Opinion
A153215
08-03-2018
In re Y.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Y.R., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J1700988)
First-time youth offender Y.A.R., age 16, appeals a dispositional order entered after the juvenile court sustained allegations he unlawfully resisted an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69 ) and resisted or obstructed a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) when he became involved in a late-night brawl at a bar-and-grill.
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Y.A.R. argues the case should be remanded, at a minimum, because the juvenile court erroneously failed to expressly declare whether the Penal Code section 69 violation, a wobbler, was a misdemeanor or a felony. The People agree, conceding this was an error, and so do we. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702; In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199; In re Nancy C. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 508, 512.) Accordingly, a remand for that limited purpose will be ordered.
The sole remaining issue is Y.A.R.'s challenge to one of the probation conditions the juvenile court imposed, barring him from the city where the incident took place, American Canyon. He argues the probation condition is both unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and unconstitutionally overbroad in that it unduly restricts his right to travel. We reach only the first contention, and conclude the condition must be stricken.
BACKGROUND
On May 31, 2017 (all dates are in that year), the Napa County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging Y.A.R. committed the offenses of resisting an executive officer in violation of section 69, and resisted, obstructed or delayed a peace officer in violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1). The former was alleged to be a felony, the latter a misdemeanor.
According to the detention report, the charges arose from an incident just after midnight on May 28, when police officers responded to a report of a physical fight between bar patrons and security staff at Mi Zacatecas Bar/Grill in American Canyon. Police officers described an extremely chaotic scene upon arrival, with screaming and breaking glass everywhere and several active fights. Y.A.R. was inside, punching another person. A police officer tried to break up the fight by grabbing Y.A.R. and pulling him off, but Y.A.R. grabbed the police officer by the waist and began pulling the officer down toward the floor. Eventually, the police officer was able to restrain Y.A.R., but only after throwing Y.A.R. down to the floor, landing on his chest and punching him several times in the face while a second police officer came to assist and struck Y.A.R. several more times. Y.A.R. was arrested and transported for medical treatment, and later reported that he suffered a broken nose.
Y.A.R. had been at the bar-and-grill with his 19-year-old brother. He later told a probation officer he had been out that night with his brother and some girls, and had waited in the car while his brother stopped by the establishment to dance. When one of the girls ran out to Y.A.R. and told him his older brother was getting beat up, he went inside to find his brother and was attacked by several patrons. Due to the chaos and poor lighting, he didn't realize it was a police officer who at one point was trying to grab him, and claimed that he complied with the officer's commands once he got punched and realized it was a police officer. He was adamant to the probation officer he didn't realize he was being detained by a police officer, would never resist or try to punch an authority figure, and was only trying to defend himself.
At an uncontested jurisdiction hearing on September 18, Y.A.R. admitted both counts, the allegations were found true and the Napa County juvenile court ordered the matter transferred pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 750 to Contra Costa County, the county of Y.A.R.'s residence, for disposition.
The Contra Costa County juvenile court accepted the transfer, and adjudged Y.A.R. a ward of the court with no termination date.
Before the disposition hearing, the Contra Costa County probation department evaluated Y.A.R. as being at low risk of re-offending. It noted his childhood had been traumatic, and in broad strokes painted the sad picture. Y.A.R. had been born in Mexico to homeless parents who neglected, abandoned and physically abused him, became estranged from his parents and, at age ten, began living with an older brother in Mexico who tried to care for him. Eventually, at age 14 and a half, Y.A.R. came to Richmond, California to live with his older sister, who works as a house cleaner, and her boyfriend. He was reportedly very happy in his new home where he felt surrounded by family. His sister cared for him "like a mother," enforced the rules and would discipline him when needed, and Y.A.R. had a good relationship with her boyfriend whom Y.A.R. considered a brother in law. According to his sister, Y.A.R. had been badly hurt by his traumatic upbringing in Mexico, didn't spend a lot of time with friends but was "intelligent, humble and has good sentiments," and was helpful around the house with chores.
The probation department noted that although Y.A.R. had encountered some "behavioral adjustment[s]" during his first year in high school (encountering some minor attendance and disciplinary issues, and he also got suspended once for possessing a knife), it noted Y.A.R. had made a positive turnaround since the beginning of the current school term. Y.A.R. had resumed classes, not posed any behavioral problems, had good attendance, was attending a tutoring program on Saturdays to help improve his grades and was working toward earning credits for a high school diploma, and his English was improving too. Although Y.A.R. had experimented with marijuana and alcohol, no substance abuse concerns were noted. He denied any gang affiliation, reported having acquaintances but no friends, and preferred spending time alone. Neither Y.A.R. nor his family had any criminal history. Y.A.R. also had posed no behavioral problems while detained for four days at Juvenile Hall, and had not even fought back when attacked by some juveniles who were gang members because Y.A.R. wanted to avoid trouble.
