Opinion
C077581
03-17-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DELINA LYNN WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 11F07583)
Defendant Delina Lynn Williams stabbed Jessica Brock with a paring knife more than three dozen times in the head, neck, chest, and back, piercing her heart and spinal cord in the process. A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and found she personally used a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. She was sentenced to serve an indeterminate prison term of 25 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of one year in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support her first degree murder conviction on either a premeditated murder or a murder by torture theory; and (2) the trial court prejudicially erred and violated defendant's federal constitutional rights by admitting into evidence testimony regarding several prior acts of domestic violence committed by defendant under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).
Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
We affirm. As we explain, the evidence sufficiently established defendant's guilt of first degree murder based on a premeditated murder theory. We therefore need not determine whether the evidence was also sufficient to support the alternative murder by torture theory. We also conclude the challenged domestic violence evidence was properly admitted.
FACTS
Defendant's Substance Abuse and Accompanying Violent Behavior
Defendant began abusing alcohol in the late 1980's, shortly after she married a man named Glenn Teeter, and progressed to cocaine and methamphetamine a couple years later. According to Teeter, methamphetamine caused "[p]aranoia" in defendant and "anger if she didn't get her way." On multiple occasions during their marriage, while high on methamphetamine, defendant would become angry and physically assault Teeter when he did not accede to something she wanted, causing him to call the police several times.
Several years later, in 2004, defendant began an intimate relationship with a man named Robert Reichenberger. They lived together for four or five months that year. On one occasion during that period, while defendant was drinking alcohol, Reichenberger asked her to leave, causing defendant to throw several objects at him and hit him in the face. After spending several years apart, defendant and Reichenberger resumed their romantic relationship in 2010. They lived together for about six months that year. On multiple occasions during that period, while either high on methamphetamine or drinking alcohol, defendant resumed her violent conduct. One such incident resulted in a trip to the hospital after defendant stabbed Reichenberger in the ear with a paint brush. The other incidents were less dramatic, involving defendant hitting Reichenberger with her fist on one occasion and with barbecue tools on another. Defendant's violent conduct caused Reichenberger to call the police during two of the incidents.
Defendant's Relationship with Jessica Brock
Sometime in 2009, defendant entered a substance abuse recovery program. The program had two phases. Phase one involved living in a residential facility with "strict guidelines and requirements in order to stay there," foremost among them was to stay sober. This phase provided the patients with "one-on-one" counseling sessions with the program's director, Carina Johnston, during which an individualized recovery plan would be created. After completing phase one, a patient would graduate to phase two, a "less restrictive . . . transitional living" facility. Defendant did not successfully complete phase one on her first attempt. As previously mentioned, she resumed her relationship with Reichenberger in 2010 and also resumed her drug abuse. Defendant returned to the program in August 2010, successfully completed phase one this time around, entered phase two in January 2011, and moved out of that transitional facility in May 2011.
Brock also had a substance abuse problem. She entered the same recovery program in December 2009 and also failed to complete phase one on her first attempt. Brock returned to the program in June 2010, successfully completed phase one, and moved out of the phase two transitional facility in February 2011. Johnston described her relationship with Brock in the following terms: "Brock had a hard childhood and did not have people in her life that cared significantly about her. And when she was in the structured recovery home, she received a lot of unconditional love there and care, and she looked at me as if I were a parental figure. And I think more so than some of the other residents because it was something that she had not received in the past." After Brock left the program, she sent periodic text messages to Johnston in an effort to prevent their relationship from ending. Defendant also reached out to Johnston on occasion, but not nearly as often as Brock.
While the record is unclear as to whether defendant and Brock knew each other prior to their overlapping time in the recovery program, they were friends by the time they left the program. After defendant moved out of the phase two facility, she lived with a man named Garrett Kegel until she relapsed in September 2011, at which point she moved out of Kegel's house and alternated between three places to stay, one of which was Brock's apartment. Between September and the end of October, when defendant stabbed Brock to death, the two were using methamphetamine together on a regular basis.
