Opinion
352615
10-21-2021
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL BRUCE WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 19-003351-01-FH
Before: Stephens, P.J., and Sawyer and Servitto, JJ.
Per Curiam.
Defendant appeals by right his jury trial convictions of two counts of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d. The trial court sentenced defendant to 16 months to 2 years imprisonment on each count. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2018, Detective Patricia Penman of the Wayne County Sheriff's office re-investigated a 2006 criminal sexual conduct incident where no charges had been filed. DNA of the assaulter had been obtained in a rape kit performed on the victim when the 2006 incident occurred, but at that time there was no DNA in police files that matched that in the rape kit. The DNA sample was checked again in 2017 and, at that time, the sample came back as matching defendant's DNA. Detective Penman thereafter secured a valid search warrant to take a second sample of defendant's DNA, via a mouth swab, to confirm the match.
In December 2018, Detective Penman attempted to execute the search warrant and take defendant's DNA sample while he was in a holding cell at a Detroit courthouse. A Sheriff's Office deputy, Corporal David Loftis, handcuffed defendant, removed him from the holding cell, and had him stand against the wall next to the cell. When defendant was made aware that Detective Penman was there to take his DNA sample, he yelled that Detective Penman was not going to get anything from him. Defendant then pushed or shoved Corporal Loftis backwards in an attempt to get back into the holding cell and threatened the deputy. A second deputy, Elton Oliver, approached, told defendant to stop resisting and calm down, and advised that he had to submit to the DNA test. Both deputies were able to push defendant back against the wall, but defendant continued to struggle to get back into the holding cell. While the deputies were holding defendant against the wall, Detective Penman reached over one of their shoulders and performed the DNA swab on defendant.
Defendant was charged with two counts of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer relating to the above. After a jury trial, in which defendant represented himself, defendant was convicted on both counts. This appeal followed.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant first contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer. We disagree.
"This Court reviews de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence." People v Solloway, 316 Mich.App. 174, 180; 891 N.W.2d 255 (2016). The evidence is viewed "in the light most favorable to the prosecution . . ." People v Blevins, 314 Mich.App. 339, 357; 886 N.W.2d 456 (2016), and the reviewing court "must determine whether the evidence was sufficient to justify a rational trier of fact's conclusion that the evidence proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Solloway, 316 Mich.App. at 180.
The statute under which defendant was convicted, MCL 750.81d, provides:
an individual who assaults, batters, wounds, resists, obstructs, opposes, or endangers a person who the individual knows or has reason to know is performing his or her duties is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both. [MCL 750.81d(1).]
"Obstruct" is defined in MCL 750.81d(7)(a) as including "the use or threatened use of physical interference or force or a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command." MCL 750.81d does not provide a definition of "assault," but this Court has defined "assault" for purposes of that statute to mean "a sudden violent attack; onslaught." People v Morris, 314 Mich.App. 399, 408; 886 N.W.2d 910 (2016). And a "battery" for the purposes of MCL 750.81d has been defined by this Court as "the willful and harmful or offensive touching of another person which results from an act intended to cause such a contact." Id. at 410.
To convict a defendant of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) "the defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed, opposed, or endangered a police officer;" (2) "the defendant knew or had reason to know that the person that the defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed, opposed, or endangered was a police officer performing his or her duties;" and (3) the officers' actions were lawful. People v Quinn, 305 Mich.App. 484, 491; 853 N.W.2d 383 (2014). The statute "is designed to protect persons in the identified occupations . . . who are lawfully engaged in conducting the duties of their occupations, from physical interference or the threat of physical interference." Morris 314 Mich.App. at 411.
Corporal Loftis testified after he handcuffed defendant and removed him from the holding cell, defendant pushed him in an attempt to get by him and back into the cell and Deputy Oliver assisted him in holding defendant against a wall after defendant refused to comply with instructions. Detective Penman confirmed that defendant was pushing his body up against Corporal Loftis's body in an attempt to get back into the cell. Deputy Oliver also testified that defendant "almost tackled" Corporal Loftis in his attempt to get back into the holding cell. Deputy Oliver further testified that he ordered defendant to stop resisting and submit to the DNA swab and he did not do so, that he and Corporal Loftis restrained defendant against a wall, and that Detective Penman performed the swab while the two officers restrained defendant. While defendant testified that he never resisted or obstructed the deputies, a jury is free to believe or disbelieve any of the evidence presented at trial, People v Unger, 278 Mich.App. 210, 228; 749 N.W.2d 272 (2008), and in reviewing a matter for the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court "will not interfere with the trier of fact's role of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses." People v Kanaan, 278 Mich.App. 594, 619; 751 N.W.2d 57 (2008).
From the testimony presented, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that defendant assaulted, resisted, obstructed, or opposed both Corporal Loftis and Deputy Oliver, particularly given that the prosecution does not have to prove physical violence to prove resistance or obstruction; they can be established by the defendant's words or actions. Quinn, 305 Mich.App. at 494; MCL 750.81d(7)(a). The prosecution must also prove, however, that defendant knew or had reason to know the person he assaulted, resisted, obstructed, or opposed was a police officer performing his or her duties. We find that the prosecution did so here.
Corporal Loftis testified that he was in uniform the day of the incident. Prior to the assault, he approached the holding cell, handcuffed defendant, and told defendant to exit the cell. From this, defendant either knew or should have known that Corporal Loftis was a police officer. There is also sufficient evidence that Corporal Loftis's actions were lawful. He was acting pursuant to a valid search warrant, which had been signed that day by the judge whose courtroom Corporal Loftis was assigned to. Corporal Loftis testified that, prior to the execution of the search warrant, he examined the warrant, saw that it was properly signed, and concluded the warrant was valid. While defendant testified that he was not shown the search warrant until after the swab had been taken and attempted to attack the affidavit supporting the search warrant in his questioning of the officers, he did not establish that the warrant was actually invalid.
In addition, Deputy Oliver testified that he became involved in the incident only when it appeared defendant had pushed Corporal Loftis and that Loftis may be in need of assistance to get defendant under control. Defendant confirmed that Deputy Oliver was not initially by him and has posed no argument that he did not know that Deputy Oliver was a law enforcement officer discharging his duties. Deputy Oliver testified that he was in full uniform and had driven defendant to the courthouse the morning of the incident. Deputy Oliver further testified that defendant had made threats to assault he and Corporal Loftis prior to the incident at issue. As a result, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have convicted defendant of both counts of assaulting, resisting, obstructing or opposing a police officer.
III. JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
Defendant next contends that the trial court pierced the veil of impartiality by the comments it made during defendant's self-representation. We disagree.
"The question whether judicial misconduct denied defendant a fair trial is a question of constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo." People v Stevens, 498 Mich. 162, 168; 869 N.W.2d 233 (2015). However, defendant did not preserve this issue for appeal by objecting to the judge's alleged misconduct in the trial court. People v Jackson, 292 Mich.App. 583, 597; 808 N.W.2d 541 (2011). An unpreserved issue is reviewed for plain error affecting defendant's substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 763-764; 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). "To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights." Id. "The third requirement generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings." Id. If the three requirements are satisfied, an appellate court will use its discretion in deciding whether to reverse, and reversal is only warranted when the error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or the error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant's innocence." Id.
A trial judge's discretion to control the court's proceedings is broad, but not unlimited. People v Taylor, 252 Mich.App. 519, 522; 652 N.W.2d 526 (2002). The limit on the court's actions is that the judge may not pierce the veil of impartiality. Stevens, 498 Mich. at 170. "A judge's conduct pierces this veil and violates the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial when, considering the totality of the circumstances, it is reasonably likely that the judge's conduct improperly influenced the jury by creating the appearance of advocacy or partiality against a party." Id. at 171. Whether the trial court pierced the veil of impartiality is a fact-specific analysis that considers the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 171-172. In Stevens, the Michigan Supreme Court articulated a five-part, multi-factor test to determine whether a trial judge has pierced the veil of impartiality. Id. at 172. A reviewing court should consider:
[(1)] the nature of the judicial conduct, [(2)] the tone and demeanor of the trial judge, [(3)] the scope of the judicial conduct in the context of the length and complexity of the trial and issues therein, [(4)] the extent to which the judge's conduct was directed at one side more than the other, and [(5)] the presence of any curative instructions. [Id.]
Defendant complains of several instances in which he asserts the trial court improperly interjected into the prosecution of his case. First, at one point during defendant's cross-examination of Detective Penman (defendant represented himself at trial and was conducting the cross-examination of witnesses), the court told defendant he was not making any sense. The trial court's statement was made after defendant had stated, "But the thing about it, you know, the initial, the initial standards of probable cause is that at the time of the arrest and I don't understand how you use the same products and the same machines . . ." While defendant's question was difficult to understand, it appears that defendant was trying to understand why, when he refused to provide his DNA at a different proceeding a week earlier, he was not forced to provide it but at this incident was told he must comply. In any event, there is no indication that the comment of the judge influenced the jury, nor did it have any ultimate bearing on the matter before the jury.
Next, defendant started to ask a question of a witness in which defendant supposed he was a detective and, when he clarified that it was a hypothetical question, the trial court stated "I'll say." The comment was unnecessary and it is comments such as this that we would caution a trial court to withhold, in order to maintain the proper decorum of the court. Nevertheless, considering the trial judge's comment in context, we cannot conclude that this isolated and flippant statement influenced the jury.
Defendant next challenges the trial court's asking "what difference does this make?" several times during defendant's questioning of Deputy Oliver about how the holding cell door opened, as well as its follow up statement that "We can only spend so much time on which way the doors open." Defendant had been trying to clarify if Deputy Oliver could clearly see defendant's interaction with Corporal Loftis when taking into consideration the way the door, defendant, Corporal Loftis, and Deputy Oliver were positioned. However, Deputy Oliver had already clearly and specifically testified that he had full view of everything as soon as he stepped into the hallway where the holding cells were located: "As soon as you step into the hallway you can see . . .we just step out and you are right there with the full view of the hallway." Moreover, defendant was permitted to further clarify what Deputy Oliver saw and did so, asking if he observed Corporal Loftis putting handcuffs on defendant prior to removing him from the holding cell as well as what part of Corporal Loftis's body Deputy Oliver allegedly saw defendant hit. The nature of the judge's conduct here was primarily to promote the efficiency of the trial, which it had the discretion to do. See, MCL 768.29 ("It shall be the duty of the judge to control all proceedings during the trial, and to limit the introduction of evidence and the argument of counsel to relevant and material matters, with a view to the expeditious and effective ascertainment of the truth regarding the matters involved.") and MRE 611(a) ("The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.").
Defendant also asserts that during his closing argument the trial court made several improper statements. Defendant complains that the court admonished him that he was not allowed to speak about facts that were not in evidence nor he could not talk about documentary evidence that was not admitted as a trial exhibit. This is true and was proper on the court's part. Defendant spoke of several things during his closing argument, prior to the court's admonishment, that were indeed not "facts" or exhibits introduced at trial, including defendant's HIV status, his job as drug dealer, that the victim in his separate CSC case was a prostitute, and that the victim had been charged with filing a false police report. Upon review of the record, the judge's admonishments were proper and made to promote the efficiency of the trial proceedings by limiting defendant's tangents and diatribes regarding his other pending criminal case, and to keep the proceedings moving by limiting defendant's bringing irrelevant matters into his closing argument.
Next, defendant disagrees with the trial court's statement during defendant's closing argument that while defendant said he was not required to submit to the DNA swab he was, in fact, required to submit to the DNA swab as a matter of law. Prior to that, defendant made a statement during his closing argument that the search warrant for his DNA was "forced" on him and that he "had every legal right" to resist the warrant. Defendant also stated that the most potent DNA is blood, and that he should not have to provide incriminating evidence about himself. The trial court stated, "you have a complete misunderstanding of your rights and the law. And I can sort of understand that but I can't let you stand in front of the jury and misstate the law. You can't do that.... I'm the one who tells the jury what the law is, not you." Indeed, it is a court's duty to properly instruct the jury on the law, so that the jury may correctly and intelligently decide the case. See, e.g., People v Traver, 502 Mich. 23, 31; 917 N.W.2d 260 (2018). Moreover, there was no testimony or evidence presented at trial indicating that defendant had the right to resist the warrant requirement that he provide a DNA swab.
Lastly, defendant asked a hypothetical question in his closing argument as to why, when he was "on his way home," he would lie and commit perjury in a complaint he filed with the jail stating that it was actually the deputies that assaulted him. The court interjected at that point, "You're on your way home did you just tell the jury? Did you really just tell the jury you're on your way home?" Defendant responded that he was on his way "from my Pennsylvania case. I'm sorry, not from this case." While the judge's questions were unnecessary, defendant was stating facts that were not in evidence.
Viewing the challenged comments and questions under the five Stevens factors, 498 Mich. at 172, the nature of the judicial conduct in this matter (factor 1) was overwhelmingly to keep defendant from disclosing and arguing about facts from another pending case against him, belaboring topics that the court ruled were irrelevant to this case, and generally litigating the facts of the pending criminal sexual conduct case from which the search warrant was issued rather than the instant case. Next, while a reviewing court does not have the ability to assess the trial court's tone and demeanor firsthand (factor 2, id. at 172), the words themselves may reveal bias. Id. at 176. Here, the trial court was relatively patient with defendant's self-representation. We acknowledge that the trial court was, at times, sarcastic, and also injected unnecessary comments at times. Nevertheless, these were very limited occurrences during the course of a two-day trial. On the whole, the court's tone and demeanor did not appear to display bias towards defendant.
With respect to factor 3, the scope of the judicial conduct in the context of the length and complexity of the trial and issues (Id. at 172), this was a short, relatively straight-forward trial with issues that were not particularly complex. The scope of the trial court's intervention was essentially to limit defendant's questioning of witnesses to the topics relevant to the charges in this case and admonishing him to not discuss matters in his closing argument that did not come in as evidence at trial. Defendant, likely unintentionally, complicated the issues and the trial court simply attempted to limit the trial to the charges at hand.
As to factor 4, a reviewing court must assess "the extent to which the judge's conduct was directed at one side more than the other." Id. "Judicial partiality may be exhibited when an imbalance occurs with respect to either the frequency of the intervention or the manner of the conduct." Id. at 177. It is true that the trial court's interjections into the questioning of witnesses and closing arguments was limited almost exclusively to defendant. However, the frequency of the intervention and the manner of the conduct do not do not display judicial bias. There were a few somewhat inappropriate, sarcastic comments by the judge discussed above, and those were only directed at defendant. But most of the interjections were asking defendant to move on from questions that were asked and answered or were irrelevant to the proceedings. It is also notable that the trial court, at times, attempted to move defendant off of topics that were prejudicial to him. For instance, in one interjection, the court warned defendant that if he continued to make the facts underlying the search warrant for his DNA an issue, he may open the door for testimony on the results of the DNA test. The trial court again warned defendant during closing argument, when defendant attempted to admit the search warrant from this case and its supporting affidavit, that he may not want to do so since it contained incriminating evidence against him.
The last factor referenced in Stevens is the presence of any curative instructions. Id. at 172. The judge gave the following instruction to the jury:
However, when I make a comment or give an instruction I am not trying to influence your vote or express a personal opinion about the case. If you believe I have an opinion about how you should decide the case, then pay no attention to that opinion. You are the only judges of the facts and you must decide this case only from the evidence.
The given instruction goes directly to defendant's claim on appeal that the trial court was predisposed to defendant's guilt. And the instruction told the jurors to ignore any opinion that the court may have. "Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, and it is presumed that instructions cure most errors." People v Mahone, 294 Mich.App. 208, 212; 816 N.W.2d 436 (2011).
In sum, in considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court's conduct did not pierce the veil of impartiality. The only inappropriate judicial conduct consists of a few sarcastic, offhand comments by the judge, which appear to have been born out of frustration with defendant's inability to focus on the present case and which do not appear to have affected defendant's substantial rights, given the testimony at trial. Defendant thus falls short of meeting his burden in showing the trial court pierced the veil of impartiality.
Affirmed.
Cynthia Diane Stephens David H. Sawyer Deborah A. Servitto