The probation department noted concerns, though, with "supervision issues," querying why Y.A.R. had been in a bar-and-grill after midnight with his older brother. It also noted Y.A.R. had "difficulty following the directives of those in authority." It viewed Y.A.R. as most in need of individual and family counseling, in order to develop a better understanding of his delinquent behavior but also, above all, in order to deal with the trauma he experienced in Mexico as a child.
The department recommended Y.A.R. be placed on probation at home with his sister subject to various standard terms and conditions of probation, serve 60 days on home supervision, participate in individual and family counseling, and stay away 50 yards away from the bar-and-grill.
At the disposition hearing on November 6, 2017, the Contra Costa County juvenile court largely adopted the probation department's recommendations, but with three modifications. It ordered Y.A.R. to serve 90 days, not 60, on home supervision, a 50 percent increase in the recommended term. It ordered Y.A.R. detained for two consecutive weekends in juvenile hall. And, over defense counsel's objection, it imposed the condition challenged here, ordering Y.A.R. to stay out of American Canyon entirely, rather than just to stay away from the bar-and-grill where the altercation had taken place. The court commented, "I don't see any reason for him to be in American Canyon. He lives in Richmond. American Canyon is way over Vallejo. [¶] . . . [¶] So stay out of American Canyon." Defense counsel objected, explaining that Y.A.R.'s girlfriend lived in American Canyon. The juvenile court responded: "He can't drive there. She will have to come to him. [¶] And good luck to get a bus going to American Canyon. [¶] And the other brother he cannot go with, so she'll have to come to him."
This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The principles governing our review of a probation condition imposed by the juvenile court are well-settled. We review such conditions for abuse of discretion. (In re Daniel R. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.) "Because wards are thought to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults and have more circumscribed constitutional rights, and because the juvenile court stands in the shoes of a parent when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, juvenile conditions 'may be broader than those pertaining to adult offenders.' " (In re D.G. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 47, 52.) Nevertheless, "it is consistently held that juvenile probation conditions must be judged by the same three-part standard applied to adult probation conditions under Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481: 'A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it " (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . . " ' " (Id. at p. 52.) Furthermore, probation conditions imposed upon a minor must be " ' " 'tailored specifically to meet the needs of the juvenile.' " ' " (Id. at p. 53.) Judged by these standards, the condition is not reasonable.
We decline the People's suggestion to deem Y.A.R.'s objection to this condition forfeited. As noted, defense counsel objected at the disposition hearing to the condition, specifically because it would prohibit Y.A.R. from frequenting places that had nothing to do with his offense (i.e., visiting his girlfriend who lived there). Although the legal grounds for an objection could have been more fully explained, defense counsel had no prior notice the juvenile court would impose the condition on its own. In these circumstances, we exercise our discretion to review the challenged condition based on the objection made below at the hearing. (See In re Daniel R., 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 6.)
There is no dispute the stay-away condition satisfies the second Lent prong, because traveling in American Canyon is not in itself unlawful. We also have no trouble concluding the condition satisfies the first and third prongs, because it is not reasonably related either to Y.A.R.'s offenses or to his risk of future criminality.
The People argue that barring Y.A.R. from all of American Canyon is reasonably related to the offenses Y.A.R. committed because that is the city where the crimes took place. As such, the People contend, it also relates to Y.A.R.'s risk of future criminality, "because it prevents [him] from entering a locale where he might again do or suffer harm." Both assertions prove too much, however. (See In re D.G., supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 56.) On that view, a minor could reasonably be barred from an entire county for a single, isolated instance of criminal misbehavior within the county, or indeed from an entire state if not an entire country. "The same principle which prohibits the banishment of a criminal from a state or from the United States applies with equal force to a county or city. The old Roman custom of ostracizing a citizen has not been adopted in the United States." (Ex parte Scarborough (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 648, 650.) Here, there is no evidence Y.A.R. targeted the city of American Canyon specifically for criminal activity or had a pattern of engaging in criminal activity there. Moreover, the probation department regarded him as at low risk of re-offending. In these circumstances, the geographic locale of his offense alone has no reasonable connection whatsoever to his crime, or with any predisposition to re-offend in that locale. (Compare, e.g., In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941-942 [upholding probation condition restricting juvenile from traveling to Los Angeles County who had gang ties within the county and an extensive record of criminal activity there] with Alex O. v. Superior Court (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1180-1183 [striking down probation condition barring American minor residing in Mexico from entering the United States after smuggling drugs across the Mexican border; condition was not closely related either to minor's crime or risk of future criminality, and unlike in Antonio R. "there is nothing in the record that suggests he has a lengthy criminal history or that previous rehabilitation efforts have failed"]; In re Daniel R., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 7-8 [probation condition barring minor from traveling to Mexico not justified by speculation that minor, who had a history of defying his parents by running away, would go to Mexico and get into trouble there]; In re D.G., at pp. 53-56 [probation condition barring juvenile from coming within 150 feet of any school held invalid under Lent where there is no evidence minor "presents a special danger to students"].) Put simply, there is no evidence in this record suggesting that a ban on being in American Canyon "will have a rehabilitative effect by preventing [Y.A.R.] from committing any particular crimes in the future." (In re D.G., at p. 54.)