During the two to four weeks prior to the murder, Brock sent four or five text messages to Johnston about defendant "getting violent and beating her up." One text message from Brock said defendant "punched her in the face." During a subsequent phone call, Johnston told Brock to "stay away from [defendant], that the two of them together was a horrible relationship" and "not healthy." As Johnston explained, both defendant and Brock had "explosive tempers," clarifying Brock was "explosive with her mouth" rather than physically violent. And while Johnston never saw defendant become physically violent during her time in the program, she described defendant as "a bully" who "tried to get her own way." Another text message from Brock, sent on another occasion, said defendant "beat her up, [and] stole her cell phone and her car keys." During a subsequent phone call, Brock seemed "frantic" and added that defendant stole her car. Johnston again told Brock her relationship with defendant was not healthy and added, in irritation, "If [defendant] stole your car, just call the cops." While Johnston was concerned about the allegations of violence, she was also "fed up with the relationship" between defendant and Brock and "chalked it up to two tweakers just doing what they do."
The Murder
On the night of October 24, 2011, or early the next morning, defendant and Brock got into an argument at Brock's apartment over the latter's relationship with Johnston. During the argument, defendant stabbed her friend more than three dozen times with a paring knife. Brock was stabbed at least 15 times in the back of her head and upper neck, at least 5 times in her back, 4 times in her shoulders, 4 times in her chest area, and received another 11 defensive stab wounds to her hands and arms. Two of the knife blows to Brock's chest pierced her heart. One of the blows to the back of her neck likely severed her spinal cord, which would have caused immediate paralysis. While the forensic pathologist who conducted Brock's autopsy could not delineate the precise order in which the stab wounds were inflicted, she was able to opine the wounds to the front of Brock's body were likely inflicted first, providing her with the opportunity to attempt to shield her body with her arms and hands, while the wounds to the back of her body were likely inflicted thereafter, as massive blood loss caused her to collapse to the floor.
Defendant's Conduct Following the Murder
After murdering Brock, defendant dropped the knife on the floor next to the body, attempted to clean up some of the blood, and then left the apartment in Brock's car the morning of October 25, 2011. Defendant's attempt to clean up after the murder is suggested by the presence of bloody paper towels found at the crime scene, which will be described in greater detail shortly. Her flight from the apartment in Brock's car is beyond dispute, as she would be pulled over in this car four days later and arrested on an outstanding warrant unrelated to Brock's murder. Brock's body would not be discovered for another four days.
After leaving the murder scene in Brock's car, and with Brock's cell phone and credit cards (according to defendant, the credit cards were already in the car), defendant picked up two people she knew from "the dope world" and allowed one of them to drive because she "didn't wanna get pulled over." She then used one of Brock's credit cards to put gas in the stolen car, accompanied the two she picked up to an abandoned apartment, where they were apparently staying, and took a shower to wash Brock's blood off of her face. Defendant also apparently changed her clothes, leaving the blood-stained clothing she wore during the murder in the back of Brock's car. At some point, she also disposed of Brock's cell phone.
The record does not reveal defendant's activities during the next three days. On October 29, she picked up Reichenberger in Brock's car and the two drove to Folsom Lake, where they used methamphetamine. They then drove to a fast food restaurant to get some food. After defendant pulled into the parking lot and got out of the car with Reichenberger, a deputy with the Placer County Sheriff's Department, who pulled into the parking lot behind defendant and recognized Reichenberger from prior encounters, requested a search of the car's license plate number, which revealed the registered owner was named Jessica Brock. The deputy contacted defendant and asked if her name was Jessica. Defendant responded: "[N]o, that's my girlfriend, this is her car." She then identified herself and was arrested after a records check revealed an unrelated warrant for her arrest. Brock's car was towed and Reichenberger was allowed to leave.
Defendant was apparently released from custody shortly after her arrest. She then stayed with Kegel "on and off" for the next week and was wearing a black glove on her right hand. When Kegel asked about the glove, defendant said she "cut herself badly" and "it was bothering her." One of Kegel's neighbors also asked defendant about the glove. Defendant responded: "Don't ask, don't tell." This neighbor also noticed bruises on defendant's leg and a wrap around her knee. Defendant said she had surgery on her knee, which was true. However, she also said, "she kicked some girl's ass" for "talking shit" and "she won't be talking shit no more."
