Opinion
E070308
10-15-2018
In re E.R. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. L.G., Defendant and Appellant.
Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, and James E. Brown, Guy B. Pittman and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. INJ1800017) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Susanne S. Cho, Judge. Affirmed. Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, and James E. Brown, Guy B. Pittman and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant L.G. (mother) is the mother of the three children who are the subject of this dependency matter. The juvenile court sustained the dependency petition filed by plaintiff and respondent Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS), finding true each of five asserted jurisdictional allegations, all pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1).
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
In this appeal, mother contests one of the juvenile court's five jurisdictional findings, arguing that there is no substantial evidence in support of allegation b-4, which alleges that mother's untreated mental health disorders endanger the children. Mother also contends the juvenile court erred by ordering her "to submit to a psychiatric evaluation and medication assessment based on the erroneous jurisdictional finding."
We find that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's true finding with respect to allegation b-4. Furthermore, the juvenile court did not order mother to submit to a psychiatric evaluation and medication assessment, but rather authorized her to receive this service "upon her request." We conclude mother has demonstrated no error by the juvenile court, and we affirm the challenged orders.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The family at issue includes mother, three children (born in 2008, 2009, and 2014), and the children's father. The family came to the attention of DPSS in December 2017, after police responded to a domestic dispute at their home.
In the dependency petition filed in January 2018, DPSS asserted five jurisdictional allegations, all pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect). Three of those allegations relate to the parents engaging in domestic violence with one another in the presence of the children. Another allegation asserts that mother and father were uncooperative with DPSS efforts to provide "pre-placement preventative services." Because these four allegations are not at issue in the present appeal, we need not discuss them or their underlying facts in detail. The remaining allegation, b-4, states the following: "[Mother] is diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder and she has not followed through with mental health treatment; such conditions limit her ability to provide the children with adequate care, endanger the children's safety and well-being, and create a detrimental home environment."
In an interview with a DPSS social worker, mother stated that she had been diagnosed with Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder at Desert Regional Medical Center. Mother reported that she was referred to urgent care for further treatment of those disorders, but she had declined to seek treatment. Mother elaborated in a later interview that she had suffered a panic attack in December 2017, resulting in her hospitalization and recent diagnosis. During the panic attack, she had been driving alone when she suddenly became paralyzed, unable to move or talk. She "was able to somehow find her way into a parking lot, but was crying profusely." At the hospital, she was informed that she had a panic attack, to which exhaustion, stress, and anxiety had contributed.
Mother described her childhood as difficult. She was abused physically and sexually, and in her teenage years began coping by cutting her wrists. She "experienced bouts of depression where she would cry a lot because she felt alone and had no one to talk with." She denied being involuntarily hospitalized or receiving counseling.
Mother further stated that she had been diagnosed with anxiety in 2014, after the birth of the youngest of the three children, and that "her recent stressors about her marriage have intensified her depression." She also reported that she had suffered from pain from fibromyalgia since 2014, which was formally diagnosed in 2016. She expressed her belief that "much of her emotions are connected to her medical condition and relationship." Mother had "never addressed her anxiety or depression," except that she was currently taking several psychotropic medications for depression as prescribed by her primary physician. She expressed that she felt sad on most days, and would isolate herself. She asserted, however, that her depression does not stop her from caring for her children. Mother had moved out of the home with father, and stated that she and the children had "settled in" with her mother (the children's maternal grandmother), though they were looking into moving into an apartment of their own. She expressed her belief that the best place for the children was to remain in her care, and she claimed to have been their primary caregiver even when living with father.
When DPSS interviewed father, he confirmed that mother "struggles with anxiety and depression." According to father, mother's depression affects her physical health, making her increasingly tired, and includes "bouts of crying, disinterest in activities, isolating herself and staying in bed until late hours." In father's opinion, mother's mental health issues, in conjunction with her physical maladies, have affected her ability to care for the children. Father claimed that he had cared for the children on most days, including taking them to school, picking them up, and driving them to their activities. Father "expressed concern about the additional stress" of mother caring for the children alone, particularly because of her fibromyalgia, and requested that the children be returned to his care full time.
In a written assessment, the social worker expressed concern about the children's safety in the family home, not only because of the parents' history of domestic violence with one another, but also mother's medical issues, including "anxiety and major depression disorder, which she is not treating." According to the social worker, mother "was in agreement that her case plan would include psychiatric evaluation and medication, and therapy to address the trauma she experienced as a child."
At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing in March 2018, mother's counsel argued that allegation b-4 should be dismissed. Counsel argued that there was no evidence that mother has a major depressive disorder or generalized anxiety disorder, characterizing her depression as situational, rather than clinical. Counsel also represented that mother was attending counseling.
The juvenile court found true each of the petition's allegations, including b-4. It ordered mother to retain physical custody of the children, and that DPSS must provide family maintenance services designed to keep the family together, in which she must participate. It removed the children from the physical custody of father and ordered that he be provided with reunification services. And it authorized mother to participate "upon her request" in a psychiatric evaluation with a medication assessment. DPSS's recommended case plan would have ordered the evaluation and assessment.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 300, subdivision (b) provides a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction if the child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness caused by the parent's inability to provide regular care for the child because of the parent's mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. (§ 300, subd. (b).) A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b) requires: "'(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) "serious physical harm or illness" to the [minor], or a "substantial risk" of such harm or illness.'" (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1396.) The third element "effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur)." (Ibid.) Harm or risk of harm to a child may not be presumed from the fact that the parent has a mental illness. (In re Travis C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226.)
