Opinion
E066647
01-16-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ADIEL XINOL-MENDEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Elizabeth M. Kuchar, and Minh U. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. FVI1501652) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Victor R. Stull, Judge. Affirmed. Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Elizabeth M. Kuchar, and Minh U. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Adiel Xinol-Mendez violated the probation condition requiring him, as a homeless probationer, to report daily in person—Monday through Friday between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m.—to his probation officer. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court's finding he violated probation must be reversed because it was based on a facially unconstitutional probation condition. Specifically, defendant asserts the condition requiring him, as a homeless probationer, to report daily in person violates the right of homeless probationers to travel, to obtain employment, and to be free from arbitrary and oppressive official action. We reject defendant's contentions and affirm the judgment.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The factual background of defendant's underlying criminal conduct is taken from the probation report.
On July 5, 2013, two individuals were walking through a park in Placentia when two male subjects (subject one and subject two) approached them from behind. Subject one told the victims to turn around and asked them if they had drugs. When the victims stated they did not have any drugs, subject one told them to empty their pockets and give them what they had. Subject two pulled a red hammer from the front pocket of his hoodie and held it with his right hand. Fearing both subjects would attack them, one of the victims gave subject one an iPhone and the other gave him $13. After subject one took the victims' property, subject one asked if they were at the park to tag the park and explained that he and his gang owned the park and that it was taxed. Subject one eventually told the victims to leave the park.
On July 11, 2013, while conducting a foot patrol of a local school in regards to homeless subjects sleeping on school grounds, officers made contact with a male subject, later identified as defendant. After defendant was informed he was trespassing on school grounds, defendant stated he understood but that he was homeless and had nowhere to go. Defendant also told the officers he was on probation for burglary and had prior arrests for possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Defendant also reported that he had been sleeping at the school for about a month at night and that he hung out at the local park during the day. Based on defendant's appearance and statement about hanging out at the park, a field lineup was conducted to determine whether the victims could identify defendant as one of the subjects of the July 5, 2013 park robbery. Both victims identified defendant as one of the suspects involved in the July 5, 2013 park robbery.
On February 3, 2014, the Orange County District Attorney's office filed an information charging defendant with two counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211 & 212.5, subd. (c)). The information further alleged that defendant had personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) in the commission of both counts.
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated. --------
On April 3, 2014, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of second degree robbery. In return, the remaining count and enhancement allegations were dismissed, and defendant was placed on formal probation for a period of three years on various terms and conditions, including serving 365 days in county jail.
On May 26, 2015, defendant's case was transferred to San Bernardino County pursuant to section 1203.9. On July 6, 2015, the San Bernardino County Superior Court accepted jurisdiction over defendant, and referred the case to the probation department for modification of defendant's probationary terms and conditions. On July 21, 2015, defendant's probationary terms and conditions were modified.
On June 14, 2016, the San Bernardino County Probation Department filed a petition to revoke defendant's probation, alleging that defendant failed to report to his probation officer in person immediately upon his release from custody and thereafter once every 14 days or as directed. The petition also alleged that defendant failed to comply with the probation department's reporting requirements for homeless probationers and defendant failed to keep his probation officer informed of his place of residence. The petition noted that after defendant reported he was homeless, defendant was directed to report daily between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. and that defendant never reported daily per homeless reporting instructions as directed. The petition further indicated that defendant had absconded from probation and his current whereabouts were unknown.
The trial court held a probation revocation hearing on July 27, 2016. At that time, defendant's probation officer and defendant testified. Defendant's probation officer stated that defendant first met with him on July 21, 2015, after his release from custody, and provided him with a residence address in Adelanto, California. Defendant was instructed to report monthly in person. On March 14, 2016, defendant came into the probation office, filled out a change of address form, and reported he was homeless. Defendant was thereafter informed that he was required to report in person Monday through Friday, between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m., in accordance with the probation department's monitoring policy for homeless probationers. Following the March 14, 2016 modification in defendant's reporting requirement, defendant checked into the probation office via electronic kiosk two times, once in March and once in April or May 2016. Defendant had not been checking in daily in person per his modified reporting requirement. Accordingly, on June 8, 2016, defendant's probation officer performed a "compliance check" for defendant at the old Adelanto, California address provided by defendant. Defendant's probation officer did not find any signs that defendant was living at this old address, and sought a warrant for defendant's arrest. Defendant's probation officer interviewed defendant on July 1, 2016, and asked defendant about his failure to report daily in person. Defendant claimed "he forgot."