Defendant had surgery to reconstruct her anterior cruciate ligament on September 23, 2011.
Discovery of the Body and Defendant's Statements to Police
Brock's body was discovered on November 2, 2011, over a week after she was murdered. Her mother, concerned she had not heard from her daughter in that amount of time, went to Brock's apartment and made the discovery. Law enforcement and emergency medical personnel arrived a short time later. It was obvious Brock was dead and had been for some time. Her blood-covered body lay face down on the living room floor next to a chair, several school-related items, and an unopened container of yogurt. Blood was on the carpet beneath her and spattered throughout the room. When one of the paramedics moved the chair out of his way in order to confirm Brock was dead, he noticed a bloody knife was also on the floor and pointed it out to one of the responding sheriff's deputies. Some of the blood on the living room walls appeared to have been transferred there, rather than deposited through spattering. There were also blood transfer stains on the apartment's front door, the hallway wall, and a shelf in Brock's bedroom closet. On that shelf was a shoebox with a bloody fingerprint. Some of defendant's belongings were found in this closet. Two rolls of paper towels, one found in the living room and the other found in the kitchen, also had blood on them; two sponges were found on the kitchen floor.
Brock was attending American River College.
After speaking with Brock's mother's boyfriend, who accompanied the mother to check on her daughter, one of the responding deputies discovered Brock's car was not parked at the apartment complex or in a nearby parking lot. A subsequent call to dispatch revealed the car had been towed following defendant's arrest four days earlier.
Defendant was interviewed by detectives later in the day. While she denied involvement in Brock's murder during this interview, and feigned surprise when told of her friend's death, when one of the detectives asked whether Reichenberger was going to tell them defendant and Brock "got in this big fight . . . and it went bad," defendant responded, "No, I mean, no," and then volunteered that "the worst fight" she and Brock ever had involved the latter's relationship with Johnston, adding: "I didn't understand her obsession with [Johnston], you know, and then - and then I got it. You know, [Johnston] was the woman who got her clean, essentially, a mother-type figure that she couldn't express, you know, to her mom anything, and then she couldn't express, you know, to her aunt who she's obsessed with also. Um, and [Johnston] was the substitute, and I couldn't - couldn't understand why she was so infatuated with [Johnston], you know." Defendant was not arrested for the murder following this interview. According to Kegel, when defendant returned to his house after the interview, she "was not upset about [Brock] getting killed."
Three days later, defendant was arrested at Kegel's house and interviewed a second time. During this interview, after one of the detectives told defendant someone attempted to use Brock's credit cards in the days leading up to the discovery of her body, defendant admitted to using one of the cards to put gas in Brock's car on October 25, but claimed Brock was "at the house" when she did so, and added: "I wasn't trying to commit fraud or anything." Later in the interview, defendant admitted to killing Brock and that she did so before using the card to put gas in the car. According to defendant's first version of the crime, Brock was "being crazy" about Johnston, saying she loved her and then calling her a "fucking bitch" for not appreciating her love. Defendant told Brock her relationship with Johnston was "sick" and to "quit being obsessed with her." After some arguing, Brock "just started talking about the devil," which prompted defendant to leave the apartment for two or three hours. When she came back, Brock was in the same position she was in when defendant left, sitting on the floor, rocking back and forth, "like crazy." When one of the detectives asked defendant what happened next, she responded: "I don't even know what happened. Um, um, I don't even know. Oh my God." A short time later, after the detective asked whether Brock did something "that brought this on," defendant answered: "She cut me."
