages claims against the Defendants, his official-capacity claims against Defendants Hunter and Lawson would be limited to prospective relief for an ongoing violation of federal law. See Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 669 F.3d at 1166 (holding that “under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 [] (1908), a plaintiff may bring suit against individual state officers acting in their official capacities if the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and the plaintiff seeks prospective relief”). Plaintiff, however, does not allege an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks no prospective relief-he seeks only monetary damages for the past violations of his rights and his “pain and suffering.” Doc. 1, at 7-8. So, no exception applies for Plaintiff to avoid the individual Defendants' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in their official capacities.
IV. Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court dismiss Plaintiff's case.
The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this report and recommendation with the Clerk of this Court on or before
December 22, 2021, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to make a timely objection to this report and recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This report and recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in this matter.