"'On appeal, the "substantial evidence" test is the appropriate standard of review for both the jurisdictional and dispositional findings. [Citation.] The term "substantial evidence" means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it is evidence which is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'In making this determination, all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact.'" (In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 574-575.) We must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's order, bearing in mind that, while substantial evidence may consist of inferences, inferences which are the result of speculation cannot support a finding. (In re A.L. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1049.) In other words, the juvenile court's ruling "will not be disturbed unless it exceeds the bounds of reason." (In re E.B., supra, at p. 575.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court's Jurisdictional Findings
DPSS argues that we should not reach the merits of mother's challenge to the juvenile court's true finding with respect to allegation b-4, since she has not challenged the juvenile court's other jurisdictional findings and therefore has effectively conceded the juvenile court properly had jurisdiction over the children pursuant to those other findings. (See In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 [if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction is supported by substantial evidence, reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence].) It is conceivable, however, that a finding that mother suffered from serious mental illness, and that she had failed to follow through with treatment to the extent that it had endangered the children's safety and well-being, could have consequences in this proceeding or in a subsequent family law or dependency proceeding. (See In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1489 [addressing on the merits arguably moot claim of error regarding order denying visitation even though parent's concern regarding possibility of prejudice in subsequent proceedings was "highly speculative"].) We find it appropriate, therefore, to address mother's claim of error on the merits.
Having reviewed the record, we find that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that mother has been diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder and she has not followed through with mental health treatment. Mother told a social worker that she had been so diagnosed at Desert Regional Medical Center, that she had been referred to urgent care for further treatment, and that she had declined to seek further treatment. The juvenile court reasonably concluded on this basis that mother has in fact been "diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder and she has not followed through with mental health treatment" as stated in allegation b-4.
In briefing, mother characterizes her diagnoses as "self-reported," emphasizing that no medical records or expert testimony regarding mother's mental health were submitted to the juvenile court. It is not the case, however, that mother's mental illness was established only by her own "anecdotal assessment" of her mental health or the nonexpert opinions of others, as she suggests. Rather, she reported to the social worker clinical diagnoses she had recently received, the hospital's recommendation regarding further treatment, and her failure to follow that recommendation. Mother's statements to the social worker constitute substantial evidence of the diagnoses and her lack of treatment. There is nothing in the record suggesting that mother inaccurately described her diagnoses to the social worker, or that subsequent examination revealed those diagnoses to be incorrect.
Mother points to evidence that she was under the care of a physician who had prescribed psychotropic medication for her "depression" as an indication that she had not "failed to get help for any supposed ailment." That medication appears to have been taken for general anxiety, which she was diagnosed to have in 2014. Viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's ruling, this evidence—like evidence that mother had begun seeing a counselor by the time of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing—does not establish that she in fact followed through with mental health treatment for her recently diagnosed conditions, diagnosed even after she was taking the medication. At most, mother has demonstrated that there is a conflict in the evidence as to whether her statement to the social worker that she had declined to seek treatment for her newly diagnosed conditions was true. Under the applicable standard of review, that is not enough to justify reversal of the juvenile court's finding. (In re E.B., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 574-575.)
There is also evidence that, viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's ruling, supports a finding of substantial risk of serious physical harm to the children. Mother described herself as feeling paralyzed during her December 2017 panic attack while driving. Fortunately, the children were not in the car at the time, and mother managed to bring the car to a stop safely. However, a future panic attack might come with the children in the car, and not have so fortunate a resolution. As discussed above, there is evidence that mother failed to follow through with recommended treatment for her recent diagnoses, so as to reduce the likelihood of another panic attack. And mother's December 2017 panic attack was not an isolated incident, but rather the latest manifestation of her longstanding history of anxiety and other mental illness. In addition to mother's own descriptions of her mental health history, father reported to DPSS that mother regularly suffered from mental health issues that, in conjunction with her physical maladies, affected her ability to care for the children. The social worker, too, observed that mother's "mental health diagnosis of anxiety and depression is acute and remains unaddressed, thus impacting her ability to safely parent her children . . . ." The juvenile court did not exceed the bounds of reason in concluding on this record that mother's mental health presented a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the children.
To be sure, the record could also support a different conclusion regarding the risk of harm to the children. Mother denied that her mental health issues had ever interfered with her parenting. Father's contrary testimony could be discounted as self-interested or simply false. Although mother suffered one serious panic attack, requiring hospitalization, there is no evidence that she has had more of them since December 2017. Mother admitted that she declined to seek treatment as advised after her hospitalization, but she is receiving mental health services in the form of psychotropic medication from her primary physician, and she has begun attending counseling. The evidence in support of a finding of substantial risk of serious physical harm to the children is therefore arguable. But under the deferential substantial evidence standard of review, that does not justify disturbing the juvenile court's finding. (In re E.B., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 574-575; In re A.L., supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 1049.)
Because substantial evidence supports a true finding with respect to allegation b-4, we conclude mother has not demonstrated any juvenile court error.
C. The Juvenile Court Did Not Order Mother to Undergo Psychiatric Evaluation and Medication Assessment
Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering her to undergo a psychiatric evaluation and medication assessment. The juvenile court, however, made no such order. Instead, it authorized mother to receive a psychiatric evaluation and medication assessment "upon her request." Mother has presented no reasoned argument demonstrating that the juvenile court erred by offering her a mental health service that she is free to accept or decline. And we discern no manner in which she is aggrieved by such an order. Mother apparently told the social worker that she was in agreement that her case plan would include that service. But if mother has since changed her mind, she remains free to decline it. There was no error.
III. DISPOSITION
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. MILLER
J.