Opinion
SC: 164337 COA: 355299.
03-10-2023
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Justin Scott WITKOSKI, Defendant-Appellant.
Order
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 3, 2022 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, there being no majority in favor of granting leave to appeal or taking other action.
Viviano, J. (dissenting).
The Court today forgoes an opportunity to consider whether MCL 780.131(1) and MCL 780.133 have any meaningful limitations when courts cause delay in bringing to trial prisoners subject to those statutory provisions. The first provision requires that when there are pending charges against an inmate of a state prison, "the inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after" the Michigan Department of Corrections provides a written notice and request for final disposition of the charges to the local prosecutor. MCL 780.131(1). In the event that "action is not commenced on the matter" within the 180-day period, the trial court loses jurisdiction and must dismiss the charges with prejudice. MCL 780.133. In the present case, the prisoner was not brought to trial within 180 days of the notice and it appears that neither the prosecutor nor the trial court stood ready for trial within that period. The situation is perhaps starker in another case currently before the Court, People v Franklin (Docket No. 164066, 2023 WL 2454457), in which the arraignment had not even occurred with the 180-day window. The Court of Appeals in Franklin and in the present case nevertheless held that the statutory provisions were satisfied, in large part because this Court entered administrative orders suspending criminal trials during the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Our orders thus delayed the trials for months.
This provision does not apply to charges for offenses committed by the inmate while incarcerated in the state prison or after the inmate has escaped and before he or she has been returned to the prison. MCL 780.131(2).
The questions that arise are whether courts (and the court system as a whole, as represented by this Court's administrative orders) have an obligation under MCL 780.131(1) and 780.133 to ensure compliance with time limitations in those statutory sections and, if so, whether court-caused delays can ever be excusable. We have never resolved these questions, although we have discussed them. In People v Lown, 488 Mich. 242, 794 N.W.2d 9 (2011), we noted that "[t]he Court of Appeals has observed that the `burden imposed' by MCL 780.131 and MCL 780.133 `rests as much upon the court as upon the prosecutor' because `the scheduling of cases is not controlled by the prosecutor.'" Id. at 259, 794 N.W.2d 9, quoting People v Wolak, 153 Mich.App. 60, 65, 395 N.W.2d 240 (1986). The Court gave somewhat inconsistent signals, however, on whether docket congestion was relevant to the analysis.
Compare Lown, 488 Mich. at 259, 794 N.W.2d 9 ("But, to the extent that docket congestion could be relevant, clearly the congestion here was generally explained and excusable."); with id. at 263, 794 N.W.2d 9 ("Certainly, delays attributable to the prosecutor or the court both within and after the 180-day period may be relevant to whether delay beyond the period is inexcusable or whether the prosecutor lacked an evident intent to bring the case to trial promptly. Accordingly, a court may find it necessary to consider the causes of delay."). An exchange between the majority and dissent on this point should also be mentioned. In her dissent, Justice KELLY asserted that ignoring court-caused delays would "strip[] the 180-day requirement of any practical meaning." Id. at 282, 794 N.W.2d 9. In a footnote responding to this assertion, the majority stated that it "[did] not hold that inexcusable docket congestion or other causes of delay not directly attributable to the prosecutor [were] irrelevant to the inquiry. Rather, as discussed, the docket congestion here was explained and excusable." Id. at 271, 794 N.W.2d 9 n 55.
The Court also suggested that whether the defendant consented to the delays may be relevant. See id. at 259-260, 794 N.W.2d 9 ("Finally, defendant did not object—and often explicitly consented—to the adjournments attributable to docket congestion. Accordingly, even if the court was responsible for delaying the proceedings after action was commenced, first, the record does not reflect that the delays were unexplained or without reason in the context of this case, and, second, defendant waived or forfeited any error in this regard.").
Some clarity on these points is needed. When is docket delay relevant to the analysis? Can it be excusable and, if so, what is the standard for making this determination? See People v Schinzel (On Remand), 97 Mich.App. 508, 511-512, 296 N.W.2d 85 (1980) ("The delay in the present case was occasioned by docket congestion in Detroit Recorder's Court. A delay which results from chronic docket congestion alone constitutes an inexcusable delay. People v Forrest, 72 Mich.App. 266, 249 N.W.2d 384 (1976). A delay which results from short-term docket congestion, attributable to exceptional circumstances which hamper the normally efficient functioning of the trial court, constitutes an excusable delay. [Id.] at 273, 249 N.W.2d 384, ABA Standards, Speedy Trial, § 2.3(b) (1968), People v Asher, 32 Mich.App. 380, 189 N.W.2d 148 (1971). We find that the delay here falls within the latter category."). Are systemwide delays, like the ones caused by our COVID-19 orders, evaluated the same way? Was the pandemic an "exceptional circumstance" like the one referenced in Schinzel? Were the court closures necessary? In this regard, it is certainly noteworthy that the federal court with jurisdiction over Kent and Muskegon Counties (where the Witkoski and Franklin trial courts are located) remained open for jury trials. See People v Witkoski, ___ Mich App ___, 2022 WL 627018 (2022) (Docket No. 355299), slip op. at 5 (noting that the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan "remained open for jury trials, but subject to heightened Covid-19 safety measures. See, e.g., Administrative Order of the Western District of Michigan 20-MS-024; Administrative Order of the Western District of Michigan 20-MS-029; Administrative Order of the Western District of Michigan 20-MS-037," and that "[i]n such a circumstance, the prosecutor would have been expected to bring the case to trial promptly because a jury trial would have been permitted"). If our administrative orders were not necessary, would that affect the analysis?
I fear that the results below, and in Franklin, will allow courts to cause indefinite and prolonged delays in bringing to trial prisoners subject to MCL 780.131(1) and MCL 780.133. These statutory provisions arguably do not countenance such an outcome. I would therefore grant leave to consider these questions.
Bolden, J., did not participate.