Alternatively, the People argue that barring Y.A.R. from American Canyon is valid because it is reasonably related to the probation department's ability to effectively supervise him. According to the People, Y.A.R. "cannot be adequately supervised by the Contra Costa County Probation Department were he to travel to American Canyon" from his home in Richmond. But the Contra Costa County Probation Department didn't see things that way; it didn't ask for this condition. Furthermore, the juvenile court did not forbid Y.A.R. from traveling anywhere else outside of Contra Costa County, and so even if supervision were indeed the purpose of this geographic restriction, it is not a reasonable means of supervision. Y.A.R. is free to go to the farthest reaches of California. Barring him from entering one city is not reasonably likely to enhance his probation officer's ability to keep tabs on him.
Finally, the People argue the condition is reasonable because it is "related to effective supervision based on [Y.A.R.'s] admitted associated with the Sureño criminal street gang and his active collusion with others, including his older brother, in attacking the police during the melee in the bar in American Canyon." The latter point is just another way of saying Y.A.R. committed a crime; it does not relate to the probation department's ability to supervise Y.A.R. as a result of his offense. Nor is the geographic restriction justified by concerns for possible gang activity. When a juvenile is in danger of falling in with a criminal street gang, the juvenile court unquestionably has discretion to forbid the juvenile, in an appropriately tailored manner, from entering areas where there is gang-related activity. (See In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 914-919.) But such concerns were not the juvenile court's stated reasons for imposing this condition ("I don't see any reason for him to be in American Canyon"). Furthermore, evidence of Y.A.R.'s possible gang involvement was so slight that no gang terms of probation were even recommended, nor were any imposed. And that slight evidence, such as is was, had no connection whatsoever to American Canyon. Since there is no substantial evidence Y.A.R. was involved with a criminal street gang in American Canyon, the probation condition barring him from going there cannot be justified as a deterrence against Y.A.R. engaging in gang-related activity.
Before the case was transferred, the Napa County Probation Department prepared a report, dated September 11, evaluating Y.A.R.'s suitability for deferred entry of judgment that contained conflicting information concerning Y.A.R.'s possible gang involvement, and no information concerning the suspected geographic territory of any such activities.
In it, the Napa County probation officer checked a "yes" box indicating that gang activity was "Suspected/Identified by Law Enforcement" but checked a "no" box as to whether gang activity was "Admitted by minor." The accompanying comments stated that upon getting booked into juvenile hall on May 28, Y.A.R. had "admitted being a Sureño gang member" and that the following day, while in juvenile hall, he was attacked by a Norteño gang member and "stated he did not fight back because he was afraid of getting in trouble." The report also noted Y.A.R. had burn marks on one of his hands that were consistent with a Sureño street gang symbol, but that Y.A.R. "stated he is not affiliated with any gang and made the scars himself when he was younger because he 'liked how it looked.' " It noted his older sister did not think he was involved in a gang, and thought Y.A.R. created the scars on impulse after watching YouTube videos because "he liked it." The report also noted Y.A.R. covered the scar up with a tattoo after the probation department inquired about it.
The Contra Costa Probation Department interviewed Y.A.R. several months later, and reported again that Y.A.R. "denies any gang affiliation." It noted Y.A.R. had no close relationships with people outside his family, and "has acquaintances, but prefers to be alone, as he does not want or need new friends." And, as noted, it did not recommend any gang terms.
There is of course "no exact formula for the determination of reasonableness" under Lent. (In re White (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 141, 148.) But unlike a condition proscribing particular conduct or the frequenting of specific places, "this condition is simply too broad" to have any reasonable connection with Y.A.R.'s future criminality. (Id. at p. 147 [striking down probation condition barring adult offender from three areas of city known for prostitution activity].)
For these reasons, we conclude that the geographic restriction imposed by the juvenile court is invalid under Lent and must be stricken. As a result, it is unnecessary to reach the constitutional issues Y.A.R. raises. That said, we see no impediment to limiting a stay-away order to the scene of Y.A.R.'s crime, as the probation department originally proposed. (See, e.g., People v. Petty (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1421-1422.) Indeed, Y.A.R. did not object below to that recommendation, nor does Y.A.R. argue now that such a limitation would be inappropriate. Therefore, the juvenile court will be free on remand to reconsider the probation department's recommendation in that regard.
DISPOSITION
The condition imposed by the court at the dispositional hearing on November 17, 2017, directing appellant to stay out of American Canyon, California is stricken.
The case is remanded to the juvenile court for an express declaration pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 as to the Penal Code section 69 violation, and for additional proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
/s/_________
STEWART, J. We concur. /s/_________
RICHMAN, Acting P.J. /s/_________
MILLER, J.