Summary
concluding that the Seventh Amendment does not provide a right to a jury trial on ERISA claims under Section 502(B) or Section 502 and noting that "the remedies provided by § 502 are without doubt equitable in nature"
Summary of this case from Bell v. Pension Comm. of ATH Holding Co.Opinion
TH 00-0048-C-T/H
May 10, 2001
Though this entry is being made available to the public on the court's web site, it is not intended for commercial publication either electronically or in paper form. Under the law of the case doctrine, it is presumed that the ruling or rulings in this entry will govern throughout the litigation before this court. See, e.g., Tr. of Pension, Welfare, Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Pyramid Elec., 223 F.3d 459, 468 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2000); Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227 (7th Cir. 1995). It should be noted, however, that this district judge's decision has no precedential authority and, therefore, is not binding on other courts, other judges in this district, or even other cases before this district judge. See, e.g., Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 359 (7th Cir. 1998) ("a district court's decision does not have precedential authority"); Malabarba v. Chicago Tribune Co., 149 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1998) ("district court opinions are of little or no authoritative value"); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Chuhak Tecson, P.C., 84 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th Cir. 1996) ("decisions by district judges do not have the force of precedent"); Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 1995) ("District court decisions have no weight as precedents, no authority.").
This entry constitutes the court's ruling on the parties' motions in limine.
I. Defendant's Status as "Employer" Under ADEA
Plaintiff moves for an order in limine to exclude any claim by Defendant that it does not employ enough employees to be considered an "employer" under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). This motion is SUSTAINED. In its Entry On Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment of April 20, 2001, this court granted Plaintiff's motion, holding that Defendant is an "employer" under the ADEA. That ruling is the law of the case and is therefore presumed to govern throughout the remainder of this case. See, e.g., Trustees of Pension, Welfare, Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Pyramid Elec., 223 F.3d 459, 468 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2000); Carr v. O'Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1126 (7th Cir. 1999).
Neither Defendant, its witnesses nor its counsel may make any claim that Defendant is not an "employer" under the ADEA.
II. Doherty v. Crow
Plaintiff moves for an order in limine to exclude any mention or reference that Daniel P. Doherty was not discriminated against on the basis of age discrimination. Defendant moves for an order in limine excluding any reference to the filing of or the court's decision in Daniel P. Doherty v. Clarence L. Crow, III d/ba/ Wabash Valley Harley Davidson, Cause No. TH 99-216-T/H ("the Doherty case").
The court entered its Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law Following Trial in the Doherty case on April 20, 2001. The court held that Dan Doherty proved that WVHD violated the ADEA by terminating his employment because of his age. No final judgment has been entered in that case, however, as other issues, including attorney's fees and costs, remain to be resolved.
Plaintiff asserts that the issue whether Defendant violated the ADEA when it terminated Mr. Doherty has already been decided and argues that Defendant is collaterally estopped from denying that Mr. Doherty was discriminated against on the basis of his age. Defendant argues that no final judgment has been rendered in the Doherty case and any reference to it would be irrelevant and possibly prejudicial to Defendant.
Collateral estoppel does not bar Defendant from denying that Mr. Doherty was discriminated against on the basis of age. The Supreme Court explained the doctrine of collateral estoppel in Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). The Court said: "Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel . . . the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action." Id. at 327 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000) ("issue preclusion [collateral estoppel] attaches only `[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment.'") (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, p. 250 (1982)); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Chuhak Tecson, P.C., 84 F.3d 998, 1000-01 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The doctrine of collateral estoppel. . . requires . . . a judgment that is final in the court rendering it"). The Seventh Circuit has identified four prerequisites for the application of collateral estoppel: "(1) the issue sought to be precluded is the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) that issue was actually litigated; (3) the determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment; and (4) the party against whom estoppel is invoked was fully represented in the prior action." Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers Warehouse Union (Independent) Pension Fund v. Century Motor Freight, Inc., 125 F.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Thus, collateral estoppel is not applicable unless there has been a final judgment. No final judgment has been entered in the Doherty case; the court's Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law are not a final judgment. Therefore, collateral estoppel does not bar Defendant from denying that Mr. Doherty was discriminated against on the basis of his age.
