Opinion
B288485
03-21-2019
In re LYDIA W. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.S., Defendant and Appellant.
Matthew I. Thue, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. DK19232) APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Steven E. Ipson, Commissioner. Affirmed. Matthew I. Thue, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
J.S. (Father) appeals from jurisdiction/disposition orders declaring his daughters, Lydia W. and F.S., to be dependent children of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), (section 300) and placing them in the home of Father and Vivian M. (Mother) under the supervision of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jurisdiction order as to him. DCFS claims the issue is moot based on the sustained allegations as to Mother. We affirm.
Michael J. is Lydia's biological and presumed father. The juvenile court declared Father to be her presumed father as well.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
DCFS received a referral in July 2012 alleging that Mother was possibly using drugs and neglecting Lydia, who was then less than a year old. Mother agreed to participate in a voluntary maintenance case, which was open from September 2012 to June 2013. The case was closed after Mother's situation stabilized.
DCFS received another referral in September 2015 alleging physical abuse and general neglect of then-four-year-old Lydia and one-year-old F.S. A third referral in November 2015 alleged that Mother had neglected Lydia and F.S. It also alleged that Father physically abused Lydia. These referrals were closed after DCFS received another referral.
The March 23, 2016 referral alleged Father physically abused Lydia, and Mother neglected Lydia and F.S. A sheriff's deputy who responded to the family's home reported that Lydia reported that Father had hit her with the door. Father and Mother stated that Lydia was running around and ran into the door, accidentally hitting her eye on the doorknob. Father mentioned to the deputy that he was bipolar.
A children's social worker (CSW) spoke to Mother, who stated that she had been diagnosed with anxiety and depression, for which she took medication and used medical marijuana. Father told the CSW he watched Lydia and F.S. when Mother used marijuana. When a CSW questioned him about his statement that he was bipolar, he said that he had been diagnosed as bipolar many years ago and was receiving mental health services. He explained that he would get frustrated in crowded places, and "That is why I always stay home. I don't go out." He did not take medication and did not believe his mental health issues limited his ability to care for the children.
During a July 20, 2016 visit by a CSW, Father stated that he stopped receiving mental health services about two years earlier, and he had taken psychotropic medication in the past. The CSW asked him how he was controlling the symptoms of his bipolar disorder, and he stated: "I stay away from people. Because if I get near people I will throw them to a bus. I don't deal with anyone." Mother stated that Lydia had severe temper tantrums, and she and Father took turns dealing with her when she tried their patience. Mother reported that Lydia's biological father had oppositional defiance disorder, and Lydia may have inherited some of those traits.
A CSW telephoned August 11, 2016. Father answered the phone and asked, "How many follow ups are you guys going to keep doing?" He handed the phone to Mother, who stated that she had been compliant with DCFS's requests, and she did not understand why DCFS continued to ask for more. Mother told the CSW she would like to see a judge put an end to all this. The CSW told her that DCFS would be filing a petition requesting court supervision due to her concerns. Mother said that was fine with her.
DCFS filed a section 300 petition on August 31, 2016. It alleged Father intentionally struck Lydia, putting the children at risk of serious physical harm (id., subds. (a), (j)). The petition further alleged under subdivision (b) that the children were at risk of serious physical harm or illness due to the parents's failure or inability to supervise or protect them, based on Father striking and physically abusing Lydia (counts a-1, b-1, and j-1), Mother's drug abuse (count b-2), and Mother's and Father's mental and emotional problems (counts b-3 and b-4).
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found Michael J. to be the alleged father of Lydia, and Father to be the presumed father of F.S. The children were released to Mother and Father, and the court ordered that Lydia be referred for mental health and regional center services.
In the September 22, 2016 jurisdiction/disposition report, DCFS noted that "Father was cooperative, respectful and calm during most of the interview with [the dependency investigator]. However, at one point in the interview when trying to convey the frustration regarding DCFS intervention and the fact that he does not need a mental health evaluation, [F]ather became loud and used the word 'fucking' several times in the presence of [the] child, Lydia. Mother and [the dependency investigator] attempted to have him refrain from using the language in the presence of the child, but he did it three times."