Defendant then elaborated Brock cut her in the right hand, with what she did not know. Nor did defendant know how Brock went about cutting her, saying: "I was so high" and "it just happened." Defendant then claimed she and Brock were sitting together in the living room and Brock "was going on and on and on and on" about Johnston. Defendant eventually said, "Call [Johnston] then" and "I don't fucking wanna hear it." When defendant got up to leave, Brock cut her hand. It was not until defendant was cut that she realized Brock had a sharp object. One of the detectives then asked: "How did you end up with - with the sharp object?" Defendant responded: "I think I just like pushed her. And then um, I called her a crazy bitch. And then uh, I had it." According to defendant, she only remembered stabbing Brock one time. Defendant then claimed she and Brock were standing up when she "grabbed the knife from her" and they both fell to the ground when she did so. A short time later, after one of the detectives asked whether defendant tried to see if Brock was still alive after she "realized how bad things had gone," defendant answered: "I didn't remember - I didn't - it wasn't me. I mean, it was me but - I don't know where all that anger came from. I have no idea."
Later in the interview, after defendant admitted to some of her conduct following the crime, she was again asked for her account of getting the knife from Brock. Defendant responded by describing the argument in greater detail: "One minute we were sitting there and she's still going on and on about [Johnston] and the devil and how um, uh, how did it matter anyway because no matter what, you know, [Johnston] was gonna see that she was being a fucking stupid bitch. And she kept calling [Johnston] a stupid bitch. And all this stuff. And I was just looking at her, you know, . . . like, 'Uh, [Brock]. Like you're being a basket case.' You know? 'You just need to get fucking help.' You know? And she started yelling at me, 'No I don't. I know what I'm talking about. You don't need to tell me. You don't need to tell me. I know what I'm talking about.' . . . And then it was kind of - the conversation just went on about for like an hour. You know, back and forth."
One of the detectives then asked whether Brock stood up and confronted defendant with the knife. Defendant answered, "No," and said she was the one who got up and left the living room, and considered leaving the apartment entirely, but did not do so, contradicting her earlier version of events, in which she left the apartment for two or three hours. In this new version, defendant remained in the apartment for those two or three hours, during which Brock was still "in the living room just ranting." As defendant elaborated, "she kept going back and forth between God and Devil. And God and Devil. And um, I tried to make light of it, you know? And she called [Johnston] the anti-Christ. You know, on more than one occasion. And I'm like, 'You know, well, she is the anti-Christ after all.' An- and then that's when she just . . . snapped on me." Defendant continued: "I thought she was just gonna like slap me. And I put my hand up. Like that 'cause I didn't wanna get slap[ped]. And then I looked down and my hand was - I was bleeding." One of the detectives then asked whether Brock continued to "come at" defendant with the knife. Defendant responded: "No. We didn't um, we just - I just looked at her. And then she's like, 'Oh my God.' And I'm like uh, and then the next thing I know she's stabbed."
Still later in the interview, after defendant admitted to more of her conduct following the crime, one of the detectives asked her to close her eyes and replay the killing as though she were watching a movie. Defendant responded: "It's just so uh, it's like I'm like a - just a wild animal." When the detective asked what Brock was doing, defendant answered: "Just kind of - she didn't do anything." A short time later, defendant said: "I mean, yeah, she cut me first but she wasn't gonna kill me."
DISCUSSION
I
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant contends the evidence was not sufficient to support her first degree murder conviction on either a premeditated murder theory or a murder by torture theory. We disagree. Because the evidence sufficiently established defendant's guilt of first degree murder based on a premeditated murder theory, we need not decide whether it was also sufficient to support the alternative murder by torture theory. (See People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1128-1129 [where one of alternative theories is found unsupported by sufficient evidence, reversal is not required if sufficient evidence supports the alternate theory because it is presumed jurors would not rely on a factually unsupported theory].)
A.
Legal Principles and Standard of Review
We begin by setting forth the legal definition of premeditation and deliberation. As the trial court correctly instructed the jury in this case: "[T]he defendant would be guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved . . . that she acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. The defendant acted willfully if she intended to kill. The defendant acted deliberately if she carefully weighed the considerations for and against her choice, and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted with premeditation if she decided to kill before completing the acts that caused the death. [¶] The length of time that a person spends considering whether to kill does not alone determine whether the killing is deliberate and premeditated. The amount of time required for deliberation and premeditation may vary from person to person, according to the circumstances. [¶] A decision to kill made rashly, impulsively or without careful consideration is not deliberate and premeditated. On the other hand, a cold, calculated decision to kill can be reached quickly. The test is the extent of the reflection, not the length of time."