Though reference to the Doherty case may be prejudicial to Defendant, indeed, all relevant evidence is prejudicial to one party or another, the court does not find that evidence regarding Mr. Doherty's termination or case is excludable under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Fed.R.Evid. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. . . ."). Evidence was presented that both Mr. Doherty and Mr. Pine were terminated as part of Butch Crow's staff adjustment program. Both Mr. Doherty and Mr. Pine are in the protected age class and others terminated as part of the staff adjustment program also were in the protected age class. Evidence of Mr. Doherty's termination and age are relevant in the instant case. The relevance is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Defendant. The court, however, will not allow Defendant to retry the Doherty case as part of the instant case. Such a mini trial could confuse the issues or the jury, and result in undue delay or waste time.
But the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Doherty case are irrelevant as no final judgment has been entered in that case. Even if relevant, evidence of the court's findings and conclusions in the Doherty case are excludable under Rule 403 because any probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Defendant, confusion of the issues and misleading of the jury.
Plaintiff's motion in limine to exclude evidence that Mr. Doherty was not discriminated against on the basis of age is OVERRULED and Defendant's motion in limine to exclude reference to the filing of or decision in the Doherty case is SUSTAINED IN PART. No mention or reference shall be made by Plaintiff, his counsel or his witnesses and no testimony or other evidence shall be given by Plaintiff or his witnesses regarding the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Doherty case. This ruling is definitive in nature, see Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that "a definitive ruling in limine preserves an issue for appellate review — without the need for later objection"), but counsel may seek reconsideration as appropriate at trial outside the presence of the jury.
III. The ERISA Claim
Under ERISA it is unlawful for an employer to discharge a participant "for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under [an employee welfare benefit plan]. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1140. This section of ERISA is enforced through § 502 of ERISA. Id.
Defendant moves for an order in limine excluding mention of or testimony or other evidence regarding Plaintiff's ERISA claim until Plaintiff presents sufficient evidence outside the presence of the jury to establish a prima facie case of an ERISA violation. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff does not qualify to bring an ERISA claim and that testimony or other evidence regarding such a claim would be prejudicial to Defendant. The court therefore understands Defendant's motion to be based on a claimed lack of standing.
The court finds that the motion in limine should be sustained, though not for the reason asserted by Defendant. The court understands Plaintiff to be enforcing his § 510 claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) and/or § 502(a)(3). The other subsections of § 502(a) clearly are inapplicable to Plaintiff's claim.
That section states that: "A civil action may be brought . . . by a participant . . . to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
That section states that: "A civil action may be brought. . . by a participant . . . (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations [of ERISA or an employee benefit plan] or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
Even if they were applicable, Plaintiff would have no right to a jury trial.
Courts are in disagreement on whether a plaintiff bringing an ERISA § 510 claim has a right to a jury trial. Compare Mathews v. Sears Pension Plan, 144 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir.) (stating in ERISA action for pension benefits that "there is no right to a jury trial in an ERISA case"), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1054 (1998); Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853, 855-58 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding no right to jury trial on retaliatory discharge claim under ERISA, § 502(a)(3)); Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 647 (3rd Cir. 1990) (holding employee not entitled to jury trial on claim employer violated ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) by discharging him in order to interfere with his attainment of employee benefits); Wardle v. Central States, S.E. S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 830 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding no right to jury trial on ERISA claim for pension benefits), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981); Cabin v. Plastofilm Indus., Inc., No. 96 C 2564, 1996 WL 496604, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 29, 1996) (granting motion to strike jury demand with respect to ERISA claim that employer terminated employee in retaliation for using rights under employee benefit plans and to prevent continued participation in plans); Babich v. Unisys Corp., No. 92-1473-MLB, 1994 WL 167984, at *6-8 (D.Kan. Apr. 8, 1994) (granting motion to strike jury demand on ERISA claims under § 502(a)(3) and § 502(a)(1)(B)), with McDonald v. Artcraft Elec. Supply Co., 774 F. Supp. 29, 33-36 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding plaintiff entitled to jury trial on ERISA interference and wrongful discharge claim); International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Midland Steel Prods. Co., 771 F. Supp. 860, 862-65 (N.D.Ohio. 1991) (holding former employees alleging they were discharged for purpose of interfering with their attainment of benefits under ERISA plan entitled to jury trial). For the following reasons, the court finds that the former authorities take the better view and, therefore, concludes that Plaintiff has no right to a jury trial on his ERISA claim whether brought under § 502(a)(1)(B), § 502(a)(3), or both.
