Opinion
2001-00153
Submitted September 5, 2003.
October 6, 2003.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrus, J.), rendered January 4, 2001, convicting him of murder in the second degree and petit larceny, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (M. Chris Fabricant of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se.
Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Monique Ferrell of counsel), for respondent.
Before: FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, REINALDO E. RIVERA, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The trial court properly denied the defendant's request to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance ( see Penal Law § 125.25[a]). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant ( see People v. Moye, 66 N.Y.2d 887), the court correctly concluded that no reasonable view of the evidence supported such a charge ( see People v. Hon Do Lau, 255 A.D.2d 524). A rational jury could not have determined from the evidence presented that at the time of the shooting, the defendant was acting under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance ( see People v. Roche, 98 N.Y.2d 70; People v. White, 79 N.Y.2d 900; People v. Walker, 64 N.Y.2d 741; People v. Bussey, 295 A.D.2d 444; People v. Matthews, 220 A.D.2d 822; People v. McDonald, 199 A.D.2d 420).
The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his pro se supplemental brief, are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit.
SANTUCCI, J.P., KRAUSMAN, SCHMIDT and RIVERA, JJ., concur.