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Phillips v. Village of Waterford

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
May 22, 1975
48 A.D.2d 745 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975)

Summary

In Phillips, however, the focus of the court's attention seemed to be on the application of the tolling provisions of the CPLR and whether the time limitations for actions governed by section 50-i commenced upon accrual of the cause of action or upon the happening of the event causing the damage.

Summary of this case from Priebe v. City of Canandaigua

Opinion

May 22, 1975


Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered November 16, 1971 in Saratoga County, which dismissed the complaint and from a judgment entered thereon. The plaintiff's husband disappeared on September 15, 1963. On July 13, 1968 facts were learned which established that he probably had died on the date of his disappearance in 1963. Accordingly, the plaintiff on August 15, 1968 filed a notice of claim; was thereafter granted letters of administration on July 15, 1969 and then commenced this action on August 4, 1969. The primary issue before Special Term and again upon this appeal is whether or not the action was timely commenced on August 4, 1969 pursuant to the provisions of section 50-i Gen. Mun. of the General Municipal Law. In 1968 the Appellate Division in the Fourth Department held in Erickson v Town of Henderson ( 30 A.D.2d 282) that the time limitation in subdivision 1 of the subject statute was to be computed from the date of the event, i.e., death, in a wrongful death action. In 1969 the same court in Zeitler v City of Rochester ( 32 A.D.2d 728) noted that the time limitation was by virtue of subdivision 2 of the subject statute intended to preclude the application of the tolling provisions of CPLR 204 (subd [a]). (See, also, Joiner v City of New York, 26 A.D.2d 840.) As held in the case of Erickson v Town of Henderson (supra), the time limitations for actions governed by section 50-i Gen. Mun. of the General Municipal Law do not commence upon accrual of the cause of action but rather upon the happening of the event causing the damage. The plight of a person such as the plaintiff herein who has no knowledge of the event is unfortunate when measured by subdivisions 1 and 2 of section 50-i, however, the Legislature has not seen fit to amend the statute since the interpretations in Erickson and Zeitler. Order and judgment affirmed, without costs. Herlihy, P.J., Sweeney, Kane, Main and Reynolds, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Phillips v. Village of Waterford

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
May 22, 1975
48 A.D.2d 745 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975)

In Phillips, however, the focus of the court's attention seemed to be on the application of the tolling provisions of the CPLR and whether the time limitations for actions governed by section 50-i commenced upon accrual of the cause of action or upon the happening of the event causing the damage.

Summary of this case from Priebe v. City of Canandaigua
Case details for

Phillips v. Village of Waterford

Case Details

Full title:RITA E. PHILLIPS, as Administratrix of the Estate of WALTER PHILLIPS, SR.…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department

Date published: May 22, 1975

Citations

48 A.D.2d 745 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975)

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