Opinion
C094138
09-29-2022
In re X.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. X.F., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JV137507
Duarte, Acting P. J.
Victim Kindu Crosby was shot and killed on November 17, 2018, in Sacramento.
While investigating the murder the next day, police officers detained the 14-year-old minor, X.F., in Chowchilla, where they handcuffed him, put him in a holding cell, and later drove him to Sacramento in the back of a police car. They then questioned him for over an hour, beginning after midnight on November 19, 2018, without advising him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
The juvenile court denied the minor's motion to suppress as to the initial eight minutes of the interrogation. Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, during which the prosecution argued the admitted portion of the interrogation demonstrated the minor's consciousness of guilt, the court found the murder allegation and two associated enhancements for gun use and great bodily injury true. The minor appeals the juvenile court's adjudication, contending the court prejudicially erred in admitting any of the interrogation. We agree; accordingly, we reverse the true finding and remand for a new jurisdiction hearing, with directions to grant the motion to suppress the minor's statements in its entirety.
BACKGROUND
The victim (Crosby) and his girlfriend Ashley arranged to buy marijuana from Donte Walker. Walker told Ashley to meet him at an address in Sacramento. He picked up three males--the minor, Andre Robinson, and an unidentified man (front passenger)--and drove to the meeting location. Walker claimed Robinson and the minor had accompanied him to other prior drug sales. He testified that he drove, Robinson sat behind him, and the minor sat behind the (unidentified) front passenger.
After the two cars arrived at the designated location, Ashley walked from her car to Walker's car to complete the drug deal. Ashley got into Walker's car and the rear passenger (identified as the minor by Walker) got out of the car. Ashley testified the rear passenger was wearing a black sweatsuit with a white stripe (also reflected in the surveillance videos admitted into evidence), was the youngest of the four males in the car, and appeared nervous. Ashley walked back to her car and told Crosby that Walker was very hostile and insisted on Crosby completing the transaction. Crosby took the money from Ashley and walked to Walker's car, entering it using the rear passenger door. The rear passenger then got back into the car and closed the door. About 10 seconds later, Walker jumped from the front driver's side of the car and opened the rear driver's side door, then three more males, including the rear passenger, jumped out of Walker's car, quickly dragged Crosby out of the car, and left him lying in the street as they drove away.
Ashley did not see what happened in Walker's car as she was not watching; she heard some scuffling noises and then a loud pop. A few seconds later, she heard someone yell, "Get this nigga up out of the car!" She saw the males jump out of the car, drag Crosby out, and leave him in the street. Crosby was shot in the right side of his head; the bullet went through his head and came out the left side, killing him.
A Sacramento police officer identified Walker's car. When Chowchilla police officers located the car in Chowchilla the day after the shooting, Walker and the minor were standing next to it. The minor was wearing a dark sweatsuit with a white stripe, clothing that matched the description of the rear passenger. Chowchilla police officers handcuffed and detained the minor, seized his phone, and placed him in a holding cell. Hours later, Sacramento police officers transported the handcuffed minor to Sacramento, and placed him in an interview room. We discuss the circumstances of the subsequent interview in more detail post.
Walker testified at the minor's hearing in exchange for immunity. He testified when Crosby got in the car he was positioned in the backseat between the minor, who was the rear passenger, and Robinson, who was behind the driver (Walker). Crosby pulled out the money and Robinson grabbed it from him and told him to get out of the car. As Crosby struggled for the money, the minor pulled out a gun and shot Crosby in the head. The front passenger said to get Crosby out of the car. They pulled Crosby out of the car, got back into it, and drove off.
The front passenger apparently ended up with the gun; per Walker "it was handed to the person in the front," as was the money. Walker dropped off Robinson and the front passenger near a community college campus. They took the money and the marijuana. Walker testified he did not stop them because they had the gun. According to Walker, the minor begged Walker not to take him home, so Walker brought the minor with him to visit his children and girlfriend in Chowchilla, where Walker said the minor cleaned the car at some point.
In closing argument, the People acknowledged there were credibility problems with Walker's testimony and told the juvenile court that his testimony was introduced only as corroborating evidence.
A defense forensic expert testified the shooter could have been positioned as the rear or front passenger. He acknowledged the shooting "would have naturally been more likely and easily conducted or performed from the rear passenger seat." This conclusion assumed Crosby was seated in the center backseat area facing forward straight ahead. If the positioning were slightly different or involved movement, there were scenarios in which Crosby could have been shot by the front passenger. Examples included if Crosby were facing the person to the driver's rear, or leaning forward and speaking with the driver. In the latter instance, Crosby would have been more likely shot by the front passenger.
Recovered text message exchanges suggested the minor was involved in a gun sale approximately one month before the shooting. Later text messages, days before the shooting, suggest the minor wanted to acquire a gun. On the day of the shooting, the minor texted Walker, claiming he had a gun and asking Walker to drive him to "the Heights" to commit a drug deal or robbery. GPS location points on both the minor's and Robinson's phones placed them at the scene of the shooting at the relevant time. A calendar entry in the minor's phone on the day of the shooting stated, "R.I.P. to the homie." The day after the shooting, there were various Internet searches on the minor's phone looking for information on shootings in Sacramento, and the user had opened news articles concerning shootings on November 18, 2018.
The People filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging the minor committed the murder of Crosby (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) with two enhancement allegations. The juvenile court found all allegations true and sustained the petition. The court committed the minor to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice, for a maximum period of confinement of 53 years to life.
The minor timely appealed on May 21, 2021. Record preparation and receipt were completed on March 11, 2022; the case was fully briefed on July 20, 2022, and assigned to this panel shortly thereafter. The parties waived argument and the case was deemed submitted on September 26, 2022.
DISCUSSION
I
Admission of the Initial Eight Minutes of the Interview
The minor contends the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting his un-Mirandized statements. He first contends the trial court erred in concluding the first eight minutes of the interview were non-custodial. The Attorney General disagrees. As we next explain, the minor has the better argument.
A. Additional Background
The minor filed a motion to suppress his statements at the Sacramento police station, given in the early morning of November 19, 2018, as the product of an un-Mirandized custodial interrogation. The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing the minor was not in custody.
1. Hearing on the Motion to Suppress -- Testimony and Video
Sergeant Ayers, the interviewing officer, testified at the suppression hearing. Prior to the interview, police had identified Walker and the car at the shooting. At approximately 6:13 p.m. on November 18, 2018, Walker and the minor were located in Chowchilla, standing near the car. The minor was detained at the scene, transported to the Chowchilla Police Department, and placed in a holding cell. Chowchilla police officers told the minor he was not under arrest but was being detained, and they took his cell phone. A Sacramento patrol officer later transported a handcuffed minor back to Sacramento police headquarters in a black and white marked car.
Ayers first contacted the minor approximately six hours after his initial detention, at 12:30 a.m. The interview took place in a small room at the stationhouse and was video recorded. Ayers was not in uniform and had no visible firearm. Ayers closed the interview room door and seated himself between the minor and the door. The minor was not handcuffed.
There was no public transportation in the area, the minor did not live nearby, and officers had not returned his cell phone, taken in Chowchilla. Ayers did not give the minor any Miranda advisements, did not contact a defense attorney, and did not contact the minor's family. Ayers testified that the minor was being interviewed as a witness. According to Ayers, the minor became a suspect approximately 10 minutes into the interview when Ayers realized that the minor had been at the scene because he was wearing clothing (a dark sweatsuit with a white stripe) that matched one of the people at the scene of the shooting.
Ayers informed the minor he was not under arrest, that he was free to leave, or not answer questions, and the door was unlocked. However, Ayers did not dispute the minor's assertion that he was detained. During approximately the first 10 minutes of the interview, Ayers confirmed the minor's name, that he was 14 years old, and that he was on probation. The minor said his friend had taken him to Chowchilla. When asked the friend's name, the minor asked if he had to reveal his friend's name and said he would rather not. Ayers then said he would show the minor a photograph and the minor could just answer yes or no if that was the person who had taken him to Chowchilla. He showed the minor a photograph of Walker. The minor said he did not want to name any names and Ayers stated he would take that answer as a "yes." Ayers then showed the minor a photograph of a car and asked if they had driven to Chowchilla in that car. The minor gave no response and Ayers indicated he would take that lack of response as a "yes." Ayers asked if the minor knew why Ayers was talking to him and the minor shook his head no. Ayers asked the minor if Walker had told him what had happened, and the minor shook his head. Ayers showed the minor a photograph of Crosby and asked if he knew him. The minor said he did not. Ayers asked if the minor had ever seen Crosby before and the minor shook his head no.
Although neither Walker nor Crosby are referred to by name in the interview, in closing argument the prosecutor identified them as the subjects of the photographs shown to the minor.
Ayers showed the minor a map of the area where the murder was committed and asked if he was familiar with the area. The minor indicated he was familiar with the general area as he had gone to school there. Ayers asked if the minor had been in the specific area of the murder the day before. The minor said "no" and stated he had been in Chowchilla since Friday night. Ayers then stated, "so you went down there with your friend?" The minor nodded affirmatively. Ayers, pointing at Walker's photograph asked, "Him?" and pointing at the photograph of Walker's car, "In that car, Friday evening?" The minor again nodded. Ayers then discussed with the minor that they had gone to Chowchilla to visit Walker's sister, no one else drove with them, and they had stayed in Chowchilla.
The interview occurred early on Monday morning, November 19, 2018. The preceding Friday would have been November 16, 2018, the day before the shooting.
Ayers testified that at this point in the interview, he realized the minor had been at the scene because "it came into his memory" that the minor was wearing clothing that matched one of the people at the scene. Ayers then told the minor that on Saturday afternoon Crosby had entered Walker's car and then been dragged out of it, and Crosby had been shot in the head was "clinging to life." He told the minor the incident had been recorded on video, and that the minor was wearing the exact same clothing as one of the individuals that had been in Walker's car. Ayers again told the minor he was only talking to him as a witness. Ayers continued to suggest there could be a case against the minor and Walker and encouraged the minor to tell him what had happened. The minor did not respond. Ayers said he was going to step out of the room for a while, and the minor asked if he could use the bathroom. Ayers agreed, and told the minor he had to come back to the room when he was done. The minor then asked when he could go home; Ayers said it would be a while because the forensic team was going to photograph him and collect his clothing, but then they would call his parents to come get him.
Ayers acknowledged when testifying that at this point the minor was no longer free to leave. Nonetheless, he did not Mirandize the minor or contact an attorney for the minor. (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 625.6.) The interview then continued for approximately another hour. The minor was released to his mother after the interview and processing, after 3:20 a.m.
2. The Juvenile Court's Findings and Ruling
The juvenile court issued a lengthy written ruling granting in part and denying in part the motion to suppress. As relevant here, the court found the minor was "detained" by the police in Chowchilla at about 6:13 p.m. He "had been detained by law enforcement for about six hours" before Ayers' interview of him began in Sacramento. He was taken to a holding cell in Chowchilla until a police car arrived from Sacramento to pick him up; the driving time between Sacramento and Chowchilla was approximately two hours. He was handcuffed for transport to Sacramento and was placed in an interview room at Sacramento Police Department at 12:28 a.m. The court observed that "[t]wice during the first moments" of the interview at issue here, Ayers "made it clear to the minor he was not under arrest," but noted that "[t]he minor himself acknowledged officers in Chowchilla told him he was detained." The court noted that Ayers explained to the minor that "they detained everybody and brought you back," adding "[s]o, with that said, you're not under arrest."
The juvenile court found Ayers knew the minor was 14 years old at the time of questioning, and had confirmed there was no public transportation in the area, the minor's cell phone had been taken, and his family had not been contacted. When asked why he did not obtain counsel for the minor, given the minor's age and the applicable law, Ayers testified he had consulted the district attorney's office and was told "there was no need to provide counsel because the minor was not a suspect and not in police custody [he was only detained]."
The juvenile court appeared to credit Ayers testimony that "about 10 minutes into the interview, he realized the minor was at the scene of the shooting" due to his clothing, and at that point "the direction of the interview changed." The court found Ayers' "demeanor was calm, professional, and cordial" as well as "non-threatening" and neither "aggressive" nor "confrontational" throughout the interview. Ayers' "assurances at the start of the interview that the minor was not under arrest, that he was free to leave and did not have to answer questions and that the door was unlocked, appear to be genuine." The court also found that the minor "appeared . . . to understand and indicated he did not have any questions" and that "although there are periods of silence during pending questions" the minor's answers were "responsive and show he understood the questions."
Because the court granted the minor's motion to suppress the interview beyond that point, we do not detail the remaining findings except as relevant to the first portion of the interview.
After setting forth the applicable law, the juvenile court concluded as relevant here that "the weight to be given this initial statement by [Ayers] that the minor was free to leave is countered by the fact the questioning took place at the police station in what appears to be a small interrogation room." But the court opined that "[t]hrough his words and actions, the minor agreed to the interview" when he was told he could leave and did not, and was told he did not have to answer questions, yet he did; the court added that the minor did not "bring up" his lack of transportation, the early morning hour, or his lack of cell phone, as "concerns" to Ayers. The court also opined that the minor's question to Ayers as to when he could go home "indicat[ed] that leaving the station was an option until he was told he had to wait."
Observing that the "main point of argument by the minor's counsel focused on the length of detention leading up to the beginning of the interrogation, rendering it custodial from the inception" and noting that "[a] six hour detention followed by questioning could be deemed sufficiently custodial to warrant Miranda warnings," the juvenile court nonetheless opined that a "common sense evaluation of all the circumstances is required here" and declined to find the six hours problematic. The court's reasoning in that regard centered around the fact that the minor had "fled" the scene of the murder and that "[l]aw enforcement cannot be faulted for an apparent long distance flee [sic] attempt by a suspect and witness." Seemingly for that reason, the court labeled the length of the preinterrogation delay "reasonable" and, without additional explanation, found the delay "not so oppressive or coercive as to create a custodial interrogation from the inception."
3. The Statements' Use During the Jurisdictional Hearing
At the jurisdictional hearing, the prosecutor played the first eight minutes of the interrogation, and submitted a transcript. The prosecutor argued the minor's statements in the interview demonstrated consciousness of guilt. The prosecutor argued the minor was "playing dumb" when he denied knowing what had happened and knowing who Crosby was, noting: "[I]f he was an innocent witness or the minor participant, this would be a chance to say what happened, instead of just playing dumb like he doesn't know what is going on."
The prosecutor went on to argue that when asked if he had been in the area of the shooting, the minor went from "playing dumb to actively lying," claiming he had been in Chowchilla since Friday. "And he knows the shooting was Saturday, so obviously he's trying -- he's lying, trying to say I wasn't even around this. I don't know what you're talking about." "So his statement, the Court can use it as consciousness of his guilt." In rebuttal, the prosecution again argued the minor "lied. That's consciousness of guilt. His version, when he . . . had the opportunity to say, hey this went down, I'm real sorry this happened, whatever you guys need, he didn't do that. He just said he wasn't there and then he flees to Chowchilla."
B. Analysis
"Miranda applies only to custodial interrogations, and whether a person is in custody hinges on whether a reasonable person in her or his shoes would feel free to leave." (People v. Delgado (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1104 (Delgado).) In making this determination, we consider the totality of the circumstances. (In re I.F. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 735, 759.)
As relevant here, the circumstances to be considered include but are not limited to: who initiated contact (here, law enforcement); where the interview took place (here, the stationhouse, to which the minor was brought in handcuffs at the tail end of a six-hour detention); and, whether there were restrictions on the minor's freedom to leave during the encounter (here, the encounter was in a small room with the officer positioned in front of the only door). (See In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 759.) Other factors worthy of consideration include: whether the express purpose of the interview was to question the minor as a witness or a suspect (here, the juvenile court found that during the portion of the interview at issue the purpose was to question the minor as a witness, and that purpose was conveyed to the minor); whether police informed the minor that he was under arrest or in custody (here, Ayers told the minor he was not under arrest, although both agreed that at least up until that time he had been "detained," and Ayers did not tell him he was no longer "detained"); whether police informed the minor he was free to terminate the interview and leave at any time (here, they did); how long the interrogation lasted (here, the relevant portion lasted approximately 10 minutes); how many police officers participated (one); and whether the minor was arrested at the end of the interrogation (he was not). (See ibid.)
Other factors to consider include whether the minor voluntarily agreed to an interview (here, although he did not ask to leave, he was brought to the room against his will and did not expressly agree to be interviewed; indeed, for the most part, he would not answer Ayers' questions); whether the minor's conduct indicated an awareness that he was free to leave (here, the minor's request for permission to use the bathroom as well as his query as to when he could go home would appear to indicate he lacked such awareness); whether the police dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation (here, a review of the video reveals that Ayers was by far the most active participant in the interview, and dominated and controlled the questioning); whether the police manifested a belief that the minor was culpable and they had evidence to prove it (here, Ayers made it clear to the minor that he believed the minor knew something about the murder, telling him he would assume the answer was yes if the minor did not answer when asked to identify key players); whether the police were aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory (here, Ayers was not), and whether the police used interrogation techniques to pressure the minor (here, because the trial court found Ayers was sincere in his belief that the minor was merely a witness and was not in custody, we will not consider Ayers' expression of these beliefs to the minor to be "techniques"). (See In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 759.)
Where, as here, the person is a minor and the officer was aware of that fact, we also take the juvenile's age into consideration when determining whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave under the same circumstances. (Delgado, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 1104.) In reviewing a trial court's "decision on a Miranda issue, we accept the trial court's determination of disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence, but we independently decide whether the challenged statements were obtained in violation of Miranda." (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 586.)
Although the trial court excused the six hour detention as "reasonable" and apparently declined to consider it as a factor in the question of whether a reasonable 14-year-old boy would have considered himself free to leave under the circumstances of the minor's interrogation here, we find it highly significant. For the six hours preceding his interview, the minor was undeniably in police custody, and was brought against his will (handcuffed in a police car) to the stationhouse after midnight--with no ability to contact family or friends and no access to public transportation--and put into an interview room with no evidence presented that he was given any choice in the matter. Then Ayers came into the room, shut the door behind him and sat between the minor and the only door to the room. All of this occurred before Ayers informed the minor the door was unlocked and he was free to leave.
We agree with the minor that whether the six hours preceding that advisement was "reasonable" or who could be "faulted" is not relevant to the analysis of whether the length and custodial nature of the pre-interrogation delay would cause a reasonable 14-year old to doubt that he was "free to leave" even after being told he was. Contrary to the Attorney General's argument, the juvenile court did not link its reasonableness finding to its finding that the delay was "not so oppressive or coercive as to create a custodial interrogation from the inception" in any meaningful fashion. Indeed, the latter finding appears completely unsupported by any factual findings made by the court in its written ruling. No precise findings were made about the details of the happenings during those six hours and, importantly, the effect the many hours in custody may have had on the minor.
The cases on which the Attorney General relies, including our decision in Delgado, are inapposite. Indeed, we agree with the minor that our decision in Delgado supports a conclusion in his favor. Delgado had been detained for an hour and a half prior to being unshackled and told he was "free to leave"; this court held that despite that advisement there were "lingering indicia of custody that must be factored in to the reasonable-person calculus." (Delgado, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105.) These indicia included the fact that Delgado's cell phone was taken from him and he would need to stay to retrieve it. (Ibid.) Although not entirely on point to the minor's situation, our holding in Delgado is more supportive of his position than it is of the Attorney General's.
The fact that the minor did not expressly mention his lack of a phone, transportation, and the late hour as "concerns" to Ayers is likewise irrelevant. He was not offered a ride home or even a chance to call for a ride; he was merely told he was "free to leave." The test is an objective one; we do not see how a reasonable 14 year old would not be concerned about his actual ability to walk out of the police station at 12:30 a.m. if he were in the minor's situation. No findings were articulated as to the distance between the police station at which the minor was interviewed and his home.
Although the juvenile court concluded that the minor's question to Ayers as to when he could go home suggested he understood from the beginning of the interview that he could end the interview and leave any time, we disagree. As we have set forth in detail above, the minor first asked permission to go to the bathroom and was told to return to the room after he was done; he then asked when he could go home. This exchange suggests the minor knew Ayers was in control from the outset.
Given the interplay and combined effect of all of the circumstances we have discussed, "no reasonable person, whether adult or juvenile, would have felt free to leave at that time." (Delgado, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105.) As the minor was 14 years old and in police custody, Ayers was required to provide him a consultation with legal counsel (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 625.6) and Mirandize him before interviewing him. Therefore, all of the minor's unwarned statements should have been suppressed, including the first eight minutes of the interview, and the juvenile court's partial denial of the motion was error.
II
Prejudice
The minor next argues the error was prejudicial because the prosecution repeatedly relied upon his unwarned statements to demonstrate his consciousness of guilt, as well as because there was a lack of credible direct evidence that he was the shooter. The Attorney General responds that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence that the minor was the shooter was "strong and convincing." We agree with the minor.
"When statements are obtained in violation of Miranda, as they were in this case, the error is reviewed under the federal 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' standard set forth in Chapman [v. California (1967)] 386 U.S. 18. [Citations.] [¶] The People bear the burden of proving that the error was harmless under Chapman. [Citation.] In applying this standard,' "[t]he question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction."' [Citation.] 'To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the [trier of fact] considered on the issue in question.'" (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 781.)
We cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor's statements during the first eight minutes of the interview did not contribute to the juvenile court's finding he was responsible for the murder of Crosby. In closing arguments, the prosecutor emphasized the minor's statements and argued they demonstrated a consciousness of guilt. While the evidence that the minor was at the scene of the shooting was strong, the only direct evidence that he was the shooter came from Walker, a witness whom the prosecutor admitted lacked credibility. Further, the prosecution told the court Walker's testimony was offered only to corroborate other evidence. There was no other direct evidence that the minor was the shooter, rather than merely one of the men involved in the planned drug deal and aftermath of the murder. Although the evidence established that the rear passenger was the most likely shooter, there was also unrebutted evidence that with slightly different positioning in the car or movement by Crosby--which would be consistent with the struggle over the money to which Walker testified and the "scuffle" heard by Ashley--Crosby was more likely shot by the "unidentified" front passenger whom Walker testified ended up with the gun, drugs and money. In contrast, the minor apparently ended up with neither the weapon nor the spoils, which does not add support to the argument that he was the triggerman.
We cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor's statements in the first eight minutes of the interview were unimportant in relation to the other evidence. Nor can we conclude that their admission did not materially contribute to the juvenile court's finding. Accordingly, the People have not shown that the admission of the minor's statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 23.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and dispositional order are reversed and remanded with directions to grant the motion to suppress and conduct further proceedings as necessary.
We concur: Hoch, J., Renner, J.