ERISA itself does not expressly grant a right to a jury trial. Thus, if there is a right to a jury trial on an ERISA claim, that right must be secured by the Seventh Amendment. In deciding whether the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial, the court must engage in a two step analysis. First, it must examine the nature of the right, and second, it must examine the remedies provided to determine whether they are legal or equitable in nature. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990); Spinelli, 12 F.3d at 855. The latter inquiry is the more important one. Id.
As for the first inquiry, the court believes that Plaintiff's claim is a wrongful discharge claim, which is legal rather than equitable. See Spinelli, 12 F.3d at 857. As for the second inquiry, the remedies provided by § 502(a)(3) are without doubt equitable in nature. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A) ("to enjoin any act or practice [that violates ERISA]"), 1132(a)(3)(B) ("to obtain other appropriate equitable relief"); Spinelli, 12 F.3d at 857. This conclusion is bolstered by the Supreme Court's holding in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1993), that "equitable relief" under § 502(a)(3) does not include money damages. See also Plumb v. Fluid Pump Servs., Inc., 124 F.3d 849, 863 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding legal damages not recoverable under ERISA § 502(a)(2) or (3)); Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 655-56 (7th Cir.) (holding extracontractual compensatory damages not recoverable under § 502(a)(1)(B) or 502(a)(3) and punitive damages not recoverable under the former subsection), cert. denied sub nom. Bihler v. Isenberg, 506 U.S. 818 (1992). The remedies available under § 502(a)(1)(B) also are equitable in nature; that subsection does not make money damages available. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) ("to recover benefits due" "to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan" "to clarify his rights to future benefits"). Given that the Supreme Court teaches that the second inquiry is more important, the court agrees with the Spinelli court that where the two inquiries conflict, the nature of the remedy controls. See Spinelli, 12 F.3d at 857. Thus, the appropriate analysis leads to the conclusion that the Seventh Amendment does not provide a right to a jury trial on ERISA claims under § 502(a)(1)(B), § 502(a)(3), or both. For this reason, the motion in limine regarding Plaintiff's ERISA claim should be sustained. If Plaintiff's ERISA claim is to be tried, it will be tried to the bench and not before the jury.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the court has grave concerns about whether Plaintiff has standing to bring his ERISA claim in the first instance. ERISA provides for civil enforcement by a plan "participant" or "beneficiary." 29 U.S.C. § 1132. The court assumes that Plaintiff claims a right to bring his ERISA claim as a "participant." "Participant" is defined in relevant part as "any employee or former employee of an employer . . . who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). In Firestone Tire Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), the Supreme Court construed "participant" to apply to "either employees in, or reasonably expected to be in, currently covered employment, or former employees who have . . . a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment or who have a colorable claim to vested benefits." Id. at 117-18 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff is not currently employed by Defendant; thus, if he falls within this definition it must be as a "former employee." Thus, Plaintiff must have (1) a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment, or (2) a colorable claim to vested benefits.
This issue has not been briefed by either party, so at present the court does not have the benefit of their arguments for or against standing.