With respect to the allegation of mental and emotional problems, Father told the investigator: "I did not know that I was [b]ipolar. I have epilepsy, but I am not [b]ipolar. I was diagnosed with epilepsy at 3 months old. [The bipolar] diagnosis was made up by the SSI doctor trying to get money. I take my pills for epilepsy and they calm my mood down. They help me more than the [b]ipolar pills." He took the pills for bipolar disorder "for a week and stopped two years ago. [The pills] made me start sleeping excessively. The SSI doctor was a quack." He was not receiving SSI: "They denied me even after I had three seizures in front of them, what the hell?" He also was not in counseling, explaining: "No, I don't need it. I'm of a perfect sound mind."
Mother and paternal grandmother Katherine R. (Michael J.'s mother) confirmed that Father had epilepsy and they did not know anything about him being bipolar. Michael J. believed that Father had mental health issues, and he was uneasy about Father being around Lydia.
In its evaluation, DCFS noted that Father denied having emotional problems and "states that he does not see the need for a mental health assessment, but given the inconsistencies in his statements in regards to a possible diagnosis, to different CSW's and his outburst as well as other behaviors observed, DCFS considers this to be a risk to the children." DCFS recommended that the petition be sustained and that Father be ordered to participate in a mental health assessment as well as other family maintenance services.
DCFS filed a first amended section 300 petition on September 30, 2016. The petition included allegations as to Michael J. under subdivision (b), based on Michael J.'s drug abuse and mental and emotional health issues (counts b-5 and b-6). In an addendum report, DCFS noted that Mother reported an incident in the court hallway in which Michael J., trying to run away with Lydia, pushed Mother. Katherine R. said "that was not the case and that instead she was holding the hand of [the] child Lydia and that she let her go to stand between [Father] and [Michael J.] to prevent what could have escalated to a physical altercation initiated by [Father]."
In a last minute information for the court, DCFS reported that CSWs had visited the family to check on the children. Father again questioned why there was an open case, but he signed consent forms so that the CSWs could review his mental health records.
DCFS also reported that Father had two other children, S.S. and Luna R. There had been a referral as to S.S. based on general neglect that was closed as inconclusive. There had also been a referral as to Luna R. based on an allegation of sexual abuse by her grandfather. That referral was also closed as inconclusive.
The adjudication hearing began on October 7, 2016. Katherine R., Michael J., and Mother testified in October and November 2016.
In an addendum report dated November 1, 2016, DCFS reported it had evaluated the house of paternal grandmother S.T. (Father's mother) in Mono County to see if it was suitable for the family and to have the case transferred to Mono County. DCFS did not believe the house was suitable for the family at that time. However, the juvenile court allowed the family to move to S.T.'s house as of November 22, 2016. An assessment of the house indicated it met the standards for cleanliness and safety, although the CSW was concerned that it did not yet have beds for the children.
In a supplemental report dated April 12, 2017, DCFS reported that S.T. had moved to a new home. Lydia and F.S. appeared to be happy and well cared for. However, Mother and Father were not present for a home visit, even though they had been notified in advance of the visit.
DCFS filed a second amended section 300 petition on August 24, 2017. The amended petition added count b-7, which alleged that Father had been arrested on May 1, 2017 "for driving on a suspended license, carrying a switchblade upon [his] person and having an outstanding arrest warrant for a previous arrest for driving on a suspended license." Additionally, he had epilepsy, "which given the nature of his illness can involve a seizure while driving posing the risk of a crash, which may result in injuries, and even death." Lydia and F.S. were in the car when Father was arrested, putting them at risk of serious physical harm.
In an addendum report, DCFS noted that after Father's arrest, the car was released to Mother, who was in the car at the time but did not have a driver's license. A CSW spoke to Father, who acknowledged he did not have a driver's license but said he was working on getting one. The CSW advised him not to drive if he did not have a license and could have an epileptic seizure while driving the children. Father responded that he knew plenty of people who were epileptic and still drove. The CSW again warned him of the risk. Father said he could feel when he was going to have a seizure about 10 minutes in advance. Father added that he was taking medicine to control his epilepsy. DCFS believed Father was minimizing the seriousness of his condition, noting that he had a seizure in front of two CSWs on May 23, 2017. DCFS expressed "deep[ ] concern[ ]" about the risk to the children if he had a seizure while driving them in the car.