Defendant testified that prior to the change in his reporting requirement on March 14, 2016, he had been reporting to the probation office every month. Defendant came into the probation office on March 14, 2016, and reported that he had been kicked out of his mother's home and that he was no longer residing at the Adelanto, California address he had previously provided. Defendant stated that he was "transitional." Defendant was instructed on the probation office's policy requiring homeless probationers to report every day, but claimed he was then told to "just check in every here and there for face-to-face." Defendant stated that, after March 14, 2016, he continued to report every month in person at the probation office, and claimed his probation officer was "never there" when he checked in monthly.
Following argument, the trial court found defendant in violation of probation for failing to report to probation as directed, concluding defendant's probation officer's testimony was "more compelling."
On August 3, 2016, defendant was sentenced to three years in state prison with 406 days' credit for time served. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on August 10, 2016.
III
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the probation condition requiring homeless probationers to report daily in person, Monday through Friday between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m., to a probation officer is unconstitutional. Specifically, he asserts the reporting requirement violates a homeless probationer's right to travel, right to employment, and right to be free from arbitrary and oppressive official action. For the reasons explained below, we reject these contentions.
A. Applicable Legal Principles
"When an offender chooses probation, thereby avoiding incarceration, state law authorizes the sentencing court to impose conditions on such release that are 'fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and . . . for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.' " (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 402-403, quoting Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j).) Thus, "a sentencing court has 'broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1.' " (Moran, at p. 403, quoting People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120 (Carbajal).) "If a probation condition serves to rehabilitate and protect public safety, the condition may 'impinge upon a constitutional right otherwise enjoyed by the probationer, who is "not entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as other citizens." ' " (People v. O'Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355 (O'Neil), quoting People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 624 (Lopez).)
Judicial discretion in selecting the conditions of a defendant's probation "is not unlimited." (O'Neil, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1355.) A probation condition is unreasonable and will not be upheld if it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the defendant was convicted, (2) relates to conduct that is not criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct that is not reasonably related to future criminality. (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379-380 (Olguin); O'Neil, at p. 1355.) "This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term." (Olguin, at p. 379.) Thus, as a general rule, "even if a condition of probation has no relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality." (Id. at p. 380.)
However, "[j]udicial discretion to set conditions of probation is further circumscribed by constitutional considerations." (O'Neil, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356.) Under this second level of scrutiny, if an otherwise valid condition of probation impinges on constitutional rights, the condition must be carefully tailored so as to be reasonably related to the compelling state interest in the probationer's reformation and rehabilitation. (Ibid.; People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937, 942 (Bauer); In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 (Sheena K.); In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910.) "The essential question . . . is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant's constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement." (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.)
Challenges to probation conditions ordinarily must be raised in the trial court or appellate review of those conditions will be deemed forfeited. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234-235 [extending the forfeiture rule to a claim that probation conditions are unreasonable, when the probationer fails to object on that ground in the trial court].) However, the forfeiture rule does not apply, and a defendant who did not object to a probation condition at sentencing may do so on appeal if the appellate claim "amount[s] to a 'facial challenge' " that challenges the condition on the ground its "phrasing or language . . . is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad" and the determination whether the condition is constitutionally defective "does not require scrutiny of individual facts and circumstances but instead requires the review of abstract and generalized legal concepts—a task that is well suited to the role of an appellate court." (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 885, 887.) Thus, a challenge to a probation condition on the ground it is unconstitutionally overbroad or vague "that is capable of correction without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court can be said to present a pure question of law" (id. at p. 887, italics omitted), and such a challenge is reviewable on appeal even if it was not raised in the trial court (id. at p. 889). To the extent defendant raises a facial challenge to the constitutional validity of the homeless reporting condition, the claim is not forfeited by defendant's failure to raise it below. (Ibid.)
"Generally, we review the court's imposition of a probation condition for an abuse of discretion." (In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143, citing Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121.) However, we independently review constitutional challenges to a probation condition. (In re Shaun R., at p. 1143.) Based on the foregoing, we address the merits of defendant's arguments below.
B. Right to Travel
Defendant argues the homeless reporting condition violates his constitutional right to travel. We disagree.
The right to travel and freedom of association are undoubtedly "constitutional entitlements." (Bauer, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 944.) But, as discussed, a probation condition may restrict these rights so long as it reasonably relates to reformation and rehabilitation. (In re White (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 141, 146 (White).) A probation condition that "serves to rehabilitate [the probationer] and protect public safety . . . may 'impinge upon a constitutional right otherwise enjoyed by the probationer, who is "not entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as other citizens." ' " (O'Neil, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1355, quoting Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 624.)