Whether Plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of returning to employment with Defendant is uncertain. Plaintiff's Complaint does not specifically seek reinstatement although it seeks all available equitable relief. See, e.g., Alexander v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 990 F.2d 536, 539 (10th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff who did not seek reinstatement could not have a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment); Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463, 474 (10th Cir. 1990) (same). Because the Complaint must be construed broadly, the court assumes that Plaintiff does seek reinstatement and thus clears this hurdle. Reinstatement, of course, would cut off any future damages recoverable by Plaintiff under either his ADEA claim or ERISA claim. He may have to choose which relief he seeks.
Even assuming Plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of returning to employment with Defendant, it is not clear that he would return to "covered employment". "Covered employment" has been interpreted to mean that the claimant was employed in a position actually covered by an employee benefit plan. See In re Lowenschuss, 171 F.3d 673, 681 (9th Cir. 1999) (debtor's sons were not former employees of debto's company who had reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment where sons were not covered by plan prior to or on petition date). From the Complaint's allegations, it does not appear that Plaintiff was actually covered by an employee benefit plan. Thus, if Plaintiff is a "participant" then it must be because he has a "colorable claim to vested benefits."
The Complaint alleges that Defendant provided health insurance benefits for its full-time employees, that Plaintiff worked full-time for a few weeks and was not allowed to participate in the health insurance plan, and then was returned to part-time and ultimately discharged. It further alleges that Defendant was motivated to terminate Plaintiff's employment to prevent him from obtaining health benefits. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 3-8, 10, 33-35, 38.) More importantly, the Complaint alleges that "If Mr. Pine had continued as an employee under the full-time terms provided to him, he would have had made available to him health insurance benefits provided and/or offered to the other W.V. Harley Davidson employees." ( Id. ¶ 34.) This allegation reveals that at the time of his discharge, Mr. Pine was not yet eligible for the health insurance benefits he seeks.
The Seventh Circuit has said that the "colorable claim to vested benefits" requirement is "not a stringent one." Panaras v. Liquid v. Carbonic Indus. Corp., 74 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 1996). "[J]urisdiction depends on an arguable claim, not on success. . . ." Id. (quotation omitted). Jurisdiction is lacking only if a claim is frivolous. Id. Relying on Firestone, the Seventh Circuit has adopted an expansive reading of the phrase "vested benefits". Id. at 791. In Panaras, the court reasoned that:
The discussion of "colorable claim to vested benefits" in Firestone arises during the Court's explication of the statutory grant of standing to those former employees who "may become eligible" for benefits. In the same paragraph the Court stated that "in order to establish that he or she `may become eligible' for benefits, a claimant must have a colorable claim that (1) he or she will prevail in a suit for benefits, or that (2) eligibility requirements will be fulfilled in the future." Firestone, 489 U.S. at 117-18, 109 S.Ct. at 958.Id. at 791. The court concluded that "standing is available to any former employee who has a colorable claim to benefits which the employer promised to provide pursuant to the employment relationship and which a non-frivolous argument suggests have accrued to the employee's benefit." Id.; see also Jackson v. E.J. Brach Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 979 (7th Cir. 1999).
Assuming that Mr. Pine was ineligible for the benefits he seeks under the subject employee benefit plan, then it is unclear whether he has a colorable claim for benefits and therefore standing to sue under ERISA. See Jackson v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 648 F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding plaintiff, an hourly employee, lacked standing where pension plan at issue did not cover hourly employees); cf. Shahid v. Ford Motor Co., 76 F.3d 1404, 1410-11 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding plaintiff had standing to bring claim alleging that defendant terminated her employment in an effort to deny her benefits under a severance plan in violation of ERISA where defendant considered her potentially eligible for its severance plan); Fleming v. Ayers Assocs., 948 F.2d 993, 997-98 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding evidence supported conclusion that part-time employee was hired with the intent she become a full-time employee when position became available and was thus a participant under an ERISA plan).
Moreover, to the extent Mr. Pine alleges an ERISA claim based on Defendant's repeatedly denying him full-time employment before 1998 in order to avoid the cost of providing Plaintiff health insurance benefits, under Fleming any claim to standing is even more doubtful. There is nothing to suggest that Plaintiff qualified as a participant in the subject employee benefit plan during the time he was on part-time status; the allegations are to the contrary. ERISA does not make it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire an individual to prevent that individual from becoming eligible for benefits under a welfare benefit plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 ("It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan . . ., or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan. . . ."); Williams v. Mack Trucks, Inc., No. CIV. A. 00-1338, 2000 WL 1886575, at *5-6 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 30, 2000) (holding § 1140 does not prevent employer from refusing to rehire employee in order to avoid increased pension liability); Shawley v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 784 F. Supp. 1200, 1203 (W.D.Pa. 1992) (concluding ERISA does not expressly prohibit a refusal to hire based on the employer's potential benefit liability), aff'd, 989 F.2d 652 (3rd Cir. 1993). Logic may support the same result with respect to an employer's decision not to make a part-time employee who is ineligible for benefits a full-time employee and thereby eligible for benefits.
Defendant's motion in limine regarding Plaintiff's ERISA claim is SUSTAINED. Plaintiff's ERISA claim will be tried outside the presence of the jury, and no mention of, reference to, or any evidence relating to that claim shall be made or offered in the presence of the jury. This ruling is definitive, meaning that the issue is preserved for appellate review without need for further objection at trial.
IV. Butch Crow's Criminal Charges, Record or Convictions
Defendant moves in limine to exclude mention, reference or evidence of any criminal record, criminal charges or criminal conviction of Butch Crow. Defendant contends such evidence is irrelevant and immaterial since none of the criminal matters involve impeachable offenses.
Rule 609 of the Federal Rule of Evidence governs the admissibility of such evidence. Under the rule, evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime is admissible, subject to Rule 403, if it was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(1), if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment, Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(2), and if the conviction or release from confinement occurred within ten years, whichever is later, Fed.R.Evid. 609(b).
The court assumes that evidence of any conviction of Butch Crow does not satisfy the requirements for admissibility under this rule. Plaintiff has no objection to the motion in limine concerning Butch's criminal convictions. Therefore, the motion in limine is SUSTAINED. Neither Plaintiff, his counsel, nor his witnesses may make any reference or offer evidence about any criminal charge, conviction or record of Butch Crow. This ruling is definitive.
V. Conclusion
Plaintiff's motion in limine is SUSTAINED as to any reference that Defendant did not employ enough employees to be considered an "employer" under the ADEA during the relevant time period. No reference may be made that Defendant did not employe enough employees to be considered an "employer" under the ADEA.
Plaintiff's motion in limine is OVERRULED as to any mention, reference or evidence that Dan Doherty was not discriminated against on the basis of his age.
Defendant's motion in limine to exclude reference to the filing of or decision in the Doherty case is SUSTAINED IN PART. No reference may be made to the court's findings of fact or conclusions of law in that case.
Defendant's motion in limine regarding Plaintiff's ERISA claim is SUSTAINED. No mention of, reference to, testimony or other evidence regarding Plaintiff's ERISA claim may be made or offered in the presence of the jury. This claim will be tried to the court, most likely while the jury deliberates Plaintiff's ADEA claim.
Defendant's motion in limine regarding a criminal record, criminal charges and criminal convictions of Butch Crow is SUSTAINED. No reference may be made to such record, charges or convictions.
Regardless of whether a ruling on a motion in limine is definitive or not, counsel may seek reconsideration as appropriate throughout the course of trial. The indication that a ruling is definitive simply relieves counsel of the obligation to object contemporaneously with the introduction of the evidence which was the subject of a motion in limine. Counsel are ADVISED that all requests for reconsideration of a ruling on a motion in limine must be made outside the presence and hearing of the jury.