Summary
In Pichette, the Third District affirmed a summary judgment for lack of standing because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they would be affected by "noise, traffic impact, land value diminution, or and any other respect by the proposed zoning ordinance."
Summary of this case from Save v. Citrus CtyOpinion
No. 94-102.
September 28, 1994.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Dade County, Harold Solomon, J.
John G. Fletcher, South Miami, for appellants.
Davis, Scott, Weber Edwards and Laura Besvinick, New York City; David M. Wolpin, North Miami, for appellees.
Before HUBBART and BASKIN and GREEN, JJ.
The final summary judgment under review is affirmed upon a holding that the appellants herein have no legally recognized interest which will be adversely affected by the zoning ordinance of the City of North Miami which appellants challenged below, and therefore they lacked any standing to bring the declaratory judgment action because (1) the appellant Allan Yarkin lives in the City of Bay Harbor Islands, more than a mile across Biscayne Bay from the rezoned site under attack, and there is no genuine issue raised by this record that he would be affected by noise, traffic impact, land value diminution, or in any other respect by the subject zoning ordinance; and (2) the appellants Pierre Pichette and Gaytan Torres live in the City of North Miami Beach, separated by a 57-acre buffer area from the rezoned tract of land, 3,000 and 2,800 feet, respectively, away from said tract, and there is no genuine issue raised by this record that they would be affected by noise, traffic impact, land value diminution, or in any other respect by the subject zoning ordinance, Renard v. Dade County, 261 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1972); see § 163.3215(2), Fla. Stat. (1993); Citizens Growth Management Coalition of West Palm Beach, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach, Inc., 450 So.2d 204, 208 (Fla. 1984); compare Southwest Ranches Homeowner's Ass'n v. Broward County, 502 So.2d 931 (Fla. 4th DCA) (adjoining landowners with potential pollution, flood problems had standing), rev. denied, 511 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1987). This being so, it was entirely proper for the trial court to enter the summary judgment under review on the basis that there was no genuine issue of material fact and the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, given the appellants' lack of standing to challenge the subject zoning ordinance. See Ennis v. Warm Mineral Springs, Inc., 203 So.2d 514, 517 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), cert. denied, 210 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1968).
Affirmed.