Here, the homeless reporting condition indirectly impinged upon defendant's constitutional right to travel because for purposes of convenience a homeless probationer may have to remain in close proximity to the probation office. However, as a probationer, defendant was " 'not entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as other citizens' " (Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 624); and, the condition reasonably served the compelling state interest in defendant's reformation and rehabilitation and also reasonably served to protect public safety by preventing future criminality. Defendant was a homeless recidivist offender with a substance abuse problem who committed a series of serious crimes. Demonstrating his unwillingness to remain law-abiding, defendant committed his current offense, second degree robbery, in July 2013 while he was on probation for burglary. In addition, when confronted by the officers, defendant admitted he was homeless, had nowhere to go, and had prior arrests for possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. After the case was transferred to San Bernardino County, defendant again became homeless. Defendant had demonstrated an unwillingness to seek help for his homelessness and apparent substance abuse problems. Defendant's underlying criminal conviction for robbery directly related to his homelessness. Thus, defendant's homelessness called for closer supervision of defendant.
The foregoing record establishes that the imposition of the homeless reporting probation condition was necessary to protect public safety, deter future criminality, and serve the compelling state interest in defendant's reformation and rehabilitation. Defendant's recidivist and violence-prone criminal behavior required the strictest probationary supervision. The homeless reporting condition allowed defendant's probation officer to provide such supervision by making contact with defendant in person during the weekdays in order to ascertain defendant's circumstances, such as where defendant was living, and if he was abiding by his terms and conditions of probation.
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the homeless reporting condition did not operate "to essentially banish homeless probationers from most areas of the county." Accordingly, the cases cited by defendant holding that banishment of probationers violates the right to travel are inapposite to the instant case and factually distinguishable. (See e.g., In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1084-1085 [condition that minor move to Iran to live with his parents]; Bauer, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 944-945 [residency approval condition gave probation officer the power to banish the defendant from living in certain areas]; People v. Beach (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 612, 621-623 [condition that the defendant relocate from the community where she had resided for 24 years]; People v. Blakeman (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 596, 597-599 [condition that the defendant absent himself from the county]; In re Scarborough (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 648, 649-651 [condition banished the defendant from county for a period of two years].)
In Bauer, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d 937, the trial court required, as a condition of probation the probation department did not propose, that the defendant obtain his probation officer's approval of his residence. (Id. at pp. 940, 943.) The probation report showed the defendant was living at his parents' home where he had always lived, he had had close family relations all of his life, he had no plans to leave his parents' home, and his parents were getting older and would benefit from his helping them with work around the house. (Id. at pp. 943-944.) The Court of Appeal ordered the residency approval condition stricken, concluding it was unconstitutionally overbroad because it impinged on the defendant's constitutional rights to travel and freedom of association without being "narrowly tailored to interfere as little as possible with these important rights," and it gave the probation officer "the power to banish him" from living with or near his parents. (Id. at pp. 944, 945.) Bauer is distinguishable because the defendant in that case, unlike in this case, was not a recidivist homeless transient prone to committing serious and violent crimes and suffering from an untreated substance abuse problem, and who required strict probationary supervision. As previously noted, the record demonstrates defendant's underlying criminal conduct directly related to his homelessness, and thus defendant required stricter supervision.
Defendant asserts that there were "alternative means for achieving the probation office's presumed purpose" requiring homeless probationers to report to their probation officers, such as report daily by telephone rather than in person, report in person daily at any time throughout the day rather than specifically between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m., report in person on a frequent but non-daily basis, such as once a week or several times a week. However, as explained, defendant here required strict probationary supervision, and the condition reasonably relates to defendant's reformation and rehabilitation. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that a homeless probationer has access to a telephone or cellular phone.
Moreover, requiring a specific time and day ensures consistency and provides a probationer with advance notice of what is required of him or her. (People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 751 [the rule of fair warning consists of "the due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing adequate notice to potential offenders"]; People v. Reinertson (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 320, 324-325 [A probation condition "must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated," if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness.].) Additionally, requiring a specific time and day would assist probationers in remembering the probation condition, especially homeless probationers.