"Review on appeal of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding of premeditated and deliberate murder involves consideration of the evidence presented and all logical inferences from that evidence in light of the legal definition of premeditation and deliberation that was previously set forth. Settled principles of appellate review require us to review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant premeditated and deliberated beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] The standard of review is the same in cases such as this where the People rely primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] 'Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.' [Citation.]" (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124 (Perez).)
B.
Sufficiency of the Premeditation Evidence
Defendant frames her argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and deliberation in terms of the "guidelines" articulated by our Supreme Court in People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 24-31 (Anderson) for use by appellate courts in assessing the sufficiency of such evidence. There, the court noted three types of evidence typically provide support to a murder conviction based on premeditation and deliberation, i.e., planning activity, motive, and manner of killing. "[T]o sustain a verdict of premeditated and deliberate murder, [Anderson] required (1) extremely strong evidence of planning, (2) evidence of motive in conjunction with evidence of planning or of a calculated manner of killing, or (3) evidence of all three indicia of premeditation and deliberation." (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 863; see Anderson, supra, at p. 27.)
However, in Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1117, our Supreme Court cautioned that "Anderson [, supra, 70 Cal.2d 15] did not purport to establish an exhaustive list that would exclude all other types and combinations of evidence that could support a finding of premeditation." (Id. at p. 1125.) Since Perez, the court has cautioned on multiple occasions " '[u]nreflective reliance on Anderson for a definition of premeditation is inappropriate. The Anderson analysis was intended as a framework to assist reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence supports an inference that the killing resulted from preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations. It did not refashion the elements of first degree murder or alter the substantive law of murder in any way.' [Citation.] In other words, the Anderson guidelines are descriptive, not normative. 'The Anderson factors, while helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive.' [Citation.]" (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1081; People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1019.)
Here, while we agree with defendant there was no evidence of planning activity, there was substantial evidence she possessed a motive to kill Brock, the manner of killing was calculated to produce such a result, and defendant's actions after brutally stabbing her friend to death betrayed no remorse for having done so. With respect to motive, as we explain in greater detail in part II of the discussion, evidence of the other assaultive crimes committed against both Brock and defendant's prior romantic partners, i.e., Teeter and Reichenberger, tended to show defendant possessed a motive for violently assaulting Brock during their argument over the latter's relationship with Johnston. With respect to the manner of killing, defendant stabbed Brock more than three dozen times in the chest, neck, head, and back. This manner of attack ensured Brock's quick death. While defendant claimed during her interview with detectives that Brock cut her first, the jury was not required to believe that account. Indeed, the forensic pathologist testified the cut on defendant's hand could have been self-inflicted, i.e., by her hand slipping down the handle of the small knife and across the blade while she stabbed Brock. But even if Brock cut defendant first, defendant employed far more force than required to defend herself from the small cut on her hand purportedly inflicted by Brock. Defendant's own statements to detectives reveal she retrieved the knife from Brock almost immediately after the initial cut was inflicted, Brock seemed surprised by the fact she cut defendant, and defendant then killed Brock like "a wild animal" while Brock "didn't do anything." Defendant also acknowledged she knew Brock "wasn't gonna kill [her]." Thus, even assuming Brock escalated the argument by cutting defendant's hand, the level of violence employed by defendant in response nevertheless supports the jury's conclusion that she made a premeditated and deliberate decision to kill.
