Opinion
Case No. 04cv1259-BEN (POR).
February 15, 2006
ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [Dkt. Nos. 65 67] WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
INTRODUCTION
Now before the Court are the Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint brought by Defendants Vista Unified School District, David Hubbard, David Cowles, and John Hannaman (hereinafter "the VUSD Defendants") [Dkt No. 65] and Guajome Park Academy Charter School, Stephen Halfaker, Beverly Kanawi, and Mike Hadjiaghia (hereinafter "the GPACS Defendants") [Dkt. No. 67]. The Court finds that a hearing is not necessary to decide this motion. Having reviewed the pleadings and the briefs of both parties, the Court grants the Motions to Dismiss without prejudice.
Plaintiff's initial Complaint was dismissed by this Court because she was seeking relief for her minor son as next friend and guardian but without a licensed attorney to represent her son's interests. See Order dated October 29, 2004. In arguing against dismissal, Peters argued that apart from her son's rights to seek relief under the I.D.E.A., a parent may urge her own I.D.E.A. rights pro se. Because the initial Complaint was unclear as to whether Plaintiff was also asserting her own rights, the Complaint was dismissed and Plaintiff was granted leave to amend her Complaint to bring claims to vindicate her own rights. Plaintiff's first Amended Complaint was 36 pages and 153 paragraphs long. Because the allegations were still ambiguous and because it was not clear whether the relief sought was redressable under the I.D.E.A., and because the first Amended Complaint did not contain a short and plain statement of the claim[s]" as required by Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the first Amended Complaint was dismissed without prejudice and with directions to submit a Second Amended Complaint that complies with Rule 8(a) and makes clear whether Peters is seeking to vindicate her own rights, the source of the particular rights, and the type and purpose of the relief she seeks.
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") is 27 pages and 94 paragraphs long. Although not a model of clarity and brevity, for a pro se litigant it is sufficiently clear in describing that she is seeking to vindicate her own rights, the source of those rights and the type of relief she seeks. In her SAC, Plaintiff sets out nine separate claims for relief each based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) a substantive due process claim; (2) an equal protection claim; (3) a section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act claim; (4) an Americans With Disabilities Act claim; (5) a Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 claim; (6) a Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 claim; (7) a Cal.Govt. Code § 1090 (conflict of interest) claim; (8) a First Amendment claim; and (9) a R.I.C.O. claim.
All Defendants move to dismiss. Each Defendants urges three principal arguments. First, they argue that the schools and their employees are immune from suit for the various claims because of the Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit enjoyed by the State of California and its instrumentalities and agencies. Next, they argue that for those claims that could be brought pursuant to the I.D.E.A., Plaintiff has failed to first exhaust the administrative remedies available to her under the I.D.E.A. Finally, they argue that Plaintiff fails to plead an essential element (the denial of services based on sex) for her Title IX claim. All of the Defendants argue that the SAC should be dismissed under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Attacks on jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) can be either facial, confining the inquiry to allegations in the Complaint, or factual, permitting a court to look beyond the Complaint. Polanski v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 378 F.Supp.2d 1222, 1228 (S.D. Cal. 2005). For facial attacks, the allegations in the Complaint are taken as true. Id. When the motion challenges the jurisdictional facts presented in the Complaint the court may consider evidence properly before it, and the party opposing the motion has the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Id.A facial attack on jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is similar to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In both cases review is limited to the contents of the Complaint. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[W]hen the legal sufficiency of a complaint's allegations is tested by a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), review is limited to the complaint."). The Court is required to presume all factual allegations of the Complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 984 (9th Cir. 2000).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) ("Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of dispositive issue of law."). "A claim may be dismissed only if `it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Id. (citations omitted). At the same time, a court is not to assume that a plaintiff can prove facts it has not alleged or that defendants have violated laws in ways that have not been alleged. Associated General California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
The VUSD Defendants and the GPACS Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims brought under § 1983 on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." The decisions of the United States Supreme Court have extended the Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their own States. Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). "The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court." Id.
This immunity from suit enjoyed by the States affects all of Plaintiff's claims against the two public school systems in her SAC. This is because public schools and school officials sued in their official capacity are considered part of the State of California. Berlanger v. Madera Unified School Dist., 963 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, VUSD and its school officials are considered part of the State. Likewise, GPACS and its school officials, though a charter school, is part of the California public school system and part of the State. Ridgecrest Charter School v. Sierra Sands Unified, 130 Cal.App.4th 986, 998 (Cal.App. 2005) ("In 1998, the Legislature, as part of AB 544, added section 47615 to the Act to find and declare that charter schools are a part of the `Public School System, as defined in Article IX of the California Constitution'; that they come under the system's jurisdiction; and that they are entitled to `full and fair funding' under the Act."); Wilson v. State Board of Education, 75 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1137 (Cal.App. 1999) ("[I]t is apparent that charter schools are part of California's single, statewide public school system."). As such, both the VUSD Defendants and the GPACS Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit by Plaintiff.
Because all nine of Plaintiff's claims for relief are brought through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it must be determined whether immunity has been abrogated with respect to § 1983 claims. Eleventh Amendment immunity has not been abrogated for § 1983 claims. Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 982 F.Supp. 1396, 1403 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (dismissing § 1983 claim against California school district and district's officials). As the court in Carmen recognized, while § 1983 provides a federal forum to assert a deprivation of a civil liberty, it does not provide that forum for a citizen who seeks a remedy against a State. Id. ( quoting Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" who can be sued in federal court under § 1983. Id. Accordingly, the Court, on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, dismisses Plaintiff's nine claims brought under § 1983, because this Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims. Fielder v. Gehring, 110 F.Supp.2d 1312, 1318 (D. Hawaii 2000) (dismissing claims against State and its officials for lack of jurisdiction because of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
One of Plaintiff's nine claims is a claim under § 1983 for violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (and presumably the closely related Individuals With Disabilities Act.) However, neither Section 504 nor the I.D.E.A. create private rights that may be enforced through § 1983. Alex G. v. Board of Trustees of Davis Joint Unified School Dist., 332 F.Supp.2d 1315, 1317 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (recognizing that both Robb v. Bethel School District #403, 308 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2002) and Witte v. Clark County School District, 197 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 1999) apparently assume I.D.E.A. may be enforced through § 1983, depending on administrative exhaustion, but doing so without overruling Department of Education v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 820 (9th Cir. 1983) which found that I.D.E.A. enforcement scheme displaced § 1983).
There are two recognized exceptions which could provide grounds for federal court jurisdiction ( i.e., suits seeking only prospective injunctive relief and individual capacity suits), but Plaintiff articulates neither in her SAC.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, Both the VUSD Defendants' and the GPACS Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are hereby granted and the Second Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. While the Second Amended Complaint is dismissed in its entirety, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se she is granted leave to file a Third Amended Complaint within 30 days of the date of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.