Citing People v. Smith (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1245 (Smith), defendant also argues that the probation condition was not specifically tailored to the individual probationer because the San Bernardino County Probation Department has "a blanket policy of requiring all homeless probationers to [report to] their probation officers in person daily, Monday through Friday." The court in Smith held, "Probation conditions restricting a probationer's exercise of his constitutional rights are upheld only if narrowly drawn to serve the important interests of public safety and rehabilitation, and if they are 'specifically tailored to the individual probationer.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1250.) Defendant's individual probationer claim, however, does not raise a pure question of law. We cannot determine if the condition inappropriately restricts defendant's right to travel without a factual explanation from defendant, on the record, as to how the condition results in a constitutional violation as applied to his circumstances. This argument turns on the type of case-specific information that is only found in the record. The imposition of this condition is not "[a]n obvious legal error at sentencing that is 'correctable without referring to factual findings in the record[.]' " (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 887; see People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852.) The record in the present case is silent as to how defendant would be adversely affected by the probation condition. Defendant did not testify that he was unable to report daily in person between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. to his probationer officer due to transportation issues or because he was homeless. He also did not assert the reporting condition was onerous or that he was unable to comply with its terms for any reason. Instead, he simply told his probation officer that he "forgot" to report. He also testified that he believed he was required to report "every here and there for face-to-face." Yet, we have no explanation about why he would be unable to report to his probation officer on a daily basis.
In contrast, Smith involved a probation condition that barred the defendant from leaving Los Angeles County. The condition was often imposed on a defendant convicted of a sex offense. The defendant's job required him to leave the county on a regular basis, but the trial court refused to modify the order. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the condition impermissibly infringed upon the defendant's constitutional right to intrastate travel. While the condition was facially valid, it failed to take into consideration the defendant's specific circumstances, which made it invalid as applied to that particular defendant. (Smith, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th 1245.)
Similarly, the defendant in White, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d 141 was convicted of soliciting an act of prostitution. The defendant successfully challenged a probation condition that banned her from certain areas of "prostitution activity" by arguing that it was unreasonably restrictive because, among other reasons, the ban precluded her from using a bus depot and other basic services in that area. (Id. at p. 144.)
The existence or extent of infringement on defendant's constitutional rights as applied to him by the homeless reporting condition is an issue that requires analysis of the facts of defendant's individual situation on a case-by-case basis. This argument is not a pure question of law. Defendant could have objected to the condition at trial as applied to him. However, he failed to do so.
In any event, although defendant's probation officer testified the San Bernardino County Probation Department has a specific reporting policy for homeless probationers, there is no indication in the record to suggest the challenged probation condition was not specifically tailored to this defendant based on his criminal record. Here, defendant's extensive felony criminal record and substance abuse problems required a heightened degree of supervision. Moreover, the challenged probation condition was specifically tailored to homeless probationers, like defendant, based on the need to protect public safety, deter future criminality, and serve the compelling state interest in homeless probationers' reformation and rehabilitation. The probation term is clearly less restrictive than incarceration, and takes into account the fact defendant may not have had access to a telephone or cellular phone. Defendant's underlying criminal conduct was directly related to his homelessness, and the reporting condition reasonably relates to defendant's reformation and rehabilitation.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the homeless reporting condition did not violate defendant's right to travel because it enabled defendant's probation officer to effectively supervise him, it was reasonably related to both preventing defendant's future criminality and serving the compelling state interest in defendant's reformation and rehabilitation. (See Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 380-381 ["[a] condition of probation that enables a probation officer to supervise his or her charges effectively is, therefore, 'reasonably related to future criminality' "]; Bauer, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 942 [a condition of probation that impinges on constitutional rights will be upheld if the condition is carefully tailored so as to be reasonably related to the compelling state interest in the probationer's reformation and rehabilitation].) By committing his current felony offense while on a grant of probation, defendant had demonstrated that less restrictive conditions of probation were ineffective.
C. Right to Employment
Defendant also argues that the homeless reporting condition infringed on a homeless probationer's right to employment and was not narrowly drawn using available alternative means. Specifically, defendant claims the homeless reporting condition "effectively bars homeless probationers from taking the vast majority of jobs—which likely require employees to be present at a normal starting time such as 7, 8 or 9 a.m." He also asserts that a homeless probationer who is required to report in person every weekday morning at 8:00 a.m. "will probably not be able to be present at any job that starts before about 10 or 11 a.m." Defendant also claims the homeless reporting condition requires a probationer to "wait around to meet with the probation officer, and then travel to a job presumably by public transportation—since a homeless probationer probably cannot afford a car—if that job can even be reached by public transportation." Defendant's contentions are based on speculative inferences.