At the August 24, 2017 hearing, the juvenile court ordered that the children be driven only by someone with a valid driver's license and insurance. The court also ordered Father to disclose to the Department of Motor Vehicles that he has epilepsy.
In an October 26, 2017 addendum report, DCFS reported that the children were continuing to do well, and Father had a full-time job. However, Father and Mother "have made no progress in regard[ ] to addressing their mental health needs, drug rehabilitation or parenting classes."
DCFS added in last minute information for the court that Father stated he had not gone to the Department of Motor Vehicles to report that he had epilepsy because the office was an hour away from his home. DCFS also learned he had failed to appear in court for his Vehicle Code violation, and a bench warrant for his arrest had issued.
On October 26, 2017, Mother and Michael J. pleaded no contest to the allegations of the petition.
Father finally testified on January 5, 2018. Father denied ever telling anyone that he had been diagnosed as bipolar. He had been diagnosed with epilepsy when he was three years old, but "where the bipolar came in, [he had] no idea." When asked if he ever received services to help him deal with the emotional issues caused by his epilepsy, he said he "was seeing a psychologist to sit there and help get things off my chest." He acknowledged, however, that he only saw the psychologist once. He had previously received mental health services and quit going due to transportation issues. After he saw the psychologist the one time, he "didn't see a need for it so [he] quit." When he previously received mental health services, he was prescribed medication "to help calm down, help. As a mood stabilizer, when I started, felt depressed or whatnot, I'd take [a pill] and it would help." He stopped taking the medication a while ago because he had not had any bad moods and had been doing well since he got a job.
Father testified he had been taking "Zorotin, 259 milligrams twice daily" for his epilepsy since he was three years old. He was no longer taking it, however, because his seizures had been triggered by stress, and he no longer let things cause him stress.
Zarontin is an epilepsy medication given in 250 milligram capsules. (<https://www.rxlist.com/zarontin-drug.htm#indications>, as of Mar. 18, 2019; <https://www.epilepsy.com/medications/ethosuximide>, as of Mar. 18, 2019.)
Father acknowledged his arrest for driving on a suspended license and carrying a knife, although he denied that it was a switchblade. He said he presumed he would be allowed to get a driver's license, because he knew people with epilepsy who had licenses. He admitted driving in a car with Lydia and without a driver's license two or three times since the dependency case started. Since moving to Mono County, his mother drove him and the children where they needed to go.
At the continued hearing on January 8, 2018, counsel for the children argued that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the petition as to counts b-4 and b-7. She explained that Father acknowledged suffering from anxiety related to his epilepsy, he decided on his own that he would no longer obtain treatment or take his psychotropic medication. Counsel "believe[d] this failure to maintain his mental health treatment and take his prescribed medication places the children at risk of harm." Counsel also believed Father's decision to drive the children without a license, claiming he would know in advance if he was about to have a seizure, jeopardized the children's safety. Counsel requested that all parents submit to psychological evaluations and that Father have a psychiatric evaluation as well.
Following argument, the juvenile court sustained the second amended petition as to the counts based on Mother's, Father's, and Michael J.'s mental and emotional problems, rendering them incapable of providing the children with regular care and supervision. The court also sustained the petition as to the count based on Father's driving on a suspended license. It dismissed the remaining counts. The juvenile court declared the children to be dependents of the court under section 300, subdivision (b), and ordered them placed in the parents's home under DCFS supervision.
The court explained the reason it sustained count b-7 was because "the epileptic situation provides a risk." Even though there was no evidence Father had ever been in an accident due to epilepsy, "the fact that there is a condition that the Department of Motor Vehicles would have to be informed of and . . . clear or not clear the person to drive . . . and that hasn't been complied with. I don't think an adequate safety plan, although it's valuable testimony, that [Father] feels this condition coming on ten minutes before, I don't think it's an adequate safety plan to feel the condition coming on and . . . therefore, the only option would really be [to] pull over to the side of the road. I don't think that's an adequate safety plan."
As to the allegation that Father suffered from mental and emotional problems, the juvenile court struck the allegation of bipolar disorder and reference to psychotropic medication, explaining, "I know he stated that he has that, but I don't see any independent medical diagnosis of it . . . .
As part of the disposition, the juvenile court signed a case plan for Father. This required Father to obtain mental health counseling, including a psychological assessment, psychiatric evaluation, and individual counseling to address mental health issues, and to take all prescribed psychotropic medication.