We acknowledge this level of violence would also have supported a conclusion defendant killed impulsively in a state of rage. However, it was for the jury to decide which interpretation of the evidence it believed. In other words, where the evidence is susceptible of either premeditation and deliberation or an impulsive killing, the jury was entitled to rely on the former interpretation in reaching a first degree murder verdict. Such an interpretation was also justified in this case based on defendant's conduct after the killing. After killing Brock, defendant attempted to clean up some of the blood, stole Brock's car and cell phone, used Brock's credit card to put gas in the car, disposed of the cell phone, and went about getting high with friends while Brock's body was left to decompose in her apartment. When asked about the glove she was wearing during the week after the murder, defendant responded: "Don't ask, don't tell." When asked about a wrap on her knee, she said, "she kicked some girl's ass" for "talking shit" and "she won't be talking shit no more." Such comments made after committing a brutal murder reveal a callous lack of remorse. Defendant then lied repeatedly during her two interviews with detectives. Taken together, this evidence could reasonably have been viewed by the jury as belying any theory of an impulsive rage killing and adds to the support for the conclusion the murder was premeditated and deliberate.
We conclude the evidence sufficiently supports the jury's first degree murder verdict.
II
Admission of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence
Defendant also claims the trial court abused its discretion and violated her federal constitutional rights by admitting into evidence testimony from Reichenberger and Teeter regarding the prior acts of domestic violence committed against them, described above. She is mistaken.
A.
Section 1101With certain exceptions, "evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion." (§ 1101, subd. (a).) One such exception is found in subdivision (b) of this section, which provides: "Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, . . . intent, . . . absence of mistake or accident, . . . ) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act." (Id., subd. (b).) We review the trial court's admission of other crimes evidence for abuse of discretion. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 25.)
Here, as the jury was instructed, the challenged evidence was admitted to prove defendant possessed a motive to murder Brock, intended to do so when she stabbed her to death, and the killing was not the result of an accident or mistake. "The relevance of uncharged misconduct to show identity, intent, or the existence of a common design or plan is determined by the nature and degree of the similarity between such misconduct and the charged crime. 'Evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove identity, common design or plan, or intent only if the charged and uncharged crimes are sufficiently similar to support a rational inference of identity, common design or plan, or intent.' [Citation.]" (People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1018.) "The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent. [Citation.] '[T]he recurrence of a similar result . . . tends (increasingly with each instance) to negative accident or inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act . . . .' [Citation.] In order to be admissible to prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant ' "probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402.)
" 'A greater degree of similarity is required in order to prove the existence of a common design or plan.' [Citation.] 'The greatest degree of similarity is required for evidence of uncharged misconduct to be relevant to prove identity.' [Citation.]" (People v. Scheer, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018.)
While motive is not an element of murder, " 'the absence of apparent motive may make proof of the essential elements less persuasive.' [Citation.]" (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 604.) "A 'motive' is defined as a '[c]ause or reason that moves the will and induces the action[,]' '[a]n inducement, or that which leads or tempts the mind to indulge a criminal act.' [Citation.] Motive is an intermediate fact which may be probative of such ultimate issues as intent [citation], identity [citation], or commission of the criminal act itself [citation]." (People v. Scheer, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1017-1018.) " '[T]he intermediate fact of motive' may be established by evidence of 'prior dissimilar crimes.' [Citation.] 'Similarity of offenses [is] not necessary to establish this theory of relevance' for the evident reason that the motive for the charged crime arises simply from the commission of the prior offense. [Citation.] The existence of a motive requires a nexus between the prior crime and the current one, but such linkage is not dependent on comparison and weighing of the similar and dissimilar characteristics of the past and present crimes. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 1018.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the challenged evidence was admissible under section 1101, subdivision (b). With respect to proving defendant's intent, the prior acts of domestic violence were particularly relevant because the defense claimed defendant killed Brock either in unreasonable self-defense or in the heat of passion, whereas the prosecution was required to prove defendant intentionally killed Brock with premeditation and deliberation. The fact defendant had previously attacked Teeter and Reichenberger during arguments and while intoxicated, without any suggestion she actually, if unreasonably, believed she needed to defend herself, or she did so in response to provocation sufficient to cause her to act out of impulsive rage rather than as an act of will, supports an inference defendant probably also intended to violently attack Brock during their argument, and without the mitigated mental state the defense argued she possessed. (See People v. Zankich (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 54, 66 [the defendant's commission of unprovoked assaults on two other people admissible "as tending to prove lack of provocation" for the assault on the murder victim].) For the same reasons, the prior acts of domestic violence tended to negate any suggestion of accident or mistake. " 'One sense [of the word "accident"] comes into play when the defendant admits performing an act but claims that he or she did so with innocent intent. . . .' " (People v. Spector (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1374.) In addition to claiming defendant's intent was mitigated by the doctrines of unreasonable self-defense and heat of passion, the defense also argued self-defense as a complete defense. The prior acts of domestic violence also tended to negate this as a plausible theory.