In People v. Burden (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1277, the defendant, who was working as a salesperson at the time, pled guilty to writing bad checks. One of the defendant's probation conditions barred him from work in outside or commissioned sales, and the appellate court reversed. (Id. at p. 1279.) The court explained that a condition relating to employment "must be 'necessary to serve the dual purpose of rehabilitation and public safety' " and the condition was an "unnecessary infringement upon [the defendant's] right to work." (Id. at p. 1281.) Here, as previously explained, the homeless reporting condition facilitated defendant's supervision and rehabilitation, and he was not prohibited from working in a particular industry or job. Defendant was merely required to report to his probation officer in person on weekdays between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest defendant had or even sought employment or that his probation officer withheld permission from working during the reporting time frame. At the probation revocation hearing, defendant did not claim the reporting condition was too onerous or that he could not comply with the condition because he was looking for employment.
Here, again, defendant's serious felony criminal record required a heightened degree of supervision. The record demonstrates defendant's underlying criminal conduct was directly related to his homelessness. Defendant's homeless reporting condition was not arbitrary in that it did not bar him from seeking employment. Rather, the purpose of this condition was for defendant to have increased contact with his probation officer, restrict him from exposure to increased criminal temptations, and allow his probation officer more frequent access to defendant's whereabouts in order to facilitate defendant's reformation and rehabilitation, given his history of recidivism. Furthermore, there was no evidence defendant was looking for a job. Under the circumstances of this case, the state's interest in defendant's rehabilitation was properly served by the homeless reporting condition and did not amount to a violation of defendant's right to employment.
D. Arbitrary or Oppressive Action
Defendant further argues the homeless reporting condition violated the constitutional right to be free from arbitrary and oppressive action. This claim is without merit.
It is well-settled that a probationer, like a parolee, retains basic constitutional protection against arbitrary and oppressive official action. (In re Taylor (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1019, 1038; In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1234 ["Parole conditions, like conditions of probation, must be reasonable since parolees retain 'constitutional protection against arbitrary [and] oppressive official action' "]; Terhune v. Superior Court (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 864, 874; Prison Law Office v. Koenig (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 560, 566-567; see also People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 753-754 & cases cited therein [arbitrary and oppressive parolee searches]; People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 691 [probation search cannot be arbitrary and oppressive].) However, courts have observed that "probation is a privilege and not a right, and that adult probationers, in preference to incarceration, validly may consent to limitations upon their constitutional rights—as, for example, when they agree to warrantless search conditions." (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 384, citing People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 506; People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 609 (Bravo); People v. Medina (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1580 ["a suspicionless search pursuant to a probation search condition is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment"]; People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 68-69 [upholding a probation condition requiring submission to alcohol and drug testing at the discretion of the probation officer]; Lopez, supra 66 Cal.App.4th at pp. 628-629 [upholding a probation condition prohibiting association with known gang members].) As previously observed, reasonable probation conditions may infringe upon constitutional rights, provided the conditions are narrowly tailored to achieve legitimate purposes, such as fostering the probationer's rehabilitation or protecting the public. (Olguin, supra, Cal.4th at p. 384.)
The homeless reporting condition was specifically designed to alleviate the difficulties in monitoring homeless probationers and ensured the probationers' compliance with the terms of their probation. Requiring defendant, a homeless probationer, to report in person to his probation officer every weekday between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. facilitated his supervision and rehabilitation, and did not amount to arbitrary or oppressive official action. The purpose of probation is to promote rehabilitation and foster public safety by reducing recidivism. (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 380.) Probation officers must have the ability to closely monitor their probationers to ensure compliance with the terms of their probation. (See Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 610.)
Defendant's homelessness, serious felony criminal record, and apparent substance abuse issues required a heightened degree of supervision. Defendant's homeless reporting condition was neither arbitrary nor oppressive. The imposition of the homeless reporting probation condition was necessary to protect public safety, deter future criminality, and serve the compelling state interest in defendant's reformation and rehabilitation, especially under the circumstances of this case where defendant's underlying conviction for robbery was related to his homelessness. Defendant's recidivist and violence-prone criminal behavior required the strictest probationary supervision. The alternative method of supervision, incarceration, would be much more restrictive than the privilege of probation. Therefore, the homeless reporting condition was reasonably necessary to effectively supervise and rehabilitate defendant and did not violate his right to be free from arbitrary and oppressive official action.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. McKINSTER
J.