Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2974-12T4
06-11-2014
MANUEL R. PILLACELA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION, Respondent-Respondent.
Leon Matchin, attorney for appellant. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Elaine C. Schwartz, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Espinosa and Koblitz.
On appeal from the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission.
Leon Matchin, attorney for appellant.
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Elaine C. Schwartz, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs). PER CURIAM
Manuel R. Pillacela appeals from the February 7, 2013 final decision of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission suspending his license for 180 days. We affirm.
We dissolve the stay of this suspension granted by the Commission on March 11, 2013.
In 2011, the Commission commenced "Operation Facial Scrub" as part of an effort to hunt down individuals in possession of more than one New Jersey driver's license. On August 5, 2012, the Commission sent Pillacela a notice that his driving privileges were going to be suspended because he was discovered to be in possession of two driver's licenses issued in two different names, both bearing his photograph. Pillacela appeared without counsel at the Commission headquarters in Trenton to complete a License Review Questionnaire on August 14, 2012.
On that same day, Pillacela also submitted a handwritten note to the Commission asserting that someone at his place of work gave him papers so that he could "work legal," but that he "never used [them] because [he] was afraid."
On September 26, 2012, the Commission notified Pillacela that it was going to suspend his driving privileges for 730 days pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:3-37 and N.J.S.A. 39:5-30. The notice informed Pillacela that he may request a hearing. The notice stated that the
hearing request must specify all disputed material facts and legal issues you or your attorney intend to raise . . . and must present all arguments of those issues you wish the Commission to consider. Please also include in your hearing request any mitigating circumstances that you wish the Commission to consider. If your request fails to set forth any disputed facts, legal issues or arguments of such issues, your request will be denied and this suspension will become effective on a date specified by the Commission and constitute the Commission's final decision in this matter."
Pillacela sent the Commission the following statement:
We reproduce the statement as written.
I would like to request hearing for schedule 2 year suspension for misstatement on application. My Explanation Why I Would Like Not To be Suspended because: I work as a truck driver and I support my family with my driver license. All the time that I have living in the USA I have been working as a truck Driver.
The Commission issued Pillacela a "Denial of Hearing Request/Final Decision and Order of Suspension." The Final Decision stated that, although Pillacela did not dispute that he falsely obtained a driver's license, having considered his "need for [his] driving privilege," the proposed 730 day suspension was reduced to the minimum mandatory suspension period of 180 days. The Commission stated that the decision was meant to be rehabilitative in nature, not punitive.
N.J.S.A. 39:3-37.
Pillacela was also the subject of criminal proceedings. A State Grand Jury returned an indictment on February 5, 2013, charging him with three crimes: second-degree use of personal identifying information of another, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-17.2(a) (count one); third-degree tampering with public records or information, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-7(a)(2) (count two); and third-degree forgery, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-1(a)(2) (count three). Pillacela entered into pre-trial intervention with the consent of the State on June 6, 2013, almost six months after the Commission suspended his driving privileges. R. 3:28; N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 to -22.
On appeal, Pillacela raises the following issues:
POINT I: THE MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION PROCURED EVIDENCE AGAINST APPELLANT IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO HAVE AN ATTORNEY PRESENT AND HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT WITHOUT WHICH EVIDENCE THE MVC LACKS BASIS TO REVOKE MR. PILLACELA'S LICENSE TO DRIVE.
POINT II: THE MOTOR VEHICLE SUSPENSION OF APPELLANT'S LICENSE IS BARRED BY DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
POINT III: DUE PROCESS REQUIRES AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD WHICH OVERRIDES MVC'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD PURSUANT TO N.J.A.C. 13:19-1.2
Appellate review of the decision of an administrative agency is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). We affirm an agency decision so long as it is supported by the evidence, even if we may question the wisdom of the decision or would have reached a different result. Ibid. With respect to factual findings, administrative agency findings "'are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence[.]'" In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656-57 (1999) (quoting Rova Farms Resort Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 414, 484 (1914)).
We will reverse an agency's judgment only if we find the agency's decision is "'arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or [] not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Stallworth, supra, 208 N.J. at 194 (alteration in original) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579 (1980)). Issues of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 501, 512-13 (2009).
I
Pillacela's argument in Point I of his brief focuses on his right to remain silent. As defendant was not in custody when he gave a statement to the Commission, he was not subjected to custodial interrogation and the Commission was not required to caution him of his right to remain silent. "The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706 (1966).
Although the point heading mentions a right to counsel, this issue is not briefed or argued by Pillacela and therefore we do not reach it. See R. 2:6-2(a)(5) (requiring that legal arguments be briefed and argued under distinct point headings); see also Midatlantic Solar Energy Indus. Ass'n v. Christie, 418 N.J. Super. 499, 508 (App. Div.) (noting that arguments not consistent with Rule 2:6-2(a)(5) will be ignored unless "issue[s] of general public importance" are raised), certif. denied, 207 N.J. 190 (2011).