Finally, the assaults committed against Teeter and Reichenberger supported the existence of a motive on the part of defendant to kill Brock the day of the murder. In People v. Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th 1335, a murder case in which the defendant met the victim at a nightclub, convinced her to come home with him, and later shot her in the head and neck with a firearm, the Court of Appeal held evidence of prior assaults with firearms committed against five other women was admissible under section 1101, subdivision (b), to prove motive. (Id. at p. 1385.) The common theme running through the prior assaults was that the defendant, after inviting a woman over to his house or hotel room, ostensibly for sexual purposes, and drinking too much alcohol, lost his temper and assaulted the victim with a firearm, although he did not actually fire the weapon in the prior incidents. (Id. at pp. 1354-1358.) In upholding the admission of the prior assaults evidence to prove motive, the court explained: "Other crimes evidence is admissible to establish two different types or categories of motive evidence. In the first category, 'the uncharged act supplies the motive for the charged crime; the uncharged act is cause, the charged crime is effect.' [Citation.] 'In the second category, the uncharged act evidences the existence of a motive, but the act does not supply the motive. . . . [T]he motive is the cause, and both the charged and uncharged acts are effects. Both crimes are explainable as a result of the same motive.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1381.) Agreeing with the Attorney General's argument, the court concluded the prior assaults evidence was admissible as the latter type of motive evidence, explaining that " 'the jury could permissibly infer [the defendant] similarly lost control and shared the same motive in this incident as in the seven prior incidents with the five other women.' " (Id. at p. 1384.)
Similarly, here, defendant violently assaulted Teeter and Reichenberger during arguments and while using methamphetamine or drinking alcohol, particularly "if she didn't get her way." As in People v. Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th 1335, the jury could reasonably infer defendant similarly lashed out against Brock during their methamphetamine-fueled argument over Johnston and shared the same basic motive in this incident as in the prior incidents with her romantic partners.
B.
Section 352 and Due Process
The foregoing conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry. Section 352 provides for the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence if its probative value is "substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission [would] . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." With respect to other crimes evidence, our Supreme Court has explained: "Even if evidence of other crimes is relevant under a theory of admissibility that does not rely on proving disposition, it can be highly prejudicial. 'Regardless of its probative value, evidence of other crimes always involves the risk of serious prejudice. . . .' [Citation.] Therefore, the law places other restrictions on its admissibility." (People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 318.) To be admissible under section 352, the evidence "must have substantial probative value that is not greatly outweighed by the potential that undue prejudice will result from admitting the evidence." (People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1123.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence under section 352. " '[B]ecause a motive is ordinarily the incentive for criminal behavior, its probative value generally exceeds its prejudicial effect, and wide latitude is permitted in admitting evidence of its existence.' [Citation.]" (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1550.) Such is the case here. While highly probative of intent and motive, the prior assaults evidence was mild compared to the brutal attack defendant unleashed upon Brock. Nor did the admission of this evidence present a substantial danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury. Finally, with respect to defendant's assertion her federal constitutional right to due process was violated, we note our Supreme Court has "long observed that '[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence generally does not impermissibly infringe on a . . . defendant's constitutional rights.' [Citation.]" (People v. Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 26.) Defendant has failed to persuade us this case presents an exception to this general rule.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
HOCH, J. We concur: /s/_________
BLEASE, Acting P. J. /s/_________
NICHOLSON, J.