Opinion
B300341
06-29-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANZYLON WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA212549) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Craig J. Mitchell, Judge. Affirmed. James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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In 2001, appellant Anzylon Williams was charged with attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit murder. During her trial, the court instructed the jury that it could find the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated if it found the attempted murder was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the target crime of assault with a firearm. (See People v. Wilson (Mar. 13, 2003, B156275) [nonpub. opn.] [2003 WL 1091052 at p. *2] (Wilson).) The jury convicted Williams of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The court sentenced Williams to 26 years to life in prison.
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of this court's 2003 unpublished opinion following Williams's trial. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
In 2018, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437). Among other things, Senate Bill 1437 enacted Penal Code section 1170.95, which permits a person convicted of murder under the felony-murder rule (subject to some exceptions) or a natural and probable consequences theory to petition the trial court to vacate the murder conviction and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1170.95.)
All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Williams filed a section 1170.95 petition in the trial court. The trial court denied Williams's petition, finding Williams did not establish a prima facie showing for section 1170.95 relief. The key question Williams raises on appeal is whether section 1170.95 applies to attempted murder. Consistent with the opinions issued by our colleagues in the Second and Fifth Districts, we conclude that convictions for attempted murder do not fall within the ambit of section 1170.95. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Shooting and Trial
We quote a portion of our summary of facts from our 2003 opinion. "The victim (Clark) had a live-in relationship with defendant Williams. In October of 2000, Williams told Clark that if she could not have him no one could and that (presumably if the relationship soured) she would kill him or have him killed. The following month, Clark ended the relationship and Williams moved out. Early in the morning on December 2, 2000, as Clark parked his car in a friend's driveway and got out, a car owned by Williams' brother (defendant Wilson) pulled up behind. Three people were in the car. Williams sat up from the back seat, pointed at Clark, and ducked back down. Wilson, the front passenger, got out of the car, hurled a profanity at Clark, and pulled out a hand gun. Clark ran. Wilson chased Clark and fired several shots, hitting Clark in the arm and left buttock. The culprits drove away." (Wilson, supra, B156275 [2003 WL 1091052 at p. *1].) Clark survived the shooting. (Ibid.)
An amended information charged Williams with attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murder with malice aforethought in violation of sections 187, subdivision (a), and 664; conspiracy to commit murder in violation of sections 182, subdivision (a)(1), and 187; and a firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022, subdivision (a)(1).
During the trial, the court instructed the jury: " 'If you should find the defendant Anzylon Williams guilty of [c]ount 1 based on this theory [aiding and abetting], then in order to find to be true the allegation pursuant to . . . section 664[, subdivision] (a) that the [a]ttempted [m]urder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agree that this allegation was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the target crime of [a]ssault with a [f]irearm." (Wilson, supra, B156275 [2003 WL 1091052 at p. *2].) The jury convicted Williams of attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder, found that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and found that in the commission of the attempted murder, a principal was armed with a firearm. The court sentenced Williams to an indeterminate term of 26 years to life in prison.
During her 2003 appeal, Williams argued the trial court should have "instructed that in order to find Williams guilty of premeditated attempted murder it must find that she indeed premeditated and deliberated," but "concede[d] that this argument was rejected in People v. Laster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450 . . . ." (Wilson, supra, B156275 [2003 WL 1091052 at p. *2].) This court affirmed the judgment. (Id. at pp. *1, *6.)
B. Williams Files Section 1170.95 Petitions
On February 4, 2019, Williams filed a section 1170.95 petition for resentencing using a check-the-box form prepared by Re:Store Justice, a cosponsor of Senate Bill 1437. (See Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 24, 2018, p. 1.) The People filed an opposition in which they argued Williams was not eligible for resentencing because she was not convicted of first or second degree murder and attached the minutes of the jury verdict and the abstract of judgment to their opposition. The trial court denied Williams's petition without prejudice.
On April 29, 2019, Williams filed another section 1170.95 petition, again using a check-the-box form. Williams did not check the box that she was convicted of first or second degree murder, although she checked both boxes later in the form indicating that she was convicted of first degree murder under the felony-murder rule and that she was convicted of second degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. At the hearing on her petition, the trial court stated, "[t]he court does not find that simply checking the box without making any factual representation as to the circumstances in this case satisfies the requisite standard of showing a prima [facia] case of entitlement to relief." On July 1, 2019, the trial court issued a minute order stating that Williams did not establish a prima facie showing that she was entitled to relief and denied the petition without prejudice. Williams appeals from the July 1, 2019 minute order.
DISCUSSION
A. Senate Bill 1437 Modifies Accomplice Liability for Murder
The Legislature passed Senate Bill 1437, effective January 1, 2019, "to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) "Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189 of the Penal Code, a conviction for murder requires that a person act with malice aforethought. A person's culpability for murder must be premised upon that person's own actions and subjective mens rea." (Id., subd. (g).)
Accordingly, Senate Bill 1437 amended sections 188 and 189. Section 188, subdivision (a)(3) limited the natural and probable consequences doctrine for murder, providing "[e]xcept as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime." Senate Bill 1437 also limited the felony-murder rule by adding subdivision (e) of section 189, which provides that "[a] participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in [section 189,] subdivision (a) in which a death occurs[, may be] liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2." (§ 189, subd. (e).)
B. Senate Bill 1437 Permits Petitions to Vacate Certain Murder Convictions and Seek Resentencing
The Legislature also enacted section 1170.95, which gave Senate Bill 1437 some retroactive effect. Section 1170.95, subdivision (a), permits "[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts" when a "complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine"; "[t]he petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial . . ."; and "[t]he petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019." (Ibid.)
The petition must include a declaration by the petitioner that he or she is eligible for relief based on all the requirements of subdivision (a), the superior court case number and year of the petitioner's conviction, and whether the petitioner requests the appointment of counsel. (§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(1).) The petition should be filed with the court that sentenced the petitioner, if possible. (Ibid.) Further, the petitioner must serve a copy of the petition on the district attorney, or on the agency that prosecuted the petitioner, and on the attorney who represented the petitioner in the trial court or on the public defender of the county where the petitioner was convicted. (Ibid.) Subdivision (b)(2) of section 1170.95 provides that if any of the information "is missing from the petition and cannot be readily ascertained by the court, the court may deny the petition without prejudice to the filing of another petition and advise the petitioner that the matter cannot be considered without the missing information."
Subdivision (c) of section 1170.95 states: "The court shall review the petition and determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner falls within the provisions of this section. If the petitioner has requested counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. The prosecutor shall file and serve a response within 60 days of service of the petition and the petitioner may file and serve a reply within 30 days after the prosecutor response is served. These deadlines shall be extended for good cause. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause."
The court must hold a hearing within 60 days after the order to show cause has issued "to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner had not been previously been sentenced." (§1170.95, subd. (d)(1).) "At the hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief, the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. . . ." (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Williams's Petition
1. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Williams's Petition Prior to Appointing Counsel or Issuing an Order to Show Cause
In her opening brief, Williams argued her petition "stated a prima facie claim for re-sentencing" and thus, "the trial court erred in summarily denying the petition." She claimed that under section 1170.95, the trial court could only deny her petition if it was missing information that was not readily ascertainable or if the petition, on its face, showed she was ineligible for relief. Accordingly, she argued, the court should have proceeded with the next steps, including appointing counsel who would advocate for the issuance of an order to show cause why relief should not be granted.
Williams failed to check a required box on the form. In arguing she made all necessary allegations, Williams cites her first section 1170.95 petition, filed in February 2019. However, Williams's notice of appeal states that she appeals from the July 1, 2019 minute order, which relates to her April 29, 2019 petition. We need not consider the effect of this omission from Williams's petition because, as we discuss below, we conclude that she is not entitled to resentencing relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law.
After Williams filed her opening brief, this district issued two seminal decisions interpreting section 1170.95: People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1138, review granted March 18, 2020, S260598 (Lewis) and People v. Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320, review granted March 18, 2020, S260493 (Verdugo). In analyzing the statutory framework of subdivision (c), Lewis held the trial court need not appoint counsel until after a petitioner demonstrates a prima facie showing that she falls within the provisions of section 1170.95. (Lewis, supra, at pp. 1139-1140 ["When the statutory framework is, overall, chronological, courts will construe the timing of particular acts in relation to other acts according to their location within the statute; that is, actions described in the statute occur in the order they appear in the text"].) Verdugo thereafter provided further analysis of the steps a trial court must take in evaluating a section 1170.95 petition. (Verdugo, supra, at pp. 327-332.) The Verdugo court concluded that subdivision (c) of section 1170.95 requires petitioner to make two prima facie showings. First, a petitioner must show she " 'falls within the provisions of this section' "—that is, that she is eligible for section 1170.95 relief—before the trial court appoints counsel and orders briefing. (Verdugo, supra, at p. 329; see § 1170.95, subd. (c).) Thereafter, the trial court is to evaluate whether the petitioner has demonstrated a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief before issuing an order to show cause why relief should not be granted. (Verdugo, supra, at p. 328.)
Lewis further held that in determining whether a petitioner established the initial prima facie showing of eligibility, the trial court is not limited to reviewing the petition. The court may also consider the record of conviction (Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1138), including the complaint, information, or indictment filed against the petitioner; the verdict form or factual basis documentation for a negotiated plea; and the abstract of judgment (Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 330, 331-332). "Allowing the trial court to consider its file and the record of conviction is . . . sound policy" because it will avoid misuse of judicial resources " 'when even a cursory review of the court file would show as a matter of law that the petitioner is not eligible for relief.' " (Lewis, supra, at p. 1138; accord, Verdugo, supra, at pp. 331-332, citing Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis Addendum to Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 2018, p. 1 [noting "potentially-major workload costs in the millions of dollars to courts to process and adjudicate petitions"; "[u]nknown costs to county District Attorneys' Offices and Public Defenders' Offices to litigate petitions for resentencing"; and "[u]nknown, potentially-major costs in the hundreds of thousands . . . to the millions of dollars to the [Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation] to supervise and transport inmates from state facilities to appropriate courthouses for resentencing hearings"].)
The Supreme Court has granted review in Lewis to decide (1) whether the trial court may consider the record of conviction in determining whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief under section 1170.95, and (2) when in the process outlined under that section the right to appointed counsel arises. (See Lewis, supra, S260598.) The Supreme Court also has granted review in Verdugo, deferring further action pending disposition of the issues in Lewis. (See Verdugo, supra, S260493.) However, Williams does not provide any argument that we should depart from Lewis's or Verdugo's holdings.
In her reply brief, filed after Lewis and Verdugo issued, Williams acknowledges that a petitioner must make two prima facie showings under subdivision (c) of section 1170.95. Relying on People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965, Williams also concedes the trial court may consider the record of conviction and "need not credit factual assertions that are untrue as a matter of law—for example, a petitioner's assertion that a particular conviction is eligible for relief where the crime is not listed in subdivision (a) of section 1170.95 as eligible for resentencing." (Id. at p. 980.) However, Williams argues that "[n]othing in the record [of conviction] contradicts the allegations [in her petition], or otherwise shows she is ineligible for relief." Thus, she argues we should remand with instructions that the trial court issue an order to show cause. We disagree. A cursory review of Williams's record of conviction readily reveals Williams was not convicted of murder, but of attempted murder. As we discuss below, section 1170.95 does not apply to attempted murder. Thus, the trial court could properly find she was ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law without first appointing counsel, ordering briefing, or issuing an order to show cause. (See People v. Drayton, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 980; Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 330-332; Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1138.)
Williams argues the trial court also erred in its reasoning for denying her petition. Specifically, during the hearing on Williams's petition, the trial court stated: "The court has received a boilerplate check-the-box form that the court has received over and over again from individuals in state prison seeking relief. The court does not find that simply checking the box without making any factual representations as to the circumstances in this case satisfies the requisite standard of showing a prima [facie] case of entitlement to relief." "Because we review the correctness of the order, and not the court's reasons, we will not consider the court's oral comments or use them to undermine the order ultimately entered." (Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1451.) An appealed order correct on any theory will be affirmed. (Davey v. Southern Pacific Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 330.)
2. Section 1170.95 Does Not Apply to Attempted Murder
" ' " 'As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute's words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.' " ' [Citation.]" (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.) " 'We must follow the statute's plain meaning, if such appears, unless doing so would lead to absurd results the Legislature could not have intended.' [Citations.]" (People v. Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1104, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S258175 (Lopez).) "If the statute's text evinces an unmistakable plain meaning, we need go no further." (Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP (2007) 42 Cal.4th 503, 508.)
Here, section 1170.95 unambiguously limits its applicability to "person[s] convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory." (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) Accordingly, each of the four appellate courts that have considered whether section 1170.95 extends to attempted murder has concluded the plain language of the statute and legislative history demonstrate it does not. (People v. Medrano (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1016-1018, review granted Mar. 11, 2020, S259948; People v. Larios (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 956, 970, review granted Feb. 26, 2020, S259983; People v. Munoz (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 738, 754, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258234 (Munoz); Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1104-1105, review granted.)
Williams argues that Lopez and Munoz were wrongly decided. However, the only arguments Williams offers in support of this contention are the same arguments soundly considered and rejected in Lopez and Munoz. First, citing People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59 (King), People v. Barrajas (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 926 (Barrajas), and other decisions, Williams contends remedial legislation should apply to attempted murder because it is a lesser-included offense of the completed crime. Williams next argues that interpreting section 1170.95 not to apply to attempted murder will produce absurd results contrary to the Legislature's intent because if she had been convicted of murder, her sentence could be vacated and she would serve a lesser sentence.
Williams spends considerable time in her reply brief discussing the Fifth District's analysis in both Larios and Medrano that Senate Bill 1437's amendments to sections 188 and 189 apply to attempted murder. (People v. Medrano, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1015-1016; People v. Larios, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 968.) While true that the Fifth District held the amendments to sections 188 and 189 apply to attempted murder, in considering whether section 1170.95 applied to attempted murder, both Larios and Medrano concluded it did not. (Medrano, supra, at p. 1018; Larios, supra, at pp. 968-969.)
As the Lopez court observed, King "involved a decidedly different situation in which a series of then-operative provisions of the Penal Code and the Welfare and Institutions Code, combined with prior decisions of the Supreme Court, on their face permitted a person under the age of 18 who had committed first degree murder and was tried as an adult to be sentenced to the California Youth Authority (CYA), while the same person who had attempted but failed to commit the same crime was not eligible for CYA, but instead was to be sentenced to prison. (King, [supra, 5 Cal.4th] at pp. 62-63.) Recognizing that this result made no sense, and reviewing the legislative history of the statutory change that created the anomaly, the [King] court explained, 'The clear legislative intent to make first degree murderers under the age of 18—and by extension those who attempt but fail to commit the crime—eligible for CYA should prevail over any irrational result caused by the amendment of different statutes in separate codes at different times for unrelated purposes. . . .' (Id. at p. 69.)
"Here, in contrast, we are not dealing with amendments of different statutes in separate codes at different times leading to an unintended result, but a single piece of legislation in which the Legislature unequivocally elected, both in the words it chose and its statement of purpose, to provide a benefit to one category of aiders and abettors prosecuted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine—those facing the lengthiest prison sentences—and not to others." (Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1106-1107; accord, Munoz, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 759 ["Senate Bill 1437's plain language is not the result of a disjointed series of amendments over time, as was the case in King, from which we might infer inadvertence or irrationality. Instead, the relevant provisions are contained in a single cohesive bill"].)
In Barrajas, the appellate court found a drug diversion statute applied to a defendant who had attempted to possess methamphetamine, despite the fact the statutory scheme listed possession, but not attempted possession, as a divertible offense. (Barrajas, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 930.) The Barrajas court observed, "it makes little sense to suppose the Legislature intended to exclude from diversion those persons whose efforts to acquire drugs were sincere but unavailing." (Ibid.) The Barrajas court explained that expanding the statue to apply to attempted possession was consistent with the legislative intent and sound policy. " 'First, diversion permits the courts to identify the experimental or tentative user before he becomes deeply involved with drugs, to show him the error of his ways by prompt exposure to educational and counseling programs in his own community, and to restore him to productive citizenship without the lasting stigma of a criminal conviction. Second, reliance on this quick and inexpensive method of disposition, when appropriate, reduces the clogging of the criminal justice system by drug abuse prosecutions and thus enables the courts to devote their limited time and resources to cases requiring full criminal processing.' [Citation]. There is no apparent reason consistent with this purpose to treat persons who attempted a divertible offense differently from those who completed it." (Ibid.)
In contrast, as the appellate court in Lopez observed with respect to section 1170.95, "the Legislature's decision to limit sentencing reform at this time to offenders in cases of murder is certainly rational. First, the gap between a defendant's culpability in aiding and abetting the target offense and the culpability ordinarily required to convict on the nontarget offense is greater in cases where the nontarget offense is murder, than where the nontarget offense is attempted murder or, in the prosecutor's discretion, aggravated assault. The Legislature could have reasonably concluded reform in murder cases 'was more crucial or imperative.' [Citation.]
"Second, the process created in section 1170.95 for those convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to petition the sentencing court to vacate that conviction and to be resentenced is not cost free. The staff of the Senate Appropriations Committee estimated, if 10 percent of the inmates eligible for relief under Senate Bill 1437 petitioned the courts for resentencing, additional court workload costs would approximate $7.6 million. The committee's report expressed concern that this increase in workload 'could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources.' (Sen. Com. [on] Appropriations[, Rep. on Sen Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 2018], p. 3.) Additional expenditures would also be required to transport petitioners in custody to and from court hearings. (Ibid.)
"In a world of limited resources, it is reasonable for the Legislature to limit the scope of reform measures to maintain the state's financial integrity. [Citations.]" (Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1111-1112, fn. omitted; accord, Munoz, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 765 ["balancing the costs involved, the fact the penalties for attempted murder are less severe than for murder, and the length of prison terms mandated for potentially relevant felonies, the Legislature could rationally have determined that extending Senate Bill 1437 relief to attempted murders would put too great a strain on state resources, while resulting—in most cases—in insignificant decreases in the sentences served for attempted murder convictions"].)
As to whether precluding attempted murder from the scope of section 1170.95 would be contrary to the intent of the Legislature and produce absurd results, the Munoz court explained "it is far from clear that interpreting Senate Bill 1437 to apply to convictions for murder, but not attempted murder, will always, or typically, result in longer sentences for the latter. Senate Bill 1437 does not mandate any particular punishment for either murder or attempted murder. The penalties for these crimes are prescribed in other statutes, and . . . the basic punishment for attempted murder is far less severe than that imposed for murder. [Citations.] Nor does applying the statute's plain language undermine the primary legislative goal of making punishment commensurate with culpability, because the punishment for attempted murder was already, prior to Senate Bill 1437's enactment, less than that imposed for murder." (Munoz, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 757-758.) That an attempted murderer could be punished more severely than a murderer "does not trigger application of the absurdity exception. The 'absurdity exception requires much more than [a] showing that troubling consequences may potentially result if the statute's plain meaning were followed or that a different approach would have been wiser or better. [Citations.] Rather, "[t]o justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute, the results produced must be so unreasonable the Legislature could not have intended them." [Citation.]' " (Id. at p. 758.) "The remedy for any potentially inequitable operation of section 1170.95 lies with the Legislature. If the Legislature concludes it is unwise or inequitable to exclude attempted murderers from Senate Bill 1437's reach, it has only to amend the law." (Id. at p. 760.)
DISPOSITION
The July 1, 2019 order denying William's petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. --------
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.