"The critical determinant of custody is whether there has been a significant deprivation of the suspect's freedom of action based on the objective circumstances, including the time and place of the interrogation, the status of the interrogator, the status of the suspect, and other such factors." State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103 (1997). Chief Justice Poritz, writing for the Court in P.Z., concluded that the defendant in that case was not in custody because he was free to leave at any time, the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Service's caseworker's questions were not threatening and the interview was brief. Id. at 103.
Pillacela's voluntary appearance at the Commission's headquarters "fail[s] to demonstrate the coercive atmosphere and restraint of freedom that comprises a custodial interrogation." Ibid. He was free to leave at any time and merely filled out a questionnaire.
II
In Point II of his brief, Pillacela argues that the administrative suspension of his license is barred by double jeopardy. The Commission argues that since the suspension here is administrative, not criminal, double jeopardy does not apply to this case.
Both the United States and New Jersey constitutions guarantee criminal defendants freedom from double jeopardy. U.S. Const. amend. V; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 11. Double jeopardy protects individuals in three chief ways: "(1) against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) against multiple punishments for the same offense." State v. Biegenwald, 110 N.J. 521, 532 (1988).
Our state constitution's double jeopardy provision is textually different from the federal constitution. Compare N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 11 ("No person shall, after acquittal, be tried for the same offense.") with U.S. Const. amend. V ("Nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"). Nonetheless, New Jersey courts "have consistently interpreted the state constitutional double jeopardy protection as co-extensive with the guarantee of the federal Constitution." State v. DeLuca, 108 N.J. 98, 102 (1987).
"[W]hether a sanction is subject to double jeopardy restraints depends on whether that sanction essentially constitutes a criminal penalty" and not whether the legislature has classified a sanction as civil or criminal. State v. Black, 153 N.J. 438, 445 (1998) (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100, 118 S. Ct. 488, 493-94, 139 L. Ed. 2d 450, 458-59 (1997)).
The double jeopardy argument, however, is not available to Pillacela in the Commission proceedings. Because the license suspension was first imposed months prior to indictment, it cannot be viewed as a second penalty for the same conduct. Pillacela apparently chose not to argue double jeopardy in the criminal proceedings, perhaps because he was admitted into the PTI program, which is not a sentence or a punishment, as admission occurs prior to a finding of guilt. See State v. Bell, __ N.J. __, __ (2014) (slip op. at 17-18) (holding that PTI is not available to a defendant after he is convicted by a jury); see also State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 257 (1995) ("[PTI] closely resembles probation, which has been recognized as a criminal sanction. However, punishment in the form of probation normally follows a finding of guilt. By its nature PTI is designed to furnish rehabilitative services in place of the normal criminal findings of guilt." (Citation omitted)).
We do not intend to imply any position on the merits of such an argument.
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III
Pillacela argues in Point III of his brief that he should have been afforded a hearing prior to the administrative suspension of his license. His argument is two-fold: first, he "did the best he could" to comply with the requirements that must accompany a request for hearing in order for one to be granted; second, that his "constitutional right to a hearing was violated as it pertains to such a consequence of magnitude to him as losing his license."
The Commission must provide "due notice in writing . . . and the ground thereof" to an individual facing suspension. N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a). The Commission complied with this statutory requirement in its initial letter to Pillacela. A request for a hearing, as the Commission informed Pillacela, must contain any disputed material fact, legal issue, or any other argument. N.J.A.C. 13:19-1.2(d). Failure to do so results in the denial of a hearing. N.J.A.C. 13:19-1.2(e). When the request complies, "the Chief Administrator shall require the licensee to attend a prehearing conference[.]" N.J.A.C. 13:19-1.2(f). If there are no disputed material facts but there are legal issues presented, the Chief Administrator may render a final decision on the papers; require a prehearing; or refer "the matter directly to the Office of Administrative Law pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1." N.J.A.C. 13:19-1.2(g).
Although individuals have a right to a hearing if they follow required procedures, N.J.A.C. 13:19-1.2(d), Pillacela did not follow those requirements.
"However a license to drive is denominated, either as a right or a privilege, a license suspension may not be imposed arbitrarily. . . . No one would suggest that a court can take away one's driving privileges on a whim or capriciously." State v. Moran, 202 N.J. 311, 325-26 (2010). The suspension of Pillacela's driver's license was not done arbitrarily or capriciously. He does not dispute the evidence against him nor does he contest that he actually committed the offenses with which he was charged.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION