Opinion
2012-03-8
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Lawrence A. WOODARD, Appellant.
Robert A. Regan, Glens Falls, for appellant. Kathleen B. Hogan, District Attorney, Lake George (Emilee B. Davenport of counsel), for respondent.
Robert A. Regan, Glens Falls, for appellant. Kathleen B. Hogan, District Attorney, Lake George (Emilee B. Davenport of counsel), for respondent.
Before: PETERS, J.P., LAHTINEN, KAVANAGH, STEIN and GARRY, JJ.
KAVANAGH, J.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Warren County (Hall Jr., J.), rendered May 27, 2009, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, coercion in the first degree and menacing in the second degree.
On the afternoon of April 21, 2008, the victim and defendant were talking outside his apartment when he invited her in for a visit. Shortly after they entered the apartment, defendant threatened the victim with a kitchen knife and, while he held her about the neck, forced her to walk down the hallway into his bedroom. There, he ordered the victim to disrobe, grabbed her by the hair, pulling some of it from her head and, after he undressed, sexually assaulted her. Later, the victim told defendant that she needed to be with her son who was about to report for military duty and promised to return to the apartment if he would let her leave. Once outside the apartment, the victim called 911 and the police immediately responded. When the police did not find defendant in his apartment, they searched it pursuant to a search warrant and seized kitchen knives, as well as hair samples found in the bedroom. Later that evening, defendant was arrested after he returned to the apartment and was subsequently incarcerated in the county jail. There, the clothes he was wearing when arrested were secured by jail personnel and later taken by the police in connection with their investigation.
On April 28, 2008, defendant was charged by indictment with, among other things, criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, menacing in the second degree and coercion in the first degree. After a jury trial, he was convicted of these crimes and, on his conviction for sexual assault in the first degree, he received the maximum sentence of 25 years in prison and 25 years of postrelease supervision. Lesser sentences, all of which were directed to run concurrently, were imposed for his other convictions. Defendant now appeals.
Initially, defendant claims that his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated ( see CPL 30.30[1][a] ). We disagree. The People had six months after the indictment was filed on April 28, 2008 to announce they were ready for trial ( see CPL 30.30[1][a]; 1.20[17]; People v. Swan, 90 A.D.3d 1146, 1147 n., 934 N.Y.S.2d 583 [2011] ). Two days later, defendant was arraigned and defense counsel requested that County Court initiate proceedings to determine if defendant was competent to stand trial ( see CPL art. 730). After the court issued such an order on May 6, 2008, defendant filed an omnibus motion that, among other things, challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence submitted to the grand jury, and requested that the grand jury minutes be provided to the court for its inspection. Shortly after defendant filed this motion, two psychiatrists submitted reports to the court indicating that they had found defendant incompetent to proceed to trial. The People took the position that as long as a question existed concerning defendant's competency, they were not required to respond to the omnibus motion unless so ordered by the court. A hearing was subsequently held and, in November 2008, defendant was found to be competent to stand trial. The People were then ordered to respond to defendant's omnibus motion and, on January 23, 2009, provided the court with the grand jury minutes.
Defendant claims that the delay in providing County Court with the grand jury minutes was chargeable to the People and, because more than six months had passed since the indictment was filed, his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated. When determining whether the People have satisfied their statutory obligation to be ready for trial within six months of the indictment being filed, certain time delays are excludable, including those that occur because proceedings had to be conducted to determine if a defendant is competent to stand trial ( see CPL 30.30[4][a]; People v. Lebron, 88 N.Y.2d 891, 893–894, 644 N.Y.S.2d 915, 667 N.E.2d 925 [1996]; People v. Williams, 41 A.D.3d 1252, 1254, 838 N.Y.S.2d 319 [2007]; People v. Boda, 28 A.D.3d 379, 380, 813 N.Y.S.2d 89 [2006], lv. denied 7 N.Y.3d 785, 821 N.Y.S.2d 815, 854 N.E.2d 1279 [2006] ). Here, almost five months passed after questions were first raised regarding defendant's capacity to understand the proceedings against him and the court issued its finding that he was competent to stand trial. Since that time period is not chargeable to the People, it is clear that they declared their readiness for trial within the statutory time period, and defendant's motion to dismiss was appropriately denied ( see People v. Lebron, 88 N.Y.2d at 894, 644 N.Y.S.2d 915, 667 N.E.2d 925; compare People v. Johnson, 42 A.D.3d 753, 754, 839 N.Y.S.2d 346 [2007], lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 923, 844 N.Y.S.2d 178, 875 N.E.2d 897 [2007] ).
Defendant also challenges County Court's decision to permit the People to cross-examine him at trial regarding his conviction for a felony assault that occurred in 1981. In that regard, County Court noted that defendant had a lengthy criminal record and, in its Sandoval ruling, precluded the People from cross-examining defendant regarding numerous other convictions that appeared on his record. Also, defendant was incarcerated as a result of this conviction, and remained in custody until three years before this incident is alleged to have occurred. Therefore, this conviction was not, as defendant contends, so remote as to have no value on the issue of his credibility as a witness at trial ( see People v. Wilson, 78 A.D.3d 1213, 1215–1216, 910 N.Y.S.2d 276 [2010], lv. denied 16 N.Y.3d 747, 917 N.Y.S.2d 628, 942 N.E.2d 1053 [2011]; People v. Rosa, 47 A.D.3d 1009, 1010, 850 N.Y.S.2d 234 [2008], lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 816, 857 N.Y.S.2d 49, 886 N.E.2d 814 [2008] ). Also, the court instructed the jury that evidence of this conviction was not proof of defendant's guilt and restricted cross-examination so that the jury was not informed that this conviction was for a sexual assault ( see People v. Smith, 63 A.D.3d 1301, 1304, 880 N.Y.S.2d 760 [2009], lvs. denied 13 N.Y.3d 862, 891 N.Y.S.2d 697, 920 N.E.2d 102 [2009] ). As a result, the court's Sandoval ruling represented a measured attempt to strike an appropriate balance between the People's right to cross-examine defendant about prior bad acts that were relevant in assessing his credibility and defendant's right to a fair trial.
Defendant also claims that County Court improperly denied his motion to suppress the clothing that had been taken from him while at the county jail. As previously noted, prior to defendant's arrest, the police obtained a search warrant for his apartment authorizing the seizure of, among other things, “personal items of [the defendant], including but not limited to articles used for grooming, and clothing items, including black dress pants, blue short sleeve button up shirt and white brief style underwear.” Defendant was not arrested until after the police had completed their search of the premises and had left the apartment. Later that evening, they took defendant into custody and noted that, at that time, he was wearing black pants and a khaki button up shirt. These clothes were taken from defendant by jail personnel and stored with his other belongings at the county jail. The day after he was taken into custody, the police, without a warrant, seized this clothing in connection with their investigation, and a hair sample found on it was subjected to DNA analysis.