DISCUSSION
I. Justiciability
Father recognizes "it is necessary only for the court to find that one parent's conduct has created circumstances triggering section 300 for the court to assert jurisdiction over the child. [Citations.]" (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491.) Therefore, "it is irrelevant which parent created those circumstances. A jurisdictional finding involving the conduct of a particular parent is not necessary for the court to enter orders binding on that parent, once dependency jurisdiction has been established. [Citation.] . . . For this reason, an appellate court may decline to address the evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional findings once a single finding has been found to be supported by the evidence. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 1492.)
When, however, "the outcome of the appeal could be 'the difference between father's being an "offending" parent versus a "non-offending" parent,' a finding that could result in far-reaching consequences with respect to these and future dependency proceedings, [it is] appropriate to exercise our discretion to consider the appeal on the merits." (In re Quentin H. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 608, 613; see In re Christopher M. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1316; In re D.P. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 898, 902.) "[W]e generally will exercise our discretion and reach the merits of a challenge to any jurisdictional finding when the finding (1) serves as the basis for dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal [citation]; (2) could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the current or future dependency proceedings [citations]; or (3) 'could have other consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction' [citation]." (In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762-763.)
DCFS argues that we should not address the jurisdictional findings as to Father, in that "[e]ven without sustaining count b-4 as to [F]ather, the juvenile court could have ordered him to participate in mental health services." We note that Father is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support sustaining both counts b-4—mental and emotional problems—and b-7—arrest for driving on a suspended license. But in any event, the juvenile court may enter a jurisdictional order as to a non-offending parent once dependency jurisdiction is established. (In re I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492; see also In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311; In re A.E. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) Thus, the juvenile court may order a non-offending parent to participate in counseling or other programs if that would be in the best interests of the children within the court's jurisdiction. (See Briana V., supra, at pp. 311-312.)
Father asks us to review the jurisdictional findings as to him in this case because they misclassify him as an offending parent, and "the unsupported [jurisdictional] findings formed the basis for orders requiring [F]ather to participate in a variety of mental health services—orders he now challenges on appeal"—and "formally label [F]ather as mentally ill." (See In re Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 762-763.) We agree and will therefore address Father's contention that there is no substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional findings against him.
II. Jurisdiction
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
To determine whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings, we apply the substantial evidence test. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773; In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146.) In doing so, " ' "we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court's determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court." [Citation.] "We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court. [Citations.] ' "[T]he [appellate] court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the order is appropriate." ' [Citation.]" [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (In re I.J., supra, at p. 773; accord, In re D.L., supra, at p. 1146.)
As we explained in In re D.L., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, "A child may be adjudged a dependent of the court under subdivision (b) of section 300 if the 'child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.' (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) . . . 'The three elements for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) are: " '(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) "serious physical harm or illness" to the [child], or a "substantial risk" of such harm or illness.' " [Citation.] "The third element, however, effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur)." ' [Citation.] Evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions. [Citation.] To establish a defined risk of harm at the time of the hearing, there 'must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1146.)
Section 300, "[s]ubdivision (b) means what it says. Before courts and agencies can exert jurisdiction under . . . subdivision (b), there must be evidence indicating that the child is exposed to a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness," and that the risk exists "at the time of the hearing." (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 823, 824; accord, In re Isabella F. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 128, 140.) The substantial risk of harm required for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), is risk which arises as the result of the conduct of the allegedly offending parent. (In re V.M. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 245, 252; In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136-137.)
B. Analysis
As sustained, count b-4 alleged that Father "has mental and emotional problems which render[ him] incapable of providing [F.S.] with regular care and supervision. On prior occasions[,] [Father] failed to take [his] medications as prescribed. [Father] failed to regularly participate in [a] mental health counseling program. [Father's] mental and emotional problems endanger the child's physical health and safety, placing the child at risk of suffering serious physical harm, damage and danger."
Father asserts DCFS did not identify the particular mental or emotional problems which rendered him incapable of caring for his child. Father claims the only "evidence of symptoms related to [F]ather's 'mental and emotional problems'—which he attributed to [e]pilepsy—was limited to: 1) [F]ather's self-reported anxiety in crowds and occasional bouts of crying; and 2) a social worker's report that [F]ather once became frustrated and swore in front of the [children]." Father testified that he was currently working and feeling good, and he did not need medication to stabilize his moods.
DCFS points to the evidence Father had bipolar disorder, but the juvenile court found insufficient evidence to support this allegation and struck it from the petition. DCFS also points to a report by Luna's mother that Father suffered from depression seven years earlier, but there was no evidence Father was currently suffering from depression or that it ever affected his ability to care for F.S.
DCFS also points to evidence of problems keeping the home and the children clean, both with Lydia and F.S. and previously with S.S. However, DCFS points to no evidence linking those problems to the alleged mental and emotional problems Father suffered. There must be evidence that Father's mental or emotional problems affected his ability to care for the children. (In re Travis C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226; see In re D.L., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1146.) Here, there was none. Consequently, count b-4 is not supported by substantial evidence.
The same cannot be said of count b-7. Father is epileptic but stopped taking his epilepsy medication. He had no driver's license and an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving on a suspended license, yet he chose to drive with the children in the car. Mother was also in the car, but she did not have a driver's license either. Father's choice put the children at risk of serious physical harm should Father's epilepsy have caused him to lose control of the car and crash. We agree with the trial court that Father feeling a seizure coming and being able to pull to the side of the road is not "an adequate safety plan."
Father claims that "on August 24, 2017, he signed a letter agreeing not to transport the [children] moving forward." It appears from the transcript of the August 24 hearing that Father may have signed such a letter, but the juvenile court stated it had "a rather poor copy, but it looks to me like it's dated on the letterhead portion . . . August of 2015, but the dates on the bottom are dated August of 2017 . . . ." We have no copy of any such letter.
In any event, at the August 24, 2017 hearing, the juvenile court ordered Father to inform the Department of Motor Vehicles that he had epilepsy. As of his February 5, 2018 testimony, Father had failed to do so, while continuing to insist that people with epilepsy got driver's licenses.
It is clear that Father failed to appreciate that driving with untreated epilepsy and without a driver's license posed a risk of harm to his children. A parent's denial of the existence of a problem is relevant in determining whether the parent is likely to modify his or her behavior in the future absent court supervision. (In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044.) As DCFS observes, "One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge." (In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197.)
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that Father's driving the children without a driver's license, i.e., without proof that his epilepsy was well controlled and would not pose a risk of a seizure while driving, placed the children at risk of serious physical harm. Despite Father's alleged promise not to drive the children, the fact that he continued to do so even after being cited for driving on a suspended license, coupled with his insistence that it was safe for him to drive, supports a finding of substantial risk that his past conduct would reoccur. (In re D.L., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1146.) Thus, substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional finding under count b-7.
As stated above, "once a single finding has been found to be supported by the evidence," dependency jurisdiction is established. (In re I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492.) We therefore uphold the juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction as to Father.
III. Disposition
The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child's interests and to fashion a dispositional order accordingly. On appeal, this determination cannot be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311.) Discretion is abused when the juvenile court's order "is absurd or beyond the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances considered." (In re Ana C. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1326; see, e.g., Briana V., supra, at p. 312.)
Under section 362, subdivision (a), "[t]he juvenile court may make 'all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child.' [Citations.] The problem that the juvenile court seeks to address need not be described in the sustained section 300 petition. [Citation.]" (In re Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311; accord, In re D.L., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1148.)
Father challenges the requirement in the dispositional order that he participate in mental health services. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the order.
There was evidence that Father stated he had been diagnosed as bipolar. Father acknowledged experiencing mental or emotional symptoms at times, which he attributed to his epilepsy. Father acknowledged going to counseling and taking medication for these symptoms, but he decided not to continue in counseling or taking the medication because he believed he did not need them. Father had exhibited a problem controlling his emotions when dealing with the prolonged dependency proceedings. Under these circumstances, it was in the children's best interests that Father have a mental health examination, counseling, and medication if necessary to ensure that his mental and emotional symptoms were diagnosed and treated, to ensure that they did not affect his ability to care for the children. We cannot say that the juvenile court's dispositional order exceeded the bounds of reason. (In re Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 312.)
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
JOHNSON, Acting P. J. We concur:
BENDIX, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.